Iran’s Strategic Ambitions:
Implications for Regional Security and U.S. Interests
Judith S. Yaphe
Mr. Chairman and members
of the committee, I am most grateful for this opportunity to appear before you
today. The subject of my testimony is Iran’s behavior towards its Arab neighbors in the Gulf region, the
neighbors’ perceptions of Iran’s
behavior, and the options these fragile states have in trying to manage a large,
powerful, and occasionally menacing presence. The states include Iraq and the 6
states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. I will conclude with some observations
on the
degree of cooperation the United States
can expect from Gulf Arab states in responding to Iran,
and the ways in which the United
States can maximize that cooperation. In
preparing for this hearing, I was reminded of an observation made by an Iran watcher in
2003:
When the U.S.
views Iran,
what does it see? Americans everywhere—Iran is surrounded by pro-American governments
in Kabul and Baghdad
and U.S. forces in the
Persian Gulf and Central Asia.
When the Iranian government looks beyond its borders, what
does it see? Americans surrounded by Muslims everywhere.
Some Observations on Iran’s Behavior Towards its
Neighbors
Three fundamental concepts
shape Iran’s self-view of
its role in the world: Iran
as a unified society identity and power, Islam as the source of faith and
ethical code, and Persia
as source of historical and cultural pride. Iran’s basic foreign and security
policy goals under ayatollah or shah are the same are in some respects
practically identical—securing Iran’s territorial and political integrity,
recognition of the regime’s legitimacy, and acknowledgment of the country’s
security concerns and historic regional leadership role. Iran’s leaders see their country as encircled by real and
potential enemies—Iraq, which used chemical weapons and missiles against Tehran
in their 8-year war; the Gulf Arab states, which host the U.S. military
presence and are seen as repressing their Shia communities; Pakistan, which is occasionally
involved in hostile skirmishes with Iran on their common border and has encouraged
anti-Iranian activity in Afghanistan; and Central Asia, once pro-Soviet, now a
source of economic opportunity, sectarian risk, and host to U.S. military
forces. Above all, the U.S.,
a virtual neighbor since the occupation of Iraq
in April 2003, and Israel
are viewed as enemies: both threaten Iran’s
nuclear achievements and deplore Iran’s
efforts to derail any peace process between Israel
and the Palestinians or Israel
and Syria.
Washington in particular is seen as keen to
keep the Persian Gulf as its militarized zone, maintain pro-U.S. regimes in Baghdad and Kabul, and marginalize
Iran.
Iran’s leaders—whether
moderate Persian nationalist or conservative Islamist—view the world with a mix
of confidence and trepidation. Regardless of where they stand on the political
spectrum, they likely share a common of view of the threats to the security of
the Iranian homeland and the measures necessary to protect Iranian interests.
This consensus includes agreement that at some point they will fight again and
alone—just as they did from 1980 to 1988—and that Iran must be able to defend
itself by itself.
Several factors shape Iran’s strategic and military
thinking:
·
The need to reassert Iran’s traditional role of regional
hegemon in the Gulf and beyond. Iran’s clerical leaders
believe it is Iran’s
natural right and historic destiny to dominate the region as well as to lead the
world’s Muslims. Moreover, they believe Iran
has a direct interest in all matters regional and Islamic, including in the
Gulf and the Levant.
·
The need for an enhanced capability to defend Iran
against any threat of military aggression. Tehran wants independence and
self-sufficiency in strategic and
tactical terms. It believes it
must build its own military industries, reconstitute a modern military force,
and have minimal reliance on foreign suppliers. At the same time, Tehran is seeking to
acquire nuclear technology and the capability to produce nuclear weapons
probably as a cost-effective way to compensate for military weakness and
relative strategic isolation.
Iran’s ambitions to be the
pre-eminent power in its neighborhood are long-standing. The quest for regional
hegemony began under the Shahs and has been continued by the clerics of the
Islamic Republic. Iranian foreign policy has always been designed to protect a
nation and empire that was long coveted by more powerful neighbors—Ottoman Turkey
and Tsarist Russia—and divided into spheres of influence by the Great Powers of
the 20th century—the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United
States. Viewed through this historical prism, these ambitions have little to do
with exporting its Islamic revolution or expanding its borders, although occasional
reminders to the Gulf Arabs of the Shi’a and Persian-origin communities within
their borders serve as a reminder of the vulnerability of those Sunni Arab-led
states.
