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Memorandum May 7, 2007

TO: House International Relations Committee/Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight

Attention: Natalie Coburn

FROM: Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

SUBJECT: Statement for May 9, 2007 Hearing: “Economic and Military Support for the U.S. Efforts in Iraq: The Coalition of the Willing, Then and Now.”

I would like to thank the Committee for asking me to appear at this hearing on how the international community has been supporting the U.S. effort to stabilize Iraq. I would ask that the full statement be included in the record.[1]

I have been asked, first and foremost, to analyze how changes in partner contributions of troops and of funds have, over time, affected the U.S. effort to stabilize Iraq, and to try to analyze the reasons for changes to the international effort in Iraq. I will first address international peacekeeping troop contributions. It is clear that the international coalition (non-U.S. component) performing stabilization and peacekeeping missions in Iraq has diminished. The analytical questions, some might argue, are 1) why has the coalition shrunk in both number of contributing countries and overall number of troops contributed?; and 2) what effects, if any, has the shrinkage had on the international peacekeeping mission?

The original invasion force that entered Iraq numbered about 300,000 from some 30 countries.[2] The overwhelming bulk of the force were from two countries: 250,000 were U.S. forces, and about 45,000 were British, and some of the remaining forces were considered by their governments as humanitarian in nature. Of the remaining substantial contingents, there were: 2,000 Australian troops; 900 Spanish soldiers for “health and

humanitarian tasks,” 150 Bulgarian “non-combat” soldiers; chemical decontamination forces from Slovakia; a submarine and a medical team from Denmark; and 200 Polish soldiers and special forces.[3]

In mid-2003, when the “peacekeeping” mission began following President Bush’s May 1, 2003 declaration that major combat operations had been completed, there were 33 other countries contributing a total of about 29,500 forces throughout Iraq. The largest contingent was from Britain, which had about 11,500 forces mostly in southern Iraq, the sector of the battlefield that Britain was assigned to capture during major combat operations. Four years later - as of May 4, 2007 – there are 25 other countries contributing a total of 12,200 troops, according to the State Department’s “Weekly Status Report.” In terms of numbers of international partner forces contributed, that is a decrease of about 60%.

The key question is - how has the reduction in foreign military contributions affected the stabilization mission, if at all? According to one view, the reduction in international contributions reduces international force coverage in parts of Iraq, and presumably increases the burden on U.S. forces to provide peacekeeping strength in those areas. If this view were accurate, we would expect to see more U.S. forces heading into areas that international forces have vacated. Or, we might expect to see an increase in violence in those areas if they are left relatively unprotected by international forces.

The Administration view is quite different: namely, that the reduction of international forces is a sign of progress. According to the Administration, there are fewer international partner forces because areas of Iraq that have been turned over to Iraqi control have become relatively stable and because Iraqi security forces (ISF) are increasingly capable of maintaining security without foreign help in those areas. From this perspective, the ISF is now an increasingly capable “international contributor” to Iraq’s security, and foreign forces are no longer needed in some areas.

There does not appear to be clear and unequivocal support for either view, judging from evolutions in the pattern of violence in Iraq. For example, Najaf province was turned over to Iraqi control in December 2006. The province was turned over because Multi-National Force- Iraq (MNF-I) said it judged the civilian authorities of the province able to manage their own security and governance duties. On January 27, 2007, ISF forces in Najaf discovered a large formation of armed elements, purportedly extremist Shiite gunmen opposed to the government, although their exact motives are still not known. The U.S. view is that the ISF performed admirably for detecting the buildup and then calling for MNF-I back-up, which ultimately helped turn back the challenge. It could be argued, however, that the ISF should have detected a buildup - particularly in a relatively populated area near Najaf - much earlier, and that the challenge became much more serious than it would have if international forces were still present in significant numbers there.

We have not seen a noticeable upsurge in violence in the three other provinces turned over to ISF control since they were handed over - Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and, most recently (April 2007), Maysan. This observation might appear to support the Administration view. However, these cases do not offer clear indications one way or the other because these provinces have been relatively stable ever since the fall of Saddam Hussein. The deployment of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to Samawah, the capital of Muthanna Province, was casualty free and nearly incident free. Dhi Qar, the capital of which is An Nassiriyah, close to the major Al Tallil air base, has similarly seen relatively low levels of violence.

