

**U.S.-INDIA COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION:
DEEPENING THE PARTNERSHIP**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,
NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

—————
SEPTEMBER 14, 2011
—————

Serial No. 112-62
—————

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/>

—————
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

68-297PDF

WASHINGTON : 2011

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, *Chairman*

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey	HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana	GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California	ENI F.H. FALEOMAVEGA, American Samoa
DANA ROHRBACHER, California	DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois	BRAD SHERMAN, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California	ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio	GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RON PAUL, Texas	RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
MIKE PENCE, Indiana	ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina	GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
CONNIE MACK, Florida	THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska	DENNIS CARDOZA, California
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas	BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
TED POE, Texas	BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida	ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio	CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio	FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
DAVID RIVERA, Florida	KAREN BASS, California
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania	WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas	DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania	
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina	
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York	
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina	
VACANT	

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, *Staff Director*

RICHARD J. KESSLER, *Democratic Staff Director*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, *Chairman*

TED POE, Texas	BRAD SHERMAN, California
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina	DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio	GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas	BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York	ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina	

CONTENTS

	Page
WITNESSES	
Ms. Lisa Curtis, senior research fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation	4
Mr. Frank Cilluffo, associate vice president, director, Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington University	16
S. Amer Latif, Ph.D., visiting fellow, Wadhvani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies	31
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING	
Ms. Lisa Curtis: Prepared statement	6
Mr. Frank Cilluffo: Prepared statement	19
S. Amer Latif, Ph.D.: Prepared statement	33
APPENDIX	
Hearing notice	46
Hearing minutes	47

U.S.-INDIA COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION: DEEPENING THE PARTNERSHIP

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,
NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m., in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ROYCE. Today, we will examine U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation. Of course, this hearing comes after our memorial for 9/11. And it comes right after India has again suffered a terrorist attack. Last week, a powerful bomb decimated part of one of New Delhi's high profile courthouses. It killed dozens of people. Scores of people were also injured. A few months ago, a coordinated triple bombing struck Mumbai, and that attack came during rush hour. Indian authorities are still searching for answers.

July's coordinated Mumbai attack brought back the horrors of 26/11 to India. Three years ago, a coordinated rampage rocked this great city. It killed 166. And in that total were six Americans who were killed. But unlike in 2008, this time India authorities responded more rapidly, though there is still frustration in India. Defending an open country of India's size is no easy task. Mumbai is particularly challenging. It's got a population of 20 million people. Fortunately, there are good opportunities for the United States to increase its counterterrorism cooperation with India. I visited Mumbai after the 26/11 attacks and had an opportunity at that time to not only talk with the Prime Minister about this subject, but to talk to the head of the counterterrorism operations in India about the necessity of closer cooperation between the United States and India.

I think the two countries have worked together on this for over a decade in terms of discussions that I'm cognizant of. But by all accounts, this cooperation substantially improved after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, when investigators from both countries stood shoulder-to-shoulder in response. The Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative, Homeland Security Dialogue and other working groups plug along. This April, the FBI, working with the Indian Home Ministry, hosted 39 senior police executives from across India in Los Angeles, where they participated in an exchange on counterterrorism, crisis response and megacity policing. They visited the FBI's Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory in Orange,

California, a city I represent, to be trained in all aspects of digital evidence recovery.

This is good, but I'd like to get to a point where our counterterrorism exchanges are just as high profile, just as numerous, just as unprecedented as our combined military exercises with India are. I think Secretary Clinton had it right this July when she stressed in India "how important it is that we get results" from all of our counterterrorism agreements.

Let's be clear: This is more than just helping a democratic ally. There are real, hard U.S. interests at stake. Simply put, the militants targeting India are also the militants targeting us. Indeed, at a subcommittee hearing on the "Future of al-Qaeda" after bin Laden's death, many experts placed just as much importance on Pakistan-based LeT as any al-Qaeda affiliate. LeT is India's mortal enemy, and it has gone global, with Western targets in its sights.

This week Vice President Biden said of Pakistan, "They have to get better. We are demanding it." But are we? Last month, the Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. has begun to condition security assistance to Pakistan on a "secret scorecard of U.S. objectives to combat al-Qaeda and its militant allies." Although details are classified, from the Journal's reporting, it does not seem that the U.S. has put emphasis on Pakistan making further progress on the Mumbai attackers or LeT in this "scorecard."

This would be shortsighted if it's the case. And I think this has to do with tearing down barriers that might be in the way of greater cooperation with India. As one witness will testify, "The U.S. cannot allow its national security to be held hostage by nearly two decades of unfulfilled expectations in Pakistan."

In the past decade, U.S. relations with India have grown considerably. But we've hit a lull. Counterterrorism cooperation is a way to reinvigorate this relationship, and it's a way to better protect America.

I'll now turn to the ranking member for his opening statement, Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for these important hearings today and for that opening statement that I want to associate myself with. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how to further increase our counterterrorism cooperation with an important and democratic friend, India. I also note that we are the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee and look forward to our subcommittee focusing on how to expand American exports to India as well.

As has been noted, the U.S.-India relationship is one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world for the 21st century. Despite significant improvements since the end of the Cold War, there has been significant distrust and bureaucratic impediments to better relations. Commercial relations, as I've mentioned, are often portrayed as a bright spot, but American firms have not benefited as much as we had hoped from India's efforts to modernize its military equipment and develop civilian nuclear power, and that's just two examples.

While it was inconceivable just a few years ago for U.S. firms to even seriously be considered for such projects as India's jet fighter

needs, now our jet fighters are considered, but ultimately the U.S. firms were not selected earlier this year.

We see a similar picture in counterterrorism cooperation in other areas. Relationships have improved. They have reached new heights. The level of cooperation and mutual assistance after the 2008 Mumbai attacks were remarkable, but old, lingering distrust and suspicions continue to hamper needed deeper cooperation.

Last week a powerful bomb placed in a briefcase exploded in a reception area of the Delhi High Court killing 12, wounding 70. Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami, an al-Qaeda-linked group with bases in Pakistan and Bangladesh, appears to be behind that latest attack. The groups that target India may not be the same exact groups that target the U.S., but they have major contacts and indeed overlap with al-Qaeda and they share a similar pan-Islamic ideology, although often the groups that target India have a more local anti-India focus, rather than a world-wide focus.

Deeper intelligence sharing has benefitted both countries. Further improvements are needed. Due to its sensitivity and strong bureaucratic prerogative this is also one of the most challenging areas for greater cooperation.

I bring up the subject of Pakistan. We should not have our need to cooperate with Pakistan hinder our cooperation with India and I've consistently called the State Department and others in our Government to call out Pakistan for its often duplicitous role in the struggle against terror. Pakistan's intelligence service, ISI, has for too long aided violent extremists, several Pakistani groups, including as the chairman mentioned, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba—and I apologize to those who are familiar with South Asian languages for my pronunciation—Jaish-e-Mohammed, have links to al-Qaeda. These groups have launched numerous attacks against the Indian population and government, including the deadly assault against the Indian Parliament in New Dehli in 2001. The hands of Pakistan's Government are also seen in the 26/11 2008 attacks in Mumbai, using the Indian way of identifying month and date, that is to say the 26th of November 2008.

Failure to point out the Pakistani connection to this terrorism will only serve to perpetuate it. We have to work with those we can in Pakistan but we must be more effective in calling out, and in the words of Secretary Clinton, "lean hard on Islamabad."

At the same time, the present administration is rightly building on efforts of its predecessors to deepen counterterrorism ties with India. In July 2010, the U.S. and India signed a Bilateral Counterterrorism Cooperative Initiative Memorandum of Understanding. This MOU was followed by the creation of a Homeland Security Dialogue during President Obama's visit to India. We only have such a dialogue with a handful of our closest allies. Secretary Napolitano led a delegation to India earlier this year, holding the first dialogue meeting in New Dehli. This high-level focus will hopefully play a significant role in efforts to break the patterns of bureaucratic lack of communication that we've seen in the past.

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding these hearings. As it happens, as you know, the Financial Services subcommittee is having a hearing of importance to Southern California as well, so any part of this hearing that I miss I know will be on

tape and on disk for me to watch over the next couple of days. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Sherman. We're going to go to our distinguished panel at this time and we'll start with Ms. Lisa Curtis. She is a senior research fellow for South Asia at The Heritage Foundation and before joining Heritage, Lisa served on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. She also served with the State Department and with the Central Intelligence Agency and has appeared before the House numerous times. And we welcome her back.

Mr. Frank Cilluffo is associate vice president and director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington University. He served in the White House as Special Assistant to the President for homeland security and he's one of the leading experts on terrorism and homeland security.

We have Dr. Amer Latif with us as well, a visiting fellow for U.S.-Indian Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He was director for South Asian Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, responsible for defense relations with India and surrounding countries.

All of the witnesses have submitted their testimony. It's already part of the written record, so we will ask you all to abbreviate, make a 5-minute presentation and then we'll go to questioning. We'll start with Ms. Curtis.

STATEMENT OF MS. LISA CURTIS, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Ms. CURTIS. Thank you very much for inviting me here today to testify on U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation. The U.S. and India are under threat from terrorists that seek to disrupt our country's democratic way of life, our economic progress, and indeed, to strike terror among our people. And this point was driven home, as you both mentioned, last week with the attacks in New Dehli, as well as the threat information that came to light that terrorists might be preparing to attack New York City and Washington, DC, on the 10-year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks.

Now India's failure to identify a specific organization responsible for the bombing in New Dehli partly defines the evolving nature of the threat that India faces. Analysts there are increasingly focusing on networks of individuals and the possibility that small groups of Indians may be working with Pakistan-based terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba or the Harakat-ul-Jihadi Islami. And the reality that India faces a threat from homegrown Islamic terrorists was acknowledged by India's home minister.

Now India has taken some important steps to improve its counterterrorism capabilities since the 2008 Mumbai attacks such as establishing the National Investigative Agency much like our FBI and strengthening its antiterrorism laws. But it must do far more to cope with persistent threat it faces. And the amount of resources that India has invested in bolstering its counterterrorism capabilities has simply failed to meet the challenge at hand.

Now immediately following the Mumbai attacks, as you mentioned, Chairman Royce, Washington and New Dehli broke down many bureaucratic barriers to their counterterrorism cooperation.

But unfortunately, the handling of the David Coleman Headley case revived to some extent Indian mistrust of the U.S. and its handling of terrorism cases implicating Pakistan. Striking revelations of the LeT's international reach and connections to Pakistani intelligence emerged from the trials of David C. Headley and his accomplice Tahawwur Rana. But it took almost 9 months before Indian authorities were given direct access to Headley. Moreover, the U.S. failure to pressure Pakistan to arrest intelligence officers named by Headley as involved in the Mumbai attacks reinforced Indian beliefs that the U.S. will gloss over Pakistani involvement in attacks on India so long as Pakistan continues to cooperate with the U.S. against groups that threaten the U.S. homeland.

To some extent, India is right. In the past, the U.S. has viewed the LeT, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, only through an Indo-Pakistani prism, rather than as part of the international terrorist syndicate. Thankfully, opinions within the U.S. administration are beginning to change on this issue. And as you know, the dangers of the LeT and its link to global terrorism are well known and I won't spend time going over those.

I think a hesitant U.S. approach to sharing information on Pakistan-based terrorist groups with India does not serve U.S. interests. Indeed, it cripples the U.S. ability to fully get a handle on the terrorism threat in South Asia because by choosing to view the activities of al-Qaeda and other Pakistan-based terrorist groups through a separate lens, U.S. officials have failed to hold Pakistan fully accountable for dealing with the terrorists located on its territory. And indeed, Pakistan's tolerance of groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba have facilitated al-Qaeda's ability to operate from Pakistan and Osama bin Laden's ability to hide in the country as long as he did.

