Iraqi
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and President Bush by video-conference. That Declaration was, in turn, based
on an August 26, 2007 communique signed
by five top political leaders in Iraq — Prime Minister Maliki, President of the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Masoud Barzani, President Jalal Talabani,
and Talabani’s two deputy presidents Adel Abd al-Mahdi of the Supreme Council
and Tariq al-Hashimi, the country’s highest ranking Sunni official – calling
for a long term relationship with the United States built on common interests
between Iraq and the United States.
The
strategic framework agreement, if agreed, is intended to replace the
current U.N.-mandate under which U.S. and U.S.-led forces are responsible for
contributing to the security of
Iraq. That mandate was specified
in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 of June 8, 2004.
It was most recently renewed by Resolution 1790 (December 18, 2007),
with the same provisions as previous mandate extensions (interim reviews by
June 15, 2008, and subject to termination if the Iraqi government so
requests). These Resolutions were passed
under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, and the stated U.S. and Iraqi
intention in replacing the U.N. mandate is to restore Iraq to full sovereignty
and end the Iraqi sense of international opprobrium and dishonor that Iraqis
have felt since Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait first placed Iraq under
Chapter 7 U.N. resolutions. The earlier
Resolutions primarily demanded Iraq dismantle its weapons of mass destruction
and imposed international sanctions on Iraq until it complied. Iraqi leaders’ desire to assert full
sovereignty and bring an end to an era of U.N. resolutions on Iraq is
reportedly a key consideration for negotiating the strategic framework
agreement, whether or not any such agreement actually alters the “on-the-ground”
operational scope and flexibility of U.S. forces in Iraq.
Issues for the Strategic Framework
Agreement
Foreign Minister
Hoshyar Zebari – and a wide range of Iraqi leaders – have said the Iraqi
government will submit a draft strategic framework agreement with the United
States for parliamentary approval. It
would be difficult to argue, constitutionally, that such an agreement does not
require Council of Representatives (COR, parliament) approval as defined in the
Iraqi constitution because, as discussed at the previous hearing on this issue,
Article 58 stipulates that the COR must ratify treaties and agreements by a two thirds majority. On the other hand, some observers question
whether the Iraqi government pledges will be implemented, because Iraqi
officials had said they would obtain COR approval for an extension of the U.N.
mandate, and they did not do so. As was
discussed in the Subcommittee’s December hearing on this issue, a majority of
COR deputies had expressed their view, in a letter and a resolution, that the
request to extend the mandate should be submitted to the COR in line with the
Iraqi constitution.
On the U.S. side, Gen. Douglas Lute,
Assistant to the President for Iraq and Afghanistan, said in his November 26
press briefing, cited above, that the Administration would likely
have dialogue with the U.S. congressional leaders on the framework
agreement, but that any agreement would not likely rise to the level of formal
treaty that would require Senate ratification.
I will leave it to other witnesses at this hearing to address that
question.
In the aggregate, the November 26
“Declaration of Principles” sketches out a broad and long term U.S.-Iraq pact
that spans not only security issues but includes economic and political,
diplomatic, and cultural relations.
I will now address the issues that
are likely to be negotiated in the strategic framework agreement.
Security
Issues. The judgment that the proposed pact will
likely be “long term” is based, at least in part, on the provisions in the
Declaration of Principles pertaining to security. The Declaration states that the United States
will provide “security assurances and commitments to [Iraq] to deter foreign
aggression against Iraq that violates its sovereignty and integrity of its
territories, waters, or airspace.” The
Declaration goes further to potentially include United States support for the
Iraqi government against internal threats, and the Declaration appears, in many
ways, to adopt the Maliki government’s definition of internal threats. According to the Declaration, the Iraqi
government is combating “terrorist groups, at the forefront of which is Al
Qaeda, Saddamists, and all other outlaw groups.” If a pact is negotiated in line with the
Declaration, U.S. forces could conceivably be committed to combat any armed
faction that the Maliki government defines as a threat to its security, without
regard to why that armed group is fighting, and whether or not the Maliki
government has made best efforts to address the sources and causes of the armed
opposition.
Among the most significant
implications is the potential for Iraq and the United States to differ on their
assessments of external threats to Iraq, and for Iraq to therefore assume U.S. support in a dispute or even an armed
conflict with countries that are now U.S. allies. Iraq’s Kurdish leaders could try to assert,
for example, that the United States, under the pact, is committed to confront
Turkey over its military actions against Kurdish rebel guerrillas (Kurdistan
Workers’ Party, PKK) who have a degree of safehaven in northern Iraq, which is
controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Iraq’s Shiite leaders could assert that the
United States should act against Sunni Arab governments that are widely
reported to be providing funds, arms, and transit assistance to Sunni
insurgents and the foreign fighters helping these insurgents. Some of the cited governments, including
Saudi Arabia and Jordan, are close allies of the United States. Syria, which is said to be allowing foreign
fighters to enter Iraq, although with some reduction identified by U.S.
commanders in recent months, is not an ally of the United States. However,
the United States is trying, to some extent, to modify Syria’s behavior
without direct confrontation and to coax Syria out of its broader alliance with
Iran. There is also the potential for
the current Iraqi government, widely considered to be dominated by pro-Iranian
Shiite Islamist parties, to try to minimize the extent to which Iran is
contributing funds and weaponry to violent extremist groups in Iraq, so as to
prevent U.S. action against this Iranian interference.
