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WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, House Foreign Affairs Europe Subcommittee Chairman Keith Self delivered opening remarks at a full committee hearing titled, “Shaping the Future of Cyber Diplomacy: Review for State Department Reauthorization.”

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-Remarks- 

Today the subcommittee will be exploring the role of the State Department in cyber and technology matters, and how such policies might align with U.S. national security interests and foreign policy objectives. In particular, we will be examining the work of the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy, or CDP. Across the globe, malicious cyber attacks are conducted by state and non-state actors against the United States and its allies, including from the People’s Republic of China.

From cyber criminals scamming individuals out of their savings to large-scale state-sponsored attacks from America’s adversaries, U.S. government entities and citizens are increasingly under siege. For years, PRC-supported hackers have buried deep into critical infrastructure, including water, transportation networks, and energy systems.

According to the 2025 Annual Worldwide Threats Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the PRC remains the most active and persistent cyber threat to U.S. government, private sector, and critical infrastructure networks. Beijing’s campaign to preposition access on critical infrastructure for attacks during crisis or conflict—tracked publicly as Volt Typhoon—or its more recently identified compromise of U.S. telecommunications infrastructure, also referred to as Salt Typhoon, demonstrates the growing breadth and depth of the PRC’s capability to compromise U.S. infrastructure.

Russia also poses a significant cyber threat, with its efforts to compromise sensitive targets for intelligence collection and to preposition access to U.S. critical infrastructure. In addition to Beijing and Moscow, Tehran has demonstrated an increasing willingness to carry out aggressive cyber operations targeting the security of U.S. networks and data. Furthermore, Pyongyang’s cyber program presents a highly capable and maturing threat, including an approach to launder and cash out cryptocurrency from the United States and other victims to fund its nefarious activities.

As cyber becomes a growing battlefield for criminal networks and malign actors, the State Department must be ready to meet the challenge. The U.S. is not facing these real and growing threats alone. Through cooperation with our allies and partners, the U.S. will continue to work to combat malign cyber activities from the PRC, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.

Since the recent establishment of CDP, it’s played a role in the U.S. response to a major ransomware campaign in Costa Rica that disrupted critical services. In particular, CDP, alongside other federal partners, worked to strengthen Costa Rica’s cyber defenses against attacks from malicious actors threatening the security of both our countries. It has also worked to identify strategic opportunities to leverage partner resources to further U.S. strategic objectives through subsea cable projects in the Pacific Islands. Such efforts ensured that the Pacific Islands rely on trusted, primarily American businesses for their internet connectivity while also countering the PRC’s influence in the strategically important region.

The Department of State agreement on a cybercrime UN treaty that conflicted with CDP policy lead and recommendations begs the question of the actual authority wielded by CDP. This hearing should lead us toward conclusions on how to improve CDP efficiency and effectiveness in this vital area of national interest and security. As we move through this reauthorization process, the experience and insights from today’s witnesses will help inform this subcommittee on the State Department’s cyber diplomacy role in addressing these increasingly important challenges.

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