

## HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TESTIMONY

**DR. WILLIAM J. PERRY**

**For Hearing on 17 March, 2011**

When one considers the destructive power of nuclear weapons, it is not surprising that the American nuclear posture has been, and will continue to be, highly controversial. What is surprising is the extent to which there is broad agreement on numerous issues related to our deterrent capabilities, nonproliferation initiatives and arms control strategies, which I believe are the three key components of U.S. strategic posture in the years ahead.

There is broad agreement that the nation must continue to safeguard our security by supporting military and intelligence programs that maintain our deterrence force. At the same time, we must also safeguard our security by supporting largely non-military programs that prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states, that reduce the number of nuclear weapons worldwide, and that provide better protection for the residual nuclear forces and fissile material. Both approaches are necessary for America's future; each can and should reinforce the other; and neither by itself is sufficient as long as nuclear weapons still exist in the world.

Nuclear weapons were a safeguard to our security for decades during the Cold War by deterring an attack on the U.S. and its allies. We will need them to continue to perform this deterrence role as long as others possess nuclear weapons. On the other hand, if nuclear weapons were to fall into the hands of a terror organization, they could pose an extremely serious threat to our security, and one for which traditional forms of deterrence would not be applicable, given the terrorist mindset. We must be mindful that Al Qaeda, for example, has declared that obtaining a nuclear weapon is a "holy duty" for its members. Preventing nuclear terrorism is closely tied to stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and recent developments in North Korea and Iran suggest that we may be at or near a tipping point in nuclear proliferation. (The urgency of stopping proliferation is articulated compellingly in the recent WMD Commission report: "World at Risk.")

While the programs that maintain our deterrence force are national, the programs that prevent proliferation and safeguard nuclear weapons and fissile material are both national and international. Indeed, it is clear that we cannot meet our goal of reducing the proliferation threat without substantial international cooperation. We cannot "go it alone" on this crucial security issue, nor need we, given that the nations whose cooperation is most critical are at risk from nuclear proliferation as much as we. But the international programs that are most effective in containing and rolling back proliferation can sometimes be in conflict with the national programs designed to maintain deterrence. Thus a strategic posture for the U.S. that meets both of these security requirements will necessarily have to make some tradeoffs between these two important security goals when they are in conflict. Some security analysts give a priority to dealing with one threat while others give a priority to dealing with the other threat. But it is clear to most

analysts that the key issue is how to strike a balance that supports, to reasonable levels, both of these security needs.

The need to strike such a balance has been with us at least since the ending of the Cold War. President Clinton's policy on nuclear posture spoke of the need to "lead but hedge". That policy called for the U.S. to lead the world in mutual nuclear arms reductions and to lead in programs to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, while at the same time maintaining a nuclear deterrent force that hedged against adverse geopolitical developments. The leadership aspect of this policy was demonstrated most vividly by a cooperative program with Russia, established under the Nunn-Lugar Program that dismantled about 4,000 former Soviet nuclear weapons and assisted Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan in removing all of their nuclear weapons - a significant contribution leading to a safer world. U.S. leadership has also been demonstrated by its efforts on three treaties: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, (signed during the Clinton administration but not ratified), the Moscow Treaty (signed during the Bush administration), and New START (signed during the Obama administration).

I believe that the U.S. must support programs that both lead and hedge; that is, programs that move in two parallel paths --- one path which protects our security by maintaining deterrence, and the other which protects our security by reducing the danger of nuclear weapons.

The first path, "Deterrence," is described in some detail in the administration's Nuclear Posture Review, and I agree with the policies and programs spelled out in that review.

The second path, "Reducing the Danger," includes the following components:

- Re-energize efforts to reverse the nuclear proliferation of North Korea and prevent the nuclear proliferation of Iran. Seek global cooperation to deal with other potential proliferation concerns arising from the anticipated global expansion of civilian nuclear power.
- Negotiate arms reduction treaties with Russia that make significant reductions in the nuclear stockpiles of Russia and the United States. The treaties should include verification procedures and should entail real reductions, not just a transfer of weapons from deployed to reserve forces. New START, ratified by the Senate in December, meets all of these requirements. Follow-on treaties should seek deeper reductions, which would require finding ways of dealing with "tactical" nuclear forces, reserve weapons and engaging other nuclear powers.
- Seek an international Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, as President Obama has called for, that includes verification procedures, and redouble domestic and international efforts to secure all stocks of fissile material, steps that would discourage both nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.
- Seek to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its task to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other nations and control access to

fissile material. In particular, work with the IAEA to promote universal adoption of the Additional Protocol to the NPT, which would allow extra inspections of suspected nuclear facilities as well as declared facilities.

- Augment funding for threat reduction activities that strengthen controls at vulnerable nuclear sites. The surest way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to deny terrorist acquisitions of nuclear weapons or fissile materials. An accelerated campaign to close or secure the world's most vulnerable nuclear sites as quickly as possible should be a top national priority. This would build on and expand the important foundation of work begun under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. We should commit to the investment necessary to remove or secure all fissile material at vulnerable sites worldwide in four years. This relatively small investment could dramatically decrease the prospects of terrorist nuclear acquisition. The Nuclear Summit, held last April, sought to get the cooperation of other nations in safeguarding nuclear sites around the world.