Iran assumes it is by right the
pre-eminent power in the Persian Gulf and the Greater
Middle East region. It has the largest
population, largest land mass, largest military, and oldest culture and
civilization. It believes it is the
economic engine of the region and the most innovative in application of science
and technology. Iran’s “region” is more than the Gulf or Central Asia. Its region extends from Afghanistan through the Gulf, Iraq, Turkey,
and the Greater Middle East (anything affecting Syria,
Lebanon, Palestinians, and Israel). As the
pre-eminent power, it expects to be consulted on all issues affecting the
region, in much the same sense that Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad interpreted
his and Syria’s
role. Iran
believes that the roads to a U.S.
exit strategy from Iraq, to a
peace settlement in the Arab-Israeli context, and to stability in the Gulf run
through Tehran. Without Iran, according to this view, the
country’s leaders believe, there can be no peace, no resolution of conflict,
and no ‘justice.’
Iran wants to expand its
influence and authority in the region, but it is not interested in territorial
expansion. Rather, it seeks to build its clout through a policy of aggressive
outreach short of war—by building and backing support networks throughout the
region; providing political support and economic assistance to key actors, bolstering
trade and commercial ties with neighboring countries, and signing security and
defense agreements. In implementing its policies, Iran operates on two intertwined
principles to build its networks of surrogates, intimidate opponents and
critics, and make foreign policy: the first is plausible deniability; and the second is deliberate ambiguity.
The model is Lebanon, but it began in Iraq.
The struggle of many
Shia communities in Iraq, Lebanon, and
the Gulf to achieve equal political status and end economic discrimination began
in the 1970s, when Shi’a clerics in Najaf’s seminaries began to preach a
doctrine of political activism by clerics. Known as velayat-e faqih, the doctrine was advanced primarily by Iranian
cleric Ayatollah Khomeini, then in exile in Najaf, and prominent Iraqi cleric
Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, a founder of the clandestine Dawa Party. This
Shi’a “awakening” received additional boosts from the Iranian revolution and
the creation in 1979 of an Islamic republic based on clerical rule and the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon,
which brought the IDF to the outskirts of Beirut
and contributed to the birth of Hizballah as a military and charitable
organization. By 1982, Iran’s revolutionary government was supporting
humanitarian efforts, including building clinics, schools, hospitals, and mosques,
reconstructing villages destroyed by the Israelis, and paying benefits to
families of martyrs killed fighting Israel or in the Lebanese civil war. Iran
also began to provide military training and equipment to the darker side of
Hizballah—to the terrorist networks controlled by Imad Mughniyah and others
against U.S.
and other Western targets. Elements of the newly created Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) trained in Lebanon
and with Hizballah units.
Key questions for the analytical
community in the 1980s resonate today—how much control does Iran exert over
surrogates like Hizballah and Hamas? Are Hizballah’s leaders, such as Hassan
Nasrallah, totally subservient to the wishes of Iran’s Supreme Leader and the
doctrine of velayat-e faqih? Would Hamas do more than pray for Iran if the
latter was threatened with imminent attack? Or do they act independently of Iran, as
Lebanese and Palestinian nationalists willing to work within the systems of
government so long as they can shape them?
In my view, the answer remains the same today as it was in the
1980s—great personal loyalty and devotion to the ideals of the Islamic
Revolution and to its clerical leaders but a tendency to pursue self-interest,
with or without Iran’s
approval. Iran
may not be consulted on all operations, or if it is, may not approve, but it
would not openly oppose Hizballah or Hamas actions or risk a breach with its
most successful surrogates.
Despite a prohibition by
the late Ayatollah Khomeini against relations with the Saudis, today’s Iranian
government values its expanding ties to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf
Arab regimes. Even the UAE maintains links to Iran, despite their seemingly
intractable dispute over ownership of three small islands in the Gulf, the
Tunbs and Abu Musa. Iran’s
outreach extends to Shi’a communities in Iraq
(approximately 55-60 percent of the population), Saudi
Arabia (10-15 percent of the population concentrated
primarily in the oil-rich Eastern Province), Kuwait
(approximately 20 percent), and Bahrain
(about 75 percent of the population). Iran’s approach to neighboring Arab
states and their Shia communities has changed over the years. Initially, it
consisted of efforts to organize anti-regime movements through the local
mosques and prayer houses led by local Shi’a clerics or Iran-based activists.
