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Washington, D.C. — House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul sent a letter to Rachel Cotton, deputy counsel to the president, reiterating his request for National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to testify before the committee. In the letter, Chairman McCaul highlighted that Sullivan and the National Security Council (NSC) wielded extraordinary influence regarding the planning and execution of the Biden-Harris administration’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan. With the White House and its NSC consistently obstructing the chairman’s years-long investigation into the Afghanistan withdrawal, Chairman McCaul wrote he will be forced to issue a subpoena if Sullivan does not agree to voluntarily appear before the committee by September 24, 2024.

“Mr. Sullivan has shown through word and deed that he exercised powers congressionally delegated to the State Department,” wrote Chairman McCaul. “His extraordinary usurpation of authority is only further confirmed by your August 30, 2024, letter, wherein you credit the White House, not the State Department, for making 15 State Department officials available for testimony, producing the State Department After Action Reviews and other Department documents, including permitting access to the State Department dissent channel cable. Of course, State Department testimony and materials were obtained through threats of subpoenas, issuance of subpoenas, and threats of contempt of Congress. My success in obtaining this critical evidence came despite significant interference by Mr. Sullivan and the White House into this Committee’s legitimate oversight of the State Department.”

The full text of the letter can be found here and below.

Dear Ms. Cotton:

I write to repeat my request that National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan voluntarily appear before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs for a public hearing on a mutually agreeable date. As I explained in my letter dated August 23, 2024, the National Security Council (NSC), led by Mr. Sullivan, served as the nerve center for critical decision making for the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. In so doing, Mr. Sullivan systematically exercised powers delegated to the Department of State, and critical questions remain that only he can answer. The need for Mr. Sullivan’s testimony is made vividly apparent in my historic, 355-page investigation report, which details the hundreds of witness and documentary references to Mr. Sullivan’s role in the withdrawal. Should Mr. Sullivan refuse this request, my next step will be compulsory process.

Mr. Sullivan’s testimony is needed to inform this Committee’s legislative function. As I advised in my investigation report, “Congress should consider reforming the NSC to ensure Congress’s ability to conduct its constitutional oversight over national security decision making,” because the NSC went “well beyond [its] statutory role of advising the President on national security policy integration (50 U.S.C. § 3021) into operational control, including decision making regarding roles and responsibilities delegated in statute to the State Department.” Mr. Sullivan’s testimony is critical for this Committee to effectively reform the NSC.

My investigation has found that, throughout the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the NSC repeatedly interceded in a decision-making capacity that belonged to the State Department. To start, Mr. Sullivan operated as director and chief-decision-maker of the inter-agency review process that led up to President Biden’s April 2021 go-to-zero order. Suzy George, Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, testified that Mr. Sullivan “ran the Afghan policy review process.” Former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Afghanistan Mark Evans likewise testified to the NSC’s lead decision-making role in that process. Counselor to the State Department Derek Chollet testified he took direction from the NSC regarding Afghanistan policy, and, more specifically, from Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. Sullivan occupied that same decision-making role following the go-to-zero order and throughout the disastrous August 2021 evacuation. Former Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources Brian McKeon testified that the NSC led decision-making regarding Afghan populations eligible for evacuation and led the decision-making to shutter and move the U.S. Embassy to Hamid Karzai International Airport after Kabul was surrounded by the Taliban. Former U.S. Embassy Kabul Chief of Mission, Ambassador Ross Wilson, confirmed that NSC “drove” the Special Immigrant Visa process. Former Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, referred to the non-combatant evacuation operation executed in August 2021 as an “NSC-centric period.” And, tellingly, it was Mr. Sullivan, not Secretary Blinken, whom the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley called on August 12, 2021, to suggest that the State Department initiate a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO).

Communications strategy, too, was directed by Mr. Sullivan and the NSC. According to former State Department Spokesperson Ned Price, State Department communications took direction from the NSC, which was the “focal point for engagement.” Former White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki said that her press conferences before the American people were “based on information gathered through the NSC press process where the NSC press team put together talking points and answers to questions that were coming up in the briefing.”

Not only did Mr. Sullivan direct public communications, but as my report detailed, he materially misled the American public. Those misrepresentations extended throughout the inter-agency process, military withdrawal, and NEO. They came to a head on August 31, 2021, when Ms. Psaki told the American people, “I don’t think anyone assessed [the Afghan government and forces] would collapse as quickly they did. Anyone. Anyone in this room. Anyone in the region. Anyone anywhere in the world.” My report revealed Ms. Psaki’s statement to be false – senior military advisors predicted a rapid collapse during meetings with the NSC – and my report also established Mr. Sullivan was responsible for Ms. Psaki’s press briefings.

Mr. Sullivan has shown through word and deed that he exercised powers congressionally delegated to the State Department. His extraordinary usurpation of authority is only further confirmed by your August 30, 2024, letter, wherein you credit the White House, not the State Department, for making 15 State Department officials available for testimony, producing the State Department After Action Reviews and other Department documents, including permitting access to the State Department dissent channel cable. Of course, State Department testimony and materials were obtained through threats of subpoenas, issuance of subpoenas, and threats of contempt of Congress. My success in obtaining this critical evidence came despite significant interference by Mr. Sullivan and the White House into this Committee’s legitimate oversight of the State Department.

It should by now be apparent that the independence of the executive branch is not threatened by my request for testimony. To the contrary, the oversight powers of Congress have been obstructed by the unlawful consolidation of diplomatic authority within the White House. Mr. Sullivan must testify before this Committee, not because of his title, but because of the power he wielded. Moreover, your reliance on letters and memoranda from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel is neither applicable nor binding. Those sources are inapposite, as I seek testimony on Mr. Sullivan’s exercise of State Department powers, not his national security advice to the President. Nor are advisory memoranda binding on this Committee. Moreover, as I explained in my August 23, 2024, letter, there is long history of National Security Council staff appearing before Congress.

If Mr. Sullivan has not arranged by Tuesday, September 24, 2024, to appear on a mutually agreeable date for a public hearing, I will move forward with compulsory process.

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