BALUCHISTAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

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OF THE

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BALUCHISTAN

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I call this hearing of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to order.

Today's hearing is about a part of the world and a people that most Americans know nothing about, Baluchistan, an area inhabited by the Baluch people who trace their history back for centuries. Baluchistan deserves our attention because it is a turbulent land marked by human rights' violations committed by regimes that are hostile to America's interests and values. It holds a very strategic location in an area of intense international rivalries.

Baluchistan comprises about 800 miles of coast at the head of the Arabian Sea between Iran and India and runs inland to southern Afghanistan. The Baluchs are a fiercely independent warrior people who have made their land a perilous land to invade—until natural gas and other mineral wealth was discovered there in this last century.

During the 17th century the tribes were united in a loose confederation until the British incorporated the area into the Indian empire in the 19th century. The British, however, ruled the area with a light touch, leaving tribal chiefs in control of their everyday affairs.

At the time of the partition of the British Raj into contemporary Pakistan and India back in 1947, the Baluch leaders voiced a desire for independence, but the Pakistan army took control of the area and forced the Baluch tribal chiefs to submit to the rule from Islamabad. The partition was based on religion, that partition between India and Pakistan, it was based on religion, rather than ethnic identity. The Baluchs are Sunni Muslims; and Pakistan, which was founded as an Islamic state, sees itself as the rightful ruler of all Muslims of the subcontinent.

Pakistani ideology holds Islam as the first identity, but other people identify themselves and their interests in many different ways. In practice, Pakistan does not treat all Muslims equally. The Baluch have seen little benefit from the development of the natural gas, coal, gold, uranium, and copper that is produced in their prov-

ince. Instead, the wealth is taken for the benefit of the dominant Punjabi elite that runs the country from Islamabad.

Baluchistan remains the poorest province in Pakistan, even though it is the richest in natural resources. Attacks against natural gas installations and pipelines by Baluch insurgents are steadily increasing, and there have been assassinations of Chinese engineers who are helping Pakistan develop resources that will be shipped out of the province to benefit Islamabad and, of course, Beijing.

The province's major port—let me pronounce it—Gwadar—the port of Gwadar has also been developed with the help of China and may become a naval base as well as a trade and energy transit center. Pakistan, however, is using this development to attract Punjabis into the province with the aim perhaps of outnumbering the local native Baluch.

There was a major uprising in Baluchistan that ran from 1973 to 1977, and the Baluch nationalists were inspired by the independence of Bangladesh, which was won in 1971. The Baluch insurgency, however, was ruthlessly crushed by Pakistani forces.

After two decades of relative calm, insurgency broke out again in 2005. Islamabad has refused to concede any legitimacy to Baluch nationalism or to engage the Baluch leadership in serious negotiations. Its response has been based on brute force, including extrajudicial killings. The State Department and Amnesty International have condemned Pakistan for these murderous acts in Baluchistan.

Across the border in Iran, there is a province, Sistan-Baluchistan, which is dominated by the ethnic Baluchs. The mullah regime there has denied them their basic human rights; and, as in Pakistan, the Baluchs are denied proper education and economic opportunities. As in Pakistan, the resources of Sistan-Baluchistan are often used to support an elite in a distant capital, leaving the local Baluchs in both countries impoverished.

The Governor of Sistan-Baluchistan is appointed by the mullah regime in Tehran. The Governor of Pakistan's Baluchistan is determined by a very complicated process which has some democratic elements, but the nationalist parties thought the system was so corrupt that they boycotted the elections in 2008. I hope our witnesses can shed some light on how free and fair a political process in that area could be and give us some insights into what is going on there in terms of the political process.

A low-level insurgency is in progress in Iran, as it is in Pakistan, with both countries reacting with the same brutal way of stamping out resistance. The Baluch in Iran are even more oppressed than those in Pakistan because Tehran is run by Shia theocrats who consider Sunni Muslims to be worse than heretics. Sunni Baluch clerics have been killed as part of an Iranian counterinsurgency campaign.

South Asia cannot be understood purely in religious terms, as Muslim versus non-Muslim or Sunni versus Shiite. Group identities there are rooted in deeper tribal and village allegiances, with cultural attributes and historical experiences that go back for centuries. This hearing will explore what these mean and what they mean to the United States, what are the geopolitics of the region,

the security of Pakistan, Iran, and their neighbors, how these things are being affected as well as the stability of that whole area.

Also, we are looking at finding out about those things and how all of these factors and the dynamics that are at work play into the existing borders and aspirations of self-determination from all the perspectives that Americans hold and value. We believe in self-determination and democracy, believe the people have a right to speak up, but we are also very concerned about the stability of that part of the world and what this means to America and to the people there.

So, as I say, this hearing, although I know that a lot of people saw this with trepidations, we are trying to understand something that I think we as American people have not paid attention to. So we need to learn things, like how to pronounce the port there and things like that. But even more than that, how to identify what forces are at work and who has some legitimate complaints and what America should be doing in reaction to the events there with the people there. So we are not here to—we are here to learn, and that is what this hearing is all about.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rohrabacher follows:]

CHAIRMAN DANA ROHRABACHER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS: OPENING STATEMENT: BALUCHISTAN HEARING (FEB. 8, 2012)

Today's hearing is about a part of the world and a people most Americans know nothing about: Baluchistan, the area inhabited by the Baluch people who trace their history back for centuries.

Baluchistan deserves our attention because it is a turbulent land in a very strategic location.

Baluchistan comprises about 800 miles of coast at the head of the Arabian Sea between Iran and India, and runs inland to southern Afghanistan. The Baluch are a fiercely independent, warrior peoples who have made their land perilous to invade– until the discovery of natural gas and other mineral wealth.

During the 17th Century the tribes were united in a loose confederation until the British incorporated the area into their Indian Empire in the 19th century. The British, however, ruled the area with a light touch, leaving the tribal chiefs in control of day-to-day affairs.

At the time of the Partition of the British Raj into contemporary Pakistan and India in 1947, Baluch leaders voiced a desire for independence, but the Pakistan army took control of the area and forced the Baluch tribal chiefs to submit to rule from Islamabad. The Partition was based on religion, rather than ethnic identity. The Baluch are Sunni Muslims. Pakistan, which was founded as an Islamic State, sees itself as the rightful ruler of all the Muslims of the subcontinent.

Pakistani ideology holds Islam as the first identity, but other people identify themselves and their interests in other ways. In practice, Pakistan does not treat all Muslims equally. The Baluchi have seen little benefit from the development of the natural gas, coal, gold, uranium and copper that is produced in their province. Instead the wealth is taken for the benefit of the dominant Punjabi elite that runs the country from Islamabad.

Baluchistan remains the poorest province in Pakistan, even though it is the richest in natural resources.

Attacks against natural gas installations and pipelines by Baluchi insurgents are steadily increasing, and there have been assassinations of Chinese engineers who are helping their Pakistani allies develop resources that will be shipped out of the province to benefit Islamabad and Beijing.

The province's major port of Gwadar has also been developed with the help of China, and may become a naval base as well as a trade and energy transit center. Pakistan, however, is using this development to attract Punjabis into the province with the aim of outnumbering the native Baluch.

There was a major uprising in Baluchistan that ran from 1973 to 1977. The Baluchi nationalists were inspired by the independence of Bangladesh, won in 1971. The Baluchi insurgency was, however, ruthlessly crushed by Pakistani forces.

After two decades of relative calm, insurgency broke out again in 2005. Islamabad has refused to concede any legitimacy to Baluch nationalism or to engage the Baluch leadership in serious political negotiations. Its response has been based on brute force, including extrajudicial killings. The State Dept. and Amnesty International have condemned Pakistan for its murderous acts in Baluchistan.

Across the border in Iran there is the province of Sistan-Baluchestan, which is dominated by ethnic Baluchi. The mullah regime has denied them basic human rights and, as in Pakistan, the Baluchi are denied proper education and economic opportunities. As in Pakistan, the resources of Sistan-Baluchestan are used to support the elite in the distant national capital, leaving the Baluch the most impoverished ethnic group in both countries.

The governor of Sistan-Baluchistan is appointed by the mullah regime in Tehran. The governor of Pakistan Baluchistan in is determined by a complicated process which is in theory democratic, but the nationalist parties boycotted the 2008 elections. I hope our witnesses can shed some light on how free and fair the political process is in the Baluchi province.

A low level insurgency is in progress in Iran as in Pakistan, with both regimes reacting in the same brutal manner to stamp out resistance. The Baluch in Iran are even more oppressed than in Pakistan because Tehran is run by Shia theocrats who consider Sunni Muslims to be worse than heretics. Sunni Baluch clerics have been killed as part of the Iranian counterinsurgency campaign.

South Asia cannot be understood purely in religious terms; as Muslim versus non-Muslim, Sunni versus Shia. Group identities are rooted in deeper allegiances with cultural attributes and historical experiences that go back centuries. This hearing will explore these legacies and loyalties and what they mean to the geopolitics of the region; the security of Pakistan, Iran and their neighbors; the legitimacy of existing borders and the aspiration of self-determination--- all from the perspective of American interests and values.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. With that, I would turn to my ranking member, Mr. Carnahan, for his opening remarks.

Let me note, please don't applaud, please don't throw fruit at me, either. It would be nice—just because it takes up time, and we have got to be out of here in about an hour. So go right ahead.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Chairman, I am glad to see you have a rousing ovation here today in this subcommittee hearing. You say that like someone who is used to being applauded and having fruit thrown at you.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, yes.

Mr. CARNAHAN. It goes along with the territory.

But, seriously, thank you for holding this hearing today. It is really very critical that we examine U.S. relations with Pakistan in multiple contexts like this.

Mr. Chairman, since you last called a hearing this past summer on U.S. strategy in south Asia, it is fair to say that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship has continued to strain but remains absolutely a critical partnership. I would urge the Pakistani Government to step up its efforts to weed out terror activity within and along its own borders.

Pakistan has significant challenges within its own country that have national, regional, and certainly international implications. One of the concerns and the topic of today's hearing is the situation in Baluchistan.

This past month, a State Department spokesman said, "The U.S. is deeply concerned about the ongoing violence in Baluchistan, especially targeted killings, disappearances, and other human rights abuses."

She further stated that the administration takes allegations of human rights abuses very seriously and that it had discussed these issues with Pakistani officials.

While the administration is not here today to testify, I would urge U.S. officials to continue to bring these issues up in the course of our diplomatic discussions.

With the significant investment of U.S. funding in Pakistan, it is Congress' job to make sure we are getting the return on the investment that our taxpayers deserve. We need to ensure that every dollar of U.S.-taxpayer-funded assistance is being used properly and in our interest. Vigorous oversight of all U.S. foreign aid is critical to the success of our programs there and is a key component to building infrastructure and capacity in Pakistan.

However, the U.S. and international commitment to Pakistan is not enough. In the face of all its challenges, it is critical that Pakistan work to ensure the integrity of its own people and its own country, including Baluchistan; and as the U.S., the U.N., and NATO continue in Afghanistan, the Afghan-Baluchistan border remains critical to ensuring that we are making decisions that move Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the entire region toward increased stability.

Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am looking forward to hearing the esteemed panel of witnesses that we have with us today.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

Mr. Sherman, do you have an opening statement?

Mr. SHERMAN. I do indeed.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Go right ahead.

Mr. SHERMAN. I want to thank the chairman of this subcommittee for allowing me to make a statement at this hearing. I have been on the full committee for 15 years and haven't had the honor to be a member of this subcommittee but have had a chance to see its work when reported to the full committee.

My statement will focus not only on Baluchistan but the adjoining area of the Sindh province. Many Baluch live in the Sindh province, and to a great extent the Pakistani Government treatment of both these southern areas is similar.

Pakistan-U.S. relations hit an all-time low last year when we found bin Laden in Abbottabad and perhaps later when allegedly the U. S. Embassy in Kabul was attacked by those who may have had the help of the ISI. That is why it is more important than ever for the U.S. to reach out to the various people who have been marginalized by the Pakistani Government.

The people of Baluchistan and Sindh, their culture, language, and way of life are under attack and underrepresented from so many major government entities in Pakistan. Political activities defending Baluch and Sindhi rights are subject to arrest, disappearances, torture, and even killing.

I believe the U.S. must reach out to these underrepresented historic segments of the Pakistani population. The Baluch people are culturally and traditionally regarded as secular and moderate, strongly influenced by the cultural traditions of Sufism. Both the Sindhis and the Baluch have a culture that I think will be consistent with American values; and a significant part of the people of Sindh, of course, are Baluch ethnically or have Baluch origins. The Baluch and Sindhis, including those Baluch living in Sindhi province, share the goal of government recognition of their cultural, political, and economic rights.

Baluchistan is Pakistan's most underdeveloped province. It has the highest unemployment and poverty rates, the lowest quality of life when measured economically of any province in Pakistan. The road infrastructure is also poor; and, as the chairman points out, this is ironic because it is such a resource-rich area, especially as to natural gas. Islamabad's reluctance to give the Baluch people more autonomy is in part because they covet those resources. The Baluch gained a more equitable share of the region's rich natural resources, and that is another source of resentment.

A third source of resentment is the Pakistani army cantonments that are being established in the Baluch areas. A small minority of Baluch have undertaken the armed struggle which was described by the chairman, and he also described its history.

There is also, as the chairman described, Baluch on the Iranian side of the border waging a conflict against the Ayatollah regime.

In this critical part of the world, we cannot afford to ignore the southern half of Pakistan, especially its population of Baluch and Sindhis.

I had an opportunity last year to found the Sindh Caucus, and I would invite my colleagues to join. It is co-chaired by Dan Burton, Adam Schiff is an active member, and, as I have noted, the people of Sindh have a moderate tradition that is consistent with U.S. values and U.S. interests.

For many years, the Pakistani Government has tried to impose just one language, Urdu, on the people of Pakistan, when in fact Sindhi is spoken by more people than Urdu. We need to reach out to the people of Sindh province and others who speak the Sindhi language, and we need to do so in the Sindh language.

Right now, the Voice of America is broadcasting only in Urdu. That is why I want to commend our full committee for voting for my amendment to require that the Voice of America start broadcasting in the Sindh language, and now it is a matter of actually making that happen through the bureaucracy and through the Appropriations Committee. And I look forward to the day when that is a success and we are back here talking about the Baluch language.

I believe my time has expired, and I yield back to the chair.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

It is always great to chair a hearing where someone is more radical than I am on certain issues.

Mr. SHERMAN. A rare occurrence, I might add.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Actually, we see eye to eye on almost everything except he is a Democrat and I am a Republican.

We also have another soft-spoken Member of Congress joining us, Louie Gohmert from Texas. I ask unanimous consent that he may sit in on this hearing and have the rights of all the other members of the committee.

So ordered.

Louie, do you have a couple minute opening statement for us? Go right ahead. Take 2 minutes.

Mr. GOHMERT. I will wait.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Take 1 minute and get yourself——

Mr. GOHMERT. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be here, and it is, I think, just wonderful that you have called this hearing, and I appreciate the interest I am hearing from our Democratic friends.

But when you have a place in the world that was forced to be part of another country in 1948, as Baluchistan was, and then in that same country the people that are native to that area are harassed, what some of us would consider to be the human rights of dignity that every human being should be afforded are violated on a regular basis by the national government. And then further that government goes on to, whether it is official or unofficial, to furnish supplies, encouragement—what people I met with in forward-operating bases in Afghanistan last month tell me are the supplies, the IEDs, the weapons coming in to the Taliban, so many are coming from Pakistan and coming from the Baluchistan area.

And as an editorial I was pleased to read in the Pakistan Daily Times noted, maybe it is time that we quit working so hard to support the Taliban in another country and concentrate more on our own country. And I think it would make the United States very happy to see that, it would make people of Afghanistan very happy that the Taliban was no longer being provided weapons to inflict harm on them, and it would make the Baluchs very happy, from my discussion with them, that they were allowed to live in peace without being subjected to horrors from their own government.

So I am delighted you asked for this hearing, and I appreciate the opportunity to be here.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Thank you very much. No applause. Thank you very much, Mr. Gohmert.

We have witnesses ahead of us. You will note that there are a couple more witnesses than we originally planned. Because we do know so little about this region, we didn't know who to invite, and there were some suggestions that were sent to me over the Internet that we maybe should expand it to make sure there is a little bit more representative cross-section of views, and that is what we did. So I want to thank whoever sent me those suggestions, and I think we are going to have a much richer hearing because of it.

But we have a time problem, and the time problem is that they are going to call votes sometime in the next hour, maybe even ½ hour or 45 minutes, so I am going to hold each one of you to the 5-minute rule for your testimony, and I am sorry, but I am going to have to, because otherwise there won't be any time for questions and answers at all.

We have with us on the panel Christine Fair, assistant professor, Center for Peace and Security Studies at the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service in Georgetown University. Previously, she has served as a senior political scientist with RAND Corporation, a political officer to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, and as a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations, and serves on the editorial board of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.

I will introduce each one just prior to their testimony, and we know how soft-spoken you are, Dr. Fair, and how you never cause any controversy, but you enlighten everyone, so you may proceed. Five minutes.

STATEMENT OF C. CHRISTINE FAIR, PH.D., ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Ms. FAIR. Sir, you are one of my favorite Republicans. We don't see eye to eye on a lot of things, but on the things we see eye to eye on, we see eye to eye.

Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to speak on this really important topic. As you noted, there aren't that many folks that know about Baluchistan, there aren't that many folks who know about Pakistan, and when this topic comes up, it is usually focused on the war on terror in Afghanistan. So it is nice to see that there is a hearing specifically dedicated to this particular issue.

I have submitted a longer—very long written statement that I request become part of the permanent record.

In that statement, I spend quite a bit of time trying to map out what we know geographically, historically, and demographically about Baluchistan. Unfortunately, we don't know a lot, because the Pakistan census is terribly out of date, and unfortunately the process of a census in Pakistan has become very politicized.

But what we do know is that the Baluch ethnic group is the largest ethnic group in the province. The exact numbers are perhaps unknown. But we also know that, by any measure of human development—and I put a few, just a sample in my testimony—by any

measure of human development, by any development, any measure of economic development, Baluchistan always ranks below the other provinces in Pakistan, with the perhaps exception of FATA.

In addition to that, as you note in your opening statement, Baluchistan is actually a very large producer of resources. Yet, ironically, even though Baluchistan produces about 40 percent of the country's gas, very few Baluch actually take advantage of that gas because there is no infrastructure for them to do so. So when you meet with folks from Baluchistan, they will tell you the only time they get gas or electricity hook-ups is when a cantonment comes to town. The army will counter that it is very hard to spread that infrastructure throughout a province which accounts for about 5 percent of Pakistan's population but about 40 percent of the terrain. So they will know that there are logistical challenges. Obviously, the truth lies somewhere in between.

Baluchistan's appalling human rights record also stands before us. We have Human Rights Watch here. We have Amnesty International. Everyone knows about the forced abductions that are going on. Everyone knows that Baluchistan has been a very restive province from day one. Many Baluch didn't even want to join the union of Pakistan.

In that sense, it shares a lot of similarities to Kashmir. Kashmir was also forcibly annexed, and many of the challenges that we see happening in Pakistan vis—vis Baluchistan could also, I think, be said in some measure about the situation in Kashmir.

Curiously, what I find very puzzling about Pakistan is that over the last—well, since 2004, the state has been waging a pretty vicious counterinsurgency campaign against elements of the so-called Pakistan Taliban, and it has generated quite a bit of outrage among Pakistanis. Yet the last six decades of episodic military use of force against Baluch insurgents doesn't really cause that kind of outrage at all.

In fact, in my written statement, I provided a link to a very fascinating BBC documentary that was called Ko Jaanta Hai, Who Knows Baluchistan? They went around Lahore and they asked folks, do you know what Baluchistan is? Can you name a city? And it was actually appalling how few people knew where the province was, that there was an insurgency, that people couldn't even name the major city of Gwadar.

So you have this very interesting combination of the ability of lethal force but yet you have very few people in Pakistan who know about it.

A second related problem is that, because it has so few people and because the representation in the National Assembly is based upon population, it means that Baluchistan can never have any heft in the National Assembly. While it has equal representation in the Senate, as I am sure you know in Pakistan the Senate has very little power.

Now, while we focus upon the abductions and the state-sponsored human rights abuses, which are numerous, I do want to point out, though, that this isn't the only kind of violence which is happening in Pakistan or in Baluchistan. So the forced disappearances I am sure my colleagues from Amnesty and from Human Rights Watch

will dilate upon them. But there are also targeted killings that are unfortunately done by some Baluch.

I understand the sentiment that there is this perception that they are being colonized by the Punjab, but, unfortunately, there is a past dependency problem. Baluchistan has a massive problem with education, right? So how do you produce teachers from a province that doesn't have, on the main, people who are adequately educated to produce the folks who can subsequently become teachers? So there is a need for teachers to come from other provinces in Baluchistan, but—I am sure Human Rights Watch have written an entire report about this—many of those teachers have been singled out because they are Punjabi. It is not just teachers. It is also providers of other human services. Police in particular are very vulnerable.

So I only—I don't only want to draw attention to the targeted killing of one community by state forces, but in fact we have a lot of acts of violence converging in Baluchistan.

Another one that doesn't get a lot of attention is also the sectarian violence. Shia have paid a heavy price in Pakistan, and we can continue to see this kind of violence happening in Baluchistan.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am afraid your 5 minutes is gone.

Ms. FAIR. There we go.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We will come back. Hopefully, we will have time for some questions and answers.

And I would also suggest, if the panel would like to, during their 5 minutes, express something about what has already been said, please feel free.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Fair follows:]

Balochistan

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Oversight and Investigations Sub-Committee

February 8, 2012

C. Christine Fair

Assistant Professor
Georgetown University
Security Studies Program,
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
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Introduction to Balochistan: Demography and History

Balochistan (also spelled Baluchistan) is Pakistan's westernmost province, sharing international borders with Iran's restive Balochistan-o-Sistan province, as well as with several southern provinces of Afghanistan (Nimruz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabol, Paktika). Among Pakistan's four provinces, Balochistan is the largest, occupying 43 percent of Pakistan's total area of 796,000 square kilometers. (See Map 1.) It is ethnically diverse and is home to many religious minorities, including Sikhs, Hindus, Parsees (also known as Zoroastrians), and a diverse array of Sunni sectarian adherents, as well as Shia (Yusufzai, 2011). (See Map 2.) However, Balochistan is the country's least populated and thus least densely-populated province, accounting for a mere five percent of the country's burgeoning population (Pakistan Census, 1998a).