So hopefully, the U.S.-India Homeland Security Dialogue that was launched in May will help overcome some of this mistrust between our two countries and provide fresh opportunities to enhance our counterterrorism cooperation and beyond enhancing intelligence sharing, I think the U.S. should also position itself as a resource for India as India seeks to improve its own homeland security. For instance, improving the security of cities, large cities like Mumbai will require investment from international companies that can provide state-of-the-art technology and products that help protect critical infrastructure and here, U.S. companies certainly have a role to play.

The two countries can also look at the issue of deradicalization in their counterterrorism dialogue. I think this is an area that merits further exploration. Home Minister Chidambaram's acknowledge that Indian citizens have been involved in recent acts of terrorism should drive the government to deal with the issue of Muslim alienation. I think because of the history of Hindu-Muslim communal violence in India, Indian officials up until now have been somewhat reluctant to admit the homegrown Islamic threat.

Lastly, I think the U.S. can help India with training and equipping its police forces. Ultimately, it is India that must raise its budgets for its own homeland security needs. However, the U.S. can enhance police exchanges and provide training, to share best

practices and ideas for enhancing community policing and intelligence gathering.

That concludes my remarks. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis follows:]



214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE • Washington DC 20002 • (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

**U.S.–India Counterterrorism
Cooperation: Deepening the
Partnership**

Testimony before
The United States House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee
on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade

September 14, 2011

**Lisa Curtis
Senior Research Fellow**

My name is Lisa Curtis. I am a senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.

The U.S. and India are under threat from terrorists that seek to disrupt both countries' democratic way of life, undermine their economic progress, and strike terror among their citizenries. This point was driven home last week as India experienced yet another devastating attack—this time at the New Delhi High Court—and the U.S. sought to track down credible threat information that terrorists were preparing to attack New York City and Washington, D.C., around the 10-year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks.

Despite a general convergence of American and Indian views on the need to contain terrorism, the two countries have failed in the past to work as closely as they could to minimize threats. The U.S.–India Homeland Security Dialogue launched in May provides a fresh opportunity to expand counterterrorism cooperation between New Delhi and Washington to mutual benefit. In order to gain the full benefits of this cooperation, both countries will have to overcome suspicions of the other's intentions and be willing to deepen their intelligence exchanges.

While the U.S. and India engage closely on a host of issues—including defense, nuclear nonproliferation, and economic cooperation—the greatest potential benefit to each country's national security is likely to come from the expansion of counterterrorism cooperation. The U.S. can help India strengthen its homeland security and make itself less vulnerable to terrorism by sharing best practices and lessons learned over the post-9/11 decade. The U.S. also stands to benefit from greater access to India's information and databases that track terrorists who are active in India, many of whom have close connections to al-Qaeda and other Pakistan-based terrorist groups.

The Evolving Terrorist Threat in India

While India has faced numerous insurgencies and separatist movements over the last 30 years, my testimony will focus on the threat from Islamist terrorism, which constitutes one of the most urgent internal threats to India's security. In addition to terrorist attacks by Islamist extremists, India has dealt with a Sikh uprising in the state of Punjab in the 1980s, a Muslim separatist movement in the state of Jammu and Kashmir that flared in the 1990s, various ethnic separatist movements in its northeast, and a leftist extremist movement that has recently spread in the rural areas of eastern and central India. The background on these separatist movements goes beyond the scope of my testimony and will only be mentioned to the degree that it relates to Islamist terrorist attacks, which have wracked India over the last five years.

India has experienced two major terrorist attacks within the last two months. Just last Wednesday, terrorists struck the New Delhi High Court by planting a bomb in a trash can near the reception area, killing 13 and injuring scores of others. This attack followed serial bombings in Mumbai on July 13 that killed 26. In the July attacks, terrorists detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in three separate locations of the city

almost simultaneously. The first two blasts occurred at around 6:55 p.m., one in a jewelry market and one in a business district in southern Mumbai. The third blast occurred around 7:05 p.m. in a crowded neighborhood in central Mumbai.

Two separate groups have claimed responsibility for last week's attack on the High Court. In an e-mail sent a few hours after the incident, the Harakat-ul-Jihadi Islami (HuJI) claimed credit for the bombing and demanded repeal of a death sentence for an alleged terrorist on death row for involvement in a 2001 attack on the Indian parliament. That attack precipitated a six-month military standoff between India and Pakistan that U.S. officials feared could erupt into nuclear conflict. HuJI, a well-known Pakistan-based group that also operates in Bangladesh, in the past focused on attacking targets in Indian Kashmir but has more recently forged ties to al-Qaeda. HuJI leader and close confidante of Osama bin Laden, Ilyas Kashmiri, was reportedly killed in a drone strike in Pakistan in June. In a separate e-mail sent a day after the High Court bombing, a locally based terrorist outfit called the Indian Mujahideen claimed credit for the bombing.

India has not assigned responsibility for either of the recent attacks, although Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram said the strikes were most likely conducted by India-based terrorists. The statement represented a significant departure from past Indian pronouncements following terrorist attacks in which officials automatically pointed a finger across the border to Pakistan.

India's inability to identify a specific organization responsible for the recent bombing seems to define the evolving nature of the threat that India faces. Many analysts are starting to focus less on organizational designations and paying more attention to networks of individuals and the possibility that small groups of Indians may be working in coordination with Pakistan-based terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and HuJI. Revelations from the David C. Headley trial in Chicago (see below) apparently revealed that Pakistani intelligence and the LeT have worked together in recent years on an endeavor called the Karachi Project, which seeks to motivate and equip Indians to attack their own country.¹

A survey of terrorist attacks occurring in India over the last five years validates the theory that terrorism in India is increasingly being conducted by Indians working closely with Pakistan-based terrorist groups. In the six months before the November 2008 attacks that were carried out by the LeT, India suffered several terrorist attacks inside the country, most of which were claimed by the Indian Mujahideen (IM). This led to concern in India about the growing threat posed by homegrown Islamist extremists. The IM had sent out a manifesto on November 23, 2007, via e-mail, claiming responsibility for bombing court complexes in the Indian cities of Lucknow, Varanasi, and Faizabad. The group said it conducted the attacks to avenge the mistreatment of suspects held for their involvement in a Jaish-e-Mohammed kidnapping plot.² Jaish-e-Mohammed is another Pakistan-based terrorist group with past ties to Pakistani intelligence.

¹Sandeep Unnithan, "The Karachi Project," *India Today*, February 18, 2010, at <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/The+Karachi+project/1/84662.html> (September 12, 2011).

²Praveen Swami, "Indian Mujahideen Manifestos Attacked Judiciary," *The Hindu*, September 8, 2011 at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2436739.ece> (September 12, 2011).

India's Response to the Threat

Indian officials were severely criticized for security lapses following the attack in New Delhi. Despite an earlier smaller scale bombing at the court four months prior, the government had not installed surveillance cameras in the area, and metal detectors at the building were not functioning properly. Although India has taken some steps to improve its counterterrorism capabilities since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, it must do far more to cope with the persistent threat of terrorism. India will have to overhaul its intelligence systems and reform and bolster its local police operations. The amount of resources that India has invested in bolstering its counterterrorism capabilities has so far failed to adequately meet the challenge.

Steps that India has taken to try to improve its ability to get a handle on terrorism include passing a law in December 2008 establishing the National Investigative Agency (NIA) to investigate threats or acts of terrorism. Senior NIA officers have unique authority to pursue and investigate terror incidents throughout the country, thereby addressing the challenge of separate jurisdictions for Indian states. A major challenge for India has been lack of information-sharing among the different intelligence agencies and difficulties in conducting investigations across state jurisdictions. The NIA has so far been staffed with personnel from existing intelligence and law enforcement agencies throughout India. Critics say the NIA is drastically underfunded, however.

Also in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the Indian parliament passed the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment to strengthen existing anti-terror laws by expanding definitions of terrorist attacks and instituting legal reforms and other judicial modifications, including establishing special courts for speedy trials and revising burdens of proof and search-and-seizure standards.

In addition, India revitalized the Multi-Agency Center (MAC) as an interagency counterterrorism center similar to the CIA's National Counterterrorism Center. The MAC was started before the 2008 Mumbai attacks as a way to improve coordination of intelligence and break down barriers between the state and central governments. The government also intends to set up subsidiary MACs in each state to streamline local intelligence gathering. Like the NIA, though, the MAC also reportedly has been plagued by lack of staffing and resources.

India has also established a national intelligence grid (NATGRID) to integrate existing information databases to better track terrorist suspects. Under the NATGRID, 21 sets of databases will be integrated into a single network to allow for quick access to information by both the intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

One of India's biggest challenges is to increase the number, and improve the capabilities, of its police forces. Indian police lack training and equipment and are simply too low in number to serve the population adequately. India has only 140 policemen for every 100,000 people, while the world average is around 270. A retired Indian security official said the country was short of no less than 1.8 million policemen. Indian Home Minister Chidambaram recently indicated that India had hired an extra 90,000 police officers in

2010, but 600,000 vacancies remain, which will take approximately seven years to fill at the current rate of recruitment. A report published in August by an Indian think tank stated that police forces in Mumbai do not even have the financial resources to purchase basic supplies like bulletproof vests.³

U.S.–India Counterterrorism Cooperation

The visit of U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano to New Delhi in May has laid a strong foundation for enhanced counterterrorism cooperation between the U.S. and India. Secretary Napolitano and Indian Home Minister Chidambaram launched the first-ever U.S.–India Homeland Security Dialogue to enhance cooperation in countering terrorist threats, sharing information, protecting the global supply chain, combating illicit financing, enhancing cyber security, protecting critical security infrastructure, developing effective IED detection systems, and policing large cities.

Prior to the launching of the Homeland Security Dialogue, U.S. and Indian counterterrorism cooperation was handled through the Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism, which had started meeting in 2000. Through this dialogue, India and the U.S. exchanged information, training material, and methods related to interrupting terrorist financial networks, and have taken institutional and law enforcement steps to strengthen homeland security, border management and surveillance techniques, aviation security, and disaster management in the event of a terrorist incident involving weapons of mass destruction.⁴

Despite this wide-ranging anti-terrorism cooperation, a lingering trust deficit has pervaded the U.S.–Indian relationship and prevented deeper cooperation on specific regional threats. In the past, India has been frustrated by what it viewed as inconsistencies and backsliding in U.S. public statements concerning the Pakistan-based terrorist threat to India. Indian officials also believe that the U.S. has withheld information on al-Qaeda terrorist operatives suspected of having ties to Kashmiri militants.⁵ Indian officials perceive the U.S. as hesitant to share such information because of the possible repercussions on its relationship with Pakistan and a desire to avoid creating a perception that the U.S. is taking India's side in the Indo–Pakistani dispute over Kashmir.

The 2008 Mumbai attacks broke down many barriers to cooperation between Washington and New Delhi, and forced the two countries to coordinate their response and

³Amit Kumar, "Is the Mumbai Police Geared Up to the Yask of Combating Terrorism?" Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) *Issue Brief*, August 30, 2011, p. 5, at http://www.idsa.in/system/files/IB_MumbaiPoliceCombatingTerrorism.pdf (September 12, 2011).

⁴Lisa Curtis, "Building a Strategic Partnership: U.S.–India Relations in the Wake of Mumbai," Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, United States House of Representatives, February 26, 2009, at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/Building-a-Strategic-Partnership-US-India-Relations-in-the-Wake-of-Mumbai>.

