

## **ON DISSENT IN FOREIGN POLICY.**

As the State Department's Director of Cypriot Affairs in 1973-4 when US policy in the Cyprus-Greece-Turkey triangle collapsed, I was summoned in 1975 to testify before the Special House Committee chaired by Democrat Otis Pike on why and how this Republican diplomatic disaster happened.

Chairman Pike soon learned that I had submitted a formal Dissent Memorandum to Secretary Kissinger in August detailing precisely the matters of most interest to the Committee. From early 1974 through May I had memorialized my conviction that Intelligence units of the Greek Army were planning to overthrow President Makarios and install a puppet Cypriot government under the control of Athens. I said that if this happened, I was certain that Turkey's armed forces would invade Cyprus and establish a Turk Cypriot mini-state on Cyprus. Since this would make a shambles of our policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, I argued as strongly as I could that the US should bring maximum pressure on the Greek Junta to abandon its reckless and self-defeating intentions.

In the weeks that followed my analysis of the situation was ignored by Secretary Kissinger and senior State Department officials, as were my policy recommendations. On July 15, 1974 Greek military units on Cyprus overthrew Makarios who escaped by fleeing to a British military base. They installed as President a notorious Greek Cypriot gunman. A few weeks after that the Army of Turkey invaded and established a mini-state on the Northern third of Cyprus. As Greek Cypriots fled south and Turk Cypriot north to reach the safety of their ethnic sectors, murder and mayhem prevailed. In late August a Greek Cypriot sniper shot American Ambassador Roger Davies through the heart.

Henry Kissinger had a good reason to fight tooth and nail to suppress my Dissent and testimony. I was right about Cyprus and he was wrong. At one point D. Kissinger even claimed he could not release my memorandum because that would expose me to retribution. My response to hearing that was a shouted "Bull...t." Like every other FSO in the world I knew that any retribution would come from the State Department.

The events of 1974-5 reinforced my view that in Constitutional struggles between the executive and legislative branches over their Foreign policy roles and responsibilities, the prime directive for FSOs is to "support and defend the Constitution" rather than a particular administration or party as we have all sworn to do. That requires studying the Constitution, refusing to automatically accept the executive branch view, and paying particular attention to the legislative oversight role in the foreign policy process. Congressional oversight enhances executive responsibility and enables us to learn from the inevitable mistakes.

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