While the Baloch ethnic group is indubitably the largest in the province, it is not known definitively whether or not its members comprise the majority of the province's inhabitants as the census is both out of date (from 1998) and does not ask about ethnicity. Without providing a source for his claims, Khan (2009) suggests that Baloch are the largest group in the province (followed by the Pashtuns and the Brahui) but fall short of forming a majority of the population. In addition to these three largest ethnic groups, Balochistan is also home to Sindhis and Punjabis. Using the 1998 Pakistani census data on mother tongue as a proxy for ethnicity, those who claim the Baloch language are a slight majority (55 percent), followed by Pashto speakers (30 percent), Punjabi (three percent), and Saraiki (two percent). Those who speak Urdu (the national language) comprise a mere one percent (Pakistan Census, 1998). However, the census does not distinguish Brahui speakers from Baloch speakers, even though the two languages are linguistically distinct and completely unrelated. This is one reason why some scholars are wary of declaring Baloch the majority ethnic group while others insist that they are the majority community of the province. (See map 3).

Determining Balochistan's ethnic composition is complicated by Pakistan's census. The census is supposed to be decennial, but has been deeply politicized since the 1980s. The 1981 census was delayed until 1998 (a full 17 years). This extraordinary delay was due in part to the Pakistan government's hope that many of the millions of Afghan refugees who had flocked to Pakistan would return to Afghanistan before the census was conducted (Weiss, 1999). Balochistan, along with the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK, formerly Northwest Frontier Province, NWFP) has hosted millions of Afghan refugees since 1979. While Pashtuns had lived in Balochistan long before the Afghan crises unfolded, there can be little doubt that developments across the border have altered the ethnic, political, and even religious and social fabrics of the province, as many Afghans and their offspring have acquired (legally or illegally) Pakistani national identity cards and have made Pakistan their home (S. Baloch, 2010). As of January 2012, there were more than 1.7 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2012). Current figures for Balochistan in particular are not available, but in 2010 there were more than 406,000 Afghan refugees in the province (UNHCR, 2010).

In light of the continuing security challenges throughout Pakistan, the ongoing population movement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the massive internal displacement caused by floods and

Pakistani security operations, no census is likely in the near future, despite the fact that one should have been conducted in 2008. Perhaps the strongest resistance to the census comes from Pakistan's political elite, who rely upon rural constituencies despite the country's expanding urbanization. They fear that substantial proof of urbanization may result in redistricting, which would undermine the power of rural-based political parties such as the Pakistan People's Party, among others (Yusuf, 2011).

Balochistan is also Pakistan's most developmentally under-privileged province. Consider the statistics given in Table 1. Whether one looks at traditional measures of human capital or human development, Balochistan lags behind the nation generally. In contrast, the Punjab tends to fare better than the nation on average on most measures.

Many people in the province of Balochistan—irrespective of their ethnicity—decry the lack of investment in the province and its persistent paucity of development relative to the other three provinces. This has fostered considerable anger at the Pakistani state, which along with the area's peculiar history, contributes to an episodic but intense demand, among some Baloch both within and without the province, for either greater autonomy or outright independence. Like elsewhere in South Asia, Baloch nationalists root their demands for autonomy or independence in the way the British managed the area now called Balochistan during their the colonial period, as well as the way in which they partitioned the erstwhile Raj into the successor states of India and Pakistan. Thus the Balochistan crisis, like the Kashmir conflict, stems from the British management of the area and ultimate hasty disengagement as it abandoned its empire.

Balochistan and the Pakistani State

The British Empire in South Asia coexisted with many princely states over which the British had varied levels of suzerainty, granting them considerable internal autonomy at the price of fealty to the British. In 1884, the British annexed Balochistan, seeking both to establish a buffer zone between its own empire and that of the Russians and to secure safe transit routes to Afghanistan (Khan, 2009). The area of Balochistan was and remains fragmented by desert and mountains with pockets of settlements that were often tightly organized around tribal structures with few lines of communication connecting settlements to each other or to the rest of the country. Contrary to the claims of some contemporary Baloch nationalists, there was no historically stable, "autonomous" Baloch kingdom *per se* that covered the expanse of today's Balochistan. The sixth Khan (leader) of Qalat, Nasir Khan, did manage to organize most of the major Baloch tribes under one military and administrative system in the mid 18th Century. However, that arrangement was fleeting and did not survive his death, after which power and control again returned to the tribes (Khan 2009; Harrison 1981).

Prior to annexation the Khan of Qalat promised the British safe passage through Balochistan, even though he did not in fact control the anti-British tribes in the territory. When the British were eventually attacked, they held the Khan of Qalat to be in breach of the treaty and seized the region. They ceded the western part of the territory (now Sistan-o-Balochistan Province) to Iran and the northern part to Afghanistan. Part of the remaining area became "British Balochistan," and the remainder was divided into the Khanate of Kalat and three principalities (Khan 2009, Harrison 1981).

At the time of partition, the many princely states within the Raj were forced to choose between joining India or Pakistan. Most princely states decided to join one dominion or the other based upon demography (Hindu or Muslim majority) and geography. The process was largely complete by Independence. However, several notable outliers remained. The Muslim rulers of Hyderabad and Junagarh—both deep within India—opted to join Pakistan even though they governed over largely Hindu polities. (India forcibly annexed them both, to Pakistan's enduring chagrin.) The Hindu ruler of the princely state of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, governed over a Muslim majority. He dithered, hoping to retain an independent state. As marauders from Pakistan's tribal areas and Swat invaded Kashmir in an effort to seize it for Pakistan, Singh agreed to join India in exchange for military assistance in repulsing the raiders. (That conflict morphed into the first Indo-Pakistan war of 1947. To date, the territorial disposition of Kashmir remains disputed, with Pakistan claiming sovereignty over the entire region and India generally seeking to ratify the status quo, which would leave about one third of it under Pakistan's administration and the remainder under that of India.)

A somewhat similar situation developed in what is now Balochistan. Many Baloch leaders did not embrace an independent Pakistan, before or after partition. Despite these misgivings, "British Balochistan" joined the Pakistan union. However, the Khan (leader) of Qalat—like the Maharaja of Kashmir—wanted independence. Unlike the other principalities, the Khanate of Kalat had a treaty with Whitehall, not with the British Indian government. Thus, the legality of its succession to Pakistan was contested by proponents of an independent Baloch state. The Khan of Kalat (Mir Ahmad Yar Khan) declared independence one day after Pakistan became independent. Ultimately, Pakistan annexed the Khanate by force (Axmann, 2008). Some Baloch continue to decry their inclusion in Pakistan on first principles and contend that Pakistan and its army is an occupying force. As discussed below, several Baloch organizations have engaged in militancy either to achieve greater autonomy, with devolution of power to the province, or to attain outright independence.

After forcibly seizing Balochistan, Pakistan's first governor-general, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, established an advisory council for the province, under his direct oversight (Khan, 2009). From 1948 to 1955, Balochistan was an administrative unit managed by a Quetta-based commissioner, with most of the Baloch sardars (tribal leaders) receiving a stipend from the federal government. (The policy was inherited from the British, who formulated this system of levies.) (Aslam, 2011).

Despite some misgivings among the Baloch, the province was relatively peaceful until 1955, when Pakistan promulgated the "One United Scheme," which abolished all of the provinces in what was then West Pakistan. This change was intended to combine the strength of the Western provinces to balance the ethnically homogenous and politically powerful Bengalis of East Pakistan. But the strategy, which denied provinces their own territorial identity, met resistance (Khan, 2009). Simultaneously, in the years following Independence, a few Baloch sardars had become wealthy after the discovery of natural resources on their lands. In 1958, a dispute arose about royalties from natural gas located in the area controlled by the Bugti tribe. In that year, some members of the Bugti tribe tried to disrupt the supply of gas from the Sui area in effort to increase the royalty fees from the government (Aslam, 2011). Responding to unrest resulting both from Bugti efforts to manipulate the gas market and protests

against the One United scheme, the government launched a military campaign that lasted until the early 1960s.

Following the elections of 1970, the ethno-nationalist National Awami Party (NAP) won the largest block of seats in both Balochistan and what is now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and formed governments in both provinces with the political support of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (an Islamist party associated with the Deobandi interpretive tradition). Following the 1971 civil war in which East Pakistan, with India's assistance, became Bangladesh, the NAP government finally took control of the provincial government and tried to correct some of the developmental, economic, and political problems of the province. Pakistan's first elected prime minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, opposed such reforms, fearing that they would undermine the Punjabis, Pakistan's dominant ethnic group, and other non-Baloch who controlled businesses in the province (Khan, 2009).

In 1973, the Pakistani authorities manufactured a reason to invade Balochistan when they raided the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad, discovering 300 Soviet submachine guns and 48,000 rounds of ammunition. Although Pakistani and American officials knew the weapons were meant for Baloch rebels in Iran (punishment for Iran's support of Kurdish rebels in Iraq), the government claimed that Iraq was planning to transfer the arms to Pakistan's Baloch. The elected provincial government was dismissed, Governor's Rule imposed, and the central government dispatched 80,000 troops to fight 55,000 Baloch guerillas. Iran provided 30 Cobra helicopters with their own pilots to help Pakistan put down any insurrection. (Iran has its own problems with its ethnic Baloch, who struggle under ethnic discrimination and, as they are Sunni, Shia domination.) In the end, about 3,300 Pakistani army soldiers died, as well as 5,500 militants and thousands more innocent civilians (Khan, 2009; Aslam, 2011). After Bhutto's government was toppled by General Zia ul Haq, Zia launched several development projects, such as road construction, expansion of power transmission, and building small dams, in hopes of appeasing Balochistan's residents. Zia also ensured that Quetta received Sui gas for the first time even though deposits had been discovered in Balochistan some four decades earlier (Khan, 2009).

The most recent insurgent violence began with General Musharraf's seizure of power in 1999. In particular, Musharraf outraged many in the province when he announced the development of the deep-water port at Gwador (a huge project being carried out in partnership with the Chinese) and the construction of two army cantonments.

While many Baloch see the army cantonments as part of Pakistan's "colonizing presence," the Pakistan army has long sought to increase the number of Baloch in its ranks. This desire stems from the belief—long held by the Pakistan army—that the institution must reflect the population from which it draws. Achieving this goal has proved a challenge because few Baloch meet the educational standards and/or wish to join the Pakistan army. (A similar situation prevails in Sindh.) In response, the army has built cadet schools in Quetta in the hopes of increasing the number of recruits from the province. Pakistan's army has long dominated the state, and its extensive welfare system is the best in the country. Thus disproportionate representation amongst its ranks and officer corps adds further ballast to the numerous critiques of the army's state within a state (Fair and Nawaz, 2011).

Pakistan's Extractive Policies

Ironically, while Balochistan is Pakistan's most underdeveloped province, the region is also perhaps its most resource-rich. These resources no doubt explain the central government's interest in exerting ironclad control over the state. The desolate area contains copper, uranium, gold, coal, silver, and platinum deposits. In addition, it is responsible for about 36% of Pakistan's total gas production. *Astonishingly, only 17% of the gas produced is consumed in Balochistan while the rest is consumed in other parts of Pakistan.* Many Baloch with whom I have interacted over the years lament (perhaps with some hyperbole) that the only time Baloch gets gas hookups in their home is when the military builds a cantonment. (Army officials interviewed by this author counter unpersuasively that the population patterns of Balochistan make it very costly to expand the provision of natural gas noting that it is easier to pipe it to the densely populated Punjab with its extensive lines of communication and control.) Not only is Balochistan denied the use of its own resources, the government has historically required Balochistan to *sell gas at a lower rate than the other provinces*. For example, Balochistan receives a mere $0.29 per thousand cubic feet for its gas. Nearby Sindh gets $1.65 and Punjab receives $2.35. To make matters worse, many of the development projects in the region have been given to the Chinese government. The Chinese obtained exploration rights to the Saindak copper mine. The Chinese government will receive 50% of any proceeds from the mine and the Pakistani central government 48%, leaving a meager 2% for the Balochistan provincial government. The Chinese, following their well-honed management approach to such mega-projects, are highly self-dependent and have not engaged local labor in these efforts (Khan, 2009).

The construction of a deep-sea port at Gwador has proved to be the most controversial of the central government's undertakings in the province in recent decades. The port will be situated on Balochistan's Makran Coast at Gwador and will be an important counterweight to the Iranian deep-sea port at Chahbahar (built with assistance from India). Work began in March 2002, with China paying $198 million of the $248 million total budget. China also provided 450 engineers (Grare, 2006; ICG; 2006). Baloch nationalists allege that the contract between the Pakistani and Chinese governments demonstrates the center's misuse of Balochistan's resource. The national Pakistani government and the Chinese government will take 50% and 48% of the proceeds, respectively, leaving (as at Saindak) only 2% for the province. As with Saindak, all of the construction contracts have gone to non-Baloch firms and the majority of the jobs on site are taken by Punjabis or other non-Baloch. Balochistan's residents may not currently have the skills to allow them to work on the project, but the government has missed an opportunity to train the local inhabitants and ensure that they are invested in the project's success (Aslam, 2011).

Many in the province (actual percentages are unknown) perceive Gwador as a massive effort to further colonize the province by Punjabis and other patrons of the military and bureaucracy. The reasons for this perception are numerous and include several disconcerting allegations: elites bribing revenue officials to register land in their name, cutting out locals who had owned the land for generations but lacked proof of ownership; civilians and military personnel alike acquiring land in Gwador at extremely low cost and in turn selling it to developers from Karachi or elsewhere at a higher price; the army's

mafia-like behavior in appropriating Baloch land and offering it to Punjabis at concessionary prices; and the complete lack of involvement of Baloch at any level in the project (Khan, 2009). Moreover, the project will fundamentally change the demography of the area. Before it began, the population of Gwador and the surrounding areas was a mere 70,000. When the project is complete, the population of the same area is expected to explode to nearly two million, mostly non-Baloch. Baloch nationalists fear that the expanding presence of Punjabis and Sindhis, among others, will transform the culture of the area. Even more provocative is the fact that the project has displaced many poor Baloch from the area without adequate compensation from the government. Since construction has begun, there have been numerous attacks against Chinese personnel, among others (Aslam, 2011).

The Current Crisis: Ongoing Human Rights Challenges

The International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, and many scholarly commentators place the blame for the current crisis on Pakistan's military and central government. Critics of the Pakistani government note that at the heart of the Balochistan problem are reasonable political and economic grievances which are eminently resolvable (e.g. through government transparency, greater devolution, permitting Balochistan to control its ample natural resources including fixing the price at which these commodities sell, investing in Balochistan's human development, expanding access to electricity and gas, and so forth). However, the government has largely chosen to pursue military action, involving the forced disappearance of youths with no criminal records and the elimination of Baloch tribal leaders, among other excesses (Human Rights Watch 2011a, 2011b; ICG, 2006). Until recently, the government evinced no willingness to negotiate on the subjects of political and economic autonomy.

The exact toll of the most recent spate of insurgent and counterinsurgent violence is not known. According to one Baloch nationalist (cited by Khan, 2009, p. 1083) anywhere between 8,000 and 12,000 Baloch have "disappeared." The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), which has investigated this issue, counted 143 missing persons as of May 29, 2011 and also published a list of 140 persons whose bodies were found after they went missing. HRCP also identifies 18 persons whom the organization believes were slain in targeted killings (Human Rights Commission Pakistan, 2011).

Human Rights Watch conducted its own investigation into forced disappearances (2011b). That report detailed 45 cases of alleged forced disappearances, most of which occurred between 2009 and 2010. Their investigation accuses Pakistan's security forces—especially its intelligence agencies and paramilitary outfit the Frontier Corps—of "disappearing" ethnic Baloch whom the security services believe to be involved in Baloch nationalist causes. Human Rights Watch obtained information about the campaign, which appears to be fairly extensive, from those who have escaped captivity as well as family members of the abductees. Astonishingly, most of the abductions took place during the daytime, often in well-trafficked public areas in the presence of multiple witnesses (Human Rights Watch, 2011b).

While Baloch nationalists are wont to call attention to their grievances and losses, they are not the only victims and in many cases they are the perpetrators. Baloch nationalist militants are widely suspected

to be the culprits in a wide array of killings of Punjabis, ostensibly to protest Punjabi colonization of the state. Teachers and police have been particularly vulnerable because they are seen as the representatives of the so-called Punjabi-dominated state generally and the military in particular. (As Fair and Nawaz (2011) show, the Pakistan army is not as Punjabi-dominated as is widely believed.) The targeted killing of teachers has had a profound impact on the province's already fragile educational system. There are too few educated persons in Balochistan to supply an adequate numbers of teachers, and the hostile and dangerous environment makes recruiting teachers from other provinces difficult.

A second conflict, largely distinct from the ethnically-based tension, is the continuing problem of sectarian violence. In Pakistan, this almost always takes the form of Deobandi Sunni extremist violence against Pakistan's minority Shia community. In recent years, these Deobandi Sunni militant groups (e.g. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, etc.) have also taken up arms against other Sunnis (e.g. Barelvis) whom they deride as being apostates or hypocrites (Fair, 2011). In Balochistan, the group most vulnerable to such attacks, which tend to be concentrated in Quetta and environs, is the Persian-speaking Hazaras (Human Rights Watch, 2011a).

In 2007, Pakistan's Supreme Court Chief Justice gained wide notoriety when he demanded that General Musharraf account for the for the thousands of Pakistanis who had been disappeared. Unfortunately, the United States has not pushed for transparency about the fate of the detained, as Pakistan has long been detaining such persons at the Americans' behest in prosecuting the war on terror (Human Rights Watch, 2011b).

In general, Pakistan's law enforcement capabilities are shambolic and inadequate to meet the state's myriad criminal and terrorist challenges. Worse, Pakistan's judges, for any number of reasons, are far more likely to let terrorist suspects go free than not (Fair, 2012). As for state involvement in assassination, harassment, and disappearances, there is no sign that the state is willing to forswear these methods of controlling the problems it perceives in the province.

The Pakistan government tends to blame the violence upon various vested tribal interests which seek above all to ensure that the province remains backwards and thus amenable to the prerogatives of tribal leaders. Military and paramilitary action is justified, the state argues, because these tribal leaders are irreconcilable to the state. However, Major Gregory Pipes, in research conducted for a MA thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School, discovered little evidence to support this view. Instead, he found that any conciliatory move by the government results in a decline in militant attacks, while state hostility corresponds to a spike in violence (Pipes, 2010). If the various Baloch parties to the conflict were unwilling to settle for anything short of independence, Pipes should not have observed this correlation between state action and violence.

Similarly, Pipes undermines the government's contention that the Baloch sardars seek to stunt the economic and social development of the province. If this were in fact the case, we would expect to see lower levels of development in areas controlled by separatist sardars than in other parts of the province where leadership is more aligned with the state. Pipes compares Nasirabad (home of former Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, who has long been friendly to the state) with Dera Bugti (ancestral

dominion of Baloch leader Nawab Aktar Khan Bugti, who was killed in an army operation in August 2006). Nasirabad does have more households with electricity than Dera Bugti (61% vs. 16%), reflecting Jamali's patronage network. But Dera Bugti performs only marginally lower than Nasirabad in terms of access to piped water (15% vs. 15%) and literacy rates (12% vs. 13%). Dera Bugti marginally outranks Nasirabad in contraceptive use (14% vs. 12 %) and has nearly twice the number of medical facilities (64 vs. 34). This sample challenges the truth of the government depiction of retrogressive sardars (Haider, 2012; Pipes, 2011).

Despite the intense and ongoing military operations, few Pakistanis outside Balochistan know about the province and the problems that plague it. A recent BBC report asked several Punjabis from Anarkali Bazaar in Lahore whether or not they even knew what Balochistan is. Shockingly, many indicated that they did not. They could not even name a single city in the country's largest province (BBC, 2011).

Worse, because Balochistan is the least populated province, it elects a mere 17 members of the National Assembly, out of a total of 335 (National Assembly of Pakistan). While it has equal representation with Pakistan's other four provinces (22 seats) in the 100-member Senate, the Senate is the weaker of the two houses.[i]

Curiously, while public opinion in Pakistan has ranged between being outright opposed to or espousig tepid support for Pakistan's military action against the Islamist militants that have attacked the state with increasing ferocity since 2004, few Pakistanis seem remotely bothered by the military operations against Balochistan and the extra-judicial killings of Baloch youth and political leaders. This is likely due to the widespread belief that India—along with Afghanistan—has in the past supported Baloch insurgents and continues to do so. (While India's past role in supporting Baloch insurgents is less debatable, this subject raises considerable rancor in New Delhi and Islamabad alike. Unfortunately, the United States has not generally deemed this issue of adequate importance to collect information about it.) The firm belief in Pakistan that the varied Balochistan crises are due in part to external interference no doubt allows the state to justify the actions against the Baloch because this narrative renders rebellious Baloch as proxies of Pakistan's mortal enemy, India and its presumed client Afghanistan. Lest anyone be fooled by the improving atmospherics between India and Pakitsan, India is widely seen by many Pakistanis to be one of the country's greatest threats rivaled only by the United States (Pew, 2010).

Thus, under Pakistan's current system, Balochistan is unlikely to receive the policy attention at the center that it deserves, and it has too little representation and too few domestic allies to sustain a Balochistan-centric agenda that could resolve the various conflicts in the province.

Implications and Recommendations

Most Americans have scarcely heard of Balochistan. When Pakistan does occupy a place in American popular discourse it is generally in the context of the War on Terror and Pakistan's critical but equally flawed contribution to the same. Since much of the crisis in Balochistan does not appear to be directly relevant to U.S. interests, there have been few calls in U.S. policy circles to hold Pakistan to account for

its misdeeds in the province or to seriously examine the numerous crimes perpetrated by state and non-state actors alike.

