Europe Subcommittee Chairman Self Delivers Opening Remarks at Hearing on Securing NATO’s Eastern Frontier

Today's hearing examines the security of the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – three allies on NATO's front line – we now call the Eastern Frontier. Their defense is not peripheral; it is a direct measure of the alliance's credibility and core U.S. national security interests. These nations border a Russia that has demonstrated in Ukraine both the intent and the capability to use force to achieve its objectives. But the challenge facing the Baltics is not limited to conventional aggression; the battlefield has changed. 

Today's conflict is defined by persistent multi-domain, fifth-generation warfare that is already underway. We've held two hearings examining hybrid threats and its impact on American and allied interests. These threats are not theoretical. They're being deployed every day through cyber attacks, malign influence, economic coercion, weaponized mass migration, and efforts to exploit ethnic and political divisions. In many respects, the Baltic states have been on the front lines of understanding, exposing, and countering these forms of hybrid warfare. 

Earlier this year, I introduced H.R. 7632, the Shadow Act, which builds directly on the findings of the Europe Subcommittee work. The legislation ensures that we systematically identify, analyze, and counter hybrid threats before they escalate further. This legislation establishes a hybrid warfare accountability coordinator at the State Department to enhance our efforts, enabling faster attribution, stronger information sharing, more coordinated responses, and greater resilience across NATO. I am proud that this bill passed out of committee unanimously. 

The trajectory of the war in Ukraine will shape the Baltic security environment for years to come. Even in the event of a cease-fire, a frozen conflict, Russia is likely to reconstitute its forces and, in fact, is doing so today. To fight in Ukraine, Russia has drawn down its crack troops from its western military district. When this war is over, there is a real risk that Russia may position its battle-hardened troops on the borders of the Baltic republics. This would escalate tensions between Moscow and Brussels beyond anything we saw at the onset of the invasion of Ukraine. 

History suggests the cessation of the conflict in Ukraine will not reduce the Russian threat. It may instead simply redirect it. NATO's Eastern Flank, particularly the Baltics, would be a primary target for this renewed pressure. Deterrence in this region is therefore not a future requirement; it is an immediate one, particularly due to the lack of strategic depth in the Baltics. We should also be clear-eyed about the role the Baltic states themselves are playing. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are not security freeloaders. They historically lead the way in NATO for defense spending by GDP. 

While today we are focused specifically on these three reliable partners, I would like to also acknowledge and commend Poland and Norway, who joined the Baltic Republic as the top five leaders in defense expenditures as a share of GDP in 2025. The Baltic states also host multinational NATO forces and have delivered substantial support to Ukraine. Their commitment strengthens NATO as a whole, as standard-bearers for what the alliance should look like. The United States remains indispensable to deterrence on NATO's eastern frontier. Our strategic enablers, foreign forward presence, and joint and combined coordination within the alliance are foundational. 

But credibility requires more than presence. It requires capability. The war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of ready forces, sufficient stockpiles, and the defense industrial base capable of sustaining prolonged conflict. 

The central question before us is whether NATO is postured not just to respond to a crisis in the Baltics, but to prevent one. That means ensuring deterrence is credible, allied contributions are sufficient, and the lessons of Ukraine are translated into tangible improvements in readiness and resilience. The Baltic states understand the stakes. They have invested accordingly and continue to lead by example. 

This hearing is an opportunity to assess whether the broader alliance is keeping pace and whether our strategy reflects the reality on the ground. Because if deterrence fails in the Baltics, the cost won't be measured in miles of territory. It will be measured in the credibility of NATO itself. 

Today's hearing will seek a clear-eyed assessment and actionable recommendations to ensure the security of the Baltic region. And I look forward to the testimony of our witness and a rigorous discussion on how to confront these evolving threats before they destabilize the region, undermine the alliance, and threaten broader American and transatlantic security interests.