Since Khomeini died in 1989, Iranian efforts have focused on diplomatic efforts
to restore relations with its Gulf neighbors, primarily Saudi Arabia.
Iraq as Risk and Opportunity
Iraq and Iran have endured
long years of war interspersed by uneasy periods of truce, the most recent conflict
being the 8-year period from 1980-1988 which saw nearly a million casualties on
both sides and untold damage to property and economic infrastructure. Ayatollah
Khomeini assumed Iraq’s
Shi’a would join the Shi’a Islamic Republic to defeat the secular, Sunni
Arab-dominated regime in Baghdad; Saddam assumed
the Arabs of Iran’s Khuzistan
Province would join Arab
Iraq to defeat the mullahs. Both were wrong. Iraq’s
Shi’a Arabs fought to defend the state of Iraq
from defeat by Persians and were rewarded by Saddam for their loyalty; Iran’s
Arabs remained loyal to the republic.
The collapse of Saddam
Husayn’s regime in April 2003 gave Iran an unanticipated opportunity. Its
primary regional enemy was gone. Iraqi Shi’a militants who had spent 2 decades in
Iranian exile could now return and demand a role in the post-Saddam government.
Iran had created the major exile group—the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)—as an umbrella organization for Iraqi exiles; it was
led by members of a prominent pro-Iranian clerical family, Ayatollah Muhammad
Baqr al-Hakim and his brother Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim.
Iranian pilgrims could now visit the Shi’a shrines cities of Najaf and Karbala while traders,
businessmen, diplomats, investors, diplomats, security personnel, and
intelligence operatives could easily cross the unguarded 900-mile border. Iran called for free and open elections and
democratic institutions in the new Iraq,
correctly assuming that the majority Shi’a population would win any election
and, for the first time in history, govern Iraq. Iran
was—and is—eager for an Iran-friendly government in Iraq. Iran’s
vision of a perfect Iraqi state is one strong enough to maintain Iraq’s unity and territorial integrity but too
weak to challenge Iran
or the other neighbors. Iran
would prefer an Islamic state under shariah law similar to its own theocratic
façade, but if forced to choose between a precarious Islamic state and a stable
unitary state, would almost certainly choose the latter.
With opportunity,
however, comes risk. Iran is
pouring money into Iraq
in the form of business investment and community reconstruction. It is
refurbishing the mosques and shrines of Najaf and Karbala, building community infrastructure,
and providing various forms of support (money, advisers, training, and
intelligence) to many of the political factions and government ministries,
especially the Interior Ministry, according to accounts told by Iraqis and
reported in the press. In early 2008 President Ahmadinejad, on the first visit
made by an Iranian leader to Iraq,
offered Iraq
development assistance, including joint projects for oil, pipeline and refinery
construction, and a billion dollar loan. Iraq
turned down the loan offer but signed economic and trade agreements, and issued
tenders for construction of a pipeline to Iran. Iran
has funded virtually every Shi’a candidate standing for election to the
National Assembly, and some Iraqis claim the IRGC has links to Sunni Islamist
factions in the center and north of Iraq. It expects, in return, a
compliant government in Baghdad
willing to accede to its vision of the New Iraq. By contrast, the oil-rich Gulf states—once the source of more than $80 billions in
loans to help Iraq defeat Iran—now opposes debt relief or additional
assistance to Iraq.
Iran’s influence in Iraq is
probably at its highest point now. According to interviews with Iraqis, a
growing number of Shi’a as well as Sunnis and Kurds, are uneasy with the extent
of authority and influence Iran
and the IRGC wield in Iraq.
They raise several important questions: How extensive is Iranian influence in
Iraqi ministries, (especially Defense, Interior, and Intelligence)? Have
Iranians been involved in targeting Iraqi intellectuals, academicians or military
officers for assassination? Are the Iranians through the IRGC communicating
with or assisting al-Qaida operatives in Iraq? Are the Iranian religious
scholars in the seminaries of Qom
trying to displace those of Najaf from the intellectual and spiritual
leadership of Shi’a Islam? Whether Iran
is engaged in all, some, or none of these activities, the appearance of their
involvement and the Iraqis’ unease is reminiscent of the Islamic Republic’s
assistance to Hizballah in Lebanon
in the 1980s.