Yet Balochistan is not entirely irrelevant to U.S. interests. First, as in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and elsewhere, the Pakistani state patronizes religious forces in Balochistan as a counterweight to ethnic forces. In Balochistan the most obvious partners are the varied factions of the Pashtun-dominated, Deobandi ulema party, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). The JUI has long had ties to an archipelago of madrassahs across Pakistan that has spawned numerous regional and extra-regional Islamist militant groups. JUI is most notorious for its ties to the Afghan Taliban. The varied militant groups operating under its umbrella include the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Harkat-ul-Ansar/Harkal ul Mujahideen among others. Many of these groups are also local collaborators of al Qaeda. Evidence of the state's ties to these groups and the salience of Balochistan is found in the simple fact that much of the Afghan Taliban's leadership council is based is based in Quetta. (Thus its name: the Quetta Shura).

A second area of interest for the United States is simple conformity with its own laws. The Leahy Amendment precludes the United States from providing assistance to a foreign security force if there is credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. To remain in compliance with the law, American officials must review the human rights record of those units of the Pakistani security forces that may become recipients of U.S. assistance. (After years of interviewing U.S. personnel it has become clear to the author that the United States has not taken this responsibility terribly seriously; but there has been increasing attention to it in recent years.)

Despite well-documented evidence of Pakistan military and paramilitary excesses in Swat, the Tribal Areas, Balochistan and elsewhere, the United States has not responded with alacrity. The lone exception to this rule came in October 2010, when the United States withdrew aid to some Pakistani security forces because of the evidence of mass-killings in Swat. The withholding of a small amount of aid was announced at the same time as a $2 billion aid package (Schmitt and Sanger, 2010).

While the United States has been understandably loath to take action against Pakistan's army for an array of shortcomings (e.g. supporting the Afghan Taliban and groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani Network while receiving U.S. assistance to fight the war on terror), the United States has substantively lessened our dependence upon Pakistan in recent months. The United States should take the Leahy Amendment, and other provisions of US law pertaining to human rights abuses and support of terrorist groups, more seriously and develop the domestic will to enforce them.

However, while Balochistan is strategically important to the United States (as well as Iran and Afghanistan and even India), what is happening within the province is largely a Pakistani internal affair. In principle, there is nothing wrong that cannot be remedied within the country's embattled constitutional framework given a genuine commitment by all relevant parties and state willingness to exert proper governance and law and order—with appropriate external pressure. *Given the ethnic diversity of the province, its complicated history, and the existing geographic constraints, an independent Balochistan is untenable and proposals on this point will not be entertained by this author*. However

Pakistan should be encouraged by all means of suasion to normalize relations with this important province and reverse decades of mismanagement, state-sponsored violence, and even predation by the center.

Unfortunately, one of the down sides of this hearing is that it comes at a time when U.S.-Pakistan relations could not be more strained and when U.S. ability to successfully prosecute its varied interests in the region could not be more in question given public exhaustion with the eleven-year war in Afghanistan as well as an ongoing global and domestic financial crisis. With some of the rhetoric surrounding this hearing and intimated U.S. "....support for a Balochistan carved out of Pakistan to diminish [Pakistan's] radical power," (Gohmert and Rohrabacher, 2012) it is easy to lose focus upon the real issues in Balochistan. Thus the U.S. government would be behooved to not make this an issue that further complicates the tough road ahead for U.S. diplomacy with respect to an obdurate set of security risks that inhere in Pakistan and will continue to do so for any foreseeable future.

Turning to Pakistan and its ability to bringing about some change in the wretched prevailing situation, one important proposed step that needs to be fully executed is the initiative undertaken in 2009 by the current civilian government called "Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan" (Beginning of Right in Balochistan). This is a package of constitutional, economic, political, and administrative reforms, motivated by an understanding that the government has failed to empower the provinces, as called for in the 1973 constitution. This scheme—if fully implemented—would require the government to: obtain the consent of the provincial government before undertaking any major project; compensate communities displaced by violence; increase the representation of Baloch in the civil service; and grant provincial and local government authorities a greater share of revenues (Human Rights Watch, 2011a). The package also calls for a temporary hold on construction of controversial military outposts and the replacement of the military in the province by the Frontier Corps (which recruits locally even though its officers come from the Pakistan army). Law and order operations would be placed under the control of the chief minister. The initiative also calls for investigations of targeted killings and other murders as well as into the cases of persons who have "disappeared," and for the immediate release of all persons who are detained without charges. Reflecting at least some degree of commitment, the federal government released Rs. 12 billion (roughly $140 million) in outstanding debts from Balochistan's natural gas revenues and announced a Rs. 152 billion ($1.77 billion) budget for the province. It also announced a judicial inquiry into the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti and other Baloch political leaders (Human Rights Watch, 2011b).

Another important step is the 2010 Eighteenth Amendment which provides for greater devolution of powers from the center to the provinces and further to sub-provincial governance institutions (Council on Foreign Relations, 2010). The process of devolution is ongoing but has not been without problems. Without proper taxation. One critic (Bangash, 2011) argues that the "The 18th Amendment, rather than improving the centre-provincial equation in terms of more provincial autonomy, has further exacerbated the problem. Without sufficient taxation powers, the provinces will never have enough funds to effectively run the subjects currently being devolved, nor would they be able to control the rate of taxes in response to the conditions of their province." He also believes that devolving control of the natural and mineral resources in the varied provinces exacerbates rather than mitigates tensions and

results in negligible provincial revenue generation and concomitant development. Another observer (Bhutta 2011) has noted recently that Balochistan in particular is actually worse after devolution.

These moves by the center are important, and will be even more so if they are fully executed with adequate attention to the provinces ability to raise revenue. Unfortunately, fractured politics and inadequate capacity at the provincial level may well undermine national efforts. This is particularly acute in Balochistan. First, few politicians in the Baloch Provincial Assembly bother to show up for work. In 2008, I spent several hours with a member of the provincial assembly who told me bluntly that she had no interest in legislating. She is not alone. The Balochistan state assembly frequently cannot conduct business because it lacks a quorum (Baloch, 2011). Second, in the past, provincial bureaucracies have had trouble executing their budgets due to human capital and other capacity constraints (author interviews with provincial educational officials in 2008). Simply augmenting the budget without expanding capacity is unlikely to translate into substantial improvements to any of Balochistan's abysmal metrics. Third, it is difficult to envision the recruitment of sufficient teachers or other service providers for this chronically underserved population without going outside the province. Similarly, non-local civil servants will likely be necessary to increase government capacity. In other words, there is an immediate need for external assistance in human service provision, even though in the future the province should eventually produce its own public servants.

If Balochistan is ever to transition from its current state of underdevelopment, those Baloch nationalists who are using violence as a cool of coercion must put down their weapons. Targeted killing based upon ethnicity is abhorrent under all circumstances irrespective of the motivation or identity of the murderer. At the same time, the state needs to abandon its preferred militarized conflict resolution techniques in preference to engaging legitimate grievances, fortify its commitment to its own constitution, continue devolution of power (and revenue generation) to the provinces, and pursue good faith efforts to expand development opportunities for all of its citizens. These are tall orders that should not foster optimism. However, the United States working with its partners can use select instruments of its national powers to encourage Pakistan to the right thing.

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[i] Pakistan's senate has 100 members. Each of the four provinces (Balochistan, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Sindh) have 22; the Federal Capital of Islamabad has four and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas have eight. (Senate of Pakistan, 2012).

Table 1. Demographic Indicators -1998 Census

Indicator	*Pakistan*	Baluchistan	Punjab	Sindh	KPK	FATA	Federal Territory of Islamabad
Literacy rate*	*44%*	*15%*	*47%*	45%	35%	17%	73%
Unemployment Rate*	*20%*	*33%*	*19%*	14%	27%	NA	16%
Percent of households using electricity for lighting**	*91%*	*72%*	*93%*	90%	93%	NA	98%
Use wood or charcoal for cooking**	*65%*	*96%*	*41%*	45%	76%	NA	23%
Use piped water as main source of drinking water**	*32%*	*35%*	*79%*	43%	45%	NA	NA
Using flush toilets**	*86%*	*31%*	*72%*	62%	62%	NA	96%
Human Development Index (2005)***	*0.62*	*0.54*	*0.67*	0.63	0.61	NA	NA

Sources: * Pakistan Census, "DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS - 1998 CENSUS," http://www.census.gov.pk/DemographicIndicator.htm (accessed February 5, 2012).
** Government f Pakistan, Statistics Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics, *Pakistan Social And Living Standards Measurement Survey (2010-11) National / Provincial / District,* Chapter 4. "Housing, Water Supply and Sanitation," http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/pakistan-social-and-living-standards-measurement-survey-pslm-2010-11-provincial-district-0 (accessed February 5, 2012).
***Haroon Jamal and Amir Jahan Khan, "Trends in Regional Human Development Indices," SPDC Research Report No. 73, July 2007, http://www.spdc.org.pk/Publications/Research%20Reports/RR-73.pdf (accessed February 5, 2012).

Map 1. Balochistan and Afghanistan

Source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection at the University of Texas, Austin http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-oclc-30048156l-afghan_paki_admin_2008.jpg.

Map 2. Balochistan Population by Tehsil



Source: IMMAP, http://www.immap.org/files/maps/395.jpg.

Map 3. Languages of Pakistan



Source: Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs, http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Pakistan_Baluchistan_Linguistic_lg.jpg.

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. We have with us Ralph Peters, a writer, strategist, media commentator, retired military officer. He is the author of 28 books and approximately 1,000 columns, articles, and essays. Being a writer, I can appreciate that, admire that.

He served in the U.S. Army for 22 years as an American—we are grateful for that service—first as an enlisted man, then as an officer, retiring shortly after his promotion to lieutenant colonel. As a soldier, Ralph served in the infantry and military intelligence units before becoming a foreign area officer specializing in Russia and surrounding states.

He also served in the Executive Office of the President. Special assignments took him to Southeast Asia, Central Asia, to the Caucasus, to Pakistan, and Burma. He has traveled extensively in the Muslim world as well as studying in India, sub-Saharan Africa, and Indonesia. He has reported from various conflict zones, including Iraq, Israel, and sub-Saharan Africa.

Mr. Peters, you have 5 minutes, and we look forward to hearing your testimony.

STATEMENT OF MR. RALPH PETERS, MILITARY ANALYST AND AUTHOR

Mr. PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this opportunity, and I am sure you will agree with me, as will Congressman Carnahan, that such an important problem cannot be approached in a partisan manner, and we ought to act as Americans with our American values and bring those to bear, not an ideology of any kind.

Let us start with the incontrovertible fact and that is that Baluchistan is occupied territory. It never willingly acceded to Pakistan, does not now wish to be part of Pakistan. If a plebiscite or referendum were held tomorrow, it would vote to leave Pakistan, as would every province and territory west of the Indus River.

We have a fundamental problem in that we refuse to see Pakistan for what it is. We imagine or pretend that it is a legitimate state, really in our own image, a democracy, but it is a democracy only as long as its military rulers allow it to be a democracy.

It is, in fact, a miniature empire, a last artifact, along with a few other countries around the world, of the imperial age, with artificial borders which we defend, as we do elsewhere, and I find it a travesty that our State Department obsesses on the inviolability of borders around the world drawn at Versailles or in Berlin in the 1880s or in the late 1940s.

How is it in the year of our Lord 2012 we send our troops to bleed or die to defend the residue of the European world order? And let me be clear. I do not argue that we should actively campaign militarily to change every border in the world. I argue that when the train is coming down the tracks toward you, you are wise to step off the tracks.

In the last two decades since the end of the Cold War, the United States of America, the greatest force for freedom in human history, every war and conflict in which we have engaged has been triggered by or exacerbated by these flawed European borders. How can we send our soldiers and Marines and Navy corpsmen to die for that? That is not who we are.

What is Pakistan? Pakistan is bisected by the Indus River. To the east of the Indus River is metropolitan, core Pakistan, the Punjab, and to a great extent the province of Sindh. It is the world of the subcontinent. It is a different civilization from that west of the Indus River.

West of the Indus River in the occupied territories you have the culture of central and mid Asia. When you cross the Indus River either way, even the food is different. And we look at this occupied territory of Baluchistan specifically where people who simply yearn for fundamental freedoms, for the right to determine their own future, whether or not they have a battery of qualified teachers ready to go. We must admire their determination to sacrifice everything against enormous odds in Pakistan and Iran for the simple right to say, I am a Baluch; I will decide my own future.

Instead, we face—we support Pakistan, their oppressor, a state that actively supports and arms terrorists and insurgent movements in Afghanistan that kill and maim our own soldiers. The Pakistani Government is not our friend. It is not the friend of the Baluch or the other subjugated peoples west of the Indus River. The Durand line, of course, which divides Pakistan and Afghanistan is artificial. It divides people who want to be together.

Mr. Chairman, my time is running out, so let me simply say this last thing.

Two hundred years ago, one of our greatest Presidents faced a problem. The Barbary pirates refused to let our ships pass in peace, so we paid tribute money to let our goods pass. Thomas Jefferson put a stop to that.

Today, we are paying tribute money again, this time to the Pakistani pirates to let our goods pass to Afghanistan. Mr. Chairman, I am looking for a Thomas Jefferson.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Peters follows:]

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Baluchistan Hearing, February 8, 2012

Testimony of Ralph Peters, military analyst and author

"PAKISTAN AS A FAILING EMPIRE"

Introductory remarks: This testimony arises from three premises.

First, we cannot analyze global events through reassuring ideological lenses, be they left or right, or we will continue to be mistaken, surprised and bewildered by foreign developments. The rest of the world will neither conform to our prejudices nor behave for our convenience.

Second, focusing obsessively on short-term problems blinds us to the root causes and frequent intractability of today's conflicts. Because we do not know history, we wave history away. Yet, the only way to understand the new world disorder is to place current developments in the context of generations and even centuries. Otherwise, we will continue to blunder through situations in which we deploy to Afghanistan to end Taliban rule, only to find ourselves, a decade later, impatient to negotiate the Taliban's return to power.

Third, we must not be afraid to "color outside of the lines." When it comes to foreign affairs, Washington's political spectrum is monochromatic: timid, conformist and wrong with breathtaking consistency. We have a Department of State that refuses to think beyond borders codified at Versailles nine decades ago; a Department of Defense that, faced with messianic and ethnic insurgencies, concocted its doctrine from irrelevant case studies of yesteryear's Marxist guerrillas; and a think-tank community almost Stalinist in its rigid allegiance to twentieth-century models of how the world should work.

If we do not think innovatively, we will continue to fail ignobly.

Pakistan's Empire and Baluchistan's Freedom Struggle

Pakistan is not an integrated state, but a miniature empire that inherited its dysfunctional and unjust boundaries from Britain's greater, now-defunct empire. Pakistan consists of two parts: the core Pakistan constituted by the comparatively rich and powerful provinces of Punjab and Sindh, and the territories, primarily west of the Indus River, treated as colonial possessions by the Punjabis and Sindhis. Once an observer grasps this elementary fact, Pakistan's internal problems and our own difficulties with Islamabad come into focus.

We must set aside our lazy Cold-War-era assumption that Pakistan is a necessary ally and recognize that the various insurgent movements challenging the Islamabad government are engaged in liberation struggles against an occupier. Whether Baluchi separatists or the Pakistani Taliban, these fighters (some of them certainly distasteful to our social values) are not an isolated phenomenon—as we would prefer to believe—but simply more players in the long struggle for the devolution of power that began with the collapse of European empires. Their version of freedom may not match our criteria, but they are, nonetheless, freedom fighters on their own terms and for their own people.

Pakistan's borders make no sense and don't work. The Durand Line, delineating the state's border with Afghanistan, was just a convenient inheritance from British India: Originally, it established how far the British believed they needed to push out a buffer zone west of the Indus River to protect "the Jewel in the Crown," British India, from tribal warfare and imperial Russian machinations. The Durand Line marked a *military* frontier, but the "real" frontier of British India and its rich civilization was the Indus.

Anyone who travels to Pakistan and drives across the Indus in either direction recognizes that the river remains what it has been since the age of Alexander: the divide between civilizations. To the east, in populous Punjab and Sindh, you encounter the complex cultures of the Subcontinent: Even the food is dramatically different. To the west, you find tribal societies whose characteristics, cultural and physical, are those of Central Asia. To the east, relative sophistication; to the west, tribal norms. From Gwadar northward through Quetta, Peshawar and on to Gilgit, the visitor stands on occupied territory.

The Durand Line arbitrarily divided tribal territories for British (and now Pakistani) convenience. It would be hard to devise a more dysfunctional international border. Along with the rupture of minor ethnic groups, it split the substantial Pashtun and Baluchi populations between the artificial constructs that emerged as Pakistan and Afghanistan. Also for convenience, the rest of the world agreed to pretend that these are viable states. Yet, Afghanistan is little more than a rough territorial concept: Its historical rulers controlled, at best, major cities and the caravan (now highway) routes between them. At its birth sixty-five years ago, Pakistan was a Frankenstein's monster of a state, cobbled together from ill-fitting body parts to award the subcontinent's Muslim activists a state of their own.

Today's ethnic-based and religion-fueled insurgencies are inevitable protests against borders that never worked and cultures that don't match. Even Afghanistan's western border is a manifestation not of sound geopolitical logic, but of Iran's weakness at the time the border was determined. Afghanistan will *never* become a modern, integrated state; Pakistan will never be a prosperous and peaceful one; and Iran will never be a contented one.

When we support the Islamabad government, we not only support an enemy who sponsors and protects the terrorists who kill and maim our soldiers in Afghanistan; who hid our most-wanted terrorist in a garrison town; and who extorts blood-money to keep our ill-conceived supply routes open; but we also support a brutal oppressor and occupier that denies fundamental rights, legitimate opportunities and even identity to millions of its own citizens.

Failing to distinguish adequately between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, we cannot conceive of the Pashtuns as engaged in a freedom struggle: Their social values and religious fanaticism are abhorrent to us. Yet, objectively viewed, they are fighting—with broad popular support among their own kind—for independence and their reactionary, tribal version of

freedom. If we remove our emotions and prejudices from the equation, can we justify denying forty million Pashtuns in Pakistan and Afghanistan their own state? Of course, determining the final boundaries of such a state would be problematic, but why shouldn't the Pashtuns have their own country? Because long-dead Britons drew a line on a map?

The same logic applies with even greater force to the Baluchis, who are not our enemies. We remain blinded by our ill-starred Cold-War alliance with Islamabad—a regime that always behaved treacherously toward us (our current relationship with Pakistan bears an uncanny resemblance to our country's relations with the Barbary Pirates before President Jefferson put an end to tribute money). Thus we miss the fundamental injustice of the Pakistani construct. We avert our eyes from the arrests and murders of Baluchi activists because we're unwilling to face the truth about Islamabad's nature—and our complicity in oppression.

At present, the Baluchis are divided between southwestern Pakistan, southern Afghanistan and southeastern Iran—all because of those artificial borders that were convenient for someone else. At least ten million and perhaps twice that number suffer intolerable levels of discrimination, dispossession and state violence.

While going to Afghanistan to shatter al Qaeda and punish the Taliban for hosting Osama bin Laden was necessary, remaining in force to persuade Afghans to remake themselves in our image was folly. With the best intentions, we thrust ourselves into a generations-long civil war that will, eventually, redraw the region's boundaries. In fact, our allegiance to today's boundaries exacerbates the conflict, worsening the lot of our former allies, the Northern Alliance, and marginalizing the Baluchis in the south, while enabling the Taliban to exploit those borders against us (with Pakistan's help).

Afghanistan's borders don't work, and Pakistan's borders don't work. It's not our job to alter them, but it's a fool's errand to defend them. We have stranded 100,000 American troops at the end of vulnerable supply lines through hostile or unreliable states in order to defend borders left behind by defunct European empires. This is a travesty of the first order. And instead of recognizing that peoples throughout the conflict zone, from Baluchis, through Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, to Kashmiri separatists are fighting for their identities and independence in multi-sided conflicts, we reduce the formula to us-against-them. But this conflict is not about us. We're military tourists passing through, unwilling to recognize the nature of the fight into which we have thrust ourselves.

We're on the wrong side of history in AfPak, defending the legacy of imperial ghosts. And we're going to lose. It's not our job to change these borders ourselves, but it's only common sense to get out of the way. We support the Karzai government from a lack of strategic imagination, bureaucratic inertia and military vanity. And our support for Pakistan is not only un-American, but facilitates the ongoing murder and mutilation of our troops.

Killing terrorists across the border in Pakistan is the sole useful aspect of our presence in Afghanistan. It doesn't take 100,000 troops.

The Pakistani Military's Obsession with Afghanistan

Pakistani strategic thought is frozen in the mid-twentieth century. The Pakistani military's world-view was shaped primarily by two events. First, the relatively junior officers who became Pakistan's colonels and generals at Independence had witnessed how the British were able to exploit strategic depth when the Japanese sought to invade India; despite the impressive initial victories of the Japanese and their superior fighting qualities early in the war, extended supply lines exhausted them and left them vulnerable to counteroffensives that finally destroyed their armies. Thus, the Pakistani military has been obsessed since its creation with strategic depth for a war with India. Their thinking always missed the fact that the Burma buffer kept the Japanese from the prize, while India would reach the prize immediately--the Afghan buffer and strategic depth are on the wrong side. But strategic depth became the basis of Pakistani strategy and no one dares challenge it. Even the threat of nuclear conflict has failed to alter the Pakistani mindset, with generals still insisting that strategic depth in the Afghan wilds would somehow be useful after the nuclear destruction of Pakistan. (A key lesson here is that strategy—including our own—is more often driven by habit and emotion than logic.) So, today, we have Pakistan's security establishment waging a clandestine war against our presence in Afghanistan, determined to secure Afghanistan for strategic depth in a war with India that Pakistan would lose catastrophically at the outset.

The other key event that shaped the mindset of today's Pakistani generals was the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 (by far the most traumatic for Islamabad of the four wars and numerous lesser confrontations between the two countries since Independence). The war began as Pakistan's military moved to crush the independence movement in East Bengal (today's Bangladesh). The savagery of the Pakistani army toward its own citizens shocked the world and gave India cover for intervening and dismembering Pakistan—a great advantage for New Delhi, since East Bengal had allowed Pakistan to operate against India's eastern as well as western frontier. The Pakistani military's humiliating defeat and the loss of nearly half of the state they inherited from British India left the security establishment determined to crack down hard and early on any signs of separatism.