The jury is very much still out on Maysan Province, the latest province to be turned over. There has been no major pattern of consistent violence here in recent months. However, the power of Shiite militias, particularly the Mahdi Army of Moqtada Al Sadr, has been demonstrated in the province. In Maysan, the capital of which is Amarah city, the Mahdi Army has shown the ability to assert itself as coalition partners draw down their forces. As an instructive example, in October 2006, following an altercation with the Badr Brigade militia of the rival Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Mahdi Army virtually took over Amarah for about two days. The city had earlier been vacated by the British military. The ISF was unable to prevent this Mahdi rampage. Two months earlier, the British military evacuated a camp in Amarah, Camp Abu Naji, leaving it under the control of the ISF. The following day, thousands of Iraqis, backed by Mahdi and other militias, overran the ISF left in charge of the base and stripped it bare.

Patterns of Partner Force Deployments. Some might argue that the relative stability of the areas turned over to the ISF reflect the patterns of deployment of partner forces. Specifically, some believe that partner forces were purposely placed in relatively “safe” areas because partner countries did not want their forces serving in restive areas where these forces would expect to take significant casualties. Many have made that argument particularly with respect to South Korea’s troop contingent that has served since 2004 in Irbil, in northern Iraq. Irbil, controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government, is about as safe as it gets in Iraq; there have been virtually no security incidents against Korean forces there. Irbil has not only seen significant investment and reconstruction but now has its own airport capable of handling international flights. Some argue that 1) Korean forces were not needed there to begin with given the security situation there; or 2) that the province is, if anything, more qualified to be turned over to Iraqi control than those provinces that have been turned over in southern Iraq. Yet, about 1,300 South Korea troops remain there, although it is down from a high of 3,600. The conclusion many draw from Irbil is that South Korean forces remain there primarily to demonstrate solidarity with the United States, whose help South Korea needs on North Korea and with which South Korea wants a free trade agreement, rather than to serve any pressing security or reconstruction need in Iraq.

The converse appears to also hold - that the United States has perhaps been reluctant to press its allies to deploy forces in regions where there is consistent and often heavy combat. The five most restive provinces are Baghdad, Anbar, Salahuddin, Diyala, and Nineveh. Yet, there are very few partner troops deployed in any of these provinces, compared to the size of the U.S. combat forces in these areas. There is a 120 troop Albanian contingent in the Mosul area, an area that sees regular combat. There are about 150 Bulgarian troops helping guard the People’s Mojahedin (Iranian opposition) fighters at Camp Ashraf in east Diyala Province, although the camp itself has not been attacked. About 150 forces from Azerbaijan are serving in the highly restive city of Haditha, in Anbar Province. The 850-person contingent from Georgia has served in Baghdad. When the U.S. “troop surge” is fully in place, there will be about 40,000 U.S. forces in the city, with another 40,000 Iraqi forces. Compared to these forces, the Georgian contingent is very small.

Further strengthening those who argue that international coalition partner forces are mainly symbolic is that partner forces are thinly spread, with a few exceptions. Of the 12,200 partner forces in Iraq, well more than half (7,100) are from one contingent - the British - based in Basra. Basra is restive from combat between Shiite militias, but it is not nearly as violent as the Sunni provinces and Baghdad province. Aside from the British forces in the south and the South Korean contingent in Irbil, there are only about 3,800 other partner forces deployed in the entire rest of Iraq. Of these remainder, many are associated with the 900 Polish troops (down from a contribution high of about 2,500 one year ago) deployed in and around Diwaniyah and Hilla. Neither province is fully stable, and Hilla continues to witness Sunni insurgent – possibly Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I) – suicide bombings against Shiite civilians at markets, in ritual processions, funerals, and like gatherings. There were significant clashes between U.S. forces and Mahdi Army militiamen in Diwaniyah on April 8, 2007, a culmination of far less serious clashes over the past several months, but the bulk of the fighting was done by U.S. forces, with limited if any Polish involvement.

The conclusion one could draw is that partner forces are not much of a factor on the actual “battlefield” per se, if one defines the battlefield as combat primarily against Sunni insurgents. The bulk of the actual combat in places such as Ramadi, Fallujah, Baqubah, and parts of Baghdad is conducted by American forces, with ISF generally in a supporting or intelligence gathering role.