Iraq’s government must
balance American complaints that Iran
is supporting anti-U.S. acts of terrorism in Iraq
with Iranian demands that the U.S.
leave Iraq
and the Gulf. Support from both Washington and
Tehran is critical to the survival of any
government in Baghdad. Thus far, the Maliki government has managed
to bring Americans and Iranians together for several meetings in Baghdad, and
Tehran appears to have reined in Muqtada al-Sadr by insisting he abide by his
cease-fire and drawdown his militia. Muqtada is not an Iranian loyalist. That
role is reserved for SCIRI, which has proven itself to be a much more witting
tool and ally of Iran.
Prime Minister Maliki is certain to discuss
security issues when he visits Tehran later this
week as well as the security pact under negotiation with the United States.
The
GCC: Avoiding Risk, Seeking Opportunity
Since the early 1960s, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Bahrain, Qatar, the United
Arab Emirates, and Oman have preferred, or, more
aptly, allowed outsiders to define their security policies and needs. New to
acting like states rather than tribes, but not yet wealthy from oil, and
accustomed to letting tradition determine the governance and institutions of
civil society, the smaller Arab states of the Persian Gulf initially followed
their colonial protector, Great Britain, to shelter themselves from the Arab
and Persian nationalist storms that periodically swept through the
neighborhood. The exception was Saudi Arabia,
which enjoyed better relations with the United
States than with the United Kingdom. When the British
decided they could no longer afford to protect the Gulf Arabs and withdrew in
1971, the smaller and fragile Gulf states turned
to the United States
to assume the British mantle. Concerned about possible
Soviet encroachments in the Gulf, President Richard Nixon created the Twin
Pillars policy, which designated Iran
and Saudi Arabia as proxies
for U.S.
military presence in the region. This was followed by the Carter Doctrine on U.S. military
engagement in the Gulf and the expansion of American force presence and
operations during the Iran-Iraq war.
Through the 1970s and
1980s the Arab states of the Gulf faced the hegemonic ambitions of Iran, first
under the secular and intensely nationalistic regime of the Shah and then under
the revolutionary Islamic Republic of Iran, also nationalistic and determined
to export its revolution across the Gulf. In between Iranian challenges came
Iraqi feints at territorial acquisition as well as attempts to gain influence
in decision-making on Gulf and wider Arab political, economic, and strategic
affairs. In 1981, as the Iraq-Iran war continued and Iran broadened its efforts to
export its Islamic revolution across the Gulf, the six states formed the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC). It
was not intended to be a political or security organization similar to the
European Union or NATO; instead, its members focused on common economic
interests, such as forming a common customs union and trade zone and
cooperating in local police and security matters.
The Gulf Arabs’ Security
Vision
Gulf Arab security
policies have traditionally been based on risk avoidance, collective reaction, and
reliance on non-regional powers to insure their security and survival. The
strategy was to avoid provoking either of the dominant and powerful governments
in Baghdad and Tehran, pay for protection, use arms sales as
an extension of foreign policy, and above all, maintain a balance of power in
the Gulf. Iraq’s invasion
and occupation of Kuwait in
1990 should have exposed the weakness in this form of strategic thinking, but the
Gulf governments preferred to maintain the kind of balance of power they once
felt comfortable under—a balance maintained by cordial relations with regional
powers and backed up by a more distant U.S. presence.
Several developments in
the past few years have produced a significant shift in the strategic thinking
of the Gulf states:
·
The spread of religious-based
terrorist attacks following the al-Qaida attacks on the U.S. on 9/11. Al-Qaida and other
extremist elements accuse the Al Sa`ud and other ruling families of being
un-Islamic and puppets of the U.S.
and have conducted a series of terrorist operations on Saudi and American
targets in Saudi Arabia.
Youth from many Arab states have been recruited for operations in Iraq, and press reports indicate Gulf nationals
have been caught in Iraq and
on their return to the Peninsula states.