Unfortunately for Pakistan, the obsession with strategic depth ultimately trumped anti-separatism policies to the extent that Pakistan assisted in the rise of the Taliban and maintains support for it today. Pakistan's generals assumed, naively, that terrorists and insurgents could be managed (we're not the only victims of wishful thinking). But the Afghan Taliban in turn gave birth to the Pakistani Taliban. Now the Pakistani security establishment is riven, intermittently fighting some insurgents, while tolerating or actively supporting others, and unsure how to move forward.

In supporting the Pashtun insurgency in Afghanistan, Pakistan has sown the seeds of its own destruction. While its generals remain skillful at manipulating the United States Government, they have lost control of significant portions of their own country.

Only a gross perversion of *Realpolitik* could justify our acceptance of this military's brutality toward the Baluchis and other minorities. We are in bed with an imperialist, militarist and thoroughly corrupt state that barely makes a pretense of democracy. We *want* to be duped.

AfPak in a Global Context

The problem of dysfunctional borders left behind by the retreat of European empires isn't limited to AfPak. One of our own worst blind spots lies in the conviction of our diplomats that all borders currently on the map have existed since the age of the dinosaurs and must never change. But borders have always changed and will continue to change. Our own age is one of breakdown: first of those European empires, now of the vestigial empires and artificial states that appeared in their wake. Not only in AfPak, but around the world the grim joke is that the United States of America, the greatest force for freedom in history, now defends the legacy of bygone European empires.

Consider this: Every one of our wars and significant military engagements since and including Desert Storm has been triggered or exacerbated by artificial borders left behind by European empires: Iraq has always been a phony state created for British clients, and Saddam Hussein decided that the Ottoman Empire's old borders entitled him to Kuwait; Somalia is a bizarre amalgamation of territories that divides some peoples, while thrusting together others who hate each other (yet, our diplomats refuse to recognize Somaliland as a separate—thriving—state, insisting that it must remain under the mastery of a Mogadishu government that cannot defend itself again Islamist terrorists); Yugoslavia, too, was a mini-empire doomed to collapse, yet Republican and Democratic administrations alike continued to argue that the shrinking state should somehow remain unified; we went to Afghanistan and decided that the will of the locals didn't matter and that we would build a western-style, rule-of-law, unified democracy within European-designated borders; and we deposed Saddam Hussein, but refused to countenance freedom for the Kurds or a judicious break-up of the dysfunctional state, insisting again that those European-drawn borders remain sacrosanct. Now we face a conflict with Iran--the latest, shrunken version of a Persian Empire—while Turkey dreams of re-establishing the Ottoman Empire. Not one of the borders listed in this paragraph worked or works.

Beyond the litany of our recent and pending military involvements, consider just a few of the other crises underway that stem from European-demarcated borders that either thrust together those who do not wish to be together, or divide peoples who seek reunion: Nigeria only maintains its current borders because those boundaries were established by British colonialists; otherwise, Nigeria makes no sense as a state and, by nature, would be two or even three states. Congo does not and cannot possibly work as a unified state, but other European empires awarded it to the King of the Belgians in the 1880s, so we accept it as a sovereign state for all eternity. Today's Syria was created for the French in a bout of Franco-British horse-trading (or land-swapping). Jordan was created as a prize for British Great-War clients. Indonesia—another empire—is just the post-colonial name of the Dutch East Indies, with no other unifying principle than the might of the Javanese. And Russia maintains much, though not all, of the empire of the czars.

The unifying thread—beyond the false borders themselves—is the centrifugal pressures created by peoples determined to rule themselves. When we automatically side with the "imperial" powers against the right of self-determination, we betray our own history and professed values. This certainly does not mean that every secessionist movement is admirable, only that these movements are inevitable in a world so long deformed by European empires.

Nor will these problems soon resolve themselves. Every person in this room will be dead before the legacy of the European imperial era is fully behind us. Apply simple logic: Depending on which part of the globe we examine, European imperial powers forcefully altered local social, governmental, military and economic structures for between one-hundred and five-hundred years. The post-colonial era began in earnest in 1945. Can we really believe that dilemmas that took up to half a millennium to create can be resolved in an American election cycle or two? Nor is this to say that all of Europe's imperial legacies were bad: They were a mixed bag, varying from the monstrous cruelty of the Belgians in Africa, to the unifying legacy of the British in today's India. Rather than arguing over just how bad the colonial powers were, we need to accept their interlude of rule as historical fact and move on from that point.

The best way to explain the varied upheavals we see around the world, from Benghazi to Baluchistan, from Caracas to Kandahar, is to think of human societies as eco-systems or simply physical systems. In the Newtonian order (and ninth-grade physics), when an external agent forces a system out of its natural balance and holds it out of balance, the sudden removal of the external agent causes the affected system to seek to regain its equilibrium. For centuries, the external force of European colonialism forced human societies around the world out of the "organic" balance they had achieved for themselves (although it doesn't do to shed tears for the Aztecs). With the sudden removal of that external force, we've seen the liberated societies strive to find a new functional balance. The process is difficult and fraught with mistakes, and patience is not a salient human characteristic. When the process frustrates the participants sufficiently, they turn to violence. Almost all of the wars and conflicts we see around us, from South Sudan to Daghestan, reflect the challenges of rebalancing social and political ecologies. Artificial borders make it all worse.

And there's more bad news: Globalization, which we were assured would bring us all together, only unified the world's most privileged. For the masses, globalization and its consort, the information revolution, have created a wrenching crisis of identity: Around the world, disappointed human beings have defaulted to the elementary question "Who am I?"

Increasingly, their answer is not the one academic theories predicted. Instead of answering, "I am a Pakistani" or "Afghan" or "Nigerian" or "a citizen of the world," their answer is "I am a Baluch" or "Pashtun" or "Hausa," or, even more fundamentally, "I am a Muslim" or "Christian" or "Jew." In times of stress and dislocation, primary identities reassert themselves—and no identities are more powerful or persistent than those of faith and ethnicity. Kabul intellectuals may tell us that they're "Afghans," but our Western-educated interlocutors only deceive us (and themselves). This is an age of comprehensive breakdown, when even Europeans insist that they are Walloons, Catalans, Lombards or Scots.

What Should We Do?

None of the points made above are intended to spark an American campaign to fix all the world's flawed borders. We can't and we shouldn't. Rather, the purpose is to warn against the folly of defending the doomed relics of the colonial era. There may be times when preserving specific artificial borders are a strategic necessity, but we should not reflexively defend all extant borders for the convenience of diplomats delighted with their embassy housing assignments. When borders are under great local pressure to change, it's usually best to get

out of the way and let them change. The process and result will often be messy, even disheartening...but we cannot resist the deepest currents of history. Our demand for instant gratification is our greatest strategic weakness.

We must stand back and try to understand the roots of strategic diseases and not just rush to treat the topical symptoms.

We also need to accept that the Cold War is over. Russia remains a self-destructive nuisance, but some old alliances—not least, ours with Pakistan—do far more harm than good (as did our long support for the Mubarak regime in Egypt, for example). Instead of applying a comforting twentieth-century template to the world, we must work to understand the new orders that are emerging—and will continue to emerge for generations. And unless we wish to continue to waste the blood of our troops and our treasure, we must not be afraid to be politically incorrect.

We must stop casting geostrategic challenges in simplistic us-vs.-them terms. Every conflict in which we have been engaged in recent years has been many-sided and many-layered. I used to quip that, in the Balkans, you can't ask "Who's guilty?" but have to ask "Who's guilty this week?" In complex, multi-generational conflicts such as those playing out in the semi-governed territories we call "Pakistan" and "Afghanistan," players may be helpful and treacherous simultaneously. Instead of forever asking "Who are the good guys?" we need to ask "Which course of action is to *our* advantage?"

We need to ask honestly why Baluchis are not entitled to a Free Baluchistan, why the Pashtuns—despite their abhorrent customs—are not entitled to a Pakhtunkhwa for all Pashtuns, why forty-million Kurds aren't entitled to a Free Kurdistan, or why its eastern provinces must remain part of the geopolitical monstrosity we call "Congo." Again, the point is not to encourage an activist foreign policy, but simply to recognize that it's usually wise to get out of the way of the oncoming train.

We live in a great age of contradictions and confusions, even in our terminology. While the Taliban are insurgents, they are not revolutionaries, but reactionary forces fighting for the old ways of tribal life. We are the revolutionaries, but tribal, religion-tyrannized cultures don't want our program of secular values and social liberation (we're willfully blind to the fact that in Afghanistan we are attempting exactly what the Russians attempted—not only governmental, but social and moral modernization; for example, the Russians did more for the plight of Afghan women than we have). While we may hold our own ideological convictions dear, we have to learn to content ourselves with doing what's necessary and doable.

Serious strategy begins with three questions: What precisely do we want to achieve? Is it achievable? And, if it's achievable, is it worth the probable cost? In our recent conflicts, we failed to answer a single one of those questions honestly.

Except for existential wars of survival, sound strategy aims at a positive return on investment—just as we expect a positive return on the money we put into our retirement accounts. In conflicts in which we have a choice of engagement or non-intervention, we have to become more sophisticated at analyzing the "investment quality" of our decision. Again, we return to the basic question: "What do we get out of it?" Turning our occupation of Iraq into a looting orgy for well-connected contractors did not enhance the security of our citizens.

The old American argument of Crusader America versus Fortress America, of interventionist versus isolationist, is dangerous and childish. We cannot hide in Kansas because, as on 9/11,

the world comes to us. But we also cannot embark upon spendthrift nation-building efforts where there's no nation to build.

We need to re-learn the strategic art of acting in our own interests. Generally, our interests are not served by clinging to old, dictatorial or corrupt regimes, but by declining to support the dying order. At times, military intervention in support of change may be to our advantage. More often, it will be a matter of getting out of the way of the inevitable. But what we should never do is to align ourselves with violent oppressors of minorities, with blackmailers, or with those who help our enemies kill our troops. In other words, it's time to abandon Pakistan and switch our support wholeheartedly to India.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, and I am looking for William Eaton myself. That was pretty deep there.

Mr. PETERS. Mr. Chairman, I am trying to be——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Thank you very much. I appreciate you softening your remarks and making them so nobody really knows where you are coming from. Great.

Both of our witnesses have been very tough, and that is the way you want to be. You want to be up front. Because if people are hiding what their real beliefs are, trying to couch it, we are never going to—people aren't going to understand what the reality is if we are trying to not make other people angry, but we want to make sure all of us are educated to that.

The next witness is Mr. T. Kumar. Mr. T. Kumar, who I know very well, an advocacy director for Asia Pacific, for Amnesty International, who is a persona here on the Hill and a champion of human rights. He has worked in several Asian and African countries and served as a human rights monitor in many Asian countries as well as Bosnia, Haiti, Guatemala, South Africa.

Kumar is frequently lecturing at the Foreign Service Institute where U.S. diplomats are trained and often testifies before the United States Senate and House of Representatives. He holds an advanced degree in law from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF MR. T. KUMAR, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA

Mr. KUMAR. Thank you very much, Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and Members of Congress, when I saw the announcement about having a hearing on Baluchistan, it came back to Afghanistan during the time when Afghanistan was forgotten by the entire world. Chairman, you understand what happened after the collapse of Soviet Union.

The people of Baluchistan were going through nightmare for the years, torture, disappearances, extra-judicial executions, but the world refused to look at them. Leave alone Pakistanis. Even the Pakistani civil society was limited—there were some exceptions—did not speak up about the plight of Baluchis that they wound up going—massive disappearances. Disappearance means to kidnap people or arrest people and never be heard again.

Hundreds disappeared. We have documented recently—we are talking about after the so-called democracy came to Pakistan—almost 250 disappearances in a year's time. And extra-judicial executions, torture.

So the brutality was continuing in Baluchistan, despite the fact that it is just next door to Afghanistan, where U.S. has enormous interest and Pakistan, again, enormous interest. So on that note, we are pleased and honored that you are holding this hearing to bring attention to the plight of Baluchistan.

What's happening to Baluch people? It is a kill and dump operation. It is a terror mechanism that the Pakistani military and the intelligence officers who use to terrorize the local population. It may be for a political reason because some people, maybe a majority of Baluch, may be asking for independence.

By the way, on that note, Amnesty International, as a human rights organization, does not take position on whether a country is independent or not.

But, having said that, they brutalize the population because the population wanted some opening in their political aspirations. Then when people speak up, the weapons that were used against them were, unfortunately, manufactured in the U.S. and given to by the U.S.

A couple of years ago when the disappearance was high rocketing in Baluchistan, the Baluchistan Governor was here. So I asked him actually at USIP, I asked him where the—whose weapons are you using? He said, oh, it is American weapons. The reason is no conditions were put on it.

So it is a matter of principle that Congress can put some requirement that no U.S. weapons should be used in Baluchistan in abusing its own citizens. That is something you can do. You won't get permission from the State Department.

Speaking about State Department, they were in sleep for years, not only now, earlier on as well. When Senator Baloch, Sana Baloch, was invited again to USIP, they refused to give him visa to come and testify. He is a Senator, elected Senate. So there are concerns that even U.S. over the years have ignored for different political reasons.

So now the time has come through this hearing and through other mechanisms. We hope the State will also—the administration will also change its policy, not about any political questions there but primarily talking about the plight of Baluchis and how to stop abuses that are happening against them.

There are also other people who are involved in abusing the human rights in that area. One group is, obviously, the group that fight for independence. These are Baluch nationalists. They were the prime victims of abuse. At the same time, there are reports that they also targeted killing of Punjabis and others.

So it is a time that Baluch population examined themselves, that since you have been abused, you know the value of human rights. You should speak up and to stop the abuses against anyone. It could be anyone.

I know my time is up. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kumar follows:]

Human Rights in Balochistan

Before the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Committee on Foreign Affairs
United States House of Representatives

Testimony by

T. Kumar
International Advocacy Director
Amnesty International, USA

February 8, 2012

Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, Amnesty International is pleased to testify in this hearing. The human rights situation in the Pakistani province of Balochistan is extremely disturbing. This is one of the most militarized regions of Pakistan.

Summary:

According to our own research, at least 249 Baloch activists, teachers, journalists and lawyers have disappeared or been murdered between 24 October 2010 and 10 September 2011 alone, many in so-called 'kill and dump' operations. At least 7 Baloch journalists who openly promoted nationalist causes were killed in the provinces in 2011. Enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, torture, and extra-judicial and other unlawful killings carried out with total impunity by state forces in Balochistan.

Armed Baloch groups have been implicated in the targeted killings of state security forces, non-Baloch civilians and government employees, including teachers at government education institutions and Urudu and Panjabi speaking civilians whose only crime appears to be their ethnic or linguistic background.

Sectarian attacks increased in Balochistan including deliberate targeting of minority Shi'a Muslims by militant groups including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and others.

Background:

Amnesty International is deeply concerned about the chronic insecurity faced by people in the province of Balochistan. The Pakistani government is primarily to blame for this situation due to its inability or unwillingness to protect civilians from human rights abuses or bring perpetrators to justice.

Years of human rights violations by Pakistani security forces and the continued failure of the Pakistani government to adequately address economic and social demands in the country's poorest region has entrenched a sense of hopelessness and resentment in the Baloch community.

All communities in Balochistan face poor access to health facilities, education, energy and infrastructure and opportunities for employment. But the Balochi and Brahui-speaking regions of the province have been and remain the most neglected and least developed by the state, despite these areas being rich in mineral resources and fossil fuels.

Balochistan is one of the most militarized regions of Pakistan, with the military, paramilitary Frontier Corp and levies, and police stationed across this vast province. Despite this presence, or perhaps because of it, Balochistan is one of the most dangerous parts of Pakistan, with armed

groups affiliated with the state, sectarian armed groups, armed groups hostile to the state, and criminal gangs operating with near complete impunity.

Most victims of human rights abuses – whether the perpetrator is affiliated with the state, armed Baloch or sectarian groups – are too terrified to speak openly for fear of being killed. With the upsurge in violence and collapse of the rule of law, the province is gradually heading to a state of perpetual conflict that threatens stability not only in Pakistan but also in the neighboring countries of Afghanistan and Iran, and throughout the region.

Human rights violations attributed to security forces

According to our own research, at least 249 Baloch activists, teachers, journalists and lawyers have disappeared or been murdered between 24 October 2010 and 10 September 2011 alone, many in so-called 'kill and dump' operations.

The bullet-ridden bodies of missing persons, most allegedly bearing torture marks, have been recovered across the province almost every day. Victims' families and the Baloch population at large blame these 'kill and dump' incidents on Pakistani security forces, especially the Frontier Corps and intelligence services.

Many of the victims were reportedly abducted by uniformed Frontier Corps soldiers, often accompanying men in plain clothes, in front of multiple witnesses at military checkposts and in cities and towns.

Security forces deny the charges and claim that the deaths are a result of rivalry between Baloch militant groups, but the systematic and widespread nature of these killings, and the fact that several of the victims were witnessed being detained by state forces weeks or months before later being found dead, suggests otherwise. State security forces have also been

accused of supporting pro-state Baloch armed groups accused of killing Baloch nationalists. At least 7 Baloch journalists who openly promoted nationalist causes were killed in the provinces in 2011.

The Pakistan government must immediately put an end to the practice of enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, torture, and extra-judicial and other unlawful killings carried out with total impunity by state forces in Balochistan. Credible investigations into these incidents – resulting in prosecutions – are absolutely necessary to establish even a basic level of stability in the province and develop trust between the Baloch people and the Pakistan government.

Armed groups:

Armed Baloch groups have been implicated in the targeted killings of state security forces, non-Baloch civilians and government employees, including teachers at government education institutions, and Urdu and Punjabi-speaking civilians whose only crime appears to be their ethnic or linguistic background.

On 14 August 2010, Pakistan's Independence Day, 17 people of Punjabi origin were killed in Quetta. The Balochistan Liberation Army claimed responsibility, saying that the killings were in response to the killings of Baloch missing persons. Hundreds of teachers and other professionals have fled the province as a result of these killings, bringing the education system to a breaking point and damaging the local economy.

Baloch armed groups have also claimed responsibility for killing fellow Baloch accused of spying for the state, and have been implicated in the killing of members of rival political factions, including activists considered too moderate merely because they do not advocate complete separation from Pakistan.

Nationalist groups have also claimed responsibility for repeated attacks on gas and electricity infrastructure, causing severe energy shortages in the province. Balochistan is a very cold place in winter, and with gas, oil and electricity in short supply and prices very high, these attacks have been particularly debilitating for ordinary people living in the province.

Balochistan has also witnessed an influx of Taliban and other armed Islamist groups in the northern areas that are mainly populated by ethnic Pashtuns. Prominent Afghan Taliban leaders are widely believed to be based in Quetta. With the army clamping down on militancy in northwest Pakistan, Taliban insurgents are increasingly using areas of Balochistan to regroup and rearm, creating further instability.

Sectarian killings:

Sectarian attacks have occurred across Pakistan for some years now but have increased in Balochistan since at least 2010. These are not random killings but demonstrate the deliberate targeting of minority Shi'a Muslims by militant groups including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and others. Balochistan's Hazara Shi'a community claims that hundreds of their members have been murdered by Taliban and Sunni extremists since 2004.

Routine targeted killings against the Hazara and other groups because of their ethnicity, religion or political affiliation raises serious questions about the ability or willingness of Pakistan security forces to protect the people of Balochistan. Continued failure to address sectarian violence will only exacerbate the general breakdown in law and order in Balochistan.

Pakistani government response:

Despite several pledges to improve the law and order situation and put an end to human rights abuses in Balochistan, Pakistan's government has

failed to provide a clear framework for how it will achieve this and the situation continues to deteriorate.

In an attempt to address the Baloch community's deep-rooted sense of disenfranchisement, the Pakistan government in November 2009 launched the Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan, a peace and reconciliation package aimed at diffusing tensions in the province and bringing the Baloch into the mainstream of Pakistani society.

The reform package contains some 61 measures aimed at increasing provincial autonomy by addressing constitutional, economic, political and administrative grievances. Although the government claims to have implemented around 80% of the envisaged measures, there has been no major improvement in the human rights situation.

Baloch nationalist groups have dismissed the reform package as a half-hearted federal attempt to divert attention from their demands for full political autonomy.

The government has yet to publicly reveal the findings of its investigations into the hundreds of people believed to be held secretly by security forces and intelligence services as part of the so-called "war on terror," or in response to internal opposition in Balochistan.

In March 2010, the Pakistan government established the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances to trace the disappeared. Of the several hundred cases that have come before both commissions across Pakistan, only 224 people have been traced, including some from Balochistan.

As I have already outlined, these abuses continue unabated. Amnesty International has observed the Commission during its hearings and has noted several deficiencies, including the lack of a protection program for

those who have witnessed abuses and for relatives of victims, shortages in staffing capacity to investigate the high volume of cases, and failure to adequately investigate the security forces and intelligence services, which are frequently accused of involvement in disappearances.

No member of state security forces or intelligence services has been prosecuted for alleged involvement in the enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, torture or killing of victims.

Amnesty International calls on all parties to any armed conflict in Balochistan to:

- Comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II governing non-international armed conflicts.

Amnesty International calls on the Pakistani government to:

- Accede to the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance;
- Investigate all alleged human rights abuses in the province;
- Bring all perpetrators of abuses to justice, whether state or non-state actors, in trials meeting international standards of due process;
- Ensure that all individuals brought to justice receive a fair trial and are not subjected to torture or other abuses in detention; and
- Ensure any military operations comply with International Humanitarian Law applicable to non-international armed conflict.

Amnesty International calls on all non-state armed groups in Balochistan to:

- Refrain from committing human rights abuses and respect the laws of Pakistan that are consistent with international human rights standards and criminalize a range of human rights abuses, including torture, abduction

and unlawful killing; strictly abide by the provisions of international humanitarian law and ensure that civilians are not exposed to violence.

Amnesty International calls on the United States government to:

- Raise human rights abuses in Balochistan during all the interactions with the Government of Pakistan.
- Apply the Leahy Amendment without waivers to all Pakistani military units in Balochistan.

As one of Pakistan's most significant international allies, Amnesty International calls on the United States to apply the Leahy Amendment to ensure that military assistance to units of the Army, Air force, Navy, Frontier Corp, Levies, and other security forces supported by Pakistan in Balochistan is not linked to human rights abuses.

Thank you for inviting Amnesty International to testify in this hearing.

T. Kumar
International Advocacy Director
Amnesty International USA
Email: tkumar@aiusa.org

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Your time is up. That was left on a good note—no, no, don't applaud—because challenging people who want to have their human rights respected, challenging them to respect human rights of others is a really important point, and you just made that.