⁵Polly Nayak, "Prospects for U.S.–India Counterterrorism Cooperation: An Historical Perspective," *Counterterrorism in South Asia*, summary of the Observer Research Foundation–Heritage Foundation New Delhi Dialogue, July 2010, p. 27.

investigations into the attack in unprecedented ways. The scale of the attack and the fact that it claimed the lives of six U.S. citizens led both sides to shun lengthy bureaucratic protocols. The FBI reported having unprecedented access to evidence and intelligence, as well as having the opportunity to interview 70 individuals, including the sole surviving attacker, Ajmal Kasab.⁶ U.S. technical assistance helped India develop critical leads in its investigation and to understand the command and control of the operation.

Headley/Rana Trials and LeT

The U.S. handling of the David Coleman Headley case revived, to some extent, Indian mistrust of the U.S. and its handling of terrorism cases implicating Pakistan. Striking revelations about the LeT's international reach and its close connections to Pakistani intelligence emerged from the trials of both Headley and his accomplice, Tahawwur Rana. The two were arrested in the U.S. in October 2009 for involvement in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks and a plot to bomb a Danish newspaper.

On October 2, 2009, U.S. authorities in Chicago arrested David Headley (also known as Daood Gilani) for conspiring with the LeT in Pakistan to conduct attacks in India, and for plotting an attack on the Danish newspaper that first published cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in 2005. In March 2010, Headley pleaded guilty in a U.S. court to involvement in both plots. Headley had traveled frequently to Pakistan, where he received terrorist training from the LeT, and had scouted the sites of the Mumbai attacks as well as sites for subsequent attacks in India, including the National Defense College in New Delhi and two well-known boarding schools. In four days of testimony and cross-examination, Headley detailed meetings he had with a Pakistani intelligence officer, a former army major, and a navy frogman, who were among the key players in orchestrating the Mumbai assault.⁷

Headley's co-conspirator, Pakistani-born Canadian citizen Tahawwur Rana, went on trial in the U.S. in June. Rana, who owned First World Immigration Services in Chicago and other cities, allegedly allowed Headley to use his business for cover when he scouted potential attack sites in India. The federal jury convicted Rana of helping to plot an attack against the Danish newspaper and of supporting the LeT, but cleared him of cooperating in the 2008 Mumbai rampage.

It took almost nine months before Indian authorities were given direct access to Headley. The U.S. failure to pursue arrest and prosecution of Pakistani intelligence officers named by Headley as being involved in the 2008 Mumbai attacks has also reinforced Indian beliefs that the U.S. will gloss over Pakistani involvement in attacks in India, so long as

⁶James W. McJunkin, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, FBI, Testimony Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, in "The Mumbai Attacks: A Wake-Up Call for America's Private Sector," March 11, 2009, p. 20, at <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hrg49944/html/CHRG-111hrg49944.htm> (September 12, 2011).

⁷Abha Shankar, "Trial's First Week Reinforces Pakistani Intelligence Suspicions," The Investigative Project on Terrorism, May 27, 2011, at <http://www.investigativeproject.org/2919/trial-first-week-reinforces-pakistani> (September 12, 2011).

Pakistan continues to cooperate with the U.S. against groups that attack the American homeland.

In the past, the U.S. tended to view the LeT only through the Indo-Pakistani prism—rather than as part of an international terrorist syndicate—although opinions within the current Administration are beginning to change on this issue. Throughout the 1990s, the LeT focused primarily on waging jihad in Kashmir. Over the last decade, however, it has married its objectives with al-Qaeda's extremist pan-Islamist agenda and provided al-Qaeda operatives with logistical and operational support. The leader of LeT, Hafiz Muhammed Sayeed, declared in 2001 that, "Our struggle will continue even if Kashmir is liberated."⁸ In addition to signing Osama bin Laden's 1998 edict calling for attacks on Americans and Israelis, the LeT provided shelter to al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah before he was captured eight years ago, and trained shoe bomber Richard Reid as well as one of the London subway bombers. The attack on the Jewish center in Mumbai in 2008 was another example of LeT's broadening ideological scope and objectives.

LeT involvement in Afghanistan also has picked up since 2006. The LeT apparently trained at camps in Kunar and Nuristan provinces in the 1990s but did not fight alongside the Taliban at that time.⁹ In the last four years, however, as the Taliban has regained influence in Afghanistan, the LeT has supported the insurgents by recruiting, training, and housing fighters and facilitating their infiltration into Afghanistan from the tribal areas of Pakistan. The LeT has also helped al-Qaeda by recruiting men from the Jalozai refugee camp in Peshawar for training at al-Qaeda camps to become suicide bombers in Afghanistan.¹⁰ LeT fighters were also likely part of the group that attacked a U.S. outpost in Wanat, Afghanistan, in 2008 that killed nine U.S. soldiers.

Furthermore, the LeT has maintained recruitment and fundraising activities in the U.S. In 2003, followers of "Virginia Jihad" cleric Sheikh Ali Al-Timmi were convicted for training at a LeT camp in Pakistan with the intention of fighting coalition forces in Afghanistan. Just last week, U.S. authorities arrested an American permanent resident born in Pakistan, Jubair Ahmad, for providing material support to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba by producing and uploading LeT propaganda to YouTube. Ahmad reportedly attended a LeT training camp in Pakistan before moving to the U.S. in 2007.¹¹

The hesitant U.S. approach to sharing information on Pakistan-based terrorist groups with India does not serve U.S. interests and cripples the U.S. ability to fully get a handle on terrorist threats emanating from South Asia. Downplaying connections between al-Qaeda and terrorist groups that mainly focus on attacking India is counterproductive. By

⁸Ashley J. Tellis, "Lesson from Mumbai," Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, January 28, 2009, at <http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/?files/012809Tellis.pdf> (September 12, 2011).

⁹Stephen Tankel, "Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat," *Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper*, New America Foundation, February 2010, p. 2.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹¹"Pakistani Man Arrested on U.S. Terrorism Charges," *Reuters*, September 2, 2011, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/02/us-pakistan-usa-arrest-idUSTRE7815M920110902> (September 12, 2011).

choosing to view the activities of al-Qaeda and other Pakistan-based terrorists groups, such as the LeT, through a separate lens, U.S. officials have failed to hold Pakistan accountable for dealing effectively with terrorists located on its territory.

Indeed, Pakistan's tolerance of the LeT and groups like it has facilitated al-Qaeda's ability to operate from Pakistan, and Osama bin Laden's ability to hide in the country as long as he did. For instance, information gathered from bin Laden's Abbottabad compound revealed contacts between members of the Pakistani terrorist group Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and bin Laden's courier.¹² Former Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair told the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee in February 2010 that Pakistan's conviction that terrorist groups help blunt India's military and economic advantages over Pakistan limit its incentive to pursue a comprehensive approach to countering terrorism. Blair went on to note that Pakistan's segmented approach to terrorism helped al-Qaeda maintain a safe haven in the country since some of the groups that Pakistan supports also aid al-Qaeda.¹³

Recommendations:

The U.S. and India alike should recognize the value of their shared experiences in fighting terrorism and pursue a robust dialogue on counterterrorism strategies, as well as deepen their intelligence-sharing and other forms of cooperation, thereby improving the security of both nations. More specifically, the U.S. should:

Enhance intelligence-sharing and cooperation without prejudice to Pakistani political sensitivities. Since the vast majority of counterterrorism concerns intelligence, Washington and New Delhi should focus on breaking down barriers to intelligence-sharing. Preventing Indo-Pakistani conflict is a high priority for the U.S., and Washington should encourage the two countries to continue dialogue that was officially resumed earlier this year. However, the U.S. must avoid sending the signal that it considers Pakistan-based terrorist groups that attack India less of a terrorism threat than al-Qaeda. The groups that focus on attacking India cooperate with al-Qaeda and share its pan-Islamist, anti-West agenda, and thus must be defeated in order to contain the overall terrorist threat in the region.

The U.S. should never stifle counterterrorism cooperation with India in deference to Pakistani political sensitivities. This would only strengthen the hands of the terrorists. Instead, the U.S. must make clear to Pakistan that its tolerance or support of terrorist groups will lead to international isolation and a weakened position in the region.

¹²Lisa Curtis, "Pakistan Must Act Against Network that Shielded bin Laden," Heritage Foundation *WebMemo* No. 3301, June 25, 2011 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/06/Pakistan-Must-Act-Against-Network-That-Shielded-bin-Laden>.

¹³Dennis C. Blair, former Director of National Intelligence, "Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," February 2, 2010, at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf (September 12, 2011).

Make counterterrorism cooperation a center piece of the strategic partnership and enhance the level and tempo of exchanges to institutionalize relationships among the various agencies involved in countering terrorism. The unprecedented cooperation between U.S. and Indian law enforcement and intelligence officials following the Mumbai attacks broke down many bureaucratic barriers. But the two sides need to cooperate at this level of urgency at all times to ensure that robust and streamlined cooperation becomes the norm, not the exception. Secretary Napolitano and Home Minister Chidambaram committed to comprehensive information-sharing relating to the Mumbai attacks, and now they must ensure that their respective bureaucracies maintain the spirit of that commitment.

Position itself as a resource for India as it seeks to develop more integrated and effective homeland security systems and involve the private sectors in both countries. U.S. companies are exploring the opportunities to forge partnerships in India to meet the country's growing homeland security needs. There is an immediate need for the Indian government in conjunction with the private sector to focus on better preparing its cities to cope with the terrorism threat. Improving the security of large cities like Mumbai will require investment from international companies that can provide state-of-the-art technology and products that help protect critical infrastructure. To get ahead of the challenge, Indian leaders must prioritize the issue and provide space for the private sector to get involved.

Increase official diplomatic and non-governmental exchanges on addressing the ideological foundations of terrorism and implementing de-radicalization programs. Home Minister Chidambaram's acknowledgement that Indian citizens have been involved in recent acts of terrorism points to the need for implementing initiatives that raise community awareness about the radicalization process. The White House recently released a strategy to counter radicalization in the U.S. called "Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States" that emphasizes a community-based approach to ensuring that all Americans understand that they are an essential part of the civic life of the nation, and partners with the government in combating extremists seeking to weaken society. A regular dialogue on this topic should be instituted between the two countries, bringing together practitioners, law enforcement, and intelligence analysts from India and the U.S.

Provide training for, and help with equipping, India's police forces. The U.S. can increase its police training programs with India and even help equip Indian police forces to some extent. But ultimately, India must raise budgets for its own homeland security needs. Its defense budgets have been steadily rising over the last several years. But it must focus more attention on enhancing its internal security, which includes bolstering and reforming its police forces.

The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and educational organization recognized as exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. It is privately supported and receives no funds from any government at any level, nor does it perform any government or other contract work.

The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the United States. During 2010, it had 710,000 individual, foundation, and corporate supporters representing every state in the U.S. Its 2010 income came from the following sources:

Individuals	78%
Foundations	17%
Corporations	5%

The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with 2 percent of its 2010 income. The Heritage Foundation's books are audited annually by the national accounting firm McGladrey & Pullen. A list of major donors is available from The Heritage Foundation upon request.

Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discussing their own independent research. The views expressed are their own and do not reflect an institutional position of The Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees.

Ms. CURTIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. ROYCE. We'll go now to our next witness.

**STATEMENT OF MR. FRANK CILLUFFO, ASSOCIATE VICE
PRESIDENT, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY IN-
STITUTE, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY**

Mr. CILLUFFO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member Sherman. Thanks for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be exceptionally brief, not my strong suit since I've never had an unspoken thought, but I will try to get this within the 5 minutes.

Obviously, U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation in the face of the shared threat both of you have already eloquently laid out has not been all that it could be. I would argue this is to the detriment of both of our countries. The leadership in this area is to be commended and it should help, I think, bolster the security posture of America and India alike.

As everyone has already mentioned, we share a number of common threats, concerns and tragedies, most notably 9/11 and 26/11. And just like we saw in the United States, India, too, is going through major efforts and calls for reform, some of which are making some significant progress. It is vital, I think, that the U.S. work with the Indian Government to strengthen our security efforts and develop common, best practices and intelligence-sharing protocols among U.S. and Indian law enforcement and the intelligence community, as well as the security services—those responsible for internal security.