·
The rise of political
and sectarian movements demanding political reform. All of the Gulf
states are witnessing the growing political influence
of ultra-conservative religious, ethnic, and tribal factions. These factions demand
a greater role in decision making, constitutional limitations on ruling family
power, adherence to a strict version of Islamic law, and an end to corruption
in government. In Kuwait,
for example, elections for the national assembly last month saw Islamists and
tribal conservatives win nearly half of the seats. These conservative elements
are now challenging the ruling Al Sabah family for the right to appoint cabinet
ministers and for limitations on the power of the Amir.
·
The collapse of Saddam
Husayn’s regime and installation of a non-Sunni government in Baghdad. The Gulf states
see risk if Iraq
fails and if it succeeds. A failed Iraq means more cross-border
terrorists entering or returning to the Gulf intent on overthrowing the
traditional ruling elites. It also raises the risk of sectarian or ethnic
unrest in countries where significant minority populations have long been
discriminated against by Sunni, Wahhabi prejudices and Arab nationalist
sentiment. If Iraq succeeds
in stabilizing under a democratic-leaning, elective form of governance,
especially one with a weak central government and strong semi-independent
provincial authorities, then the Gulf
states worry about the export of “advanced” political
ideas which they say their countries do not need or are not prepared to adopt. Either
strategically or tactically, Iraq
will no longer be the eastern flank of the Arab world and protector of the
Sunni world against the Persian Shi’a crescent; rather, it will provide
strategic depth for a hegemonic-minded Iran.
·
Risk of a nuclearized Iran. The Gulf Arab states
have only recently begun to express their unease with a nuclear-empowered Iran. Loathe to provoke Iran by denying its right to nuclear energy capability,
the Gulf Arabs now speak openly of their concerns about Iran developing nuclear
weapons, insisting on full-cycle control of uranium enrichment, and planning
for as many as 20 more nuclear power plants strung out along the northern shore
of the Gulf. They deny Iran would use a nuclear weapon against them, but their
fears of weaponization appear at this point to be second to fear of
environmental damage from a Chernobyl-style accident or natural disaster
(earthquake at a nuclear plant built on or near a fault) and Iran’s lack of responsibility
or preparation for consequence management in the event of a nuclear
accident.
·
Worry that the U.S. will launch war against Iran or negotiate security issues with Iran without
consulting Gulf friends and allies. Should the U.S.
launch military operations against Iran, it would be the 4th
Gulf war in one generation. Gulf rulers would like the U.S. to consult them before making any
initiatives—hostile or friendly—towards Iran. Privately, many admit that
they would feel compelled to support the U.S.
but are uncertain about the willingness of the U.S. to honor its commitments to
their stability and security (read their survival).
The GCC states are
consumers and not producers of security. They publicly urge the U.S. to get out of Iraq but only after establishing a
secure and stable government there. For them, Iraq is the litmus test. If the U.S. does not stay the course in Iraq, then how strong
will their commitments be to the Gulf governments? Their response to these new risks
has been to:
·
Seek stronger commitments to their security from
the U.S. and European governments
and new friends and customers in Asia (China,
India, and Japan) who may
be willing to extend security guarantees in exchange for assured access to oil,
investment, and arms sales. The extent
of their discussions with Europe and Asian governments is unclear, but France, Spain,
and Germany have been
talking with individual members of the GCC about security issues (France will
deploy a 500-man contingent to the UAE). My discussions with Asian and Gulf
leaders suggest that actual security cooperation may not have been raised, and
that although China, India, and Japan are increasingly dependent on
Gulf oil and gas, none are interested in contributing to Gulf security or
protecting sea lanes and access to oil and gas.
· Announce their interest
in acquiring nuclear energy facilities similar to Iran’s civilian nuclear energy
program.
Together, the GCC states control nearly half the
world's known oil reserves, but mostly in response to Iran’s nuclear programs,
several Gulf states have expressed interest in nuclear energy for domestic
energy consumption. The IAEA sent a team of experts to Riyadh last year to discuss building nuclear
energy plants. Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain,
and the UAE seem especially interested, but all declare that any nuclear energy
facilities built would be placed under IAEA and NPT safeguards.
·
Keep the diplomatic door open and maintain correct relations
with Iran.
