

“If this agreement goes through, Iran gets a cash bonanza, a boost to its international standing, and a lighted path toward nuclear weapons. With sweeping sanctions relief, we have lessened our ability to challenge Iran’s conduct across the board. As Iran grows stronger, we will be weaker to respond...Are temporary constraints on Iran’s nuclear program worth the price of permanent sanctions relief?” – Chairman Royce

Why It Matters: The IAEA, Secret Side Deals, and Parchin

As part of the agreement, Iran agreed to finally resolve longstanding questions the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has about the “possible military dimensions” (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program—basically, Iran’s attempts to design a nuclear warhead. This According to nonproliferation experts who have testified in front of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, **understanding how close Iran came to designing a nuclear warhead is essential to determining how long it would take Iran to rush to a fully functional nuclear weapon.** However, the IAEA’s report on these military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program is not due until December, months after Congress votes in early September.



[Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency \(IAEA\) made several side deals](#), officially “separate arrangements,” governing how the IAEA’s will carry out the inspections necessary to answer these questions. **These agreements were not provided to the U.S. government and have not been read by any U.S. official in their final form**, although Administration officials have been briefed on their content.

In recent weeks several troubling aspects of these side deals have surfaced in media reports. IAEA inspectors may be denied physical access to Parchin, a military base where Iran’s nuclear warhead work took place. Instead, Iran will collect soil samples from the site itself—[even as it continues to destroy evidence at the site](#). In addition, Iran may deny inspectors the opportunity to interview the scientists involved in Iran’s nuclear weapons work. [As Chairman Royce recently wrote](#), allowing Iran to block inspectors from visiting Parchin will undermine future inspections as **Iran will almost certainly treat these arrangements as setting a standard for future IAEA requests to access suspicious sites—particularly those on military bases.**

Key Points

- **It’s simple---we must know how close Iran got to designing a warhead. Otherwise, we won’t know how close they are to building a working nuclear bomb.**
- **It’s deeply concerning that Congress will not know how far Iran got in designing a warhead before we vote on the President’s nuclear deal.**
- **Now we hear that Iran will take its own samples instead of allowing inspectors to do their job—that’s unacceptable. The President must demand the secret deals between international inspectors and Iran—and provide them to the people’s representatives in Congress.**
- **If Iran stonewalls international inspectors now, you can be sure Iran will stonewall them in the future.**

