Testimony Before the

U.S. House of Representatives

Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere

Hearing on

The Mérida Initiative:

U.S.-Mexico-Central America Security Cooperation

October 25, 2007

Statement by

Armand B. Peschard-Sverdrup

President & CEO

Peschard-Sverdrup & Associates, LLC

&

Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Peschard-Sverdrup & Associates, LLC

1448 Hague, Dr. S.W., Leesburg, Virginia 20175,

Tel. (703) 963-6139 Email: apeschard@verizon.net

The Mérida Initiative:

U.S.-Mexican-Central American Security Cooperation

Testimony Before the House Foreign Relations Subcommittee

on the Western Hemisphere

October 25, 2007

Armand B. Peschard-Sverdrup[1]

President and CEO, Peschard-Sverdrup & Associates, LLC

Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this Subcommittee today to discuss the Mérida Initiative that was jointly announced by President Bush and President Calderón on Monday, October 22, 2007, and for inviting me to testify before the Subcommittee.

I think that it is important to consider the Mérida Initiative as an initial step toward the deepening of bilateral security cooperation between the United States and Mexico. The cooperation must be based on a much more balanced set of common threats and objectives, as opposed to just a means to advance an agenda that is perceived to be skewed toward addressing only U.S. security concerns.

The initiative is likely to provide opportunities for confidence building between the agencies responsible for law enforcement and security in both the United States and Mexico. After all, overcoming the almost habitual levels of mutual mistrust of law enforcement and security agencies is crucial if the two governments are ever to tactically succeed in going after transnational threats jointly.

Moreover, it is important to realize that any initiative designed by the Bush and Calderón Administrations cannot be overly bold. Neither government has much political maneuverability at home, because both are minority governments that must contend with healthy opposition parties in their respective Congresses.

The Mérida Initiative has to be carefully drafted so as to be acceptable to the U.S. tax payer, and so that Mexicans would not perceive it as an encroachment on Mexico’s sovereignty. To be acceptable to the U.S. public, the initiative—and more important the $1.4 billion funding contemplated for a multi-year period—has to be packaged as money spent on curbing the flow of drugs that enter the United States. This is particularly important when viewed against the backdrop of the billions of dollars being spent in Iraq as well as a complicated political environment with lingering hostility emanating from an immigration debate that is still being played out in many regions throughout the United States, which—rightly or wrongly—many Americans associate with Mexico.

Mexico is in the process of carrying out a series of key measures aimed at professionalizing Mexican law enforcement personnel and organizationally restructuring Mexico’s security apparatus. Because these are tasks that Mexico itself needs to carry out, these measures need to remain completely separate from any type of bilateral or regional initiative. Otherwise, opponents of the Mérida Initiative would be quick to retort that such internal reform measures are indicators that the U.S. government is setting conditions, if not outright dictating what Mexico’s policy should be, in exchange for the support the United States is offering. Although such a reaction would not derail the initiative, it would most definitely up the political price that President Calderón would end up having to pay.

The impact of the Initiative on joint counternarcotics efforts and U.S.-Mexico relations.

It is important that the Mérida Initiative be perceived as a joint bilateral plan to combat transnational organized crime, as opposed to just a counternarcotics measure. Transnational criminal organizations, which operate well within both of our nations and seamlessly across our borders, are involved in a variety of illegal and dangerous activities that threaten the safety, health, well-being, and moral fiber of our respective societies, not to mention the economic prosperity of our cities, states, and even nations—which have to cope with the terrible repercussions of the negative multiplier effects that accompany drug-trafficking, human trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, and even contraband.

I believe that the success of the Merida Initiative—if approved by Congress—should be measured on several levels.

Obviously, the United States expects the initiative to reduce drug trafficking and other criminal activities. Realistically, even if the initiative were to succeed in dismantling the operations of a particular drug-trafficking cartel or several cartels, or result in the apprehension and conceivably even the extradition of an important kingpin or drug lord, or even disrupt the flow of drugs temporarily, there will always be someone within that same criminal organization or a rival cartel eager to make a cold-blooded power play to take over either that part of the organization or the turf that may have been left vacant by the arrest or murder of its previous stakeholder. In short, slowing down and disrupting the flow of drugs and criminal activity may be the best possible outcome, though it would most likely only be a temporary at that.

The initiative gives the United States and Mexico an opportunity to strengthen their security relationship. The implementation of the programs included in the agreement will result in mutual cooperation, information sharing, and coordination between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement and security agencies. This will, in turn, increase the level of trust that will be a significant byproduct of the initiative, aiding in future cooperative efforts.