In
keeping with tradition, the GCC allowed Iranian President Ahmadinejad to speak
to its annual summit in December 2007. Saudi
Arabia then welcomed him to make his first hajj, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina
required of all Muslims. This was the first appearance by an Iranian at a GCC
meeting and the first hajj visit by a sitting Iranian president.
Elements of a U.S. Strategy
When oil sold for $20.00
a barrel and Asia was not a major consumer of the world’s energy resources, the
U.S. had greater leverage on
the Gulf states.
And, when the U.S. first
entered Iraq
in 2003, its influence was at its highest point. Neither lasted long. What,
then, are U.S.
options?
·
Engagement of Iran’s government or isolation? American administrations
since the 1979 Islamic Revolution and hostage crisis have believed that the
Iranian regime’s most important goal was recognition of its legitimacy and that
talking to Iranian leaders would be tantamount to recognition and a reward for
bad behavior. The tactic may have been effective in the 1980s, when Iran was at war with Iraq
and considered a rogue state intent on exporting its extreme version of Islamic
revolution to Iraq, Lebanon, and
the Gulf. But, in my opinion, denial of recognition is no longer a trump card
for the U.S.
I defer to Dr. Takeyh, who is much more the expert on President Ahmadinejad
than I am, but it seems to me that neither Mr. Ahmadinejad nor Supreme Leader
Khamenei is intimidated by our refusal to recognize the Islamic Republic. More
important to Ahmadinejad and most Iranians is recognition and acceptance of Iran’s claims
to be the dominant power in the Gulf region and a participant to be consulted
in matters dealing with the Greater Middle East, including Israeli-Palestinian
and Lebanese issues.
·
Offer talks to shift the onus of obstructionism to Iran? Offering to hold talks
with Iran does not imply
recognition of or approval for Tehran’s
bad behavior. It would, however, signal Iran’s
neighbors and the Greater Middle East region that the U.S. is willing to probe Iran
diplomatically and seek some common ground. Washington and Tehran have some
interests in common: both have a huge stake in Iraq’s survival as a unified
state that functions within acceptable parameters and quells sectarian unrest;
for Iran and many in the Gulf region, this means political and economic
equality for non-Sunni, non-Arab populations and not a Sunni-Shi`a/Arab-Kurd
clash of civilizations, that some scholars and political leaders in the region
predict.
·
Stop vilifying Iran as a “rogue” state? Frequent U.S. condemnation of Iran and responses to Ahmadinejad’s
vituperative statements, only serves to enhance his stature among Iranians and
the Arab street. Conversely, recognizing Iran’s
security perceptions and giving it a voice in a regional forum would allow Iran the political, economic, and strategic
interaction it seeks, but would also set the agenda and terms of engagement on
the basis of Iran’s
behavior before it tries to make demands based on its nuclear status.
·
End the sanctions that preclude economic investment in Iran? Acquiescence to a
pipeline project to carry Central Asian gas and oil, for example, would be an
important signal of U.S.
awareness of Iran’s
economic needs. It could also defuse
potential Iranian dependence on Chinese investment in the energy sector of its
economy.
·
Seek progress on common interests before tackling the larger
and more complicated issues? Iraq and our friends in the
Gulf will continue to move cautiously in developing ties to Iran. Those
ties, for now and the foreseeable future, will probably remain limited to
cooperation on trade, commerce, police matters, and sharing of intelligence on
drugs and narcotics trafficking. They are not likely to conclude any
significant security pact whose terms would include a demand for the withdrawal
of U.S.
military forces from the region. Gulf governments may prefer to avoid
antagonizing their larger and dangerous neighbors, but they also realize that U.S. commitments to their security and presence,
however invisible they may pretend it is, allow them the freedom to negotiate
with former enemy Iran and,
at some point in the future, Iraq.
·
Push hard on political reform American-style or insist on
timetables for change? Even without U.S.
pressure, the GCC states and Iraq
will face daunting challenges over the next decade, including rising demands
for an end to authoritarian rule (meaning monarchies, ruling families, single
parties, or tribes), and greater restrictions on or opportunities for women.