I don't make these recommendations lightly and I recognize the challenges they pose at both the operational and strategic level, especially in regard to Pakistan. Yet, I am equally cognizant of the fact that India is a key democratic ally in an unstable region dominated by extremism from jihadists and Islamic separatists operating in Jammu and Kashmir, to Maoists in the Naxalite belt, to the reemergence of Sikh extremism. Simply put, they live in a tough neighborhood.

Furthermore, these threats affect not only Indian public safety, but also directly threaten U.S. national security interests and I would argue jihadi extremism posing the greatest threat of all. Yes, enhanced cooperation with India will complicate U.S. cooperation with Pakistan. The truth is, however, that this cooperation has been erratic at best and varies based on the political climate and bureaucratic interests in Islamabad. While there is some recent good news such as the arrest of Younis al-Mauritani, the U.S. cannot allow, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, our national security to be held hostage by unfulfilled expectations in Pakistan.

Just a few words on the current threat environment as I think it should predicate U.S. and Indian counterterrorism efforts. We have seen that the threat is morphing. It's metastasized. It comes in various shapes, sizes, flavors, and forms, ranging from al-Qaeda senior leadership—no, unfortunately, ding dong, the witch is not dead after Osama bin Laden was killed. We still have a threat that is very significant from al-Qaeda senior leadership and its affiliates, most notably al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula, operating out of Yemen, but also al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb operating

out of North Africa and the Sahel. And I might note, Mr. Chairman, you had an excellent blog post on AQIM's linkages to Boko Haram, as well as, obviously, al-Shabaab in Somalia. So the threat itself is morphing and it's changing and we've got to be ready for it.

More regionally, as it pertains to this particular hearing, we've seen the conflation of Jihadi organizations in Pakistan. This witch's brew of organizations from the Haqqani Network or HQN to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba from Tehrik-e-Taliban to HuJI, from JEM to the Islamic Jihad Union to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, all these groups to some extent or another are coming together, sometimes tactically, sometimes strategically, but they're all linked by an affinity for a Jihadi narrative and ideology.

I think of unique significance is that many of these groups historically had discrete and narrow objectives. Now they're ascribing and subscribing more and more to al-Qaeda's goals, visions, and objectives. That is a unique set of issues for the United States. And all have found refuge and safe haven in Pakistan.

I want to highlight just three—the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, and HuJI—as organizations that pose serious security implications for the United States, for India, and yes, even for Pakistan. Time prohibits me to get into any specificity here, but one thing I wanted to reinforce is it's critical that we work with Pakistan and hold them accountable to take additional action. To me, the big litmus test here is whether or not they are willing to sever their ties to LeT and HQN and no longer view them as proxies to influence events in Afghanistan and India, respectively. With respect to HQN, this has huge implications for the future—to the future U.S. role in Afghanistan. So we need to hold them accountable on that front.


Bottom line, why Yemen, why Somalia, why the Sahel, why Waziristan, why FATA? These are un- and under-governed spaces. It provides the terrorists the time and the space to move. We need to be able to address these issues because the host nations either lack the political will or the capacity or a combination of both to address these issues. So in short, I think that what we need is a combination of intelligence, paramilitary force, conventional force, and policing. Now is not the time to ease off the gas pedal. Now is the time to push hard. Right now, they are on their heels, they're on their back feet. But the bottom line is to think of it as suppressive fire. The reason they're on their back feet is because I'd rather them looking over their shoulder not knowing when they're going to get hit than having the time to plot, train, and execute attacks. So I just caution drones, SOF, way to go, happy to go into that in much greater length.

And I'll just wrap up very briefly because I agree very much with what Lisa has laid out in terms of U.S.-India going forward, but two impediments to intelligence sharing. One, the Indians do have to take very seriously the endemic corruption within their police forces. Two, there are concerns about the Russian and former KGB connection to the intelligence security services of India, most notably R&AW. So we need further assurances to be able to make sure that that information can be protected.

My bottom line here is law enforcement to law enforcement is the way to go, not only federally, and we need to get down to not only these strategic conversations, but down to the mid-level to ensure that these become reality.

I'll stop at that. I tried to do it within 5 minutes. Mea culpa for going over. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cilluffo follows:]




**U.S.-INDIA COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION:
DEEPENING THE PARTNERSHIP**

**THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NON-PROLIFERATION AND
TRADE**

SEPTEMBER 14, 2011

**STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO
DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY INSTITUTE
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY**



Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Sherman, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. US-India counterterrorism cooperation in the face of a shared threat has not been all that it could be, to the detriment of both nations. Your leadership in this area is to be commended, as it should help bolster the security posture of America and India alike. Terrorism is a transnational threat, which to some extent must be tackled through transnational solutions. This hearing is, therefore, an important step in the right direction.

India and the United States share similar histories in regard to homeland security events and counterterrorism practices. Two tragic and catastrophic events, the September 11 attacks in the United States and the “26-11” Mumbai attacks in India, illuminated previously unseen homeland security issues and refocused each nation’s strategic consciousness. As in the United States, an evolving terror threat has fueled calls for reform in the internal security architecture of India.

It is vital that the United States work with the Indian government to strengthen the efficacy of their internal security architecture and to develop common best practices and intelligence sharing protocols among US and Indian law enforcement, intelligence, and security services. In short, US and Indian officials should commit themselves to forging the practitioner-to-practitioner relationships necessary to counter the terror threat to India, to the United States, and around the globe.

I do not make these recommendations lightly and I recognize the challenges such pose at the operational and strategic level — especially in regard to Pakistan. Yet, I am equally cognizant of the fact that India is a key democratic ally in an unstable region dominated by extremism. This extremism presents itself in multiple forms. Not only jihadists and Islamist separatists operating in Jammu and Kashmir, but also Maoists in the Naxalite region in the east, the re-emergence of the Sikh terrorist organization Babbar Khalsa and to a lesser extent the Tamil Tigers (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE) all threaten Indian internal security. Furthermore, the threats India faces from extremist networks within the country and beyond, affect not only Indian public safety, but directly threaten US national security interests — jihadi extremism posing the greatest threat.

Yes, enhanced cooperation with India will complicate US cooperation with Pakistan. The truth is, however, that American-Pakistani cooperation is erratic, and varies based on the political climate and bureaucratic interests in Islamabad, with attitudes and actions varying between and across agencies. The cooperative relationships that do exist at the practitioner level with our Pakistani partners will survive, even if the political rhetoric becomes more strained — self-interest will ensure such. In the wake of bin Laden’s death, when U.S.-Pakistani relations seemed to be at a low point, there were still some reasons for optimism. Consider the recent arrest of Younis al-Mauritani, described as al-Qaeda’s foreign minister, at a compound in the Pakistani suburbs of Quetta. The arrest was made as a result of high-level ISI-CIA cooperation, and was one of the most high-profile al

Qaeda arrests made by Pakistani security forces.¹ However, despite some recent promising developments, the US cannot allow its national security to be held hostage by nearly two decades of unfulfilled expectations in Pakistan. It is vital that the United States now work to deepen America's cooperative relationships with India's internal security architecture to counter the terror threat that permeates and extends beyond the region.

THE THREAT PICTURE: A SNAPSHOT


The United States and India face common challenges as they work to defend against a host of threats, both regional and global. The threat environment the United States and India face today is one that is different from yesterday and one that will change tomorrow. It has metastasized and morphed and comes in various forms, ranging from al Qaeda senior leadership (AQSL), which despite the recent deaths among their leadership ranks, should still be seen as a danger to US interests, to al Qaeda's affiliates who continue to grow in reach and numbers — namely al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) operating out of Yemen; al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operating out of North Africa and spreading throughout the Sahel, as well as training other militant groups like Boko Haram; and al-Shabaab in Somalia, al Qaeda's East African wing.

Regionally, we have seen the conflation of jihadi organizations in Pakistan. United States' and Indian national interests and shared counterterrorism vision should be based on this common threat. These organizations increasingly ascribe and subscribe to al Qaeda's goals, vision and objectives. This witches' brew of organizations, from the Haqqani Network (HQN) to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), from Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HuJI), from Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), is coming together and cooperating on a tactical and sometimes strategic basis, linked by an affinity for militant Islamist ideology. While countless terrorist groups target Indian soil, and US interests in Afghanistan and the broader Southeast Asian region, several groups have found refuge in Pakistan as they continue to expand their network and pose a greater danger to the United States and India. Pakistan has significant, historical links to HQN and LeT, and both organizations pose serious security implications for US interests.

Lashkar-e-Taiba, or "Army of the pure," was created in the early 1990s as a militant wing of the Pakistani-based Islamic fundamentalist organization Markaz Dawual-Irshad. This group was founded in the Kunar province of Afghanistan, in order to fight alongside the Taliban against the Soviet Union, and is now based in Muridke near Lahore in Pakistan.² Its formation was supposedly aided by instruction and funding from Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, which gave this

¹ "Al Mauritani's Arrest," DAWN.com September 7, 2011

² U.S. State Department, "Country Reports on Terrorism, Chapter 8 -- Foreign Terrorist Organizations." Last modified April 28, 2006. <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/65275.htm>




support in exchange for the LeT promising to target Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir, and train Muslim extremists on Indian soil. Like several other key Islamist militant groups, the LeT follows a strict fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, or the Wahhabi theological tradition. Although the group was formed to help fight alongside the Taliban, its primary goal was to drive out the Indian forces in the Kashmir region and establish an Islamic caliphate instead of Hindi rule, challenging India's sovereignty over Kashmir and seeking to unite all Muslim areas surrounding Pakistan.³ Over time, the breadth and reach of the group's goals have evolved. It is becoming more clear that in recent years LeT has begun to expand its sights globally, extending beyond Kashmir and India to include Western targets such as Washington, Tel Aviv, as well as New Delhi. Now instead of solely waging war to impose Islam over all of India, the group has adopted the ideology of other militant Islamist groups that have a more holistic anti-western approach, seeking to implement Islam worldwide and unite the Muslims of the world. LeT has proclaimed that it has chosen the "path of jihad" in order to liberate all Muslims from non-Muslim rule, especially under democratic systems.⁴ LeT is responsible for the "26-11" Mumbai attacks which targeted Westerners and the renowned international Taj Hotel in India's largest city.

While LeT is perhaps the most widely known terrorist threat to India in the region, other entities operating out of Pakistan demonstrate similar capabilities. One such organization is the Haqqani Network. This organization is currently led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, the son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, but originated in the 1970's and has formed significant ties with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban in the years since its inception. Today, the Haqqani Network is operationally based in North Waziristan, the remote border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. They receive protection and support from facets of Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI, which continues to drag its feet on taking action against the Haqqanis because they see the network as a useful proxy to expand their influence and establish footholds in Afghanistan.⁵ Because the Haqqani network is seen by parts of Pakistan's government as a valuable ally, the government has refused to take action in the tribal regions of Waziristan which creates safe havens, not only for the Haqqanis but for al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, with which the Haqqanis are intimately involved. The Haqqani Network poses a significant threat to United States (which strangely, and inadvisably, has not been designated a foreign terrorist organization) and Indian interests in the region, as it is believed that the organization is a powerful insurgent force in Afghanistan, one that targets coalition forces as well as Indian investments and interests in the country. The network has long served as an enabler,

³ Bajoria, Jayshree, "Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure)" Updated: January 14, 2010. <http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/lashkar-e-taiba-army-pure-aka-lashkar-e-tayyiba-lashkar-e-toiba-lashkar-taiba/p17882>

⁴ "Lashkar-e-Taiba 'Army of the Pure'" http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm

⁵ Jeffrey Dressler, "The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan," Afghanistan Report 6 (2010), Institute for the Study of War.



predominantly for al Qaeda, but with the overarching goal of expanding global militancy.⁶ It is believed that the Haqqanis carried out the Kabul hotel bombing in June. Counterinsurgency operations over the past year have seen success against the Haqqanis but a sustained counterterrorism effort is needed to prevent regeneration.

