

EDWARD R. ROYCE, CALIFORNIA  
CHAIRMAN

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, NEW JERSEY  
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, FLORIDA  
DANA ROHRBACHER, CALIFORNIA  
STEVE CHABOT, OHIO  
JOE WILSON, SOUTH CAROLINA  
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, TEXAS  
TED POE, TEXAS  
MATT SALMON, ARIZONA  
TOM MARINO, PENNSYLVANIA  
JEFF DUNCAN, SOUTH CAROLINA  
ADAM KINZINGER, ILLINOIS  
MO BROOKS, ALABAMA  
TOM COTTON, ARKANSAS  
PAUL COOK, CALIFORNIA  
GEORGE HOLDING, NORTH CAROLINA  
RANDY K. WEBER SR., TEXAS  
SCOTT PERRY, PENNSYLVANIA  
STEVE STOCKMAN, TEXAS  
RON DESANTIS, FLORIDA  
TREY RADEL, FLORIDA  
DOUG COLLINS, GEORGIA  
MARK MEADOWS, NORTH CAROLINA  
TED S. YOHO, FLORIDA  
LUKE MESSER, INDIANA

AMY PORTER  
CHIEF OF STAFF

THOMAS SHEEHY  
STAFF DIRECTOR



One Hundred Thirteenth Congress  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Committee on Foreign Affairs  
2170 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
[www.foreignaffairs.house.gov](http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov)

ELIOT L. ENGEL, NEW YORK  
RANKING DEMOCRATIC MEMBER

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, AMERICAN SAMOA  
BRAD SHERMAN, CALIFORNIA  
GREGORY W. MEEKS, NEW YORK  
ALBIO SIREES, NEW JERSEY  
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, VIRGINIA  
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, FLORIDA  
BRIAN HIGGINS, NEW YORK  
KAREN BASS, CALIFORNIA  
WILLIAM KEATING, MASSACHUSETTS  
DAVID CICILLINE, RHODE ISLAND  
ALAN GRAYSON, FLORIDA  
JUAN VARGAS, CALIFORNIA  
BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, ILLINOIS  
JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, MASSACHUSETTS  
AMI BERA, CALIFORNIA  
ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, CALIFORNIA  
GRACE MENG, NEW YORK  
LOIS FRANKEL, FLORIDA  
TULSI GABBARD, HAWAII  
JOAQUIN CASTRO, TEXAS

JASON STEINBAUM  
DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

November 19, 2013

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As the United States and its P5+1 partners prepare to engage in the next round of nuclear diplomacy, we are writing to express our great concern regarding the scope and content of the interim agreement under negotiation with Iran.

As you have repeatedly stated, Iran's nuclear weapons program is a fundamental threat to the national security of the United States and our allies. As a result, our policy must be based on two premises:

First, the United States must prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. And second, Iran does not have an inherent right to enrichment and reprocessing under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This was clearly articulated as your Administration's position by Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, who stated in testimony last month that "we do not believe there is an inherent right by anyone to enrichment." We strongly believe that any agreement should not implicitly or explicitly recognize an inherent right by Iran to enrich uranium.

We are troubled by press reports indicating that the proposed interim agreement discussed at the recent P5+1 meetings with Iran in Geneva may not do enough to prevent Iran from continuing to make progress on developing a nuclear weapons capability, nor does it contain all the elements which we believe must be part of any interim deal. In particular we are concerned about reports that:

- Iran will not be required to "suspend enrichment and reprocessing activities, including research and development," as required by United Nations Security Council resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929. The UN Security Council-mandated suspension in enrichment and reprocessing sends a stern message to Iran that its nuclear program is rejected by the international community.
- Iran will not be required to halt the production and installation of additional centrifuges. Continued production and installation of centrifuges, particularly the more advanced variant, will allow Iran to improve its capacity to produce highly enriched uranium.

- Iran will not be required to transfer to another country under IAEA supervision all uranium enriched to a level of 20 percent or higher. The failure to ship out or render unusable this material would allow Iran to more quickly attain a dangerous breakout capacity.
- Iran will not be required to halt all construction and other activities at the Arak heavy water facility and reactor, which is intended to produce weapons-grade plutonium. If Iran gets closer to completing and fueling the Arak reactor, it will reach a point of no return in its ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium.
- The P5+1 has offered significant sanctions relief to Iran, which will ease pressure on the regime in Tehran.

We believe very strongly that Iran must come into full compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations, including providing a full accounting of all nuclear-related sites, both disclosed and undisclosed, and all information requested by the IAEA concerning research and work on a nuclear explosive device and its means of delivery.

We also believe that Iran must ratify and verifiably implement all provisions of the Additional Protocol, and guarantee IAEA inspectors unrestricted access to all of its nuclear sites. Iran has refused to allow inspectors access to the facility at Parchin, where research and development of a nuclear explosive device is suspected to have occurred. Iran's decades of non-compliance with the IAEA and repeated use of covert facilities to hide its nuclear activities make it essential that it submit to the highest standard of international inspections and be forthcoming on its past activities.

Mr. President, the United States cannot allow Iran to continue to advance toward a nuclear weapons capability while at the same time providing relief from the sanctions pressure we worked so hard to build, and the Administration has worked to enforce. It was sanctions and economic pressure that brought Iran to the table. We believe Congress has an important role to play in ensuring that effective pressure is brought to bear on Iran to keep its nuclear program from advancing. We must sustain economic pressure and consequent political pressure on the Iranian regime if we hope to reach a final agreement in which Iran has verifiably dismantled its nuclear program.

We look forward to working with you in supporting your diplomatic efforts and buttressing them with tough pressure on Iran. We believe this offers the best path to eliminate peacefully the Iranian nuclear threat.

Sincerely,



EDWARD R. ROYCE  
Chairman



ELIOT L. ENGEL  
Ranking Member