There may be problems of overdevelopment and a risk to the fragile Gulf ecosystem
from increased tanker traffic, lack of potable water, or a nuclear accident or
oil fire. The region also faces a challenge to keep small rich populations
happy and expatriate labor unorganized and isolated (more than 85 percent of
the population of Qatar
and the UAE is foreign labor, for example). The U.S.
will need to choose its issues carefully, especially since a strong public
stance on domestic political reform often triggers local cynicism that the U.S. doesn’t
live by its ideals and that its security is heavily reliant upon dysfunctional
governments or unpopular regimes.
·
Promote cooperative relations between Iraq and its
Gulf neighbors?
For the next 10-15 years Iraqis will need to concentrate on reinventing
themselves, their identity, their political institutions and economic
infrastructure. For that, they will need cooperation from their neighbors in
stabilizing trade and development plans and maintaining secure borders. In the
long-term Iraq
could return to claim its rightful place as leader of the Gulf, and it resume
efforts to acquire WMD. If it does, then Kuwait had better look to its
borders and the GCC to its alliances.
·
Pursue effective deterrence and collective defense options
at the same time? While continued arms
sales to the Gulf are no panacea for countering a nuclear-armed Iran,
two other frequently mentioned alternatives have their own drawbacks. The first
is a regional nuclear-free zone, but neither Israel
nor Iran
seem the least bit interested. The second is to turn the GCC into a regional
defense and security organization which would include Iraq, Yemen,
and, eventually, Iran.
Unfortunately, the GCC would be hard-pressed to become the Persian Gulf or Middle East’s equivalent of OSCE or the EU. Pan-regional
solutions will not work—they are too broad in scope, and too vague in purpose.
o
Alternatively,
the U.S.
in conjunction with our European partners and Asian states dependent on the
region’s energy resources could cooperate in supporting the establishment of a sub-regional
security organization as a venue for threat reduction talks and confidence
building measures. cooperative political, economic and security union and
encouraging Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf states to join it.
o
Similarly,
the U.S. should engage
Europe, non-Gulf Arabs (Egypt)
and Asian powers with influence in the region to address security issues that
are not specifically military. Most states in this region share transnational
problems—terrorism, religious and nationalist extremism, organized crime, arms
smuggling, illegal immigration, environmental pollution, drug and human
trafficking, disease, poverty, lack of water resources, and desertification.
·
Offer the GCC expanded security guarantees and a smaller
military presence? In the face of a nuclear-capable Iran,
or a rearmed Iraq, the Gulf
Arabs are likely to seek expanded U.S. guarantees of enhanced
protection and promises to defend them if a confrontation is imminent. This
could include advanced missile defense systems or coming under the American
nuclear umbrella. They are not likely, however, to support an American policy
of pre-emptive strikes to lessen their Iran
problem or to welcome the presence of a substantial U.S. military force on “bases” or
with access to base facilities. They will not join Iran
in a security arrangement that would preclude a U.S presence in the Gulf,
reflecting in part their understanding that the U.S.
military presence allows them to improve relations with Tehran
now and Baghdad
some day. At the same time, the Gulf regimes are wary of closer ties to the U.S., fearing popular protest to the costs of
the U.S. presence and
dependence on the U.S.
for protection their governments should be able to provide.
Conclusion
The U.S. military is
likely to be present in the Gulf for some time. The desire to reduce the U.S. military footprint and the vulnerability of
forward deployed forces needs to be balanced against the diplomatic and
deterrent value of a visible U.S.
military presence in the Gulf. If
friends and enemies no longer see U.S.
forces and operations, they may conclude that the Gulf governments are once
again vulnerable to intimidation or outright threat and that the U.S. is less
likely to defend its interests and honor its security commitments in the
region. In approaching decisions on the U.S. future
forward presence posture for the Gulf, several political realties need to be
taken into account:
· Iraq and Iran
are not perceived by the GCC states as major and imminent threats to regional
security and most
believe the United
States needs to shape strategies to engage Iraq and Iran positively.
·
Palestine is still important. The
fact or perception of Israeli intransigence as well as divisions within the
Palestinian Authority and U.S. reluctance to take the lead in finding a
solution all shape GCC public attitudes and damage U.S influence in the region
to a significant degree.
· Political change in Iran may come smoothly or violently, but it will
not alter a defense strategy based upon the goal of acquiring a nuclear
capability and is unlikely to lead to
major reversals in Tehran’s
foreign and security policies.