A third terrorist organization exercising significant influence in the region is Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HuJI). While HuJI's founding purpose was to counter Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980's, their goals have shifted to targeting Indian military forces and interests in Kashmir. A key player in HuJI's growth has been Ilyas Kashmiri, head of al Qaeda operations in Pakistan. While his whereabouts are currently unknown, targeted strike missions by US drones likely killed him earlier this year. Similar surgical attacks in the region resulted in the death of al Qaeda's second in command last month, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman.⁷ The deaths of these crucial figures, "bridge builders" both among regional terrorist groups and within the ranks of the organizations themselves, proves the value in continued drone campaigns.

HuJI, the militant group Kashmiri led, played an important role in the conflation and cooperation of extremist organizations in the region. Kashmiri spent years in the Pakistani Army's Special Forces and fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviets. He was able to translate that experience into effective leadership of HuJI's forces in Kashmir. In a long string of high-profile terror attacks on targets in India, he displayed the full range of his training and planning abilities. This blend of expertise, together with a pragmatic action-oriented mindset, made him a unique commodity in the jihadi world. Few, if any, other leaders had comparable organizational skills, or were as well positioned to spur global jihad. To that end, he developed strong personal connections with myriad Islamist terrorist groups, including Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Haqqani network, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and, most importantly, the senior leadership of al-Qaeda. Each group valued his ability to convert the grand aspirations of its leaders into practicable plans of attack. Unsurprisingly, Kashmiri and HuJI both appeared on the "most wanted" lists drafted by the United States, Pakistan, and India. Among other things, Kashmiri served as al Qaeda's principal in interaction with radicals in the West, and acted as a coordinator between David Headley and Tahawwur Hussain Rana of Chicago, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, in their work together on the Mumbai attacks of 2008. Leveraging the strengths of each group to complement the others, Kashmiri was able to build bridges between organizations that would otherwise have competed for resources, recruits, and publicity.

Instead of resting on our laurels, now is the time to double down and pull out all the stops, by striking hard—again and again—while al Qaeda is back on its heels. Careful

⁶ Don Ressler and Vahid Brown, "The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al Qaeda," Harmony Program (2011), The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

⁷ Greg Miller and Julie Tate, "Al Qaeda's No. 2 Leader is Killed in Pakistan, U.S. Officials Say," The Washington Post, August 27, 2011.



use of drones, underpinned by intelligence, will help consolidate recent counterterror gains. With luck, there will soon be more opportunities such as this to highlight and profile valuable al Qaeda leaders lost. A decapitation strategy may not be sufficient to ensure strategic victory, but there is a reason the term “high value target” exists and we should make it our business to eliminate as many of them as possible as quickly as possible.

COUNTERTERRORISM RESPONSE IN BRIEF

Even from this brief snapshot, three specific conclusions can be drawn. First, that the national security risks originating from this region threaten both the United States and India. Second, that the danger does not arise from the actions of a nation-state that can be deterred through the traditional tools of statecraft — but from the intentions, actions, and aspirations of an expanding nexus of terrorist organizations, criminal gangs, and rogue nation and sub-national state entities. Third, the antecedent social, political and economic conditions that gave rise to this threat domain have a long history and are not immediately solvable — in short, the elimination of the root causes of these threats are beyond the capabilities of any one country (including the United States).

What are the implications of such conclusions? Again, there are three. First, the United States must partner with other nation-states that have not only the capability but the political will to address these issues — both within their borders and beyond. Second, that to meet these threats, the United States and others must not only develop innovative strategies — ones that not only blend intelligence, paramilitary force, conventional force, and policing — but also establish national and international networks that interconnect the efforts of those organizations that will carry out such strategies. Third, to avoid exhaustion on the part of their organizations and citizenry and in recognition of the budgetary constraints we now face, the United States and allied countries must make the difficult decisions necessary to target effort only to those operations where what is achieved is worth what is expended. The reality is this: for reasons tied to both tactics and treasury, the United States needs to lighten its footprint (including in Afghanistan) and increase its flexibility, acumen, and lethality.

Before the United States can take actions to assume a lighter footprint (especially in Afghanistan), it is paramount that we hold Pakistan accountable to take action against the extremist forces festering under their watch. The litmus test here is whether Pakistan will sever its historic ties to its proxies, namely LeT in India and the Haqqani Network in Afghanistan. While we acknowledge the fact that there are some factions in Pakistan that will never cut these ties, we must also realize that some in Pakistan recognize the threat these groups pose. Those individuals are motivated to cooperate with the US, and we should continue to do all we reasonably can to encourage and support their efforts. This is not only in the best interests of the United States and India, but also of Pakistan. These terrorist organizations pose a significant threat to United States national security as these



groups whose targets were once simply regional, are now buying into the broader, global jihadi goals and objectives.

AREAS OF COOPERATION

India's threat landscape has evolved in much the same way as the United States' terrorism picture. As evidenced by the attacks in Mumbai this summer, the new threat domain is very different from that exemplified by the large-scale, heavily orchestrated Mumbai attacks of 2008. The latter have not disappeared, but rather, added to their ranks is a new domain that is increasingly defined by low threshold, small group or lone-wolf style attacks on perceived soft targets.⁸ To meet and counter a constantly changing threat picture, a flexible counterterrorism system must be created. A system of systems that develops long standing practitioner-to-practitioner relationships among US-Indian police, security, intelligence and perhaps military institutions is needed. Key to the construction of such, is the development of a counterterrorism strategy that ensures -a nation's security is as much a journey as it is an ideal end-state. While it is important that we know where we want to go, it is equally as important to ensure that rigid structures are not locked into place but rather a resilient, adaptive architecture is implemented which can change as the terrorist threat continues to evolve.

One area that has experienced success in adapting to the changing landscape is paramilitary campaigns. This evolution in the operational environment demands that the authorities under Title 10 (legal basis for the military services and the department of defense) and Title 50 (procedures for covert actions) be equally synchronized and coordinated.⁹ It is vital for the synchronization of military and intelligence assets to occur because Somalia, Yemen, Waziristan, and the Sahel are all under- or ungoverned spaces. To address these issues we cannot implement what has become the US' dominant counterinsurgency (COIN) model — we must assume allied forces will not have the forces required to maintain positive control over the terrain or population. As is the case with traditional and current COIN practices, campaigns must leverage intelligence to the greatest extent possible in the targeting of military and police force. Given the realities on the ground, however, intelligence assets must be used to support strike missions that go beyond the narrow parameters of conventional COIN. Be it through the use of drones, special forces, conventional forces, or even the police, constant pressure must be applied against terror organizations. In short, covering fire must be maintained in order to deny them the operational space and time necessary to plan, train, and carry out terrorist operations.¹⁰

⁸ Arun Kumar, "India Severely Impacted by Terrorism: US Report," *News One*, August 19, 2011.

⁹ Frank J. Cilluffo and Clinton Watts, "Yemen & Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Exploiting a Window of Counterterrorism Opportunity," Issue Brief June 24, 2011, Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI).

¹⁰ Frank J. Cilluffo, "After bin Laden the Threat Remains: Drones, CIA, and SOF the Only Game in Town," HSPI Commentary 22 (2011).



Broader cooperation on counterterrorism issues, exemplified in several recent initiatives, demonstrates the strength and shared vision of US-India relations. In July 2010, the India-US Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative was signed. Built upon the 2000 India-US Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism, the 2001 revival of the India-US Defense Policy Group, the 2004 Next Step in Strategic Partnership, and the 2005 India-US Defense Framework Agreement, this new initiative establishes an ongoing exchange between the two nations. The initiative calls for expansive sharing of best practices in areas of mutual interest including terrorist financing, forensic sciences, mass-transit security, investigation procedures, and cyber security, all with the goal of strengthening joint capabilities to combat terrorism. In November 2010, President Obama and Indian Prime Minister Singh announced the US-India Homeland Security Dialogue. The first dialogue took place in May between Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram and U.S. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, who discussed ways India and the US could increase communication and shared practices to eliminate terrorist safe havens and infrastructure in the region. Our two nations will work to foster capacity building and increased engagement between our intelligence agencies. Progress in these areas will be assessed every six months.

CHALLENGES FOR COOPERATION

While we have made great strides in expanding our relationship with India in the counterterrorism space, obstacles to increased cooperation remain. These hurdles must be addressed and overcome if we hope to jointly counter the threats in the region. Despite the anti-terrorism initiatives mentioned above, as well as a whole host of other mechanisms for cooperation, a trust deficit encompasses the US/India relationship.¹¹ The US relationship with Pakistan as well as Indian perceptions of the US withholding intelligence on Islamic militants in Jammu and Kashmir continues to be a source of distrust, one that prevents deeper cooperation between our two nations.

More specifically, one aspect of the Indian security structure that deters cooperation is endemic corruption found in every level of India's law enforcement apparatus. Corruption prevents front-line police officers from fulfilling their duty effectively as they often concede to bribes and regional politics, rather than focusing on community policing and accurate crime reporting.

Another obstacle to greater intelligence sharing between the US and India is a notion that pervades the US intelligence community regarding the Soviet KGB's close relationship with the Indian intelligence structure, the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), India's External Intelligence Agency. Vestiges of the Cold War represent a reality that rightfully leave many in the US counterterrorism community hesitant to engage in deeper

¹¹ Lisa Curtis, "After Mumbai: Time to Strengthen U.S.-India Counterterrorism Cooperation," Backgrounder No. 2217 (2008), The Heritage Foundation.

involvement until further assurances are made that the information can be appropriately protected.

THE PATH AHEAD

In addition to current initiatives and ongoing dialogues, and notwithstanding identified challenges for cooperation, there are multiple, unexplored avenues that could be pursued:


- Counterterrorism Intelligence Sharing
- Law Enforcement to Law Enforcement Cooperation
- Institutionalizing Lessons Learned Re: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
- Cooperation on Countering Violent Islamist Extremism
- Cooperation on Counter-radicalization Efforts
- Critical Infrastructure Protection

Allow me to drill deeper into these bullets. Working together on shared interests will help to bridge the trust gap that exists between our two countries. Countering violent Islamist extremism, homegrown counter-radicalization, and critical infrastructure protection all represent areas of mutual interest with India. Within the region as a whole, and in Afghanistan specifically, both United States coalition forces and Indian interests are threatened by the same regional terrorist organizations. US-Indian intelligence sharing and cooperation is important if we hope to prevent future attacks from the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.¹²

While Afghanistan is a logical place to start, it is in the United States' best interests to minimize the evolving, global terrorist threat originating in the region by breaking down the walls between our intelligence agencies and working toward increased intelligence sharing. This is a vital next step, as intelligence remains the lifeblood of any counterterrorism campaign. One way to foster a fuller and more frank dialogue between the United States and India is to routinize discussions between and among the occupants of mid-level positions in our respective security and intelligence services. While high level security talks are important, the breakdown of barriers will only occur if regular exchanges between mid-level security services officials are encouraged. A similar approach with other key US allies has proven successful; it is time India is incorporated more deeply into this framework.

