Verbatim, as delivered

Chairman Berman’s opening statement at hearing, “The July Summit and Beyond: Prospects for U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Reductions”

Our hearing today addresses one of the most important issues in the U.S.-Russia relationship -- the future of efforts to reduce the nuclear arsenals of both countries.

The touchstone of this effort is the first Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty, START I, which significantly reduced U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, and included unprecedented transparency, verification and data-sharing provisions.

It was a foundation of the U.S.-Russia post-Cold War relationship, and heralded a new era in which nuclear-armed missiles, submarines and bombers were being dismantled and destroyed.

It seemed that both countries were beginning to emerge from the doctrine of “Mutually Assured Destruction,” in which security was measured in terms of the massive destruction that each could inflict upon the other.

This treaty, however, will expire in early December, taking with it the carefully-negotiated and detailed verification and inspection regime that has been so important in building trust and confidence between Moscow and Washington.

In March, both President Obama and President Medvedev announced their joint intention to agree on the terms of a successor agreement to START I by July.

In April, President Obama restated his commitment that the U.S. will seek “a new agreement by the end of this year that is legally binding and sufficiently bold…[a]nd this will set the stage for further cuts, and we will seek to include all nuclear weapons states in this endeavor.”

This is a tall order, but one that, so far, both the U.S. and Russia seem willing to accomplish.

The Vice President has famously called for pressing the “reset button” in the U.S.-Russia relationship. This new treaty would do that in the arena of strategic nuclear arms reduction, but it is also a “placeholder” for the real nuclear arms reduction treaty to come.

Given that this is the Committee’s first hearing in quite some time on these important matters, I think it’s important to take a step back and review some of the fundamentals.

A first key question: are reductions in US, Russia, and others’ nuclear arsenals a good idea?

With a few exceptions, nearly everyone agrees that fewer nuclear weapons makes for a better, more stable world; it is, after all, the basis of our nuclear nonproliferation policy.

Significant unilateral reductions, unanswered by Russia and the other powers, are probably unwise.

But I’m convinced that significant bilateral or multilateral reductions are in the U.S. national interest.

I believe the only appropriate role for nuclear weapons is to deter the use of nuclear weapons by others. There is no other reasonable, real-world scenario I’ve seen that justifies any other mission.

If you agree with this judgment, then the U.S. and Russia – and indeed, the other declared nuclear states – can drastically cut their nuclear arsenals.

I can’t fathom that a U.S. President would authorize the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear threat, knowing that the consequence would be the crumbling of the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Other states would rush to acquire nuclear arms, if for no other reason than to defend themselves against a United States willing to use such weapons against a state that has not used or even possessed them.

While some argue that we may need to use nuclear weapons against chemical or biological threats or deep underground facilities – ignoring that the capabilities of advanced conventional weapons to do the same job is very strong – it would be irresponsible to ignore the impact of our first use of nuclear weapons on the long-term national security of the United States.

Our allies do attach great importance to the so-called U.S. “nuclear umbrella” of extended deterrence, and we must be mindful of their interests.

But there is no longer a Soviet Union and a Warsaw Pact, poised to send waves of tanks and infantry into Western Europe.

Nor do I believe that China will seek an empire in East Asia based on conventional conquest.

In this context, it is also important to note that terrorist groups can’t be deterred with the threat of nuclear retaliation.

Much of the debate about the use of nuclear weapons seems divorced from reality. It often seems that proponents of retaining larger stockpiles of nuclear weapons are casting about for any scenario, however far-fetched, to justify higher numbers of nuclear weapons for their own sake.

Therefore, if the mission is really limited to deterring a nuclear attack, then both the U.S. and Russia should be able to reduce the number of deployed and reserve warheads significantly below the levels contemplated in the 2002 Moscow treaty, and lower than the levels reportedly contemplated in the START I successor agreement now being negotiated.

Second, I would argue that the retention of significant levels of nuclear weapons by the United States does harm our national security interests in other ways.

The longer that nuclear weapons are seen as the hallmark of a Great Power, then the greater the incentive for other states to also pursue, acquire, and accumulate their own nuclear arsenals to attain the same recognition and influence.

There is probably not a hard linkage between reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the efforts by Iran, North Korea and others to acquire a nuclear capability.

But the U.S. retaining more weapons than it needs provides a useful pretext for these and other countries to argue that we are insisting on a double-standard: that on the one hand, we want to deny developing countries their “right” to peaceful nuclear energy, as provided under the NPT, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; but on the other hand, we are not upholding our commitment under the NPT – along with Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France -- to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament …”

When other countries do not believe that the United States is serious about fulfilling this legal obligation, then they are less inclined to support our nonproliferation activities.

For them, the international nuclear nonproliferation regime is fundamentally discriminatory, and only serious progress on nuclear disarmament by the United States and Russia – who still possess approximately 95 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons – can reduce and eventually eliminate this discrimination.

That leads to the next question: Is it a good idea to pursue legally-binding treaties on reductions, and legally-binding verification provisions?

The last administration clearly thought the answer was no. They conceived of arms control as an exercise between enemies.

Once the Soviet Union dissolved, it was said, there was no longer a need for legally-binding arms control agreements.

However, the real objection seemed to be that such agreements and their intrusive verification and monitoring provisions, needlessly constrained the flexibility of U.S. forces for other missions.

As I’ve argued, I believe the need for such flexibility makes no sense when considering the appropriate role of nuclear weapons.

In 2002, the Bush Administration concluded the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or SORT, but this agreement does not include any monitoring or verification provisions.

The fact that the START I verification regime remained in force compensated for the lack of verification measures in the Moscow treaty.

But as we contemplate significantly lower levels of nuclear weapons, it is critical to have clear, intrusive, and comprehensive verification and monitoring provisions to reassure both sides that the other is not seeking to retain a significant advantage in forces.

And it becomes even more important to have the structure, commitment, and clarity of a legally-binding agreement.

The final question: Is the goal of zero global nuclear weapons a good idea?

One of our witnesses today, Perry, co-authored a landmark editorial with Sen. Nunn, Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of State Shultz, on a “World without Nuclear Weapons.”

The President himself has recommitted the United States to the eventual objective of a world of zero nuclear weapons. I say “recommitted” because this goal is, as I’ve already noted, enshrined as the law of the land in the U.S. ratification of the NPT over 40 years ago.

How, and when, we get to zero is a fascinating subject, and one we may address in a future hearing.