In addition, I firmly believe that we must expand our focus beyond narrow nonproliferation policies to address the larger security concerns and conflicts that undergird the desires of other countries to acquire military nuclear capabilities. The United States should:

- Seek a deeper strategic dialogue with Russia that is broader than nuclear treaties, to include civilian nuclear energy, ballistic missile defenses, space systems, nuclear nonproliferation steps, and ways of improving warning systems and increasing decision time.
- Renew and strengthen strategic dialogue with a broad set of states interested in strategic stability, including not just Russia and our NATO allies but also China and U.S. allies and friends in Asia.
- Seek Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and encourage other hold-out nations to do likewise. Almost no other measure would improve the credibility of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts than this. I believe that the Stockpile Stewardship Program, established as a safeguard when the U.S. signed the CTBT, has been an outstanding success and has given us the needed confidence in the reliability of our stockpile without nuclear testing. The United States has refrained from testing nuclear weapons for 17 years already and has no plans to resume such testing in the future. Prior to seeking ratification, the Administration should conduct a careful analysis of the issues that prevented ratification a decade ago.
- While the Senate has the responsibility for considering the CTBT for ratification, both the Senate and the House should support funding for any Treaty safeguards the Obama Administration may propose, which will be essential to the ratification process.
- Develop and pursue options for advancing U.S. interests in stability in outer space and in increasing warning and decision-time. The options could include the possibility of negotiated measures.

- Renew the practice and spirit of executive-legislative dialogue on nuclear strategy that helped pave the way for bipartisanship and continuity in policy in past years. To this end, we urge that the Congress consider reviving the Arms Control Observer Group, which served the country well in the past.

### Concluding Remarks


In surveying nearly seven decades of nuclear history, I note that nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. It is clear that a tradition against the use of nuclear weapons has taken hold, which we must strive to maintain, and urge all nuclear-armed nations to adhere to it.

I see our present time as a moment of opportunity but also of urgency. The opportunity arises because the Russian government has indicated a readiness to undertake a serious dialogue with the U.S. on strategic issues. The urgency arises because of the imminent danger of nuclear terrorism if we pass a tipping point in nuclear proliferation. We should reject the vision of a future world defined by a collapse of the nonproliferation regime, a cascade of nuclear proliferation to new states, a resulting dramatic rise in the risks of nuclear terrorism, and renewed fruitless competition for nuclear advantage among major powers. We should instead work for a world in which nuclear terrorism risks are steadily reduced through stronger cooperative measures to control terrorist access to materials, technology, and expertise. And a world of cooperation among the major powers that ensures strategic stability and order, and steadily diminishes reliance on nuclear weapons to preserve world peace, not as a favor to others, but because it is in the best interests of the United States and the world. I believe that the United States should lead the global effort to give fruitful birth to this new world.

United States House of Representatives  
Committee on Foreign Affairs

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WILLIAM J. PERRY	SELF
<b>3. Date of Committee hearing:</b>	
MARCH 17, 2011 9:30AM	
<b>4. Have you received any Federal grants or contracts (including any subgrants and subcontracts) since October 1, 2008 related to the subject on which you have been invited to testify?</b>	<b>5. Have any of the <u>organizations you are representing</u> received any Federal grants or contracts (including any subgrants and subcontracts) since October 1, 2008 related to the subject on which you have been invited to testify?</b>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
<b>6. If you answered yes to either item 4 or 5, please list the source and amount of each grant or contract, and indicate whether the recipient of such grant was you or the organization(s) you are representing. You may list additional grants or contracts on additional sheets.</b>	
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Witness name: WILLIAM J. PERRY

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

Individual

Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:

FISCAL YEAR 2011

federal grant(s)/ contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
N/A			
RESIGNED LANL/LLNL LANL BOARDS ON 10/8/10			

FISCAL YEAR 2010

federal grant(s)/ contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
LANL/LLNS	DEPT. OF ENERGY	\$ 22,500.00	QUARTERLY CONSULTANT FEE
LANL/LLNS, LCC	DEPT. OF ENERGY	\$ 5,000.00	BOARD OF GOVERNORS FEE

FISCAL YEAR 2009

Federal grant(s)/ contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
LANL/LLNS	DEPT. OF ENERGY	\$60,000.00	QUARTERLY CONSULTATION FEE
LLNS/LLNS, LLC	DEPT. OF ENERGY	\$10,000.00	BOARD OF GOVERNORS FEE

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Current fiscal year (2011): N/A \_\_\_\_\_ ;  
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Current fiscal year (2011): N/A \_\_\_\_\_ ;  
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 Fiscal year 2009: \_\_\_\_\_ .

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2011): N/A \_\_\_\_\_ ;  
 Fiscal year 2010: \_\_\_\_\_ ;  
 Fiscal year 2009: \_\_\_\_\_ .

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

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Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

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Fiscal year 2010: \_\_\_\_\_;  
Fiscal year 2009: \_\_\_\_\_.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2011): N/A \_\_\_\_\_;  
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List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

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Fiscal year 2010: \_\_\_\_\_;  
Fiscal year 2009: \_\_\_\_\_.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2011): N/A \_\_\_\_\_;  
Fiscal year 2010: \_\_\_\_\_;  
Fiscal year 2009: \_\_\_\_\_.

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