We have two other witnesses, and then we will go into our questions and answers.

We are joined, in the meantime, by another Member of Congress, a champion of American commitment to freedom and democracy, a real patriot from Texas, and a man of the law, Judge Poe. In fact, both Congressman Gohmert and Judge Poe are both former judges, and so when we talk about the law and the violations of human rights, they shine out with their expertise as well as their passion. So we are very happy to have you join us, Your Honor, and we will proceed with the witnesses right now so we can get through this and then go on to questions and answers.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We have Dr. Hossein Bor, a lawyer active in facilitating trade, investment, and project development between American corporations and their counterparts from Gulf countries.

Dr. Bor previously served as an adjunct professor of law at the Catholic University of America and was the energy and economic adviser to the Embassy of Qatar in Washington, DC, from 1982 to 1998. He has written extensively on various issues relating to the Middle East, including a treatise on Iran and nationalities. He holds a Ph.D. and degrees from both American University and Washington University.

And you may proceed, Dr. Bor.

STATEMENT OF M. HOSSEIN BOR, PH.D., COUNSEL, ENTWISTLE & CAPPUCCI, LLP

Mr. BOR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is a great honor and pleasure to speak on behalf of the Baluch. I am of course an American Baluch myself, and thank you for the opportunity.

As you know, Baluchistan is the most really—the Baluch people are the most persecuted, oppressed, and neglected peoples in the Middle East and South Asia; and of course you, Mr. Chairman, gave a very good overview of Baluch history. The only thing I can add, Baluch look at their history in one term. Baluch era or Baluch Doura means the era when the Baluch ruled themselves, and their institutions and values were supreme in Baluchistan, and the post-Baluch era, which is the era of colonialism and, of course, the subsequent division and forceful incorporation into Iran and Afghanistan and, of course, Pakistan.

And, of course, before the advent of colonialism you should also notice that the Baluch were independent. Like Europe, there were several feudal states, and in many eras also in the 14th, 15th century you had a large confederacy of Baluchi state and Durand, extending from Kirman in the east, in Persia, to the Indus Valley, and that is also the current boundaries of Baluchistan as a whole.

And, of course, as you well know, Baluchistan was divided by the British into three parts. Goldsmid Line, drawn in 1871 by the British colonial officers, divided Baluchistan between Iran and British India; and of course the Durand Line, drawn also by the British in 1894, divided Baluchistan between British India and Afghanistan.

And of course Baluch, ever since, they have been struggling to regain their lost freedom to reassert the Baluch control over their homeland, Baluchistan, and to preserve their language and culture.

And the Baluch have never accepted or recognized either the Goldsmid Line, dividing the Baluch between Iran and Pakistan, nor the Durand Line, separating north and Baluchistan. This is reflected in four insurrections by the Baluch against Pakistan in 1948, 1958, 1973, and 2005 insurgency, which is continuing and growing in strength each day. Like Baluch, Afghanistan and nationalist Pashtuns in Pakistan also do not recognize the Durand Line.

Of course, my colleagues, they well articulated the plight of human rights in Baluchistan and the egregious violation of Baluch human rights by Pakistani army and the Pakistani Government. The only thing I can add, according to a report published by the Asian Human Rights Commission on January 31st last month, it says that the extrajudicial killings of disappeared persons in Baluchistan include 23 bullet-riddled bodies found during the first month of this year, during January, 56 mutilated bodies during the last 6 months, and 271 bodies since July, 2010. That tells you about the extent of the brutality. And according, of course, to Baluch sources, the figures are much higher, and since 2001 about 4,000 Baluch have been—have disappeared, and this is a continuing problem, and that is one of the main reasons that the Baluch——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Excuse me, you said from 2001 to the present date how many?

Mr. BOR. 4,000.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. 4,000 people have disappeared.

Mr. BOR. Yes, sir.

And, of course, this is one of the main impediments to Baluch leaders negotiating with weak civilian government in Pakistan. Until these issues are resolved to the satisfaction of the aggrieved Baluch families, no Baluch leader would dare to negotiate with the Pakistani Government.

And of course they also—as they stated, Baluchistan is one of the most richest lands in the world—oil, aluminum, gold, coal—but it is exploited for the benefit of non-Baluch in Punjab. And even though the Baluchistan account for 30 percent of the natural gas exploited in Pakistan, Baluchistan saves only 17 percent. The rest, even the British colonialists were not so greedy and brutal, and that is why the Baluchistan remain the most—the least developed region in Pakistan. There is no really basic industries to talk about. And of course that is one of the main reasons for the ongoing insurgency in Baluchistan.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bor follows:]

Baluchistan and Baluch Nationalism: the U.S. Interests

By

Dr. M. HOSSEINBOR
A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia and the Author of Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism, Pakistani Adab Publications, 2000.

A Presentation

On

Baluchistan Hearing

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation
House Committee on Foreign Affairs

The United States Congress
Rayburn House Office Building, February 8, 2012

It is a great honor for me to appear before you to present the case of the Baluch, one of the most persecuted, oppressed, and neglected peoples in the Middle East and South Asia. On behalf of the Baluch people, with an estimated population of over 15 million living in Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, I would like to thank the honorable Members of this Committee and the United States Congress for this opportunity.

Baluchistan: A Historical Perspective

Until the advent of British Colonialism and division of Baluchistan in Mid-19th century, Baluchistan maintained its independence, for the most part, from the surrounding empires. This is reflected in the fact that the pre-division era is known by the Baluch as Baluchi Doura which is a term synonymous with Baluchi era, signifying a period (approximately 1440-1948 A.D.) when the Baluch political and military institutions as well as Baluchi culture and language were paramount throughout Baluchistan. The Baluchi Doura is best identified by the Baluch Tribal Confederacy (approximately 1487-1511 A.D.) established by Mir Chakar Rind, stretching from Kirman in Iran in the west and Indus River in the East which constitute the boundaries of present day Baluchistan. The most powerful independent Baluch state during Baluchi Doura was Khanate of Kalat established in 1666 A.D. and lasted nearly 300 years until the forceful annexation of Eastern Baluchistan into Pakistan in 1948.

Under the British Empire, the land was divided into three parts. The Goldsmid Line drawn in 1871 and demarcated in 1896 gave Western Baluchistan to Persia, while retaining the larger eastern part for British India. The Durand Line, drawn also by the British in 1894, further divided Baluchistan between the British India and Afghanistan, assigning to the latter a portion of Northern Baluchistan. The eastern Baluchistan was forcefully annexed to Pakistan in 1948.The Western Baluchistan was invaded and incorporated into Iran by Reza Shah, the founder of Pahlavi Dynasty, in 1928. The smaller northern part remains part of Afghanistan.

Currently divided among Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, Baluchistan-meaning the Baluch homeland- covers about 240,000 square miles with a coastline stretching nearly 1000 miles from the Strait of Hormuz to Karachi in Pakistan. In addition to a common ancestral homeland Baluchistan, Baluch speak their own language called Baluchi, an ancient Indo-European language, have their distinct culture, share a common history, and adhere to a moderate form of Sunni Islam.

Baluch and Pakistan

Ever since the division and forceful incorporation of their homeland into Pakistan and Iran, the Baluch have struggled to regain their lost freedom, to reassert the Baluch control over their homeland Baluchistan, and to preserve their language and culture within Iran and Pakistan. The Baluch never accepted or recognized either the Goldsmid Line dividing the Baluch between Iran and

Pakistan or the Durand Line separating northern Baluchistan. This is reflected in four insurrections by the Baluch against Pakistan in 1948, 1958,1973, and 2005 insurgency which is continuing and growing in strength each day. Like the Baluch, Afghanistan and nationalist Pashtoons in Pakistan also do not recognize the Durand Line.

Pakistan and Human Rights Violations against the Baluch

The Baluch insurgent groups declared a unilateral ceasefire upon the election of the new PPP-led government in Pakistan in 2008 in order to show their good will and pave the way for a political solution. But the Pakistani Army did not reciprocate, hence the continuing conflict.

The conflict has taken a heavy toll among Baluch civilians including several thousands held incommunicado by Pakistan military and intelligence services, forced disappearances of thousands of Baluch intellectuals and political activists, internal displacements of an estimated 150,000 Baluch civilians due to the on-going military operations in Baluchistan, and the extrajudicial killings of several hundred Baluch activists under what is known as the "kill and dump policy" pursued by the Pakistani intelligence service known as ISI and its affiliates. According to a report published by the Asian Human Rights Commission on January 31, 2012 and titled "Pakistan: the people of Balochistan have to bury the mutilated bodies of their loved ones almost every day of the week", the extrajudicial killings of disappeared persons in Baluchistan include 23 bullet riddled bodies found during the first moth of this year, 56 mutilated bodies during the last six months, and 271 bodies since July 2010 (http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-021-2012).

The precise number of enforced disappearances is not known and may never be disclosed by Pakistan. The current civilian government elected in 2008 has acknowledged a list of 1,102 enforced disappearance from Baluchistan. The Pakistan Human Rights Commission of Pakistan cited evidence of 600 disappearances in Baluchistan, but not an estimate of total numbers (Selig S. Harrison, Pakistan: The state of the Union, A Special Report, Center for International Policy, 2009, P.8). But an authoritative report released by Amnesty International in July 2008 clearly shows that the Pakistani government has engaged in large-scale "enforced disappearances" against "activists pushing for greater regional ethnic and regional rights... and greater access to provincial resources" in Baluchistan and Sind. The report adds that the Baluch and Sindi activist were "arbitrarily detained, denied access to lawyers, families and courts and held in undeclared places of detention run by Pakistan's intelligence agencies, with government concealing their fate or whereabouts" (Denying the Undeniable: Enforced Disappearances in Pakistan, Amnesty International, July,2008).

The Baluch sources put the number of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances much higher than that reported in media. A report published in or around 2010 by the Voice for Baluch Missing Persons, formed by the aggrieved families of the missing Baluch, blamed Pakistan's ISI and MI (Military

Intelligence) for extrajudicial killing and disappearance of "more than 4000 baloch political activists since 2001".The report adds that since the election of the civilian government in 2008, " not much has improved for the disappeared or their families in Pakistan" "(Voice for Baluch Missing Persons, Disappearances: Pakistan's Kill and Dump Policy, Understanding Pakistan's Dirty War Against Baloch People, Quetta, Pakistan, Undated, P. 24).

The unresolved issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances of Baluch activists and intellectuals by Pakistan's intelligence agencies is one of the main stumbling blocks in resolving the Pakistan-Baluch conflict. The Baluch leadership has refused to negotiate with Pakistani authorities unless this issue is resolved to the satisfaction of Baluch families affected. Given its involvement in this matter, the Pakistan's military has prevented the civilian government from addressing this issue.

Economic Exploitation

Another major cause of Baluch-Pakistan conflict is the exploitation of Baluchistan's rich natural resources by Punjabi-dominated central governments. As reported by Selig S. Harrison, a leading authority on ethnic conflicts in Pakistan, a prime example of Punjabi economic exploitation is that " Although gas obtained from Baluchistan accounts for 30 percent of Pakistan's total gas production, Baluchistan consumes only 17 percent of its own output, while the remaining 83 percent goes to the rest of the country" and that "the central government pays a much lower price for Baluchistan gas than for gas produced in other provinces and pays lower royalties" (Selig S. Harrison, Pakistan: The state of the Union, A Special Report, Center for International Policy, 2009, P.21). As a result of such economic policies, Baluchistan is one of the least developed parts of Pakistan. This is in spite of the fact that Baluchistan is the largest Pakistani Province constituting about 44 percent of the Pakistani land mass, is rich in natural resources, is on major trade routes between Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, and has several hundred miles of coast line stretching from Iranian port of Gwatr to Karachi.

As the poorest, least developed, and most neglected province in Pakistan, Baluchistan has the worst indicators among Pakistani provinces for life expectancy, school enrollment, adult literacy, infant mortality, and access to drinking water and sanitation. Most major economic activities are concentrated in Punjab where the dominant Punjabis live. Although Baluchistan is known to be rich in minerals including gas, oil, gold, copper, coal, silver, platinum, aluminum, and, most important, uranium, the province is characterized as the "forgotten land", implying a prolonged economic and social neglect. In spite of the province's vast resources, there are no major industries in Baluchistan, the Baluch have no control over their resources, and have no say in running Baluchistan's economy. Literally speaking, the land is being looted by Baluchistan's new colonial masters in Pakistan.

The Baluch's lack of control over their resources is the main cause of underdevelopment of Baluchistan. Under the successive Punjabi-dominated

governments, both military and civilian, most of the development expenditures in the province were and are geared towards the expansion of the military-related infrastructure such as roads, military bases, and facilities serving the Pakistani army and settlers, thus hardly benefiting the Baluch masses. In addition, as far as few non-military projects are concerned, they are planned behind closed doors in Islamabad and implemented through the army-controlled provincial bureaucracy. The needs and wants of the Baluch population are not taken into consideration because the Baluch are not represented in economic and political decisions at the provincial level, let alone at the national level.

The Baluch Insurgency and the Pakistan Army

The Baluch welcomed with open arm the newly elected civilian government in 2008, hoping that it will address their demands and grievances. These demands include full control of their natural resources, implementation of 1973 Constitution restoring powers belonging to provinces, recognition of ethnic identities and promotion of Baluchi language in schools and broadcasts, removal of military cantonments from Baluchitan, release of all political prisoners, and the resolution of the enforced disappearances. But given the Pakistan Military's control of security and foreign policy, the weak civilian government has failed to meet the Baluch demand for full autonomy. It adopted what is known as Aghaz Hoghoogh Baluchistan(Beginning of the Rights of the Baluch), but has taken no concrete action to implement it.

Given the lack of results on political front, a Baluch insurgency that erupted against General Musharraf's military rule in 2005 has been gaining momentum ever since. Its prime targets have been military bases and government installations throughout Baluchistan. The Pakistan Army and paramilitary Frontier Corps have responded by a series of continuing military operations in Baluchistan to suppress the unrest. These operations have resulted in large casualties on both sides as well as among civilians. This has further hardened the position of the insurgents and the army generals. The insurgents are openly advocating an independent Baluchistan as their ultimate goal. The army, in turn, has been accusing India and Afghanistan of supporting and instigating the Baluch insurgents, without producing any evidence as yet.

As the past Baluch insurgencies have demonstrated, the Baluch-Pakistan conflict can not be resolved through military means alone. In spite of Pakistan Army's overwhelming military force, the Baluch insurgents have gained in strength and have held their ground. They may not be able to defeat the well-armed and well-disciplined Pakistani army, but they can bleed the army and drain Pakistan's scarce resources in a prolonged guerrilla war. Such a pro-longed conflict could also pave the way for foreign intervention that may lead to disintegration of Pakistan as happened with the separation of Bangladesh in the aftermath of Indo-Pakistani war in 1971. The brutality with which the Pakistani army has conducted its operations in Baluchistan has alienated the Baluch population, thus creating a fertile ground for insurgents to operate.

The Prospects for a Political Solution

Until and unless the Baluch demands are met, the prospect for a political solution is not promising. The Baluch political leadership has lost confidence in the weak civilian government due to its inability to deliver on its repeated promises to meet the Baluch demands. Its numerous attempts at reconciliation with the Baluch have been blocked by the Pakistani Army, which has the final say over Baluchistan. As a result, the main Baluch politicians including Mir Suliman Davood Khan, Khan of Kalat, Navab Khair Bakhsh Marri, the Chief of Marri tribe, Sardar Attaullah Mingal, the Chief of Mingal tribe, the elders of Bugti tribe, and the leaders of most Baluch political parties have concluded that further negotiation with the weak civilian government will not serve any purpose.

Therefore, for any dialogue and political negotiation between the Baluch and central government to succeed, it is essential to curb the powers of the Pakistani military and bring it under full civilian control. After all, reconciliation between parties can take place only through negotiations between the duly elected central government and the elected provincial government in Baluchistan. There is no room or popular mandate for the army in such negotiations.

The Baluch are committed to the promotion of democracy, federalism, rule of law, human rights, equal rights for women, protection of the rights of minorities, pluralism, and social justice for all Pakistani citizens. The future of Pakistan as a modern and progressive state could be guaranteed only through participation of all national groups including the Baluch, Pashtoons, Punjabis, Sindis, and other ethnic and religious minorities, with equal voice, in a federal state. The Baluch envision a federal state whereby the central or federal government will be responsible only for national defense, foreign affairs, currency, and national planning. All other powers will be preserved for the federating units or states.

The Geostrategic Importance of Baluchistan and the U.S. Interests

Baluchistan is of great geopolitical importance due to four major factors. First, with a coastline stretching nearly 1000 miles from the Strait of Hormuz to Karachi, Baluchistan occupy a strategic position with a commanding view of shipping lines carrying 40 percent of world oil supplies through the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. has a direct interest in securing the shipping lines in the Persian Gulf. Secondly, Baluchistan links the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. Third, Baluchistan holds large reserves of natural resources including silver, uranium, aluminum, oil, gas, gold, copper, and platinum. Fourth, as the closest access point to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean for land locked Afghanistan and Central Asian countries, Baluchistan is the most economic route

for oil pipelines from those countries to the Arabian Sea and from the Gulf countries to Pakistan and India.

Therefore, developments in Baluchistan could directly affects the U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The o n-going conflict in Baluchistan, provoked by Pakistani military operations, could have wide-ranging implications that may affect the U.S. interests in regional stability. The growing insurgency in Baluchistan, if not resolved peacefully, could spill over into Afghanistan, Iran, and the neighboring Arab Gulf states with large Baluch population. If the insurgents are successful through their own efforts or through direct foreign military intervention, their stated goal is an independent Baluchistan. This, in turn, could have major political, military, economic, and diplomatic ramifications for the regional powers as well as for the U.S. policies toward the region.

In addition, Baluchistan and Pashtoon areas of Pakistan are used by the Pakistani military and intelligence services to shelter and support Afghan Taliban and other jihadist groups in their continuing attacks against American, NATO, and Afghan forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan uses the Talibans to reassert its control and influence over Afghanistan as its sphere of influence against India. To counter the Pakistan-Taliban alliance, it may become necessary at some point for the U.S. and Afghan government to support Baluch and Pashtoon nationalists who espouse secular values. Both Baluch and Afghans have rejected the Durand Line and have cooperated in the past in their campaign for greater Baluchistan and an independent Pashtoonistan. An alliance of Baluch and Pashtoon nationalist supported by the U.S. can serve as a counter weight to Iranian and Pakistani support for Taliban as U.S. prepares for withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Moreover, the Baluch's interests coincides with those of the U.S. and the Baluch leaders have openly welcomed the U.S. support. As stated by Selig S. Harrison, an eminent scholar of Pakistani Politics, "an independent Baluchistan would not be a threat to U.S. interests, since Baluch leaders have often declared their support for U.S. strategic objectives in the Persian Gulf and have offered assurances that the U.S. Navy and U.S. merchant shipping would have access to modernized port facilities at Gwadar..." in Baluchistan(Selig S. Harrison, Pakistan: The State of the Union, A Special Report, Center for International Policy, 2009, P.25).

Among Common areas of interest is the Baluch support for the U.S. efforts to contain the spread of Talibanization in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Given their secular outlook and ideology, the Baluch nationalists and political parties have acted as a major barrier to Talibanization of Baluchistan, thus incurring the wrath of Pakistani military and intelligence services. In addition, Baluch are also opposed to the growing Chinese involvement in Baluchistan's Gwadar port. Any Chinese naval base in Gwadar on the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz poses a strategic challenge to the U.S. interest in the region. That is also the case with the plans for linking China to Gwadar via an overland route. Moreover, Baluch oppose the gas pipeline project for carrying Iranian gas to Pakistan and are ready to stop it. This is in accord with the U.S. economic sanctions imposed on

Iran. To counter the growing Iran-Pakistan alliance to suppress the Baluch, they are also against the growing Iranian hegemony in the region.

Baluch and Iran

Iran is a heterogeneous state comprised of six distinct nationalities including Arabs, Baluch, Kurds, Persians, Turks, and Turkmens. Although there are no accurate data as to the population of Iran's various national groups, the recent scholarly literature tends to agree that non-Persians are a majority comprising at least 55 percent of Iran's estimated population of 70 millions. The five non-Persian nationalities have one other important feature in common: They live along the state's international borders, which cut across their ethnic homelands, thus dividing them between two or three states.

In spite of its large and diverse population, its rich natural resources, and its strategic location, Iran has failed to develop its full potentials and to occupy its rightful place in the international community. It lags far behind economically as compared to the emerging economic powers in Asia -Pacific. In contrast to the growing spread of democracies in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, Iran is in the grip of a clerical regime ruling by an iron fist as demonstrated by the recent violent crackdown of peaceful demonstration in Tehran and the mass executions mentioned in Baluchistan. The backwardness of the Iranian political systems, whether monarchial or clerical, is clearly evident from the relegation of Iranian women, more than half of Iran's population, to second class citizens as compared with other regional countries such as Bangladesh, India, Israel, and even Pakistan, where women have been repeatedly elected as prime ministers.

Baluch and Iran: A historical Perspective

The Iranian Baluchistan was invaded and incorporated into Iran by Reza Shah, the founder of Pahlavi Dynasty, in 1928. As the dominant power in the region at the time, the British supported Reza Shah's annexation of Baluchistan in order to strengthen Iran as buffer state against Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Today, Iranian Baluchistan is divided into three parts to expedite its integration and assimilation into Iran. The largest part constitutes the "Province of Seistan and Baluchistan". It covers more than 181,578 square kilometers, which is in itself the largest province in Iran. The second part of Iranian Baluchistan is officially known as the Province of Hormuzgan for its location on the Strait of Hormuz. The third and northern part of Iranian Baluchistan is included in the neighboring Persian-speaking Provinces of Kerman and Khorasan. All three parts combined cover around 280,000 square kilometers.

In addition to their ancestral homeland Baluchistan, Baluch speak their own language called Baluchi, an ancient Indo-European language, have their distinct culture, share a common history, and adhere to Sunni Islam while Persians follow Shi'ate Islam, the official state religion of the ruling clerics. As a result, Baluch have been subject of constant ethnic, religious, cultural, and

economic discrimination and political and military repression ever since their forceful incorporation into Iran in 1928. In turn, the Baluch have been striving to preserve their language and culture and to secure a degree of self-rule within a secular, democratic, and federal Iran.