In order to determine what our joint counterterrorism path ahead looks like, it is important to observe and absorb lessons learned from our respective countries, and employ best practices across the board (with necessary tweaks or alterations, as local practices or context might require). Doing this will prevent both countries from having to "reinvent the wheel" when it comes to counterterrorism strategy, and will demonstrate where gaps in knowledge or loopholes in security still exist. By sharing and adopting


¹² Lisa Curtis, "After Mumbai."



knowledge gained from individual experience, we will build trust between our two countries and ensure that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

A key component in expanding this knowledge base is through open and regular dialogue not only in bilateral relations at the federal level, but between US and Indian law enforcement entities. Initiatives of this kind are already being implemented in the form of police exchanges, leading to new understandings about tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that have since been shared nationwide in this country. Members of the Los Angeles and Las Vegas Police Departments have been first-hand participants in these interactions. LAPD and LVPD sent a team of experts to Mumbai to meet with local law enforcement officials to learn about the city's response to the "26-11" Mumbai attacks, and returned with heightened understanding of counterterrorism tactics, techniques and procedures that are changing the US law enforcement landscape. They observed where loopholes existed within the Indian terrorism response model and upon returning to the United States, worked to ensure those gaps were closed in regards to our own counterterrorism strategies. Several key lessons included the need for all urban centers to have a clear, unified chain of command for response, so that in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster, counter-efforts are best organized and resources are employed most effectively. Operational training must be conducted to plan for and resist continuous, entrenched attacks. Furthermore, the police forces in Mumbai were poorly equipped with limited weaponry, inferior tactics, and inadequate knowledge of the Taj Hotel's layout. India needs to modernize and professionalize its law enforcement architecture, aggressively address the rampant corruption, and enhance standardized information sharing processes vertically and horizontally throughout the local, state and federal levels of government. The national police in India rely on an entrenched, three-tiered law enforcement system, one that does not empower the first responder. This lack of a first-preventer mentality must be addressed, simply because in spite of this reality, the current mindset is that public security will come from the police and no private sector participation is necessary. This notion should be addressed immediately, as the private sector, like the hotel industry in Mumbai, can and should play a key role in homeland security initiatives. In short, the current threat climate demands leadership on the part of both government, which should have its own house in order to set a good example, and the private sector, which is uniquely situated to help inform and render public sector efforts more effective. Public-private partnerships act as a force multiplier against our adversaries, in an era where non-state actors have unprecedented power to affect outcomes and resilience depends upon the joint efforts of all sectors as well as individual citizens.

Another important "lesson learned" originated from the manner in which the terrorist attacks in Mumbai were conducted. The highly successful, multi-team assault on the Taj Hotel was a style of attack that could potentially be implemented in the United States. Thus the LAPD team, after extensive study with Indian law enforcement in Mumbai, developed tactics, techniques and procedures that have since been nationalized in the US.



Training in Multi-Assault, Counter Terrorism Action Capabilities or MACTAC will enable law enforcement teams to immediately locate and neutralize violent assaults and terrorist actions like those executed in Mumbai. The growing relationship between our countries' law enforcement agencies is mutually beneficial as lessons are learned and new counterterrorism strategies and tactics are adopted.

Future US efforts should be aimed at helping Indian law enforcement move away from rigid, more traditional event-focused models of policing. Major metropolitan law enforcement agencies in the United States are working to implement intelligence-led community policing strategies. The importance of, and motivations behind, such strategies were captured by a recent Counterterrorism Intelligence Research Survey conducted by the Homeland Security Policy Institute.¹³ HSPI's data regarding the perceptions of police intelligence commanders in the US demonstrates that intelligence-led community policing is a product of the belief that the counterterrorism mission is a shared responsibility between local and national officials, that increased information sharing is warranted given perceptions of the threat, and that for local law enforcement — information from citizens and ongoing investigations is every bit as important as information from national partners. Given the dynamics of India's population and expected population growth — India has one of the lowest police-to-population ratios in the world at 142 police officers for every 100,000 people, whereas in the United States the ratio is 315 police per 100,000 people — it is logical to assume that India's megacities will become high value soft targets where terrorists can threaten millions of innocent lives.¹⁴ A hybrid of intelligence-led policing with community-led policing is the best solution for both nations to counter the evolving terror threat.

Other areas that hold promise and potential for US-India partnership include cooperation on Countering Violent Islamist Extremism and on furthering counter-radicalization, especially as pertains to homegrown terrorism and Internet radicalization. Although effective initiatives in both areas require action on the part of entities and individuals outside the realm of government, it is also true that governments at all levels have a role to play in these initiatives, including by spurring and coordinating efforts.

Likewise, governments have a crucial—but not exclusive—role to play in critical infrastructure protection. Public-private partnerships are key to these endeavors, and in this regard, the United States has much to share and much to learn. Cooperation on these issues could help advance a culture of shared responsibility for internal security, as well as help secure the tough neighborhood in which India is situated, which in turn could be beneficial for US national security.

¹³ Cilluffo, Frank J., Joseph R. Clark, and Michael P. Downing. 2011. "Counterterrorism Intelligence: Law Enforcement Perspectives." Research Brief, Vol. 1, No. 1. Washington, DC: Homeland Security Policy Institute.

¹⁴ Dasgupta, Sunil. "Why Mumbai Needs A Mayor." *Foreign Affairs*. August 1, 2011.



I wish to thank the Committee and its staff for the opportunity to testify before you today, and I would now be pleased to try to answer any questions that you may have.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Cilluffo.
Dr. Latif, go ahead.

**STATEMENT OF S. AMER LATIF, PH.D., VISITING FELLOW,
WADHWANI CHAIR IN U.S.-INDIA POLICY STUDIES, CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

Mr. LATIF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sherman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify here today on the issue of the U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation.

I'd like to mention at the outset that the views that I express here during the testimony are my own and do not necessarily represent those of CSIS or the Department of Defense.

Mr. Chairman, it is timely for this committee to be holding this hearing on U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation, given the terrorists attacks which you've mentioned in your opening statement. It is useful at this juncture to be able to evaluate the status of our counterterrorism efforts, assess the progress to date, understand existing challenges, and propose ways to advance the partnership.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to quickly summarize some of the highlights of my written testimony which I have already submitted for the record. To begin, it's important to note that the U.S. and India have made notable progress on counterterrorism cooperation since 2000 when the Counterterrorism Joint Working Group was established. In July of last year, the U.S. and India signed the Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative or the CCI, which outlined a range of areas for cooperation. And this May, of course, we had the Homeland Security Dialogue held in New Dehli. Intelligence sharing appears to have deepened after the 26/11 attacks as well. However, the progress that's been made over the past decade could plateau in the future due to challenges facing bilateral counterterrorism cooperation.

Let me briefly outline three challenges for your consideration. Number one, the lack of bureaucratic alignment and optimal communication between the U.S. and India and within their respective bureaucracies. The Indian and American bureaucracies are not communicating or coordinating as effectively as they might, due to markedly different structures and bureaucratic cultures. Within the U.S., you have a number of CT-related dialogues that have CT-related issues and also unclear leads and responsibilities for particular U.S. agencies. On the Indian side, you have limited bureaucratic capacity and also a centralized decision making system which makes decisions very, very slow.

The second challenge I would outline is that each side has a different view of terrorism priorities. While both sides agree on the need to fight the scourge of terrorism, there are concerns in New Dehli about Washington's relationship with Pakistan and that the U.S. is not doing enough to pressure Pakistan in dismantling Lashkar-e-Tayyiba.

Third, I would say that India harbors doubts about whether or not Washington is going to be fully transparent and forthcoming with intelligence in the wake of the David Headley case.

So Mr. Chairman, let me now briefly outline some ideas of where the U.S. and India might advance counterterrorism cooperation.

Number one, streamline the working groups and bureaucratic procedures between both sides. The U.S. and India should agree to have the Department of Homeland Security and the Home Ministry as the conduits for all CT cooperation. There should also be a bilateral comprehensive review of all dialogues with CT equities to determine which groups could be consolidated into others, left to their own, or eliminated outright.

Second, Washington should continue to apply pressure to Pakistan on completely dismantling all Lashkar-e-Tayyiba infrastructure.

Third, there ought to be an intensification of the bilateral intelligence dialogue between the U.S. and India on Afghanistan. As the U.S. begins to withdraw from Afghanistan, Indians will have a lot of concerns about the nature of stability. Having an intelligence dialogue on Afghanistan would be an excellent way to be able to build confidence and counterterrorism cooperation between the U.S. and India.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer the idea of the U.S. and Indian sides working together to harden the Indian periphery. What I mean here is that the U.S. and India should work together to build the border security and counterterrorism capacities of India's bordering countries to include Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives.

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is a very dynamic organization and has also proven its ability to be able to exploit ungoverned or poorly governed spaces in these areas. Having the United States and India work together toward building the CT capacities in these countries would be able to make India much, much safer.

Mr. Chairman, while there are challenges to greater CT cooperation, the strategic stakes are too high for both sides to allow their efforts to lag. Once again, I would like to thank you for allowing me to appear before the committee and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Latif follows:]

**Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade**

***“U.S.-INDIA COUNTERTERRORISM
COOPERATION: DEEPENING THE
PARTNERSHIP”***

A Statement by

Dr. Sahibzada Amer Latif
Visiting Fellow,
Wadhvani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

**September 14, 2011
2200 Rayburn House Office Building**

Statement of Dr. Sahibzada Amer Latif**Visiting Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)****House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism and
Nonproliferation and Trade****“U.S.-India Counterterrorism Cooperation: Deepening the Partnership”****September 14, 2011**

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on the issue of U.S.-India counterterrorism (CT) cooperation. By way of introduction, I am a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the newly established Wadhvani Chair for U.S.-India Policy Studies. The program is among the first of its kind among Washington think tanks dedicated to India and, indeed our program motto has become “Unlocking the full potential of the U.S.-India relationship.” I want to mention at the outset that the views expressed in this statement and during my testimony today are my own and do not represent the views of CSIS or the Department of Defense.

As we sit here today shortly after the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, India has once again endured another attack which occurred a week ago at the High Court in New Delhi. As of this writing, current figures put the death toll at 13 individuals which may increase with many of the remaining 73 injured in critical condition. This attack followed another one in Mumbai on July 13 which consisted of three bomb blasts around the city that left 26 dead and 130 injured. These attacks were the latest in a series of attacks that have hit India since the terror attacks against Mumbai in November 2008.

While the investigation to identify the perpetrators continues, speculation has focused on the Indian Mujahideen (IM) as the possible culprit. The IM has emerged as one of a number of Islamist-based militant groups within India, along with the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), the Harkat ul Jihadi al Islami (HUJI), and others, who have linkages with Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT).

Lashkar-e-Tayyaba represents one of the greatest threats to American and Indian interests in South Asia today. After the spectacular attacks in Mumbai in 2008, the U.S. undertook active shuttle diplomacy to dampen tensions between the nuclear armed neighbors. Another major attack on the scale of Mumbai 2008 that originates in Pakistan could lead to calls from the Indian public for retaliation. If India was to retaliate or threaten to retaliate, it could also adversely affect U.S. CT efforts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Pakistan would most likely divert important assets and troops currently deployed in the FATA eastwards towards the Indian border. While

U.S. involvement in Indo-Pak crises has often played an important role, there is no guarantee the U.S. will have the same mitigating effect the next time around.

The recent attacks in New Delhi and Mumbai revealed that India has much work ahead to build the necessary capabilities to thwart another terror attack. Despite Indian government commitments after the Mumbai 2008 attacks to invest billions of dollars into building CT and coastal security capabilities, the recent attacks have demonstrated that India's ability to detect and deter terror attacks appears to have only marginally improved. To be sure, India has had success in the past against other forms of terrorism such as Khalistani terrorism in the Punjab during the 1980s. However, India needs to adopt a fresh approach that is built around a national strategy which combats terrorism through a multi-agency approach in close coordination with state governments.

As the U.S. and India have deepened their partnership over the last decade, CT cooperation has been touted as a key component of the relationship. Both sides have ritually condemned terrorism in all forms through various public forums and joint statements. However, it is useful at this juncture to evaluate the status of bilateral counterterrorism efforts, assess progress to date, understand existing challenges, and determine where greater progress might be made.