Britain and Basra. This is not to argue, however, that partner forces are irrelevant. In 2004 and even well into 2005, there was a strong sense that the Basra-Amarah area policed by Britain was “quiet” and “stable.” Britain was taking few casualties there and appeared to be steadily building ties to local political leaders and factions. However, a dynamic took hold in the Basra area that has proved costly for British forces - about 50 killed since the summer of 2006 and eleven killed in April 2007 alone. The growing violence in Basra reportedly contributed to the British announcement in February 2007 that British forces will start to draw down by about 25% by the summer of 2007. On the other hand, the Administration view, articulated at the time of the British drawdown announcement, is that Britain is drawing down because Basra, even with the new trends in violence, is more stable than most of the areas patrolled by U.S. forces, and no longer in need of as much British help.

Basra is an important case study because it provides indicators of the effects of the thinning out of partner forces in Iraq. To quote Prime Minister Blair when he announced the British drawdown earlier this year, “...the next chapter in Basra’s history can be written by Iraqis.” In Basra, there are very few Sunni Muslims, and therefore very little Sunni-Shiite violence. However, there are a number of intersecting currents that have contributed to substantial violence in the city, and for the upsurge of violence against British forces since 2006, although the number of incidents there are nowhere near what U.S. forces face in Anbar, for example. In the first instance, there has been a scramble for power and money among Shiite factions in the Basra area, perhaps not least of all because Basra is Iraq’s primary oil producing province at this point. Broadly drawn, the competition for influence is between a small party called Fadilah, the Sadr movement, and the mainstream Shiite parties SCIRI (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) and Da’wa. Fadilah and the Sadr trend are usually aligned against SCIRI and Da’wa, but in Basra they are opposed to each other because of this scramble for power and money. In Basra, with power comes the ability to divert oil exports, smuggle them out, and pocket the proceeds. In addition, Fadilah and the Sadr trend compete for the allegiance of the lower class Shiites. In April 2007, the Sadrists conducted protests in Basra to try to persuade the provincial governor, who is a Fadilah member, to resign. Basra is also an area of significant Iranian influence because it is next to Iran, separated only by the narrow Shatt al-Arab waterway, and a key route for Iranian pilgrims to visit the Shiite holy sites in southern Iraq. A similar multi-tiered power struggle is at work in Diwaniyah, the violence in which was discussed above, where SCIRI controls the provincial council and the governorship and is trying to marginalize the Sadr trend.

Effects of Militia Control. The case studies above provide a glimpse of what tends to happen as international forces thin out around Iraq and turn over territory to ISF control. Southern Iraq, including Basra and Amarah, show us how Iraqi social and political life – putting aside militia-inspired violence – develops when militias grow in strength. Some examples of the growing Islamization of Basra and surrounding areas are contained in the State Department’s human rights country report on Iraq for 2006, released on March 6, 2007. According to the report, professors at Basra University who were considered secular received written threats and demands to depart Basra. During 2006, a series of killings targeted professors in Basra (as well as Baghdad). The report also says there were “Serious reports of torture and killings [ ] leveled at [the Ministry of Interior’s] Serious Crime Unit detention facility in Basra....”

Although not limiting its discussion to Basra, the State Department report presents trends in gender discrimination. Several press accounts over the past few years have described trends in Basra similar to those in the State Department report. In particular, the report says that:

in practice conservative societal standards impeded women’s abilities to exercise their rights. Throughout the country, women reported increasing pressure to wear veils. Many reported the presence of flyers in their neighborhoods threatening women who refused. Women were targeted for undertaking normal activities, such as driving a car, talking on a cell phone, and wearing trousers, in an effort to force them to remain at home, wear veils, and adhere to a very conservative interpretation of Islam. In addition to societal pressures, there were several reports of women at government ministries being told to wear a veil or lose their job.

Although the State Department report does not specifically attribute such intimidation to Shiite parties or militias, press reports about Basra have consistently suggested that it is Shiite militiamen, particularly Mahdi Army members, that are conducting the intimidation discussed above. Other reports have said that Mahdi and Badr militiamen have beaten students publicly displaying affection and have attacked sellers of alcohol.

These trends suggest that, although Sunni-Shiite violence might be a relatively minor feature in Basra, human rights and basic freedoms are being eroded there. One might anticipate that these trends will accelerate once British forces, as expected, turn over Basra Province to ISF control later in 2007.

Why Are Coalition Partners Leaving?

The other question that was posed is why the international coalition has diminished. In assessing changes to the peacekeeping coalition, some might consider it instructive to analyze decisions by certain countries to withdraw or reduce their contingents in Iraq.