The Mérida Initiative can assist Mexican law enforcement to combat crime well before it reaches U.S. borders, not to mention U.S. communities. This alone provides U.S. taxpayers a significant return on their investment.

The $500 million of the $1.4 billion being requested over a multi-year period will enable the United States to contribute toward the institutional strengthening of Mexican security forces and will address some of the asymmetries that exist relative to their U.S. counterparts. Ultimately, less than one-third of the $1.4 billion will go to Mexico’s military and naval forces. The bulk of the funding will be earmarked for institutional strengthening of Mexico’s civilian institutions responsible for public and national security: the Office of the Attorney General’s Federal Investigative Agency, the Ministry of Public Security’s Federal Preventive Police Force, the Ministry of Government’s Center for Investigation and National Security and the National Migration Institute, the Ministry of Finance’s Customs Administration, the Ministry of Communications and Transport, and the Ministry of Health. It is worth noting that a good part of the financial support will also go toward the institutional strengthening of Mexico’s new National Federal Police Force.

Of the initial $500 million that President Bush is requesting, 59 percent would be earmarked for civil agencies responsible for law enforcement and security; the remaining 41 percent would go to Mexico’s army and navy. This breakdown is somewhat misleading in terms of the portion going toward the Mexican military and naval forces at the outset. Aside from accounting for expenditures that are being front-loaded within the multi-year span of the initiative, funds are also marked for big-ticket items such as helicopters and airplanes. Furthermore, it should be noted that the army and navy are Mexico’s only security-focused institutions that have a true nationwide deployment capability. Therefore, it is in the interest of Mexico and the United States to continue to strengthen these institutions so that they can confront 21^st-century threats.

In other words, the six brand new Bell 412 helicopters that the military will receive as part of the package will be delivered at the outset, along with a two-year parts and maintenance package. The military needs the six helicopters to complement the four Bell 412s that it currently owns and to enable Mexico to possess a squadron of these helicopters in order to expand their range of operation in patrolling and combating criminal activity. Clearly, this part of the package is significantly different from the previous comparable assistance package, when the Pentagon provided helicopters to Mexico’s army in the 1990s. Back then, the Huey helicopters were given to the Mexican army for free under the Excess Defense Articles program and were therefore given “as is,” with no spare parts or maintenance provided. Although this was a well-intended offering, it has taken the Mexican military many years to recover from the repercussions of having army helicopter clunkers that were rendered inoperable soon after they were provided. Providing new Bell 412s marks the first step in re-establishing a relationship with Mexico’s military.

In addition, the two Casa 245 twin-engine aircraft that the Mexican navy will be acquiring as part of this initiative were manufactured in Spain but contain 51 percent U.S. content. What’s more, because the U.S Coast Guard uses this aircraft, it also offers some interoperability.

In sum, the Mérida Initiative not only will help address the institutional asymmetries that currently exist between the United States and Mexico by strengthening the numerous institutions—civilian and military—that play differing, yet equally vital, roles in targeting and combating these various security threats confronting our nations but also should help both Mexico and the United States combat transnational crime more effectively and jointly when necessary.

How will the package be perceived by the Mexican Congress and the public?

The impact of transnational organized crime does not respect party lines. Both the Institutional Revolutionary Party governors of Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, and Nuevo Leon and the Democratic Revolutionary Party governors of Michoacán, Guerrero, and Baja California, as well as that party’s mayor of Mexico City, are grappling equally with the criminality and violence brought about by the different transnational criminal organizations that operate in Mexico and across the border in the United States. Crime has no borders or political affiliations—it is a matter of great concern to all parties that strive for stability, security, and peace in Mexico. Therefore, with the exception of normal partisan bickering, the Mexican Congress should not only support this initiative but also continue to approve the appropriations that will be needed for strengthening security efforts in Mexico.

Even though the Mérida Initiative does not require specific approval by the Mexican Senate—because bilateral as well as international agreements under which Mexico is a signatory provide the Calderón Administration the legal latitude to commit to such initiatives—it would definitely be politically important for the Mexican Senate and the Chamber of Deputies to support the initiative.

The Mexican Congress should recognize that the Mérida Initiative is consistent with the objectives and strategies outlined in President Calderón’s National Development Plan 2006–2012, which he unveiled shortly after taking office. This is the document that lays out the president’s goals and strategies for his administration during his six-year term in office.

Moreover, the initiative complements and underscores President Calderón’s and the Mexican Congress’ commitment to addressing institutional deficiencies within Mexico’s security apparatus, as evidenced by the 24 percent increase for these agencies in Mexico’s FY 2007 federal budget.

