Opening Statement of Congressman Brad Sherman

Chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade

 “The Six Party Process: Progress and Perils in North Korea’s Denuclearization”

October 25, 2007

I want to thank our distinguished witness, Assistant Secretary Christopher R. Hill for joining us today to provide an update on our efforts towards North Korea’s denuclearization.

The stated goal of the Six Party process is the peaceful and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The importance and urgency of this task has never been greater, and its implications extend far beyond the Peninsula.

Today, we know that the nuclear programs of North Korea, Iran, Libya and now perhaps Syria, share a common thread. In August 2003, the world learned of a vast illegal international nuclear proliferation network led by the Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. Khan sold nuclear equipment and related technologies to Libya, Iran and North Korea. Thankfully, in large part because of a concerted multilateral sanctions regime led by the United States and its allies, Libya saw it in its interest to give up its nuclear program. Unfortunately, the centrifuges in Iran continue to turn to this day due, in part, to the Khan network. We know that North Korea’s uranium enrichment program was aided by the Khan network.

Last month, we learned that Israel conducted an air strike against a facility in northern Syria, which allegedly was connected to a nuclear program. The Washington Post reported yesterday that, based on commercial satellite photos, some experts believe that the destroyed site was similar in design to a North Korean reactor capable of producing nuclear material for bombs. This has fueled speculation of North Korean complicity in the matter.

The lesson from these events is clear: denuclearization of nations such as North Korea and Iran is not limited to those countries alone; it has global consequences. We need to be sure that we are not duped. At the end of the day, North Korea must give up its own nuclear materials and must never be in the business of forward proliferation.

It is in that context that we review the Administration’s strategy known as the Six Party process. Despite the Administration’s efforts over the last seven years, tangible results remain illusive: by all accounts, should it choose to, North Korea is capable of producing more weapons today than in the past. According to David Albright, a renowned expert on North Korea’s nuclear program, the vast majority of North Korea’s separated plutonium—between 80 and 99 percent—was produced since North Korea lifted the freeze on production and reprocessing in 2003. The remainder was separated before 1992.

Nevertheless, the agreement reached this month in Beijing contains the elements of a successful roadmap for a lasting solution to this problem. The agreement exacts commitments on the part of North Korea of a scope not seen in a decade. It may be the best hope we have, but it cannot be allowed to morph into a nuclear Munich.

According to the agreement, North Korea has agreed to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs by the end of this year. North Korea has also agreed to disable all of its existing nuclear facilities. Disablement of Yongbyon’s 5 megawatt Experimental Reactor, Reprocessing Plant, and Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Facility will be completed by December. Appropriately, the United States will lead these activities and provide the initial funding.

Notably absent from those commitments is specific mention of North Korea’s alleged uranium program, which originally triggered this nuclear crisis in 2003. Also absent is reference to existing nuclear weapons or devices in North Korea’s arsenal. Most observers assess that the North so far has reprocessed 40-50 kilograms of plutonium, sufficient for roughly six to eight bombs. Denuclearization must include disarmament of the existing nuclear weapons that continue to pose a threat to the region. If the Yongbyon nuclear complex is allowed to operate as business as usual, North Korea could produce one bomb’s worth of plutonium per year for the next few years.

Pyongyang has also reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how to other nations. Recent events with regard to Syria’s alleged nuclear program illustrate the importance of this. Not only do we have to denuclearize and disarm North Korea of its nuclear weapons, we have to verify that North Korea is not sharing sensitive information with the likes of Iran and Syria.

In return, the United States will provide substantial economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to North Korea. The United States has also agreed to begin the process of normalizing relations with North Korea, including eventual removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

The agreement reached is a milestone and I applaud today’s witness for his efforts at getting us this far. The commitments made by North Korea seem to represent real and positive change. However, the issue of nuclear disarmament of North Korea is not without its history. What were heralded in the past as great achievements turned out to be hidden failures. The weight of that history suggests prudence. It suggests that the United States must remain vigilant in its verification that North Korea fully complies with its commitments.

As we review testimony from today’s witness, we need an explanation of how the Administration intends to monitor North Korea’s commitments. This is all the more important given the IAEA’s marginal involvement in the verification process. Will you have the resources, access and information needed to provide unequivocal confirmation that North Korea is meeting its obligations? For instance, how does the Administration plan to remove or discard 8,000 fuel rods from the reactor? I am told that they just can’t be buried. These fuel rods must first be reprocessed before being safely disposed.

We also need to know how the outstanding issues such as uranium enrichment and North Korea’s existing nuclear arsenal will be handled.

I would also like the witness to comment on the Administration’s plan to remove North Korea’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, to provide additional shipments of fuel and other aid, and other commitments made on the U.S. side of the equation.

Lastly, Congress obviously has a role to play in this process. My colleagues and I remain committed to ensuring rigorous oversight is applied in the months ahead. I welcome your views on what legislative authorities are needed to implement various aspects of the agreement and facilitate its success.

I look forward to hearing from our witness. Thank you.