The foreign contributions began to shrink noticeably in 2004. That process began with Spain’s May 2004 withdrawal of its 1,300 troops. Spain made that decision following the March 11, 2004, Madrid bombings and subsequent defeat of the former Spanish government that had supported the war effort. Several Spanish-speaking countries followed Spain’s lead – Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, withdrawing a total of about 900 personnel. By September 2004, according to the State Department, there were 29 other contributing countries fielding about 25,000 forces in Iraq - a decrease of almost 5,000 forces since mid-2003.

The size of the foreign contingent in Iraq fell further during 2005 as Iraq held a series of elections that produced a full-term government and a permanent constitution. Some governments, particularly Ukraine, maintained that the elections signaled a completion of the political transition process in Iraq and represented an appropriate milestone for the withdrawal of their forces. Ukraine subsequently withdrew its 1,500 forces after the December 2005 elections. The Netherlands withdrew 1,300 of its troops in 2005, virtually its whole contingent. By the end of 2005, the size of the coalition stood at about 20,000 forces from 26 other countries - a decrease of about another 5,000 troops during 2005.

During 2006, several other countries drew down their forces, claiming progress and the ability to turn over control of territory to the growing ISF. However, the reductions were from areas of Iraq that have tended to witness relatively few attacks on a daily basis. For example, as noted earlier, South Korea withdrew 1,000 forces from Irbil in May 2006, and a further drawdown in early 2007 brought its current troop level to about 1,300. In July 2006, Japan completed withdrawal of its 600-person military reconstruction contingent from Samawah, which is in a relatively stable area of southern Iraq. Simultaneously, all of Muthanna province, of which Samawah is the capital, was handed over to ISF control. Italy completed the withdrawal of its 2,000 contingent in December 2006 after turning over Dhi Qar Province to ISF control. By the beginning of 2007, the non-U.S. peacekeeping force had fallen to about 16,000 personnel from 25 countries.

On the other hand, the Georgian contingent is expected to expand to 2,000 by June and move out of Baghdad to help guard the Iran-Iraq border. [4] Although this announcement would appear to contradict assertions that the coalition is leaving Iraq, Georgian leaders made clear when they announced the buildup that Georgia hoped the contribution would boost Georgia’s chances of being accepted for membership in NATO.

Financial Issues[5]

The issue of financial contributions is substantially different from that of the provision of peacekeeping forces, and, to some governments, might represent a substitute for contributing forces. Financial contributions to Iraq reconstruction are far less risky to allied and other governments than is putting troops and other personnel in potential harm’s way. However, an examination of financial pledges to Iraq reconstruction might still assist an analysis of international attitudes toward the U.S. stabilization mission and the Iraqi government there. In the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis, two countries that, for constitutional and other reasons, did not join the U.S.-led coalition to liberate Kuwait, made significant financial contributions to offset U.S. costs to fight that war. Those two countries were Germany and Japan, contributing, respectively, $6.4 billion and $10 billion to the approximately $60 billion incremental costs of the 1991 Persian Gulf war.

The 2003 war differs from the 1991 war because hostilities did not end with the main goal of the operation accomplished - the fall of Saddam Hussein. International peacekeeping and stabilization efforts continue. While Germany has continued to keep its troops out of Iraq, Japan, as noted above, did contribute forces to keep peace in southern Iraq, although their publicly announced mission was reconstruction. In line with their differing approaches and attitudes toward the conflict, Germany has only pledged $10 million to Iraq reconstruction, but Japan has pledged almost $5 billion in both loans and grants. Aside from the United States, Japan is by far the largest contributor to post-Saddam reconstruction, and it has obligated all of the grant money and at least half of the $3.5 billion in loan portions of its pledges.

Middle Eastern States.[6] It is perhaps more instructive to analyze the implementation of financial pledges by states in Iraq’s region. The degree to which Middle Eastern states have or have not fulfilled their aid pledges to Iraq provides indication of their attitudes toward the post-Saddam Iraqi power structure. Many believe that an analysis of regional contributions to Iraq reconstruction is highly significant because the regional states have the most to gain or lose from success or failure in Iraq. It appears that many of these countries are withholding implementation of their financial pledges unless or until the Iraqi government appears more inclusive of the Sunni minority or takes steps these countries are insisting on.

