



IRANIAN NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS: KEY CONCERNS

House Foreign Affairs Committee Oversight

Iran's leaders have invested massive resources and decades of effort into their nuclear program. Enrichment facilities were built in secret...As one witness will testify, "when it comes to [Iran's] nuclear program, they have a history of deception, covert procurement, and construction of clandestine facilities that are acknowledged only when revealed by the government's adversaries." This dangerous regime has tied its prestige to its nuclear ambitions, and they are not peaceful. – Chairman Ed Royce

As nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany) resume, the Committee continues to work to identify key areas of concern with any potential final agreement.

Iran Will Be Allowed to Enrich Uranium—the Core Ingredient in a Nuclear Weapon

In last year's interim agreement, the Obama Administration and its negotiating partners conceded that as part of any final or "comprehensive" deal, Iran will have "a mutually defined enrichment program." Enrichment is the key nuclear bomb making technology. This de facto recognition of Iran's claimed "right to enrich" will significantly undermine longstanding U.S. nonproliferation efforts and promote nuclear proliferation throughout the Middle East and around the world.

As Mark Wallace, former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., pointed out in testimony before a joint subcommittee hearing in January:

If Iran truly only sought a civilian and peaceful nuclear energy program, there would be zero need for any enrichment capacity or the heavy water reactor. Many countries have peaceful nuclear energy programs without engaging in enrichment nor operating heavy water reactors. The international community seems to have all too quickly forgotten that there are multiple UN Security Council Resolutions calling for Iran to suspend all enrichment.

At the Committee's June hearing, former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) official Olli Heinonen emphasized the difficulty in verifying Iranian compliance with any final agreement, given the ease with which clandestine nuclear efforts can be made, Iran's efforts to conceal its nuclear program in the past, and Iran's ongoing refusal to cooperate with the IAEA:

The strength of the IAEA verification system is access to nuclear material, facilities, equipment and people. However, the safeguard is not the magic pill that once taken cures everything. No verification system can provide absolute assurances...This is especially the case when applied to problematic states that are noncompliant like Iran.

In addition, former State Department non-proliferation official Steve Rademaker testified in June that the final agreement will "sunset" after a period of time to be determined by negotiations. Once this period lapses, any restrictions placed on Iran's nuclear program during that time will be removed, even without any change in Iran's behavior as a state sponsor of terrorism. Rademaker warned the Committee:

The momentum in the direction of tightening sanctions has all been reversed and then they are promised

and then when that period [of the final agreement] expires they can do all the enrichment they want. They can do all reprocessing they want. None of that will be limited...

Iran Refuses to Acknowledge the Military Dimensions of its Nuclear Program

The IAEA has extensive evidence that Iran has had an active nuclear weapons program, and has worked to design a nuclear warhead. For years Iran has refused to cooperate with the IAEA's requests for information or access to suspect sites. Iran and the IAEA reached an agreement last year – separate from the ongoing P5+1 negotiations – to address the IAEA's concerns. However, Iran ignored an August 25th deadline and reports – as recently as October 9th – indicate that Iran continues to refuse to fully cooperate with the IAEA. Senior Administration officials, including Secretary Kerry, have stated that Iran must resolve the IAEA's concerns regarding its nuclear weapons program before a final agreement is reached.

As former weapons inspector David Albright explained in his testimony before a joint Subcommittee hearing in January:

*If Iran is unwilling to detail its past efforts to build nuclear weapons, or at the very least acknowledge the existence of a program, it will undermine the credibility of statements about its present-day nuclear intentions. **If Iran wants the world to believe it will not build nuclear weapons in the future, the Iranian government should reconsider its blanket denials of ever seeking nuclear weapons in the past.***

On October 1, **352 House Members** joined Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel in writing to Secretary Kerry. The Members emphasized:

We believe that Iran's willingness to fully reveal all aspects of its nuclear program is a fundamental test of Iran's intention to uphold a comprehensive agreement. As you wrote in the Washington Post earlier this summer, if Iran's nuclear program is truly peaceful, 'it's not a hard proposition to prove.' The only reasonable conclusion for its stonewalling of international investigators is that Tehran does indeed have much to hide.

Iran Continues to Develop the Ballistic Missiles Needed to Deliver a Nuclear Warhead:

While the interim agreement does not specifically mention ballistic missiles, it does call for Iran to abide by all UN Security Council resolutions—including the requirement that *“Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.”*

However, in Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's view this is *“a stupid, idiotic expectation ... The revolutionary guards should definitely carry out their program and not be satisfied with the present level. **They should mass produce.**”*

John Lauder, former Director of the Intelligence Community's Nonproliferation Center, explained to the Committee the importance of limiting Iranian ballistic missile production:

*...you have to look at the ballistic missile program and **that's one program they worked with North Korea on...** and continue to develop so that's a very central piece to any meaningful monitoring verification protocol. **The missiles have to be very, very much a part of that...**you may recall in the heyday of arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, we chose to focus on delivery vehicles, because they were easier to monitor.*