The Human Rights Violations and Discrimination against the Baluch and Sunnis

Both Iranian constitutions of 1906 and 1979 failed to recognize the non-Persian national groups or to protect their political and cultural self-rule in their own respective homelands. Consequently, the Baluch and other non-Persian groups have been marginalized and subjected under both monarchial and clerical regimes to blatant discrimination in all spheres of their daily lives. The discrimination is institutionalized and systematic and is geared to the ongoing state policies of Persianization of non-Persian nationalities and conversion of Sunnis, Baha'is, and other religious minorities to shi'ism.

Political Discrimination and Oppression

The core policy of the Persian –dominated governments, both clerical and monarchial, has been to forcefully assimilate or Persianize Baluch and other non-Persian nationalities. In this context, the current clerical regime like its predecessor, refers to all six nationalities comprising Iran- namely, Arabs, Baluch, Kurds, Persians, Turks, and Turkmen's- as constituting a single nation called Millat-e Iran or the "the nation of Iran". As embodied, interpreted, and implemented in the first Iranian Constitution of 1906 as well as in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 1979, the concept of "Millat-e Iran" is a manifestation of Persian nationalism which is equated with Iranian nationalism.

Aside from its theocratic color and content, "the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran" hardly differs from the Constitution of 1906 in respect to preserving the unitary state system in the country. Like its predecessor, the new constitution ruled out the question of autonomy or any other form of recognition of national, cultural, and religious rights of non-Persian nationalities. It declared in Article 12 that "the official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelve Ja'fari School of Thought and this principle shall remain eternally immutable". Similarly, Article 15 recognized Persian as the official state language, while prohibiting the use of non-Persian languages in schools, offices, or for any other official use in their respective homelands.

Moreover, the rights of Baluch and Iranian Sunnis in general were further restricted by the provision of Article 115, which excluded Sunnis from holding the office of the Presidency of the Republic, thus reducing Baluch and Sunnis to the status of second-class citizens. In addition, the provision of Vilayat-e Faghih (governance of religious jurist) in Article 5 had no base in the tenets of the Sunni branch of Islam and as such it was not acceptable to Sunnis. According to Article 5, the Valii-e Faghih or governing jurist, who is not elected, is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and has ultimate authority over all the

three branches of the government. As the non-elected supreme leader, he is empowered to dismiss the elected president, to dissolve the parliament, and to remove at will the supposedly independent judicial authorities. Obviously, the concentration of such broad and unchecked powers in the hands of one unelected individual has been strongly opposed by Baluch and other national groups as well as by secular opposition.

In addition, the Baluch have been totally excluded from all the decision-making positions at local, provincial, and central government levels. Almost all provincial governors, city mayors, and the heads of all provincial departments are non- Baluch appointed by the central government. The Baluch and Sunnis were never represented in decision making positions in central government. No Baluch or Sunni ever served as a minister of cabinet or as an ambassador. Even the number of the Baluch in the provincial administration is hardly more than five percent of the total civil servants.

Similarly, the Baluch-speaking areas have been arbitrarily divided administratively into three parts to expedite the Baluch assimilation in accordance with the clerical government's Persianisation and Shiazation policies as mentioned earlier. This policy towards the Baluch is in no way distinct or different from that pursued toward other non-Persian national groups including Arabs, Kurds, Turks, and Turkmen's. The differences, if any, are merely in degree not in kind. Although all these national groups possess historically defined geographic homelands, none has been constituted or recognized as a separate administrative unit let alone as a self-autonomous province. Each ethnic region or homeland has been arbitrarily divided into several parts and incorporated in different provinces at different times. Like Baluchistan, Kurdistan and Azerbaijan have been arbitrarily divided into several parts to facilitate their Persianization and to prevent any threat that may arise if Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, or Baluchistan were reconstituted to incorporate all parts of their respective historical homelands.

Mass Executions of Baluch Prisoners

Although the Baluch, with an estimated population of five to seven million, constitute less than 10% of Iranian population, the number of Baluch executed in 2009 exceeded more than half of total executions in Iran. As an example of cold-blooded mass murder by the clerical dictatorship, thirteen young Baluch were hanged in Zahedan prison on July 14, 2009 followed by three more executions the next day. They were accused of membership in Popular Resistance Movement of Iran, also known as Jundullah, that is fighting for the rights of Baluch and Sunnis against the Shia't clerical regime in Iran. They were charged with medieval crimes of waging war ageist God, corruption on earth, and the fabricated charge of collusion with the so-called enemies of the Islamic Republic, namely the US and Israel referred to as "Zionist Entity". The US and Israel have vehemently denied these charges and Jundullah has rejected them also as baseless fabrications similar to the Islamic Republic's attempt to attribute the on-

going mass protests against the election fraud in Tehran and other major cities to foreign powers.

The Islamic Republic ignored the repeated calls by Amnesty International and other human rights organizations to halt this mass execution and to accord the accused fair trail and due process of law as require under international law. Subsequently, the EU also condemned this mass execution in Zahedan last.
According to local Baluch sources, the 13 young Baluch executed, including four students of Baluchistan University, had participated in peaceful anti-government demonstrations during and after the presidential election in Zahedan.
One of the main reasons for their execution was to suppress a growing uprising and insurgency among ethnic Baluch, who adhere to Sunni Islam, against the Iranian Government run by a Shia't clerical dictatorship. The mass killing of the Baluch was also intended to send a strong message to other non-Persian ethnic groups- including Iran's Kurds, Arabs, Azeri Turks, and Turkmens- to prevent similar uprisings among them.

It is time to warn the world that Iranian Baluchistan is well on its way to become the Islamic Republic's Darfur unless the international community acts to stop it before it is too late. The actions of the Islamic Republic against the Baluch certainly constitute crimes against humanity meriting investigation by the UN and international tribunals.

Cultural Discrimination:

The use of Baluchi language, Baluchi schools, and Baluchi publications have been strictly prohibited even in their own homeland Baluchistan. That is also the case with other non-Persian languages. Only Persian history is taught as "Iranian' history, never the history of Baluch or other national groups. No cultural institutions or activities are tolerated among the Baluch or other non-Persians. Even the Iranian census data do not reflect the nature of its ethnic heterogeneity. Instead, it uses religious designation to emphasize Muslim homogeneity and to distort the multi-ethnic nature of the country.

Among many instances of cultural oppression against the Baluch was the arrest of six members of the Voice of Justice of the Young People's Society, a Baluch cultural association registered under Iranian law, in early May 2007. This NGO was primarily involved in organizing concerts, arts exhibitions, and educational courses for young Baluch. Subsequently, the head of the organization, Mr. Ya'qub Mehrnehad, a student, Journalist and civil activist, was tried in secret and convicted to death for an unknown offence in early February 2008. He has allegedly been tortured. He is currently on death row without access to his family members or a lawyer. His brother, Ibrahim Mehrnehad, is also in jail and has been also denied access to his family or to a lawyer.

Economic Discrimination

Economically, centralization of power has led to a pattern of an uneven economic development whereby all trade, industry, and development are concentrated in central Iran to the total exclusion of other regions such as Baluchistan and Kurdistan. As a result, Baluchistan is the one of the least developed parts of Iran. This is in spite of the fact that Baluchistan is the largest Iranian Province constituting 15 to 18 per cent of the Iranian land mass, is rich in natural resources, is on major trade routes between Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, and has a 700-mile coast line stretching from Strait of Hurmoz to Pakistani border.

Iranian Baluchistan is one of the poorest, least developed, and neglected provinces in Iran. According to the UN Common Country Assessment for Iran (www.undp.org.ir/reports/npd/CCA.pdf), Baluchistan has the worst indicators among Iranian provinces for life expectancy, school enrollment, adult literacy, infant mortality, and access to drinking water and sanitation. All major economic activities are concentrated in central Iran where the dominant Persians live. Although Baluchistan is known to be rich in minerals including gas, oil, gold, and marine resources, the province is characterized as the "forgotten land", implying a prolonged economic and social neglect. In spite of the province's vast resources, there are no major industries in Baluchistan, the Baluch have no control over their resources, and have no say in running Baluchistan's economy. Literally speaking, the land is being looted by Baluchistan's new colonial masters in Iran and Pakistan.

The Baluch's lack of control over their resources is the main cause of underdevelopment of Baluchistan. As a result, there is a growing economic and social gap between Baluch and Persian-dominated regions of Iran, a fact that makes Iran a prime example of uneven development in the world. Under both monarchial and clerical governments, most of the development expenditures in the province were and are geared towards the expansion of the military-related infrastructure such as roads, military bases, and facilities serving Persian bureaucrats and settlers, thus hardly benefiting the Baluch masses. In addition, as far as non-military projects are concerned, they are planned behind closed doors in Tehran, due to the highly centralized nature of economic planning in Iran, and implemented through the Persian-controlled provincial bureaucracy. The needs and wants of the Baluch population are not taken into consideration because the Baluch are not represented in economic and political decisions at the provincial level, let alone at the national level.

Religious Discrimination

Overwhelming majority of the Baluch adhere to Sunni school of Islam as are Kurds, Turkmens, people of Talesh region in the Gilan Province along the Caspian Sea, Persian-speaking regions of Khorasan Province bordering Afghanistan, and the population of southern coasts and islands in the Persian Gulf. Together, the Iranian Sunnis constitute more than a quarter of Iran's estimated population of 60 millions. In spite of its claim to the leadership of the Islamic world, the Islamic Republic of Iran has subjected its Sunni population to

religious discrimination and, in some instances, to forceful conversion to Shi'ism. As a matter of fact, the Sunnis have not been allowed to build a mosque in Tehran where several million Sunnis live. This is in spite of the clerical regime's claim for leadership of the Islamic world. If fellow Muslims are treated so harshly by the Islamic Republic, the fate of Baha'is and other non-Muslim religious minorities should be of great concern to international community.

Numerous Sunni clerics from Baluchistan, Kurdistan, Turkmen Sahra and other Sunni regions have been arbitrarily arrested, tortured, and assassinated. As documented by Amnesty International in its report cited above, "A number of Baluchis, including Sunni clerics, have been killed in suspicious circumstances both in Iran and Abroad. Similar suspicious deaths of members of other religious minorities or of those opposed to the Iranian authorities point to a pattern of extrajudicial executions by the Iranian authorities". The said report names only few of the victims including moulavi (religious title used by Sunni clerics) Abdolmalek Molaazadeh, Moulavi Abdolnasser Jamshid Zahi, Moulavi Ahmad Sayyad, and Moulavi Aman Naroui. The author personally knew Moulavi Habibullah Hosseinbor who was summoned to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence in 1984 when he disappeared. Since then, no one ever heard from him and it is believed that he died under torture. Hundreds if not thousands members of the opposition groups and minorities have suffered a similar fate.

A practice widely used to discriminate against Baluch and other minorities is Gozinesh meaning selection, an ideological test requiring applicants to universities and candidates for government jobs to demonstrate allegiance to Shia Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran including the concept of Vilayat-e Faghih (Governance of Relious Jurist), a concept not adhered to by Sunnis. This practice has been used to exclude Baluch from admission to universities or employment by government ever since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. As observed by Amnesty International in its report titled "Iran: Human Right Abuses Against the Baluchi Minority", dated September 17, 2007, " In law and practice, this process (i.e. Gozinesh) impairs- on grounds of political opinion, previous political affiliation or support or religious affiliation-equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation for all those who seek employment in the public and parastatal sector (such as the bonyads) and, reportedly, in some instances in parts of private sector."

The Solution: Federal Democracy

The only viable solution to the chronic political crisis in Iran is democracy, devolution, and federalism. Such a democratic system of government is best suited for a multinational/multi-ethnic state like Iran that is home to Persians, Arabs, Baluchis, Kurds, Turkmans, Turks, and other religious and ethnic minorities. A federal system is designed to protect against dictatorship and absolute power, ensure political participation at local, state, and federal levels, and create a more even system of economic development. As it is said, we do not need to reinvent the wheel. The federal system has functioned reasonably

well and has a successful track record as demonstrated by the examples of the US, Switzerland, India, and many other countries.

The Baluch are committed to the promotion of democracy, federalism, rule of law, human rights, equal rights for women, protection of the rights of minorities, pluralism, and social justice for all Iranian citizens. We believe that the future of Iran as a modern and progressive state could be guaranteed only through participation of all national groups, with equal voice, in a federal Iran. The Baluch envision a federal state whereby the central or federal government will be responsible for national defense, foreign affairs, currency, and national planning. All other powers will be preserved for the federating units or states.

The federal constitution shall treat all Iranian citizens, regardless of gender, race, color, or religion, as equal under the law and shall protect and guarantee freedom of speech, freedom of opinion, freedom of association, freedom of religion, and free and fair election. The federal constitution shall also ensure that all national groups constituting Iran will have equal opportunity to develop their respective cultures, languages, histories, economies and homelands. The federal constitution shall also protect the rights of religious minorities including Baha'is, Christians, Jews, and Sunnis. The constitutions of the federating units or states shall also guarantee the same rights for their respective citizens. Federal and state constitutions shall mandate that federal and state governments be based on elected legislative and executive branches and independent judiciaries.

The only vision guaranteeing the future of Iran as a modern, stable, and unified state in the community of nations is to establish a genuine democracy through a secular and federal state where the rule of law is supreme, where individual rights and liberties are protected, where the rights of women and minorities are respected, and where various Iranian ethnic and religious groups enjoy equal rights and self-rule.Otherwise, the Islamic Republic of Iran will collapse from within and will face the same fate suffered by the former Yugoslavia and ex-Soviet Union.

The Iranian nationalities- Baluch, Kurds, Arabs, Azeri Turks, Turkmen, and Lurs- will never willingly accept their status as second class citizens within Iran. Should the Iranian state fail to address their quest for self-rule, its future remains bleak.

Conclusions and Recommendations

1- **The U.S. should condemn in the strongest possible terms the grave human rights violations perpetrated against the Baluch in Iran and Pakistan.**

2- **The U.S. should set up daily broadcasts in Baluchi language through Voice of America.**

3- **The U.S. should provide economic aid specifically earmarked for education and health projects in Pakistani Baluchistan.**

4- The U.S. should support and strengthen Baluch-Pashtoon alliance to counter Pakistani and Iranian moves in Afghanistan.

5- The U.S. should facilitate negotiations between the Baluch and central government in Pakistan for a peaceful resolution of their conflict.

6- The U.S. should support an independent Baluchistan in case Pakistan or Iran or both collapsed from within.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is the end of your 5 minutes right now, so we will have to move on during the questions and answers.

By the way, all of—with unanimous consent, the entire—your entire statements will be put into the record. So when you get a record of the hearing, your entire statement will be in the record.

We now turn to Ali Dayan Hasan. He is the Pakistan director of Asia division of Human Rights Watch. Before taking over as Pakistan director, he served as Human Rights Watch for south Asia as a researcher and that he did since 2003 and specialized in Pakistan.

Before joining the Human Rights Watch, Hasan was a senior editor at Pakistan's premier independent political news monthly, the Herald; and during 2006–2007 he was also a visiting scholar from Oxford, University of Oxford, and has a BA from the London School of Economics and a master's degree from St. Antony's College in Oxford.

And we welcome you, and you have 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF MR. ALI DAYAN HASAN, PAKISTAN DIRECTOR, ASIA DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

Mr. HASAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me this opportunity.

I have listened with care to what my colleagues—fellow witnesses have had to say. I would like to clarify at the outset that my testimony is based on my experiences as someone who has researched extensively on human rights abuses in Baluchistan, often on the ground in the province itself.

Now, at the outset, because there has been this question of independence that has been raised, I want to clarify that Human Rights Watch, as an international human rights organization, takes no position on this particular issue of independence. We understand that Baluchistan is an internationally recognized part of Pakistan, and we expect the Pakistani Government to adhere to all human rights protections within the Pakistani Constitution and as mandated by international law.

We have also found the Pakistani state, particularly the military, entirely lacking in this department. Baluchistan presents a hydra-headed conflict situation. There are multiple actors perpetrating violence in there, but the engine of human rights abuse, no doubt, is the Pakistani military, paramilitaries, and intelligence agencies. They have run, particularly since 2004, a campaign of enforced disappearances where at least hundreds of Baluch nationalists have disappeared.

In the last 1½ years, we have seen targeted killings increase, and something between 200 and 300 Baluch opponents of the Pakistani state have been found killed, and of course torture and illegal detention by the military and paramilitaries and intelligence agencies are commonplace. This is an absolutely appalling situation, even by Pakistani standards, and certainly when you are operating in Baluchistan you do see that the military in many ways behaves like a brutal occupying military. That is its behavior.

All of this is a very serious problem. I would, however, point out that in the latest spike, the issue of disappearances became commonplace in Pakistan, and in Baluchistan in particular, because of

the license provided by the U.S., the U.K., and other powers in the context of the war on terror where the disappearance and legal detention of Taliban and Al Qaeda suspects was green-lighted effectively by the U.S. This gave the Pakistani military carte blanche, if you will, to extend such abusive operations to its own political opponents, which include Baluch nationalists.

Having said that, there are also multiple abuses—though of course I must clarify that there is no comparison between the abuses perpetrated by the state and other actors—but there are abuses that we have documented by Baluch nationalist militants, particularly attacks against education personnel and against other non-Baluch residents of the province.

Now, non-Baluch residents of the province are not a small minority. We are talking of—although there is contentious figures because of a lack of census—something about 40 percent at least of the population of Baluch.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Did you say 40 or 14?

Mr. HASAN. Four-zero.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Four-zero.

Mr. HASAN. Four-zero percent of the population of Baluchistan—this is an approximation—are non-Baluch at least. So this is a very, very complex situation now. Non-Baluch, particularly Punjabi settlers and Urdu-speaking settlers in Baluchistan, are living equally in fear of their lives because of fear of attack from Baluch nationalists.

Finally, there is the issue of religious militant groups, particularly Sunni militant groups, that are attacking the Shia, largely Hazara, but Shia in general. And these militant groups often do act, it is alleged and widely believed, at—in conjunction with or at the behest of the Pakistani military, but they also act independently. The basic problem is that if the Pakistani state takes Baluchistan seriously, it must enforce rights respecting rule of law in the province. It has abjectly failed to do so, and this is creating a human rights crisis across Baluchistan.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hasan follows:]

Statement of Ali Dayan Hasan
Pakistan Director, Human Rights Watch:

House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

February 8, 2012

Hearing on Balochistan

Balochistan: An overview

Balochistan, Pakistan's western-most province, borders eastern Iran and southern Afghanistan. It is the largest of the country's four provinces in terms of area (44 percent of the country's land area), but the smallest in terms of population (5 percent of the country's total). According to the last national census in 1998, over two-thirds of its population of nearly eight million people live in rural areas.[1] The population comprises those whose first language—an important marker of ethnic distinction in Pakistan—is Balochi (55 percent), Pashto (30 percent), Sindhi (5.6 percent), Seraki (2.6 percent), Punjabi (2.5 percent), and Urdu (1 percent).[2]

There are three distinct geographic regions of Balochistan. The belt comprising Hub, Lasbella, and Khizdar in the east is heavily influenced by the city of Karachi, Pakistan's sprawling economic center in Sindh province. The coastal belt comprising Makran is dominated by Gwadar port. Eastern Balochistan is the most remote part of the province. This sparsely populated region is home to the richest but largely untapped deposits of natural resources in Pakistan including oil, gas, copper, and gold. Significantly, it is the area where the struggle for power between the Pakistani state and local tribal elites has been most apparent.[3]

Balochistan is both economically and strategically important: not only does the province border Iran and Afghanistan, it hosts a particular ethnic mix of residents, and is allegedly home to the so-called Quetta Shura of the Taliban in the provincial capital Quetta.[4] The situation is further complicated by the large number of foreign states with an economic or

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[1] Census of Pakistan 1998, Balochistan Provincial Report; and World Bank, *Balochistan Economic Report: From Periphery To Core,* Volume II, 2008.

[2] Census of Pakistan 1998, Balochistan Provincial Report.

[3] Robert G. Wirsing, "Baloch Nationalism And The Geopolitics Of Energy Resources: The Changing Context Of Separatism In Pakistan," *Strategic Studies Institute*, United States Army War College, April 2008, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub853.pdf (accessed November 22, 2010).

[4] Ibid. The Quetta Shura is a militant organization composed of top leadership of the Afghan Taliban. It formed after US-led forces attacked the Taliban in Afghanistan in November 2001 and its senior leadership escaped into Pakistan.

political stake in the mineral-rich province, including the United States, China, Iran, India, and the United Arab Emirates.[5]

Conflict in Balochistan

The province has historically had a tense relationship with Pakistan's government, in large part due to issues of provincial autonomy, control of mineral resources and exploration, and a consequent sense of deprivation. Under President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military ruler from 1999 until 2008, the situation deteriorated markedly.[6] Two assassination attempts on Musharraf in 2005 and 2006 during visits to Balochistan resulted in a crackdown on Baloch nationalists by armed forces and Military Intelligence (MI), its lead intelligence agency in the province. These operations ultimately led to the killing in August 2006 of influential tribal chieftain Nawab Akbar Bugti and 35 of his close followers.

The Pakistani military charges that Baloch militants receive arms and financial support from India.[7] While India consistently denies these allegations, Pakistani officials say that India's role in stoking unrest in Balochistan is illustrated by the scale and sophistication of recent attacks on Pakistan interests, alleged confessions of captured militants, and past evidence of support by "foreign" powers for separatist elements.[8]

Militancy in Balochistan has been fueled by ethnic Baloch anger over the Pakistani government's efforts to harness local mineral and fossil fuel resources, maintain large numbers of troops in the province, and construct the Gwadar deep-sea port at the mouth of the Persian Gulf with non-Baloch workers.