Of perhaps greatest significance are the Persian Gulf monarchy states - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. All are led by Sunni Muslim regimes, although Bahrain’s population is majority Shiite. Kuwait was overrun by Saddam Hussein in 1990 and all of them perceived a major threat from his regime, even though he was a Sunni ruling over a majority Shiite population. With oil prices over $60 per barrel, virtually all - with the exception of Bahrain and Oman which are small oil exporters - are widely judged to have significant available funds to contribute to causes and efforts that they perceive will ensure their national security. Saudi Arabia and the UAE contributed $16.8 billion and $4 billion, respectively, to the 1991 Persian Gulf war effort. Occupied Kuwait, drawing on funds outside Kuwait, contributed $16 billion for its own liberation in 1991. All of the Gulf states, including Kuwait with about 8,000 soldiers that escaped Iraq’s invasion, participated in the 1991 Gulf war as part of the “Joint Arab-Islamic Force.”

In the 2003 war, all of the Gulf states, although shying from publicity, allowed at least some use of their facilities for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).[7] Kuwait closed off its entire northern half to host the entire invasion force for OIF. However, none of the Gulf states – nor any Middle Eastern state - contributed actual forces for OIF or for post-major combat peacekeeping in Iraq. The following is a discussion of Gulf state financial pledges to Iraq reconstruction:

! Saudi Arabia pledged $500 million in loans and a $500 million line of credit for exports to Iraq at the 2003 Madrid conference. The Iraqi Ministry of Planning does not credit Saudi Arabia with providing any funds under the pledge, and Saudi Arabia has not publicly contradicted that assertion.

! Kuwait has pledged a total of about $565 million. Although the Ministry of Planning of Iraq says Kuwait has only fulfilled $10 million of a $16 million grant pledge, press reports and fact sheets distributed by Kuwait’s Embassy in Washington indicate that Kuwait has largely fulfilled the $500 million in “in-kind assistance” pledge, consisting mostly of supplies and provisions channeled through a “humanitarian operation center” (HOC) that Kuwait set up in the pre-2003 invasion period. Some of the assistance total includes a water line that Kuwait built into Iraq. Kuwait also has provided assistance (fuel, water, other supplies) to the Polish-led security sector in Hilla and Diwaniyah and, as is widely known, Kuwait continues to host U.S. forces that rotate into and out of Iraq.[8]

! Of the other Gulf states, the UAE was the largest grant donor, pledging $215 million. Qatar has pledged $100 million, of which $10 million is grant aid and $90 million is to be loans; and Oman $3 million. The Iraqi Ministry of Planning credits Qatar with remitting $5 million of the grant aid. The UAE and Oman reportedly have remitted none of what each pledged. No pledges have been recorded for Bahrain.

The United States has had somewhat more success in obtaining Gulf commitments on debt relief.[9] In mid-April 2007, the United States obtained a provisional agreement from Saudi Arabia to write off 80% of the $18 billion in Saddam-era debt owed to the Kingdom by Iraq, although press reports after the May 3-4, 2007 regional conference on Iraq in Egypt said the Saudi government did not specify a level of Iraq debt relief at that meeting. Kuwait’s government had previously agreed to an 80% write-off of its $15 billion Iraqi debt, but Kuwait’s National Assembly has not ratified that arrangement, suggesting substantial resistance to the idea, and Kuwait did not announce a firm debt relief pledge at the regional conference. Prior to the meeting in Egypt, the United Arab Emirates reportedly pledged to forgive 80% of its $4 billion Iraq debt. Some might argue that the Gulf states have little hope of collecting these funds in light of Iraq’s financial situation, and that the rewards of writing off the debt outweigh the costs of insisting on repayment.

The pattern of Gulf state pledges and fulfillment of their pledges might be explained by their views of how post-Saddam Iraq has evolved. Kuwait was severely shaken by Saddam Hussein’s invasion and occupation, and Kuwaiti leaders were widely viewed as willing to accept virtually any result in Iraq as a replacement for his regime - even the current Shiite-dominated government. Kuwait, therefore, has been more willing than the other Gulf states to help stabilize the post-Saddam government, and Kuwait believes that forging good relations with the Shiite leaders in southern Iraq would ensure that Kuwait’s border with Iraq remains quiet. Kuwait has stopped short of contributing forces, however, largely on the perception that they would not be welcomed by most Iraqis. Several Kuwaiti truck drivers and humanitarian workers have been killed or attacked in southern Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein.