In fact, on average, the Calderón Administration—with the budgetary approval of the Mexican Congress—is projected to spend between $2.4 and $2.5 billion annually on security-oriented expenditures. Assuming no budgetary cutbacks over the remaining five years of President Calderón’s term in office, this expenditure could total between $12 and $12.5 billion.

Ultimately, how the Mérida Initiative is viewed in the Mexican Congress and by the Mexican public at large will largely depend on how the initiative is framed. There will be natural nationalistic knee-jerk reaction that questions whether the initiative is an encroachment on Mexican sovereignty. This response will be accompanied by a natural concern over whether there are any strings attached; conditions set by the United States may be objectionable to certain segments of Mexican society.

The presence of U.S. law enforcement or military officers in-country has always been a point of contention in the relationship between Mexico and the United States. Therefore, it will be important to take these concerns into account when framing the agreement.

Some of the sophisticated technology that is being discussed under this initiative (helicopters, airplanes, database and information system technologies) may require in-country user training, as well as service, maintenance, and technical support. I assume that the Mexican Congress and the Mexican people would find that type of presence acceptable—particularly because it would contribute to the effective use of the technologies from which Mexico is bound to benefit. Furthermore, we should not forget that the cartels and other transnational criminal organizations have sophisticated technologies of their own at their disposal.

However, the Mérida Initiative also calls for specialized training of law enforcement personnel with the intention of helping to further professionalize these institutions. To the extent possible, I would encourage that such training be conducted in the United States, although I understand that it ultimately will be a decision that the Mexican government will make.

It is my understanding that such training will range from prosecutorial-oriented training offered by the U.S. Department of Justice to very specialized training provided by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, when the training pertains to arms trafficking; the FBI, when it pertains to investigative methods; the Department of Homeland Security, when it pertains to immigration and customs issues; and the Drug Enforcement Administration, when it pertains to the manufacture and traffic of illicit controlled substances.

Moreover, we should not discount the possibility that U.S. law enforcement can also gain from the law enforcement experience of Mexican law enforcement officials themselves—particularly given their experience in combating drug traffickers, transnational youth gangs, and contraband.

A deal breaker for the Mexican public would be any initiative that would allow for an out-and-out joint tactical operational effort in Mexico. As the security relationship between our two nations matures and the level of mutual confidence increases, such a joint effort may be something that both nations may feel more comfortable with over time.

The U.S. Congress has a unique opportunity to support the bold leadership that President Calderón has exhibited in just his first 10 months in office and, more importantly, to reinforce the unprecedented level of cooperation between the United States and Mexico that this initiative is based on.

Are there any parts of the package that the U.S. congress should tweak?

Given that I have not yet seen the specific details of the initiative, I find it difficult to determine with any level of confidence whether or not the package includes any parts that the U.S. Congress should tweak.

If anything, we should not lose sight of the fact that strengthening law enforcement will help to enhance Mexico’s competitiveness from the standpoint of increasing the country’s ability to combat crime and therefore make it a more attractive destination for foreign direct investment. It also will strengthen rule of law, which will aid in the further consolidation of Mexican democracy. Both of these factors will contribute to Mexico’s political and economic stability and will, in turn, benefit U.S. interests.

Given that bilateral two-way trade between the United States and Mexico has increased by 408 percent since the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement—from $81.5 billion in 1993 to $332.5 billion in 2006, with most of the goods flowing through the 25 land ports of entry—we should continue to strengthen the operational capability of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency and Mexico’s Customs Administration.

In an attempt to better tackle human trafficking and improve the method of registering people entering and leaving our respective nations, we should make sure that we help strengthen Mexico’s National Migration Institute, particularly its Integral Migratory Operation System (SIOM)as well as its U.S. counterpart, Immigration and Customs Enforcement as well as Citizenship and Immigration Services.

Clearly, during a week that has seen the San Diego-Tijuana region fighting off disastrous wildfires, and Nicaragua trying to stay afloat following devastating flooding, not to mention projected increases in the frequency and intensity of natural disasters, it begs the question of whether disaster relief and emergency response should be subject to consideration. Apart from responding to a real operational need, there are also diplomatic dividends to be had from helping our neighbors.

In sum, if both the United States and Mexico manage the Mérida Initiative effectively, it could conceivably evolve into a framework for subregional security cooperation that could extend to Central America, whose criminal organizations use Mexico both as a destination and a transit point to the United States. Therefore, this region cannot be ignored in discussions of security and ways to combat transnational crime.

The Mérida Initiative is certainly a step in the right direction.

With that comment, Mr. Chairman, I conclude my remarks and welcome the opportunity to answer any questions that you or the Subcommittee members may have.

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[1] Peschard-Sverdrup & Associates and CSIS do not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this testimony should be understood to be solely those of the author.