In December 2009 Pakistan's newly elected civilian government, in an effort to bring about political reconciliation in the province, passed the *Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan* ("Beginning of Rights in Balochistan") package of constitutional, political, administrative, and economic reforms. It noted the province's "sense of deprivation in the political and

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[5] Ibid. See also Maha Atal "China's Pakistan Corridor," Forbes Asia, May 10, 2010, http://www.forbes.com/global/2010/0510/companies-pakistan-oil-gas-balochistan-china-pak-corridor.html (accessed November 22, 2010).
[6] See Ahmed Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos* (New York: Viking, 2008), pp. 283-287.
[7] Salman Masood, "Pakistan Spy Chief to Visit India," *New York Times*, November 28, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/world/asia/29pstan.html (accessed November 22, 2010).
[8] "What's the Problem with Pakistan?" *Foreign Affairs*, March 31, 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/roundtables/whats-the-problem-with-pakistan (accessed November 22, 2010).

economic structures of the federation" and past failure to implement provisions of the 1973 Pakistan Constitution that sought to empower the provinces.[9]

The package aims, among other things, to delegate a range of federal areas of authority to the Balochistan government, and requires federal authorities to obtain provincial government consent with respect to major projects. It seeks to redress the province's socio-economic disparity compared to the rest of the country by increasing Baloch employment in the civil service, giving provincial and local government authorities a greater share of resource industry revenues, and compensating communities displaced by violence. It also calls for military cantonments under construction in the resource-rich Sui and Kohlu regions to be temporarily halted and for the military to be replaced there by the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force that answers to the civilian Federal Ministry of the Interior. Under the package, the Balochistan chief minister is to have control over the Frontier Corps' law and order operations. The package also calls for an investigation of missing persons, and for all persons detained without charge to be released.[10]

As a result of the package, the Pakistan federal government in 2010 released Rs12 billion (US$140 million) to the Balochistan government in outstanding debts owed to it with respect to natural gas revenues and announced a Rs152 billion (US$1.77 billion) budget for the province, double that of 2009.[11] The package also establishes a judicial inquiry into the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti and other Baloch political leaders.[12]

Despite these attempted reforms, doubts persist within Baloch society about the Pakistan government's intentions. Significant Baloch nationalist parties and leaders have rejected the package, claiming it does not adequately address core grievances or genuinely enable greater provincial autonomy.[13] Many have continued to call for complete separation from

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[9] Preamble, Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan, December 9, 2009.
[10] Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan, December 9, 2009.
[11] Nasir Jamal and Saleem Shahid, "Rs152 billion budget for Balochistan," *Dawn*, June 22, 2010, http://news.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/rs152-billion-budget-for-balochistan-260 (accessed November 30, 2010).
[12] Raja Asghar, "Govt offers olive branch to Balochistan," *Dawn*, November 25, 2009, http://news.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/04-balochistanpackage-qs-10 (accessed November 30, 2010).
[13] Murtaza Ali Shah, "Baloch nationalists reject package," *The News International*, November 25, 2009.

Pakistan.[14] However, Baloch nationalists are highly splintered and it is unclear how much influence Baloch political leaders now exert over militant groups.[15]

Divisions among Baloch nationalists have exacerbated lawlessness and violence in the province. In 2010, Baloch militants escalated ethnically motivated targeted killings, especially in Quetta.[16] In addition, they have continued to target gas pipelines, railway lines and electricity networks, and government buildings, including schools.[17] Similarly, sectarian killings by religious extremist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi have also escalated, targeting Shia, particularly the ethnically distinct Hazara Shia community.

Human Rights Abuses in Balochistan

Since 2005, Pakistani human rights organizations have recorded numerous serious human rights violations by security forces, including extrajudicial executions, torture, enforced disappearances, forced displacement, and excessive use of force.[18] According to the Geneva-based Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, violence in 2005 around Dera Bugti district alone displaced around 6,000 people and killed scores.[19] The total number of people displaced from all districts remains unknown, with estimates ranging from tens to hundreds of thousands.[20] After Musharraf's ouster in 2008, Pakistan's Interior Ministry estimated that 1,100 Baloch had "disappeared" during his rule.[21] To date, the government has only uncovered the fate of a handful of these people.[22]

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[14] Sajid Hussain, "18th Amendment Fails To Appease Most Of Baloch Nationalists," *The News On Sunday*, April 11, 2010; Syed Talat Hussain, "Regime of Fear," *Newsline*, April 21, 2010.
[15] Syed Talat Hussain, "Regime of Fear," *Newsline*.
[16] Ibid.
[17] "Pakistan Fails To Curb Violence In Balochistan," Sify, July 6, 2010.
[18] Human Rights Commission of Pakistan "Human Rights Violations: Conflict In Balochistan," August 2006, http://hrcp-web.org/pdf/Conflict%20in%20balochistan--%20Complete.pdf (accessed November 22, 2010).
[19] "Pakistan: Tens of Thousands Displaced by Army Operations Against Insurgent Groups," *Internal Displacement Monitoring Center,* October 10, 2006, p. 7, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/6CEF209F30020F37C1257203004E6189/$file/Pakistan%20-October%202006.pdf (accessed November 22, 2010).
[20] Ibid.
[21] Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2009* (New York: Human Rights Watch 2009), Pakistan chapter, http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report/2009/pakistan.
[22] Asian Human Rights Commission, "Pakistan: More than 168 children have disappeared from Balochistan, a war crime tribunal should be constituted," February 2, 2010,

Armed militant groups in Balochistan are responsible for targeted killings and destroying private property. In the past several years, they have increasingly targeted non-Baloch civilians and their businesses, as well as major gas installations and infrastructure.[23] They have also struck police and security forces and military bases throughout the province.[24]

Three distinct non-state groups are responsible for violence against civilians in the province: militant Baloch nationalist groups seeking separation or autonomy for Balochistan that target Punjabis and other minorities; militant Sunni Muslim groups such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi that attack members of the Shia community; and armed Islamist groups that have most recently attacked those who act contrary to their interpretation of Islam.[25]

Militant nationalist groups such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Baloch Liberation United Front (BLUF) have claimed responsibility for most killings of non-Baloch civilians, including teachers and other education personnel. They attempt to justify these attacks as a nationalist Baloch response to grievances against the state, and retaliation against abuses that state security forces have committed against Baloch community members.

Amidst the violence, Balochistan's long-term problems of governance and the stand-off between the Pakistani military and Baloch militants have deepened a general perception in the province of neglect, discrimination, and denial of rights. These are exacerbated by the continuing tribal system and its archaic social structures, the influence of the tribal chief on the justice system and police, and the consequent denial of citizens' fundamental rights.

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http://www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2010statements/2395/ (accessed November 22, 2010).

[23] "Pakistan Fails to Curb Violence in Balochistan," *Sify*, July 6, 2010, http://sify.com/news/pakistan-fails-to-curtail-violence-in-balochistan-news-international-khgqOpbaide.html (accessed November 22, 2010).

[24] Syed Talat Hussain,"Regime of Fear," *Newsline*, April 21, 2010, http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2010/04/regime-of-fear (accessed November 22, 2010).

[25] A large proportion of the population of urban dwellers comprises people who settled there in the 1930s or at the time of independence in 1947. Those committing the recent violence make no distinction between these "settlers" and more recent migrants to the province. Older urban areas (Quetta, Loralai, Zhob, Sibi) were largely inhabited by the settlers, Pathtuns (and the Hazara community in Quetta), while the Baloch remained largely in the rural villages or small rural towns.

The poor and marginalized, particularly women, are adversely affected by traditional forms of dispute resolution and lack of access to other redress mechanisms. They lack assets and opportunities, have no social safety net, and are bound by practices that affect their welfare.[26] There are frequent reports of both state law enforcement agencies and local power-brokers committing abuses against marginalized populations. Labor conditions are abysmal, and there is no single system of justice despite a uniform civil and criminal code. The widespread use of tribal *jirgas* (councils) and other informal forums of justice increase the difficulty of seeking redress and obtaining justice, devaluing its quality.

Finally, the violence has denuded the already thinly spread provision of public safety. Organized police services cover only a fraction of the province's territory (about 4 percent of the land area), while the rest is covered by tribal recruits forming levies.[27]

As the violence in Balochistan intensifies, atrocities mount. While the Pakistani military and Baloch militants readily exploit the misery of civilians for their own political purposes, they have failed to address these grievances or to accept responsibility for them.

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[26] Violence against women and girls, including rape, domestic violence, and forced marriage, remains a serious problem. In one case in 2008, five women were shot and buried alive by members of their own tribe after three of them refused to get married as their families had demanded. Israrullah Zehri, a senator from Balochistan province, publicly defended the killings as "tribal custom." Another legislator, Hazar Khan Bijrani, stands accused of presiding over a tribal *jirga* (council) that in 2006 ordered the handing-over of five girls, aged six and younger, as "compensation" in a dispute. Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2009* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009), Pakistan chapter, http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report/2009/pakistan.

[27] Asian Development Bank, *Report and Recommendation to the President on the Pakistan - Balochistan Resource Management Program*, 2004. The Pakistani state recruits men from local communities into the Levies, a quasi-police force, the Frontier Constabulary and Frontier Corps. The Frontier Corps is a federal paramilitary force consisting almost entirely of ethnic Pashtuns from the province's northern regions. Although the force is part of the civilian federal Interior Ministry, its forces are commanded by officers of the Pakistan Army.

Enforced Disappearances in Balochistan[28]

The problem of disappearances in Pakistan is widespread and is not limited to Balochistan province. However, the focus here is specifically on "disappearances" in Balochistan, as they are a distinctive feature of the conflict there between government security forces and armed militants that has devastated the province over many years. These disappearances take place in a province in which armed militants, particularly Baloch nationalist armed groups, have attacked security forces and military bases throughout the province. These groups have been responsible for many targeted killings, including the killing of numerous teachers and other educators. In recent years they have increasingly attacked non-Baloch civilians and their businesses, as well as major gas installations and infrastructure. Human Rights Watch documented abuses by militants in its 2010 report, "*Their Future Is at Stake": Attacks on Teachers and Schools in Pakistan's Balochistan Province*.

Cases documented by Human Rights Watch show that Pakistan's security forces, particularly its intelligence agencies, targeted for enforced disappearance ethnic Baloch suspected of involvement in the Baloch nationalist movement. Evidence of a broader campaign by the authorities includes detailed accounts of the released detainees and their relatives, witness accounts describing the circumstances of abductions and the identity of the perpetrators, and admissions by government officials. In a few cases representatives of the intelligence agencies admitted responsibility to the families, or during court hearings. None of the victims, their relatives, or eyewitnesses to the alleged disappearances interviewed by Human Rights Watch blamed armed Baloch groups. Most blamed Pakistan's intelligence agencies or the paramilitary Frontier Corps.

Abductions were carried out in broad daylight, often in busy public areas, and in the presence of multiple witnesses. Victims were taken away from shops and hotels, public buses, university campuses, homes, and places of work.

The victims of enforced disappearances in the cases documented were predominantly men in their mid-20s to mid-40s. Three of the disappeared were children, the youngest of whom was 12 years old at the time of the abduction. In three cases, the victims were over 60 years

[28] For a detailed examination of issues outlined in this section please see "We Can Torture, Kill or Keep You for Years": Enforced Disappearances by Pakistan Security Forces in Balochistan, Human Rights Watch, July 2011. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/07/25/we-can-torture-kill-or-keep-you-years.

old. Most victims appear to have been targeted because of alleged participation in Baloch nationalist parties and movements, including the Baloch Republican Party (BRP), Baloch National Front (BNF), Baloch National Movement (BNM), and Balochistan National Party (BNP), as well as the Baloch Student Organization (Azad) (BSO-Azad). In several cases, people appeared to have been targeted because of their tribal affiliation, especially when a particular tribe, such as the Bugti or Mengal, was involved in fighting with Pakistan's armed forces.

Witnesses frequently described the perpetrators as armed men in civilian clothes, usually arriving in one or more four-door pickup trucks. The witnesses typically referred to these assailants as representatives of the "agencies," a term commonly used to describe the intelligence agencies, including the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Military Intelligence (MI), and the Intelligence Bureau (IB). Other information obtained by Human Rights Watch in many cases corroborates these claims.

In 16 cases documented by Human Rights Watch, the abductions were carried out by, in the presence of, or with the assistance of uniformed personnel of the Frontier Corps (FC), an Interior Ministry paramilitary force. In a number of cases, police assisted by being present at the scene or securing an area while plainclothes intelligence officers abducted individuals who later "disappeared."

In all the cases Human Rights Watch documented, even evident members of the security forces did not identify themselves, explain the basis for arrest or where they were taking those apprehended. Often instead they beat the victims and dragged them handcuffed and blindfolded into their vehicles. For example, on July 1, 2010, Shams Baloch, the 49-year-old former mayor of Khuzdar town in Balochistan, was abducted from an ambulance while accompanying his sick mother to a hospital in Quetta, Balochistan's capital. About an hour after they left Khuzdar, men in Frontier Corps uniforms stopped the ambulance at a checkpoint and ordered Baloch to get out. They proceeded to beat him, while holding others at gunpoint. Four armed men in plain clothes arrived a short time afterwards and took Baloch with them. The police refused to investigate.

Another feature of enforced disappearances in Balochistan is that many of the victims, especially senior political activists, have been "disappeared" more than once. They have been abducted, held in unacknowledged detention for weeks or even months, released, and then abducted again. And sometimes "disappearances" occur after the security forces have made several unsuccessful attempts at abducting a person before finally apprehending and disappearing the victim.

Information on the fate of persons subjected to enforced disappearances in Pakistan is scarce. Some of the alleged disappeared are being held in unacknowledged detention in facilities run by the Frontier Corps and the intelligence agencies, such as at the Kuli army cantonment, a military base in Quetta.

Those who the security forces eventually release are frequently reluctant to talk about their experiences for fear of being disappeared again or facing other repercussions. Many have been threatened with retaliation if they discuss who abducted them or reveal that they were tortured in custody. Without exception in the cases Human Rights Watch investigated, released detainees and relatives who were able to obtain information about the disappeared person's treatment in custody reported torture and ill-treatment. Methods of torture included prolonged beatings, often with sticks or leather belts, hanging detainees upside down, and food and sleep deprivation.

There is increasing evidence to substantiate the fears of many families that disappeared relatives who have been missing for months or years have been killed in custody. According to media reports, more than 70 bodies of previously disappeared persons have been discovered between July 2010 and February 2011.

While the problem is widespread, the exact number of enforced disappearances perpetrated in recent years by Pakistan's security forces remains unknown. Anti-government Baloch nationalists claim thousands of cases. Official numbers of disappeared persons are wildly contradictory. In 2008 Pakistan's interior minister, Rehman Malik, admitted at least 1,100 victims. In January 2011 Balochistan's home minister, Mir Zafrullah Zehri, told provincial legislators that only 55 persons were considered missing. The minister provided no explanation for these figures, which are inconsistent with those of credible sources.

Some of the disappeared have been traced by various institutions. The Balochistan home minister claimed in January 2011 that 32 people had been traced. According to separate investigations by the federal Interior Ministry and provincial Home Ministry, 23 victims of disappearances have been traced. The Commission of Inquiry for Missing Persons, established by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, has traced a total of 134 persons throughout Pakistan, of which 23 have so far been released. However, this list is not publicly available and it is not known if disappeared persons from Balochistan are on this list.

Since President Asif Ali Zadari took office in 2008, his government has taken significant steps to address Baloch grievances. It offered a public apology to the people of Balochistan

for human rights violations perpetrated by the state under military rule, including large-scale disappearances. In December 2009 the government, seeking political reconciliation in Balochistan, passed the Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan ("Beginning of Rights in Balochistan") package of constitutional, political, administrative, and economic reforms. It noted the province's "sense of deprivation in the political and economic structures of the federation" and past failure to implement provisions of the 1973 Pakistan Constitution that sought to empower the provinces.

Yet the government has not kept its promises to address the crisis of enforced disappearances in Balochistan. Those responsible for enforced disappearances in the cases documented in this report have not been held accountable. The security forces have continued to behave with the same impunity they enjoyed under the military government of President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. This impunity seems to penetrate the system at all levels: police who refuse to register and investigate disappearance cases, courts that appear unwilling or unable to fully enforce the law against the security forces, intelligence agencies that continue to blatantly ignore court orders, and high-level government officials who talk of the need for accountability yet are unwilling or unable to rein in the security forces. The reality is that security forces controlled by the military, including intelligence agencies and the Frontier Corps, continue to act outside all formal mechanisms of civilian oversight.

In the vast majority of cases we documented, relatives of the disappeared reported the cases to the local police. In most cases the police eventually, often after an order from the Supreme Court, registered the cases. Yet that is where official activity usually ended, as no investigations followed. Police often explicitly told the families that they had no powers to investigate disappearances allegedly committed by the intelligence agencies or Frontier Corps personnel.

The right to habeas corpus continues to be largely undermined both by the failure of the courts to meaningfully uphold it and by security agency defiance. In 27 disappearance cases documented in this report, the families of the victims or lawyers acting on their behalf filed petitions with the Balochistan High Court. In none of those cases did the court establish the whereabouts of the disappeared.

The Supreme Court has been more active. In 2009, it reopened the inquiry into disappearance cases across Pakistan that it began during the Musharraf period and that had led to a confrontation resulting in Musharraf's dismissal of the chief justice. In May 2010 the Supreme Court formed the Commission of Inquiry for Missing Persons, with a mandate to investigate enforced disappearances and provide recommendations for eliminating this

practice. A new Commission of Inquiry for Missing Persons was established by the federal Ministry of Interior on March 1, 2011. While some of the disappeared were traced by the first commission, no perpetrators were brought to account, possibly because of fears within the courts about confronting Pakistan's powerful intelligence and security agencies.

The inability of law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice system to tackle the problem of disappearances is exacerbated by the continuing failure of Pakistani authorities at the national and provincial level to exert the political will to address the issue of disappearances in Balochistan. The authorities have failed so far to send a strong message to the security forces and intelligence agencies and to implement a set of concrete measures that would put an end to the practice of enforced disappearances.

This failure remains one of the key factors contributing to the persistent cycle of abuse and impunity in the region, which takes a heavy toll on the Baloch community. It not only affects the victims whose lives are brutalized and lost, but also their families who live in the anguish that they may never learn the fate of their loved ones. It also deeply undermines the efforts of the Pakistani government to win the trust of the Baloch people and achieve reconciliation in the province.

Targeted Killings of Baloch Nationalists[29]

Across Balochistan since January 2011, at least 300 people have been abducted and killed and their bodies abandoned—acts widely referred to as "kill and dump" operations, in which Pakistani security forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations may be responsible. Assailants have also carried out targeted killings of opposition leaders and activists. Human Rights Watch has extensively documented enforced disappearances by Pakistan's security forces in Balochistan, including several cases in which those "disappeared" have been found dead.

The surge in unlawful killings of suspected militants and opposition figures in Balochistan has taken the brutality in the province to an unprecedented level. For example, In the first 10 days of July, nine bullet-riddled bodies, several of them bearing marks of torture, were discovered in the province, Human Rights Watch said. On July 1, the body of Abdul Ghaffar Lango, a prominent Baloch nationalist activist, was found in an abandoned hotel in the town of Gadani, in the Lasbela district. The local police told the media that, "The body bore multiple marks of brutal torture." Lango had been abducted by men in civilian clothes in

[29] Please refer to "Pakistan: Upsurge in Killings in Balochistan," Human Righs Watch news release, July 13, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/13/pakistan-upsurge-killings-balochistan.

Karachi, in Sindh province, on December 11, 2009. When Lango's relatives tried to lodge a complaint about his abduction, the police refused to take it. An officer told the family that Lango had been detained because he was a BNP leader and that the "authorities" wanted to restrain him from participating in politics.

Hanif Baloch, an activist with the Baloch Students Organisation (Azad), was abducted from the town of Hub, Lasbela district, on July 4. His body was found in Mach, Bolan district on July 6, with three bullet wounds to his upper body. On the same day in Kech district, the bodies of Azam Mehrab, a resident of Tump, and Rahim, a resident of Mand, were found dumped in Juzak, on the outskirts of the town of Turbat. Both had been shot dead under unknown circumstances.

While Baloch nationalist leaders and activists have long been targeted by the Pakistani security forces, since the beginning of 2011 human rights activists and academics critical of the military have also been killed. Siddique Eido, a coordinator for the highly regarded nongovernmental organization Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), was abducted with another man by men in security forces uniforms on December 21, 2010, from the town of Pasni in Gwadar district.

The bodies of both men, bearing marks of torture, were found in Ormara, Gwadar district, on April 28. HRCP said that "the degree of official inaction and callousness" in response to Eido's death amounted to "collusion" in his killing. Earlier, on March 1, an HRCP coordinator for the city of Khuzdar, Naeem Sabir district, was shot and killed by unknown assailants.

On June 1, Saba Dashtiyari, a professor at the University of Balochistan and an acclaimed Baloch writer and poet, was shot dead by unidentified gunmen in the provincial capital, Quetta. Dashtiyari had publicly backed the cause of an independent Balochistan.

Human Rights Watch has repeatedly called upon the Pakistan government to take immediate measures to end killings in Balochistan, to conduct prompt, impartial, and transparent investigations into alleged extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances and ensure that all those responsible, regardless of rank, are fully prosecuted, including as a matter of command responsibility. Victims of abuses by government security forces should be provided appropriate redress.

Recent Extrajudicial Killings in Balochistan

Human Rights Watch has investigated cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in Balochistan. Below are recent cases of killings that indicate involvement by the Pakistani military, its intelligence agencies, or the paramilitary Frontier Corps. There has been a notable failure by the federal government in Islamabad and the Balochistan provincial government in Quetta to investigate these cases and hold perpetrators accountable.

Enforced disappearance and killing of Abdul Ghaffar Lango

On December 11, 2009, a group of unknown men abducted Abdul Ghaffar Lango, a prominent Baloch nationalist activist, outside a hospital in Karachi in Sindh province. At 3 p.m. that day, Lango was leaving the Institute of Surgery and Medicine, a hospital in Karachi, with his wife, who had just been discharged after surgery. Lango's wife told Human Rights Watch that as the couple reached the main gate, two white Toyota Vigo pickup trucks drove up at high speed in front of them and suddenly stopped. About 10 men in civilian clothes approached the couple. One beat Lango unconscious with the butt of his rifle, and Lango fell to the ground. The men then dragged him into one of the cars and drove away. Lango's wife said there were many witnesses to the incident since it took place in a crowded area in broad daylight.

Later that day, Lango's relatives tried to lodge a complaint about his abduction at the Garden police station in Karachi, but the police refused to accept it. A police officer at the station told the family that Lango had been detained because he was a BNP leader and authorities wanted to restrain him from participating in politics. But the police would not provide any information on his whereabouts.