There have been successes in U.S.-India bilateral CT cooperation. Both sides have established a CT dialogue called the CT Joint Working Group which was established in 2000, and has regularly met on at least an annual basis. The group has been useful in exchanging perspectives on terror threats in South Asia and establishing areas of possible bilateral cooperation. In July of last year, the U.S. and India signed the Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative (CCI) which outlined a range of areas for cooperation to include forensics training, investigative assistance, enhancing capabilities on money laundering, exchanging best practices on mass transit and rail security, and maritime security.¹

This past May the Department of Homeland Security held its inaugural Homeland Security Dialogue in New Delhi with Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano meeting with her Indian counterpart P. Chidambaram. The dialogue is a good step forward as it will encompass the breadth of homeland security cooperation to include maritime security, infrastructure protection, and intelligence sharing.² Additionally, the U.S. and Indian armies trained together on counterinsurgency/counterterrorism scenarios in 2007 during their annual army to army exercise called Yudh Abhyas. Intelligence sharing, while always difficult to judge, appeared to deepen after the 26/11

¹ "India-U.S. Sign Counter Terrorism Cooperation Initiative," Embassy of India website, July 23, 2010 at <http://www.indianembassy.org/prdetail1560/-india-u.s.-sign-counter-terrorism-cooperation-initiative> (September 12 2011)

² "India-U.S. Homeland Security Dialogue-Joint Statement," Embassy of India website, May 27, 2011 at <http://www.indianembassy.org/prdetail1722/india-u.s.-homeland-security-dialogue--joint-statement> (September 11, 2011)

Mumbai attacks as FBI officials closely collaborated with their Indian counterparts in what many FBI officials considered unprecedented cooperation.

While bilateral CT cooperation has rhetorically become an important area of collaboration, some key challenges still remain. One of the biggest challenges is getting the American and Indian bureaucracies optimally aligned to facilitate better communication and coordination. There are currently a number of bilateral working groups that have CT equities and are spread across various USG agencies to include Homeland Security, State, Treasury, and Defense. On the U.S. side, many of these dialogues do not regularly communicate or coordinate with one another, and several dialogues have overlapping areas of cooperation. One suspects the same situation on the Indian side where interagency communication and coordination can be scarce.

After reading the joint statement of the Homeland Security Dialogue and the press release on the CCI, one is struck by the overlap between the two documents. On the U.S. side, this overlap naturally raises the question of which agency has the lead for particular areas of cooperation, and who has overall responsibility for assigning agencies to the various areas of cooperation. Simply put, there is often a question of which agency is in charge when dealing with a particular area of CT cooperation. Secretary Napolitano was asked about this issue on June 2 at CSIS after returning from the Homeland Security Dialogue. Specifically, she was asked about the myriad CT-related dialogues and how the various dialogues might de-conflict or coordinate with each other. She responded by saying, "I don't see it as deconfliction as much as trying to—consolidation... There are other dialogues that deal with offshoots of this... But I think what will happen over time is that there will be some consolidation that occurs. And one of the things that we will do is... say, okay, what now, after having had this inaugural discussion, makes sense to consolidate within for the next session." While this approach makes sense, the process of consolidation will be difficult as each agency relishes its own exclusive bilateral dialogue with India. Once dialogues are established, they are exceedingly difficult to dismantle (from either side) even if they are seen as redundant or unproductive.

The limited Indian bureaucratic capacity and centralized decision-making present challenges to effective CT cooperation as well. The Indian system can be easily overwhelmed with various USG agencies attempting to engage it on various dimensions of CT cooperation. For India, terrorism is a domestic law enforcement issue that resides with the Home Ministry. In its dealings with Washington, the Home Ministry has eschewed entreaties from DoD to engage it on CT cooperation despite DoD's wide ranging CT capabilities. The Indian bureaucracy also does not have analogous agencies or offices for every area of cooperation making it common for one joint secretary or director to be responsible for multiple areas of cooperation. South Block's highly centralized decision making system, in which decisions on routine activities and cooperation are frequently referred to higher levels, can cause delays and sometimes outright cancellations. The opaque nature of Indian decision making can be a significant deterrent to closer cooperation. Finally, the relationship between the Indian central and state governments is important to note. According to the Indian

Constitution, the state is given primary responsibility for law enforcement matters. To that end, it is the state governments that have arrest authority and are the first responders to terrorist attacks. The nature of center-state relations also complicates bilateral cooperation since the USG cannot directly engage state governments without first going through the central government.

Another major challenge to effective CT cooperation is how each side views the terrorist threat. While both sides agree the scourge of terrorism needs to be addressed, there are concerns in New Delhi about Washington's relationship with Pakistan. For India, Pakistan represents the epicenter of the terror threat against India, and Indian officials are frustrated that Washington does not push the Army leadership in Rawalpindi more aggressively to dismantle LeT's infrastructure. The U.S. on the other hand, has been occupied with trying to get the Pakistan Army to sustain current operations in FATA while undertaking new ones in North Waziristan. For Washington, asking Rawalpindi to also aggressively pursue the dismantling of LeT as vigorously as militants in the FATA could stretch Pakistani capacity and detract from Washington's primary aim of disrupting al-Qaida (AQ) and the Afghan Taliban in the FATA. The current state of U.S.-Pakistan relations in the wake of the Raymond Davis case and the killing of Osama bin Laden further limits how much pressure Washington can apply to Rawalpindi to dismantle LeT. While Washington realizes the danger that LeT poses to regional stability and has been vocal about bringing the Mumbai attackers to justice, it still does not meet Indian expectations of placing it on an equal plane with AQ and the Afghan Taliban.

India also harbors doubts about U.S. commitment to bilateral CT cooperation due to a perception that Washington is not fully transparent. The David Headley case was a prime example of where India was surprised by accounts that the U.S. was aware of Headley before his arrest as a terrorist.³ India's doubts about U.S. transparency were compounded when Indian queries to question Headley were not immediately granted. A subsequent U.S. investigation into the David Headley affair ordered by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper ultimately revealed that while some information was available to U.S. officials before the Mumbai attacks, it was not sufficient to link Headley to a terror plot in India.⁴ However, among some segments of Indian government officials and its strategic elite, there may be a lingering perception that Washington will not divulge information that could possibly compromise its relations with Pakistan.

The Way Ahead

While there are significant challenges to optimizing bilateral CT cooperation, the strategic stakes are too high for both sides to allow their efforts to lag. In an effort to rejuvenate CT cooperation, there are a few recommendations for both sides to consider:

³ Jane Perlez, "U.S. Had Warnings on Plotter of Mumbai Attack," New York Times, October 16, 2010 at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/world/asia/17headley.html?pagewanted=all> (September 12, 2011)

⁴ Vinay Kumar, "Slip-ups over Headley Issue: U.S. Review Findings to India," The Hindu, November 9, 2010 at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article875931.ece> (September 12, 2011)

Streamline Working Groups and Bureaucratic Procedures

To provide better organization for CT efforts, the U.S. and India should agree to have the Department of Homeland Security and the Home Ministry, respectively, as the conduits for all CT cooperation. The U.S. side should also undertake an active effort to examine all working groups and dialogues and consolidate those groups where there are overlaps or redundancies. The Indian side should endeavor to decentralize some of its decision making, establish authoritative points of contact for all CT engagement, and facilitate more seamless approval processes for CT activities.

Maintain maritime and coastal security separate from overall CT efforts

Coastal and maritime security are critical components of a solid CT approach but should be handled through the maritime agencies of the respective governments. The Indian Navy was put in charge of all maritime security operations to include coastal security after the 26/11 attacks. On the U.S. side, the Coast Guard and Navy could engage with Indian counterparts through the Navy Executive Steering Group, held annually.

Apply consistent pressure on Rawalpindi to dismantle LeT infrastructure

Washington needs to consider LeT with the same importance as AQ and the Afghan Taliban. To that end, Washington must apply continual pressure on the Pakistani military establishment to dismantle LeT infrastructure and refrain from using LeT as an asymmetric capability against India. The current state of U.S.-Pakistan relations will make this difficult in the near term but LeT's ability to upset regional stability between India and Pakistan is arguably greater than other terror threats faced by the U.S.

Intensify bilateral intelligence dialogue on Afghanistan

As Washington begins to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, there will be keen interest in New Delhi about how the domestic situation in Afghanistan evolves. The U.S. and India should intensify their intelligence dialogue about Afghanistan to include the political situation, tribal politics, the strength of the national government, and the role of various regional actors.

Harden the Indian Periphery

Aside from bilateral CT efforts, both sides should also consider a regional dimension to their cooperation. Terror groups such as the LeT and HUJI have become adept at exploiting weak borders and ungoverned spaces along India's borders in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. For India, it is not only strategically essential to build its domestic CT capabilities, but also to *harden its periphery* and deny the use of its neighbors' territory as facilitation nodes for terrorist group operations such as transit, money laundering, and recruiting.

In Nepal, the country has recently emerged from a brutal civil war in which a fragile government is trying to form a constitution and determine an acceptable way to integrate cadre from the People's Liberation Army into the Nepalese Army. While Kathmandu wrestles with these challenges, the LeT reportedly established operations in Nepal in the Terai where a majority of Nepal's Muslims reside. Muhammad Omar Madni ran LeT's operations in Nepal and traveled widely throughout Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Gulf States recruiting, seeking funding and logistical support,⁵ until he was eventually apprehended by Indian authorities in June 2009.⁶

In Bangladesh, LeT has worked to establish a terror infrastructure by forging ties with HUJI-Bangladesh (HUJI-B) and the Jamaat ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB),⁷ and used Bangladeshi territory as a transit point for counterfeit currency and recruitment.⁸ The Maldives is an archipelago consisting of approximately 1200 islands, only 200 of which are inhabited. This wide swath of ungoverned maritime space was reportedly explored by LeT commander Faisal Haroon as a possible logistical base.⁹ The Maldives also suffered its first terrorist attack in Male at Sultan Park in September 2007 in which 12 foreign tourists were injured.¹⁰ In March 2009, Pakistani authorities arrested nine Maldivian nationals in Waziristan Province, some of who may have been drawn there through LeT's charitable front Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq which carried out relief operations after the 2005 tsunami. Sri Lanka was also reportedly seen by LeT as an attractive location for transit operations with its large Muslim population in the eastern region of the country.

In order to better *harden India's periphery*, the U.S. and India should explore possibilities for working together on strengthening borders, building CT capacity, improving maritime security, and improving the professionalism of security forces in India's neighboring states. By working trilaterally with regional states, the U.S. will be able to work cooperatively with their Indian partners in building capacity, while respecting Indian sensitivities as the dominant regional power. While India has typically

⁵ Animesh Roul, "Lashkar-e-Taiba's Financial Network Targets India from the Gulf States," *Terrorism Monitor*, Volume 7, Issue 19 (July 2, 2009), at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35221 (September 11, 2011)

⁶ "Terror Suspect has links with Saeed: Chidambaram," *Indian Express*, June 5, 2009 at <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/terror-suspect-has-links-with-saeed-chidamb/471662/> (September 11, 2011)

⁷ "The Threat from Jamaat ul Mujahideen Bangladesh," *International Crisis Group*, Number 187 (March 1, 2010), pg. i. Also see David Montero, "Pakistani Militants Expand Abroad, Starting in Bangladesh," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 5, 2010 at <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0805/Pakistani-militants-expand-abroad-starting-in-Bangladesh> (September 11, 2011).

⁸ Animesh Roul, "Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Strategy of 'Encircling' India," *Terrorism Monitor*, Volume 8, Issue 38 (October 21, 2010) at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37056&cHash=b2f2164427 (September 11, 2011)

⁹ Praveen Swami, "Nine Maldives Jihadists Held in Pakistan," *The Hindu*, April 4, 2009 at <http://www.hindu.com/2009/04/04/stories/2009040452281100.htm> (September 11, 2011)

¹⁰ "Tourist hurt in Maldives Blast," *BBC News*, September 29, 2007, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7019929.stm (September 11, 2011)

been resistant to such proposals in the past, New Delhi should consider the benefits of leveraging U.S. assistance.