Not only has Saudi Arabia hesitated to contribute funds, but, in April 2007, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE refused to receive Maliki in a visit he made through the region, attempting to build support for Iraq in advance of the regional conference in Egypt during May 3-4, 2007. A recent op-ed by noted scholar Fouad Ajami might explain why Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states have, to date, refused to respond to U.S. urgings that it provide the loans and credits pledged. According to Ajami[10]:

[Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s] first trip beyond Iraq’s borders had been to Saudi Arabia. He had meant that visit as a message that Iraq’s “Arab identity” will trump all other orientations. It had been a message that the Arab world’s Shia stepchildren were ready to come into the fold. But a huge historical contest had erupted in Baghdad, the seat of the Abbasid caliphate had fallen to new Shia inheritors, and the custodians of Arab power were not yet ready for this history.

The converse has been the position of Iran. According to the report of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Iran is on record for a pledge of only $10 million. However, it is widely reported that Iran has extended Iraq a line of credit of about $1 billion. The credit is being used to build roads in the Kurdish north and a new airport near Najaf, a key entry point for Iranian pilgrims visiting the Imam Ali Shrine there. Iran reportedly also provides cooking fuels and 2 million liters per day of kerosene to Iraqis.

Iran’s reasons for its generosity are readily apparent. Iraqi politics are now dominated by pro-Iranian parties that subscribe, to greater or lesser degrees, to the ideology of the founder of Iran’s Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Many of Iraq’s Shiite Islamist elite were in exile from the time of Saddam’s crackdown on the Shiite Islamists in 1980, until his fall in 2003. Some might argue that the current Iraqi political structure gives Iran “strategic depth” in Iraq, and it is in Iran’s interests to maintain that government in power, even if doing so involves substantial financial costs to Iran.

Some other Arab countries could be discussed - in particular, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. However, with the exception of Jordan, none has pledged funds for Iraq reconstruction. All three are inhabited mostly by Sunni Muslims, although Syria’s ruling family, the Alawite clan, is believed to be an offshoot of Shiite Islam. Jordan has pledged $1.5 million in grant aid, according to Iraq’s Ministry of Planning, and it has thus far provided about $75,000.

Although Syria is aligned with Iran regionally and despite its ruling family’s identity, Syria - as far as Iraq policy goes - is “acting” as a Sunni state. Several former Iraqi regime members reportedly took refuge there after the fall of the regime and U.S. officials continue to assert – as recently as April 11, 2007 – that Syria is an entry route for Al Qaeda suicide bombers to enter Iraq. The leaders of both Egypt and Jordan have warned of a developing Shiite “crescent,” to paraphrase their concerns, consisting of Iran, Iraq’s Shiite factions, Syria (more generally), and Lebanese Hezbollah.

Another pertinent state is Turkey, a long time U.S. ally and a member of NATO . It is inhabited by Sunni Muslims, but Turks are ethnically not Arabs. Turkey has pledged $50 million for Iraq, but, according to the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, has expended only about $1.3 million of that. Turkey is wary of the pro-Iranian Shiite parties that dominate Iraq’s government, and believes that Iran is able to extend its political and strategic influence through its close relations with these parties.

Turkey’s primary concern, however, is the disposition of the Kurdish region, particularly the possibility that the Kurdish region might try to become an independent state. Such an action, Turkey fears, could serve as further inspiration for separatism among Turkey’s Kurds, and would further jeopardize Turkey’s efforts to insist that the Iraqi Kurds expel guerrilla fighters from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that are present in some refugee camps in northern Iraq. The three Kurdish inhabited provinces of Iraq - Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah - form a legal “region” in post-Saddam Iraq with its own administration, parliament, and security forces.

Current State of US Coalition Forces

This table was created from information found in both American and international newspapers, U.S. government websites, country embassy websites, etc. Information is the most current available at this time.

Country	Troops	Location	Total Deaths (2003-07)	Status or Issues
Albania	120	Mosul,Nineveh province. Multi-National Brigade North	0	Increased troop level to 120 from 70 in 2005, remained fairly stable since that time. Seeking admittance to NATO in 2008.
Armenia	46	Al-Kut, Wasit province. Multinational Division (MND) Central- South	0	No discussion of withdrawing troops. Serve under Polish command. Troops are non-combat. Approved to stay until end of 2007.