The family filed a petition with the Sindh High Court on January 12, 2010. On January 15, the court ordered the deputy attorney general and advocate general of Sindh to submit a report on Lango's whereabouts within two weeks. On March 3, Sindh Deputy Attorney General Umer Hayat Sindhu told the court on behalf of the director general of the Intelligence Bureau that Lango had not been detained or arrested by the Intelligence Bureau, which, he explained, was "only an intelligence agency that does not detain anyone for interrogation." Police representatives also told the court that Lango was not in their custody. No other security or intelligence authorities reported on Lango's whereabouts.

On July 1, 2011, Lango's body was found in an abandoned hotel near the Lakbado area of the town of Gadani, in Lasbela district of Balochistan. The local police, represented by the

station house officer of the Gadani police station, told the local media: "The body bore multiple marks of brutal torture. The cause of death was stated to be a severe wound in the head, caused by a hard rod or some other hard or sharp object." Lango appeared to have been recently killed.

Enforced Disappearance and Killing of Siddique Eido and Yusuf Nazar

Siddique Eido, a coordinator for the highly regarded nongovernmental organization Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), and Yousaf Nazar, a tailor by profession, were abducted by men in security forces uniforms on December 21, 2010, from the town of Pasni in Gwadar district. Eido and Nazar were returning from Gwadar to their native Pasni after appearing in court in a criminal case lodged against them. Seven other co-accused and four police officers were travelling with them when their van was stopped by three unlicensed vehicles. The assailants, who were in Frontier Corps uniforms, abducted Eido and Nazar at gunpoint in the presence of the police officers. The bodies of both men were found in Ormara, Gwadar district, on April 28, 2011. Both bore marks of torture.

In response to the killings and the authorities' failure to seriously investigate the case, HRCP said: "The uniforms of the abductors and the vehicles they had used gave credence to the belief that state agents were involved. Siddique had been abducted in the presence of several policemen, but despite such clear evidence no action was taken to publicly identify abductors or secure release." HRCP added that "the degree of official inaction and callousness" amounted to "collusion" in Eido's killing.

Enforced Disappearance and Killing of Naseer Kamalan

Naseer Kamalan was abducted at gunpoint on November 5, 2010, from a passenger van on the Makran Coastal Highway near Pasni in Gwadar district. Kamalan's fellow passengers told Human Rights Watch that his abductors were in Frontier Corps uniforms and were driving a jeep of the type commonly used by the Frontier Corps. Kamalan's body was found on January 17, 2011, dumped on the Makran Coastal Highway.

Enforced Disappearance and Killing of Jamil Yaqub

Jamil Yaqub was abducted in the town of Turbat on August 28, 2010, by a group of men in Frontier Corps uniforms, who had arrived in a jeep with military markings and insignia. Family members described to Human Rights Watch how they hid from the Frontier Corps personnel and then watched helplessly as Yaqub was abducted during daylight hours. Yaqub's body, bearing marks of torture, was found on February 10, 2011, on the outskirts of Turbat.

Other Killings Verified by Human Rights Watch

According to eyewitnesses, Hanif Baloch, a Baloch Students Organisation (Azad) (BSO-Azad) activist, was abducted from the town of Hub on July 4, 2011, by armed men in military uniform. His body was found on July 6, with three bullet wounds to his upper body.

On July 6, 2011, two bodies bearing multiple bullet wounds were found dumped near Juzak on the outskirts of Turbat in Kech district. Turbat District Headquarters Hospital authorities identified them as Azam Mehrab, a resident of Tump, and Rahim, son of Muhammad Yousaf, a resident of Go Kurth area of Mand, in Panjgoor district.

On June 18, 2011, the BSO-Azad junior joint secretary, Shafi Baloch, was abducted from the Lakhpass area of Mastung district. Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that Baloch was going to Mastung from Quetta in a passenger van for medical treatment when uniformed, armed men in three cars made him disembark and abducted him at gunpoint. His bullet-riddled body was found dumped near Mach, in Bolan district, 60 kilometers from Quetta.

On June 1, 2011, Prof. Saba Dashtiyari, a professor at the University of Balochistan in Quetta and an acclaimed writer and poet, was killed after being shot repeatedly by unidentified gunmen on Sariab Road in Quetta. Dashtiyari was the author of several books on Baloch culture and language and was a scholar on Islam. In recent years, he had publicly backed the cause for an armed struggle to achieve an independent Balochistan. No one has claimed responsibility for Dashtiyari's killing.

Targeted Killings by Baloch Nationalists and other militant groups[30]

Attacks By Baloch Nationalists

Armed militant groups in Balochistan are responsible for killing many civilians and destroying private property. In the past several years, they have increasingly targeted non-Baloch civilians and their businesses, police stations, and major gas installations and

[30] Abuses by militants in Balochistan were documented by Human Rights Watch in a December 2010 report "*Their Future is at Stake": Attacks on Teachers and Schools in Pakistan's Balochistan Province,* http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/12/13/their-future-stake.

infrastructure. They have also attacked security forces and military bases throughout the province. Abuses by militants in Balochistan were documented by Human Rights Watch in a December 2010 report *"Their Future is at Stake."*

Teachers, professors, and school administrators have found their lives increasingly under threat in Balochistan. Between January 2008 and October 2010, suspected militant groups targeted and killed at least 22 teachers and other education personnel in the province. Militants have also threatened, bombed, or otherwise attacked schools, resulting in injuries, deaths, property damage, and curtailed education for Balochistan's children and youth. In 2009, government schools were open for only 120 days, compared with around 220 days in the rest of Pakistan.

Fearing for their safety, many teachers—particularly ethnic Punjabis and Shiite Muslims and other targeted minorities—have sought transfers, further burdening what is already the worst educational system in Pakistan. Since 2008, more than 200 teachers and professors have transferred from their schools to the relatively more secure capital Quetta, or have moved out of the province entirely. Nearly 200 others are in the process of making such transfers. New teachers are hard to find, and replacements often less qualified than predecessors. In Baloch areas of the province, schools are often under or poorly staffed, and many remaining teachers say they are so preoccupied with declining security their teaching has been adversely affected.

Human Rights Watch has interviewed teachers, government officials, journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and school children, who describe attacks on Balochistan's educational facilities, teaching personnel, and students as part of broader political, religious, and cultural divisions. We have considered the consequences of such attacks for education in the region, including pervasive fear, fewer school days, and hemorrhaging of qualified teachers.

Killing people of a certain ethnicity or religion who have dedicated their lives to teaching only undercuts opportunities and outcomes in a province already struggling to educate its populace and achieve greater development, making a bad situation even worse. There is no acceptable justification for targeted killings of teachers and other education personnel, or attacks on schools. Beyond the killings' simple unlawfulness, the militant groups that are responsible demonstrate disturbing willingness to make the education of the province's children a pawn of their armed agenda.

Education falls in the crosshairs of three distinct violent conflicts in Balochistan. The first is a nationalist conflict, in which militant Baloch groups such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Baloch Liberation United Front (BLUF) seeking separation or autonomy for Balochistan have targeted Punjabis and other minorities, particularly in the districts of Mastung, Kalat, Nushki, Gwadar, Khuzdar, and Quetta. While individuals from all professions have been the victims of such "targeted killings," teachers and students constitute a significant proportion of victims because militant groups view schools and educational personnel, particularly ethnic Punjabis, as representatives of the Pakistani state and symbols of perceived Punjabi military oppression of the province.

Often no group claims responsibility for attacks, and few perpetrators have been apprehended and prosecuted. Those that do claim responsibility for such violence often justify it as a response to perceived lack of Baloch control over resources, under-representation in the national government, and retaliation for abuses by state security forces against the Baloch community. For example, the recent surge in killings can be traced to the 2006 assassination of prominent Baloch tribal leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, and the murders of three prominent Baloch politicians in April 2009 by assailants believed to be linked to the Pakistan military. Apparent militant nationalist groups have threatened school officials, demanding that they stop teaching Pakistani history, flying the Pakistani flag, and having children sing the national anthem. The BLA claimed responsibility for the shooting death of Anwar Baig, a senior teacher killed in Kalat in June 2009 because he supposedly opposed recitation of the Baloch nationalist and hoisting the nationalist flag instead of the Pakistani flag.

Attacks by Sectarian Groups[31]

The second distinct conflict is a sectarian one, in which militant Sunni Muslim groups have attacked members of the Shia community, especially members of the Persian-speaking Hazara community. Such sectarian attacks appeared to have increased since 2009, and occur mainly in Quetta and its neighboring districts. Further, armed Islamist groups are also attacking those who act contrary to their interpretation of Islam.

Human Rights Watch has documented over 300 killings of members of the Shia community, mostly from the Hazara community that have taken place since 2008. For example, on October 4, 2011, gunmen riding on motorbikes stopped a bus carrying mostly Hazara Shia

[31] For further details see the Human Rights Watch press releases "Pakistan: Prevent Targeted Killings of Shia Muslims," October 4, 2011 http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/04/pakistan-prevent-targeted-killings-shia-muslims, and "Pakistan: Protect Shia Muslims," December 3, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/03/pakistan-protect-shia-muslims.

Muslims who were headed to work at a vegetable market on the outskirts of Quetta, the provincial capital. The attackers forced the passengers off the bus, made them stand in a row, and opened fire, killing 13 and wounding six others.

On September 19, near the town of Mastung, gunmen forced about 40 Hazara who had been traveling by bus to Iran to visit Shia holy sites to disembark, shot 26 dead, and wounded six. Although some Hazara managed to escape, another three were killed as they tried to bring victims to a hospital in Quetta. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a Sunni militant group, claimed responsibility for the September 19 attack.

On November 29, Mohammad Danish Alam, a Shia teacher at Balochistan University, became victim of an apparent sectarian killing when he was gunned down by unidentified men in the Zarghoonabad suburb of Quetta, Balochistan's capital. Local police reported that Alam, a science and information technology lecturer, was on his way to the university on his motorcycle when gunmen opened fire and killed him.

Pakistani and international human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, have made numerous calls to Pakistan's authorities to hold those responsible for the attacks to account. While authorities claim to have arrested dozens of suspects, no one has been charged in these attacks.

While sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia militant groups has been a persistent problem in Pakistan, more recent attacks have primarily targeted ordinary Shia going about their daily lives. Despite Pakistan's return to constitutional rule in 2008, scores of unarmed Shia have been killed across Pakistan by Sunni extremists, particularly around the Islamic month of Moharram, which is of particular significance to the Shia. Human Rights Watch has recorded at least 16 attacks on the Shia so far in 2011 across Pakistan.

Sunni militant groups such as the supposedly banned Lashkar-e Jhangvi operate with impunity even in areas where state authority is well established, such as Punjab province and the port city of Karachi. Both in Balochistan, where local militants challenge government authority, and elsewhere across Pakistan, law enforcement officials have been seen to look the other way during attacks on Shia and other vulnerable groups.

Recommendations to the United States Government

In its discussions with the government of Pakistan, the US should:

- Press the government of Pakistan to take all necessary measures to end enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and arbitrary detentions, and fully investigate and prosecute as appropriate all persons, regardless of position or rank, who order or carry out such abuses.
- Communicate directly to the agencies responsible for disappearances and other abuses, including the army, ISI, IB, Frontier Corps, police, and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies, to demand an end to abuses and facilitate criminal inquires to hold perpetrators accountable. Make it clear that continued disappearances will result in conditions on or an end to relationships with those agencies.
- Suspend police and military assistance and cooperation programs with the Frontier Corps, police, and Pakistan Army units based in Balochistan until military and civilian authorities fully investigate and take appropriate action regarding allegations of disappearance and other abuses by their forces.
- Actively implement the Leahy Law by ensuring that the Pakistani government has effective mechanisms in place to ensure that no security unit funded or trained by the US is responsible for human rights violations and that adequate vetting and oversight mechanisms are in place to help deter abuses in the future.
- Urge that the Pakistani government investigate alleged human rights abuses by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and other militant groups and hold those responsible to account, particularly those who have committed serious abuses in Balochistan, including multiple killings of members of the Shia community.
- Demand that the Pakistani government take urgent measures to protect members of the Shia community and other vulnerable groups in Balochistan and across Pakistan.

The US government should urge Baloch nationalist groups to:

- Cease attacks and threats against all civilians, particularly non-Baloch residents of the province.
- Cease attacks on teachers, professors, education personnel, and against schools.
- Immediately issue a public statement directing group members to respect the lives of non-Baloch residents of the province and to end attacks on schools, students and teachers.

- Take appropriate disciplinary action against group members who order or participate in attacks on civilians.
- Recognize that the United States considers attacks targeting people on the basis of ethnicity or religion to be particularly reprehensible and will seek to hold all groups that engage in such practices accountable.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Good. That is a good point to end your testimony on.

I want to thank all of you for participating today. There will be votes coming up soon, so we want to try to get involved with some questions right away. I will just do a few, and the ranking member, and we will make sure that other congressmen get a chance as well.

I think one point, I like to read history. I mean, I like to read history, and Mr. Peters was expressing—was talking about Thomas Jefferson and such. I agree with you, Dr. Peters, or Mr. Peters, I should say, or Colonel Peters. I think that our Founding Fathers and most of the people who built this country would be turning over in their grave if they found out that we were sending American military personnel in order to maintain the colonial boundaries that were established by the people we had to fight in order to become independent.

And many of the conflicts that we have throughout the world today—I agree with you, Colonel Peters—that can be traced right back to the colonial era with decisions that were made by colonial powers. And then we end up in conflicts like this, and especially if the United States intervenes in order to maintain a status quo of borderlines, which is what we seem to be doing. This is not consistent with our national interests or our traditions at all, and I think America needs to reexamine this issue and have a heartfelt debate internally about what should motivate America to get involved.

But one thing is for sure. When someone is helping kill Americans or threatening to set up some sort of dictatorship over—for whatever cause, Americans, we should not be on their side in helping them. And I think that what broke—the straw that broke the camel's back was when we found out that not only has Pakistan been arming those Taliban and other radicals that have been murdering American soldiers in Afghanistan, but they have given aid and comfort and safe haven to the man who masterminded the slaughter of 3,000 Americans. And anybody who doesn't believe that they did that is an irrational optimist about what is going on down there.

I think that at that point we need to understand that we cannot back up everything that Pakistan does simply because something might disturb the lines that were drawn so long ago and that would create instability. With that said, thank you.

Would you like to comment on that?

Mr. PETERS. If I may.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But you only have about 20 seconds to do it.

Mr. PETERS. Mr. Chairman, you like to read history. Today, you are making history.

Not only does Pakistan facilitate terrorism in Afghanistan while playing triple and quadruple games, but we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that Pakistan has made us complicit in terrorism against India. Because Pakistan, using the nuclear red herring, knows that they have been able to sponsor attacks against New Delhi, against Mumbai, and knowing we will step in and stop India from retaliating. Imagine how different it would be if the Pakistanis didn't think they could count on us to run interference.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think that is a good point.

Let me just end my questions and answers with this thought, and it has been expressed by our witnesses. If we are going to be taken seriously when we talk like this we have to be consistent and we have to be honest.

And I certainly—whether it is the Sindh Province or Baluchistan or what is going on in the Baluch Province in Iran or what is going on in the Baluch Province in Pakistan, people have a right to their self-determination, which is what is being testified today. Let's note, I think that people of Kashmir also have a right to their self-determination, and I think Dr. Fair might want to comment on that.

Ms. FAIR. I am going to focus my comments upon our relationship with Pakistan.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. 30 seconds, then we have got to move on.

Ms. FAIR. But I do want to say one thing. The Leahy amendment. For the last several years, I have been looking at our relationship with Pakistan; and we have been very negligent in taking the Leahy amendment seriously. Whether we are looking at Pakistan abuses in FATA or Swat, talking to officials, we don't even populate the Leahy database or we have begun doing so quite late in the game.

But the problem goes back to what Ali Dayan was saying, is that, in many ways, Pakistan's abuse of human rights served our interest. And so we are kind of coming to this late in the game, that we are trying to ask the Pakistanis to clean up their act after we have given them a blank check for about a decade, literally a blank check for about a decade.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is correct. I think we have been manipulated for a longer than that.

We have about 8 minutes before we have to be on the floor for a vote. Would you like to ask a couple of questions?

Mr. CARNAHAN. I have a question. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will do this very quickly to try to get some other people in as well.

I wanted to go to Dr. Bor. In 2008, in written testimony before Congress, you wrote about the political, cultural, and economic oppression of the Baluch people at the hands of the Iranian regime. I am interested in hearing what, if anything, has changed in the past 4 years; and, secondly, with regard to the Baluchistan areas in Iran, how do you see their sentiment in terms of being open to working with the West?

Mr. BOR. I think Baluch in general, whether in Iran or in Pakistan, they are very open-hearted. They have welcomed U.S. support with open arm. And they have also expressed their desire that if Baluchistan become independent to provide the U.S. with bases in Gwadar. And, of course, as you know, Baluchistan strategically probably is the most important piece of the land in the world now, stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to Karachi; and that is where 40 percent of the world oil passes.

Unfortunately, the Chinese are building a naval base or they are building Gwadar. And even more dangerous for the U.S. strategy interest is connecting the overland Karakoram Highway to Gwadar, so that instead of being through U.S. Navy in Pacific and in Indian Oceans through the Indian Navy so they can come di-

rectly there, and that is the choke Strait of Hormuz. So the Baluch have—historically, in fact they have been searching.

And of course I notice a perfect coincidence of interest between Baluch and the U.S. Because Baluch, they don't want the pipeline to go from Iran to Pakistan in violation of U.S. sanction. The Baluch, of course, they are secular. They are against a Pakistan-Taliban alliance because they are secular, and they want to fight Taliban. If the U.S. supported Baluch they can stop Taliban shelter by ISI and Pakistani Government in Baluchistan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. We have time, and I apologize, but you never know when votes are going to be called. We have about 3 more minutes worth of questions and answers, and I am going to grant Louie Gohmert 1 minute. You came in first, Louie, so you are first.

Oh, the Judge has something he has to say. Judge Poe has 1 minute and then Louie Gohmert.

Mr. POE. Thank you for being here.

I want to say this. I am a great believer in self-determination for people who believe in it as well. Baluchistan I think fits that category. Somebody over there in Baluchistan has been reading the Declaration of Independence that gives a justification on a moral and legal reason why people can separate themselves from abusive governments. So we will see how that plays out.

As far as Pakistan goes, they are the Benedict Arnold in the relationship with the United States. Ten years and $20 billion later, we are still paying them to not look out after our interests.

They persecuted the informant that gave us the information about Osama Bin Laden and charged him with treason. I mean, how long is it going to take before we get the point?

We don't need to continue to give American money to Pakistan at all, not a dime. And they have proven they don't deserve it, and it is not in our national interest.

And the third comment is the United States, as one of you all has said, needs to look to India as a supporter and as an ally on not just the economic front but the war on terror as well.

And, lastly, Mr. Peters, you will never make it as a diplomat in the State Department.

Mr. PETERS. Congressman, I am proud to be a soldier, not a diplomat.

Mr. POE. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. See, it is always great to have Texans around. They just step right up.

And here is another one, Louie Gohmert.

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, and I couldn't agree with my fellow former judge from Texas more.

It is greatly disturbing to hear that weapons that we have provided to Pakistan have been utilized to create human rights' violations. That is particularly disturbing. That is not what this Nation is about. And it would seem to me that since we are trying to get out of Afghanistan and turn that country over to them, the quicker we could stop assisting Pakistan in funding the Taliban that we are trying to fight, which is also creating human rights' violations against Baluchistan, it sounds like we could create a real win for

the United States, Baluchistan, Baluchs, for people of Afghanistan if we just quit helping Pakistan help all of our enemies.

So I appreciate your testimony. I look forward to anything additionally they may have to submit.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We have 3 minutes before we have to be on the floor to vote, so I will give a 30-second summary.

First of all, thank you to the witnesses. There was a lot of trepidation by people before we held this hearing. I got so many emails threatening all sorts of crazy things and worrying that some people would be represented. We learned a lot by this hearing. We put a lot of stuff on the record.

This is not to plot out some sort of conspiracy. What we are here to discuss is start a national dialogue in the open about what America's policy should be in this very volatile part of the world and where our ideals for human dignity and freedom and justice and self-determination, where they fit into our policies in that part of the world.

So we have started the discussion today. I think this hearing was a first good step, and it was certainly not a stunt on anybody's part. We honestly really were going to try to get into these issues.

So I want to thank you all for coming, and I am sorry we do have to run off for our votes right now.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), Chairman

February 8, 2012

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, to be held in **Room 2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live, via the WEBCAST link on the Committee website at http://www.hcfa.house.gov):**

DATE: Wednesday, February 8, 2012

TIME: 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Baluchistan

WITNESSES: C. Christine Fair, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Georgetown University

Mr. Ralph Peters
Military Analyst and Author

Mr. T. Kumar
Director, International Advocacy
Amnesty International USA

M. Hossein Bor, Ph.D.
Counsel
Entwistle & Cappucci, LLP

Mr. Ali Dayan Hasan
Pakistan Director, Asia Division
Human Rights Watch

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON *Oversight and Investigations* HEARING

Day *Wednesday* Date *2/8/12* Room *2200 Rayburn HOB*

Starting Time *2:36 pm* Ending Time *3:42 pm*

Recesses *n/a* (____to ____) (____to ____) (____to ____) (____to ____) (____to ____) (____to ____)

Presiding Member(s)

Chairman Dana Rohrabacher

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session [✓]
Executive (closed) Session [ ]
Televised [✓]

Electronically Recorded (taped) [✓]
Stenographic Record [✓]

TITLE OF HEARING:

Baluchistan

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Chairman Dana Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Russ Carnahan, and Rep. Ted Poe.

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: *(Mark with an * if they are not members of full committee.)*

*Rep. Brad Sherman and Rep. Louie Gohmert**

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [✓] No [ ]
(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: *(List any statements submitted for the record.)*

Prepared Statement of C. Christine Fair, Ph.D.
Prepared Statement of Mr. Ralph Peters
Prepared Statement of Mr. T. Kumar
Prepared Statement of M. Hossein Bor, Ph.D.
Prepared Statement of Mr. Ali Dayan Hasan

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____
or
TIME ADJOURNED *3:42 pm*

Subcommittee Staff Director