U.S. Pacific Command has already undertaken some capacity building work throughout South Asia. In testimony to the Senate Armed Service Committee in April of this year, PACOM Commander Admiral Willard stated, "We know that Lashkar-e-Taiba is currently laid down throughout South Asia. We're currently working in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and India in order to build those nations' capacities or assist in building their capacities to attempt to contain LET in those areas."¹¹ While DOD has begun work to build CT capacity on India's periphery, there are limits to what it can do. Given the sensitivities about the region's colonial legacy, any American efforts at engaging neighboring states must be respectful of each country's sovereignty. High profile American engagement has the potential to antagonize host governments and cause concern in New Delhi about prominent American presence in a region that it considers its sphere of influence. Any engagement with regional South Asian states needs to be executed discreetly and, wherever possible, in close coordination with India. Being mindful of these sensitivities, the U.S. and India could use this opportunity to work trilaterally or multilaterally with regional states to build CT capacity. An example of this could be trilateral or quadrilateral CT exercises among the region's CT forces. Or perhaps a multilateral training seminar that discusses the principles of effective coastal security. In this way, the United States and India could take their CT cooperation to a new level by cooperating on CT initiatives outside of India's borders.

¹¹ "Hearing to Receive Testimony on U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2012 and the Future Years Defense Program," Committee on Armed Services, April 12, 2011.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Latif.

Let me ask Ms. Curtis a question and it goes to a statement that Secretary Clinton made in July. She called for Pakistan to prosecute the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, transparently, fully, and urgently. On the other hand, the State Department's recently released Annual Terrorism Report found that Pakistan's antiterrorism courts that have been set up in Pakistan that are supposed to work under the rule of law, but the acquittal rate is something like 75 percent. There's a real question that they're really plagued by a situation where they're almost incapable of prosecuting suspected suspects or terrorists to date.

Given that, do we have any hope that the Mumbai attackers will face justice?

Ms. CURTIS. Thank you. I want to go to a comment that you made in your opening statement that I completely agree with that the LeT should be part of that secret report card that we have developed with Pakistan in terms of benchmarks that they need to meet because as I said in my testimony, both written and oral, the LeT does have links to al-Qaeda. They are an international danger. We should in no way give Pakistan the impression that we will give them a pass on the LeT, so long as they take steps on terrorists like al-Zawahiri and other al-Qaeda leaders. I think we need to put a full court press on both issues because they are related and they both affect our security as well as India's.

In terms of the question will they actually move forward with prosecution. They have detained LeT leaders, but they have failed—it's been almost 3 years now and they have not moved forward with prosecuting these individuals. I think it's completely unacceptable. And where you talk about the challenges in the court system and their inability to prosecute individuals, I believe that it's really a lack of political will at the top. And that is a message is sent from the top levels of the Pakistani leadership and here I'm talking about the Pakistan military and intelligence agencies, to move forward I think Pakistan could. So I think we need to keep the pressure on, make it clear that if Pakistan doesn't move forward with these prosecutions, it's going to increasingly lead to Pakistan's international isolation and ultimately weaken its position in the region. I think this is the message that we need to keep driving home to the Pakistanis and it does need to be at the top of our priority list and so that comes back to the point that you're absolutely right, it has to be part of that report card.

Mr. ROYCE. Maybe Mr. Sherman and myself, given our concurrence on the view on this should write the administration on this subject. I look forward to work with you on that, Brad.

Let me ask you also about the Karachi Project. One of the things I wanted to get to was the link between LeT and the Indian Mujahideen and the Students Islamic Movement of India.

The Karachi Project, you indicate Pakistani intelligence and LeT worked to motivate and equip Indians to attack their own country, right? Can you go into a little detail on that? Can you expand on it a little bit?

Ms. CURTIS. Yes, first let me give a little bit of history. The Students Islamic Movement of India, SIMI, that you mentioned, have been around for a long time since the early '90s. And they were

sort of functioning within the country, but it wasn't until around the attacks of 9/11 that they were perceived as a real danger to India. And they were outlawed at that time and they had made statements supporting al-Qaeda. And there is a belief that the Indian Mujahideen, some of its leaders may have been some of the same individuals that were involved with SIMI. So the Indian Mujahideen may be an evolution of that SIMI group which, of course, then it would be an indigenous group, made up mostly of Indians.

And the interesting thing is there were many attacks in 2007, 2008, for which the Indian Mujahideen claimed responsibility in India and the 2008 Mumbai attacks were different in that it was obviously the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, the Pakistan-based group that was involved. But I think the Karachi Project or the information that's been forthcoming on the so-called Karachi Project begins to explain what maybe we have been seeing over India in the last 5, 6 years.

And if the information on the Karachi Project is correct, what it discusses is a very deliberate effort by the Pakistani intelligence working in tandem with groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Harakat-ul-Jihadi Islami to infiltrate into India, recruit Indians to carry out attacks. Equip them with the capabilities to do so. So I think this is something that we need to continue to look at and explore, but it also shows that India has a two-pronged issue that it needs to address. And that is one, how does it deal with getting at the Pakistan-based organizations. I think the U.S. and India have to work in tandem on that issue. And second, what can it do to prevent the recruitment of Indians?

And that's why I brought up the idea of working together on countering violent extremism, working with communities to educate about the radicalization process. I think it's a good sign that the Home Minister has actually come forward and said hey, this is a problem we have to deal with. Many politicians have been reluctant to do so in the past.

Mr. ROYCE. We're running out of time, so I'm going to ask one more question here. Some have suggested that the U.S. and Indian high-tech companies could collaborate to spur the next generation of homeland security technology. How could they better join forces?

And then Mr. Latif, I'll ask you to what extent do U.S. restrictions on technology-sharing hamper U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation, and what are the dangers of using such restrictions. If you could just briefly answer that, we'll then go to Mr. Sherman.

Mr. CILLUFFO. I mean, put very briefly and simply, obviously, India is home to a number of the more advanced technological companies, certainly from an IT perspective. And when you look at India's biggest deficits, to me it's the information sharing challenges they have between and among their various police entities and how they connect with other police entities and how they, in turn, connect with the Home Ministry. So I think there's a lot that they can do right there and there's a lot, I think, that the United States can do because we have to have similar integration challenges.

If you really look back to 9/11, the greatest progress has been made in the sharing of information vertically and horizontally. So I think from an architectural standpoint, we have a lot that we can

share. I know the Indians have visited the fusion centers. I know they have examined CJIS and N-DEX, some of our other systems. So I think there are opportunities there.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Latif. That last question?

Mr. LATIF. Yes, sir. On technology transfer with India and the United States, there has been a tremendous amount of technology that has been transferred to India since the civil nuclear deal was actually completed in 2008. So there's been a paradigm shift, I think, within the U.S. Government on transferring technology to India and we've seen that most recently with a very high percentage of licenses that have been granted.

Mr. ROYCE. True enough. We're discussing the down side of risk on some of that.

Mr. LATIF. Right. Some of the risks would entail perhaps a potential that India might reengineer—reverse engineer some of the technologies. And also given their long relationship with Russia, there is a concern within the government that perhaps maybe some sensitive technologies could leak to Russia and be compromised.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Latif.

Mr. Sherman?

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Cilluffo, you point to police corruption in India, used to police departments looking the other way when there's vice. Are there elements in the police in India that would cooperate with Islamic terrorism or Maoist terrorism?

Mr. CILLUFFO. The corruption issue is a significant one and that must be addressed as well. As to whether or not you have police officers who are sympathetic to Islamic extremists or Maoists, I would have to say the likelihood is yes, that is indeed a concern.

Mr. SHERMAN. So more, not so much corruption in the sense of doing it for money, but doing it out of genuine belief in the terrorist organization's objectives?

Mr. CILLUFFO. I don't see those as either or propositions. I think both are issues.

Mr. SHERMAN. What can we do to make it easier for India to buy the technology it needs for its security and have the recent export control reforms benefit U.S.-India relations?

Ms. Curtis?

Ms. CURTIS. As I mentioned, as we are building this strategic partnership and homeland security cooperation being a major part of that, U.S. companies will become involved and looking to the opportunities to help India solve some of its homeland security challenges. And protecting ourselves means partnering with others.

Mr. SHERMAN. I understand how important it is. Are any of our witnesses aware of anything India was kind of interested in buying that they would face some problems in buying due to U.S. law?

Mr. LATIF. Mr. Sherman, I'm not aware of anything. As far as I'm aware anything that India has wanted to purchase in terms of technology for its counterterrorism or homeland security purposes, they have been granted. Unless it has application to missile development or nuclear programs, the Indians are allowed to purchase it.

Mr. SHERMAN. So face recognition technology, drones.

Mr. LATIF. Well, on drones, it depends. I mean if we're looking at Predators, that might be a little bit of a problem.

Mr. SHERMAN. Not so much as armed drones as surveillance drones.

Mr. LATIF. Right, right.

Mr. SHERMAN. Moving to another issue, the Indian Prime Minister has identified the Maoist or Naxalite insurgency as the biggest internal security challenge. How does that insurgency affect India and its ability to focus on the Islamic extremist terrorist threat?

Mr. Latif?

Mr. LATIF. Well, sir, it is a very big problem for the Indians. You've got a Naxalite insurgency that is spread over 10 states. You don't have a central plan to attack the insurgency. And so as a result within India, because of the way that law enforcement relationships are set up, the state has primacy over the Center. What this means in terms of the amount of capacity that they have to be able to address the multitude of terrorist threats that they've got, they're a bit stretched. You've got a Naxalite insurgency. You've got Islamist terrorists coming up in Kashmir and then, of course, in the Northeast.

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, thank you. My time in this room hasn't expired, but my time to get to that room is virtually expired.

Mr. ROYCE. Well, thank you, Mr. Sherman. I want to thank each of our witnesses. I very much appreciate your testimony here today. We're going to have to adjourn for final passage on this legislation. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 2:49 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X



MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Chairman

September 1, 2011

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, to be held in **2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building** **(and available live, via the WEBCAST link on the Committee website at <http://www.hcfa.house.gov>)**:

DATE: Wednesday, September 14, 2011

TIME: 2:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: U.S.-India Counterterrorism Cooperation: Deepening the Partnership

WITNESSES: Ms. Lisa Curtis
Senior Research Fellow
Asian Studies Center
The Heritage Foundation

Mr. Frank Cilluffo
Associate Vice President
Director, Homeland Security Policy Institute
The George Washington University

S. Amer Latif, Ph.D
Visiting Fellow
Wadhvani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies
Center for Strategic and International Studies

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.



COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade HEARING

Day Wednesday Date September 14, 2011 Room 2200

Starting Time 2:04pm Ending Time 2:50pm

Recesses (___ to ___) (___ to ___)

Presiding Member(s)

Chairman Ed Royce

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session

Electronically Recorded (taped)

Executive (closed) Session

Stenographic Record

Televised

TITLE OF HEARING:

U.S.-India Counterterrorism Cooperation: Deepening the Partnership

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Rep. Ed Royce, Rep. Brad Sherman

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an * if they are not members of full committee.)


HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes No
(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)

None

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or
TIME ADJOURNED _____


Subcommittee Staff Director

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee
Member Attendance

Republicans

- Rep. Edward Royce (Chair)
- Rep. Ted Poe
- Rep. Jeff Duncan
- Rep. Bill Johnson
- Rep. Tim Griffin
- Rep. Ann Marie Buerkle
- Rep. Renee Ellmers

Democrats

- Rep. Brad Sherman (Ranking Member)
- Rep. David Cicilline
- Rep. Gerry Connolly
- Rep. Brian Higgins
- Rep. Allyson Schwartz