I have not studied various defense
arrangements that the United States has with other countries around the world,
but I have had extensive discussions with U.S. officials in the Persian Gulf
region and Persian Gulf officials about the defense pacts the United States has
signed with several of those governments, including Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE,
Qatar, and Oman. The texts of these
pacts are classified, but, according to these officials, the pacts reportedly do have some provisions for
discussing how the United States might assist those governments in a security
crisis. However, no one claims that
these pacts give the United States any role in assisting incumbent governments
in fending off internal challenges. The
pacts mostly provide for “status of forces,” (see below), U.S. arms sales, training
of the Gulf militaries, access to Gulf military facilities, and prepositioning
of U.S. military equipment in the Gulf states.
The defense pacts with the Gulf
states will likely need to be extended to support any long-term U.S. presence
in Iraq. It is under the U.S. defense pact
with Kuwait that U.S. troops enter and exit Iraq through Kuwait, which has
facilities for training and repairing and storing U.S. military equipment (Camp
Arifjan). Air bases in Qatar and UAE are
used by U.S. forces to fly support missions in Iraq.
Another indication that a proposed
pact with Iraq will likely entail a “long-term” commitment is the assessment of
Iraq’s current Defense Minister, Abd al-Qadir al-Ubaydi. On a visit to Washington D.C. last week, he
told journalists that Iraq will not be able to take full responsibility for its
internal security until 2012, and will not be able to defend against external
threats until 2018 - 2020. He previously told the “Independent
Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq” (the so-called “Jones Commission,”
named after Gen. James Jones who led the September 2007 study) that Iraq would
be ready to secure itself from external
threats by 2018, at the earliest.
The steady but slow progress being made in training and equipping the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) – along with ISF self-sufficiency time-frames
roughly similar to those outlined by Ubaydi – were discussed by the U.S.
commander of the ISF “train and equip” program, Lt. Gen. James Dubik, in
testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on January 17, 2008. Ubaydi’s visit to Washington last week was reportedly to begin the
preliminary process of negotiating the bilateral pact; negotiations are to
begin in earnest in February 2008.
In addressing security issues, the
Declaration mentions two specific missions for U.S. forces that would be in
Iraq under the proposed pact: (1) supporting the combating of the groups
discussed above, including by destroying their logistical networks, and sources
of finance; and (2) supporting Iraq through training, equipping, and arming of
the ISF and completing the building of the ISF administrative systems.
In performance of these functions,
press accounts and comments by Gen. Lute, referenced above, the following
issues would likely be addressed in the negotiations:
! Overall
U.S. Mission. According to General
Douglas Lute, Assistant to the President
for Iraq and Afghanistan, in his press briefing on November 26, 2007, the “size
and shape” of any long-term U.S. presence would be part of the negotiations on
a strategic framework agreement. He
denied that any agreement would specify time lines or goals for the withdrawal
of U.S. troops from Iraq. However, the
Declaration’s stipulation of the “anti-terrorism” and ISF training and
equipping missions will likely color how many troops would remain in Iraq under
the pact. Not stated in the Declaration,
but certainly at issue, is the need for U.S. forces to protect the forces
performing these other missions, and to protect other U.S. facilities such as
the U.S. Embassy. It is difficult to
say precisely how many U.S. forces might be required to perform these missions
over the long-term, and much depends on intangible and hard-to-predict factors
such as the attitudes of the Sunni population toward Al Qaeda-Iraq, and how
committed and enthusiastic the ISF are in taking on threats to the Iraqi
government. I don’t think anyone would
want to be too definitive on numbers.
However, in conversations with experts on these issues around town, the
common thinking seems to be that a range of about 50,000 - 100,000 U.S. forces,
with some experts centered around a figure of
70,000 U.S. forces, would be required for these missions.
! Scope
of Authority. The freedom of action
for U.S. military forces in Iraq, including rules of engagement and status of
prisoners taken, will likely be among the most sensitive issues in the
negotiations. Under the current U.N.
mandate, U.S. forces have broad scope of authority and freedom of action,
including the power to arrest and detain Iraqis perceived as threatening Iraq’s
security, and to hold them without charge.
A key issue in negotiations on the strategic framework agreement will
undoubtedly be not only this issue but, perhaps more importantly, the degree to
which U.S. forces in Iraq must coordinate with or obtain Iraqi approval for
specific combat operations. Some Iraqi
observers say that the Iraqi side is likely to try to demand, for example,
limits on the U.S. ability to employ airstrikes, potentially including the
types of aircraft the United States could station in Iraq. U.S. commanders will undoubtedly argue for
the maximum flexibility for U.S. forces in any bilateral pact, in order not to
have their hands tied when they come under threat.
! Legal
Status of Forces. A bilateral
defense pact with Iraq will apparently include a Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA). The most significant provisions
of any SOFA are civil and criminal jurisdiction over the facilities where U.S.
personnel will be based, as well as over U.S. personnel, including security
contractors. The agreement might also
address issues such as entry to or exit from Iraq, tax liabilities, postal
services, or employment terms for Iraqi nationals working for the U.S.
military. Currently, U.S. military
personnel, as well as contractors, are immune from Iraqi law under the U.N.
mandate and a separate CPA order (Order 17) issued on June 27, 2004, one day
before the handover of sovereignty. P.L. 109-289 (FY2007 DoD appropriations)
contains a provision that the Defense Department not agree to allow U.S. forces
in Iraq to be subject to Iraqi law.
However, a draft law now pending before Iraq’s Council of
Representatives would end that immunity for contractors; the law was drafted
because of the controversy surrounding the September 2007 incident at Nisoor
Square in Baghdad involving the Blackwater USA security company, in which 17
Iraqi civilians died.
! Permanent
Basing. The facilities used by U.S.
forces in Iraq do not, by most assessments, formally constitute “permanent
bases.” Some of these facilities conceivably could be made permanent U.S. bases
if there were a U.S.-Iraqi agreement to do so.
In his November 26, 2007 briefing, Gen. Lute said that the negotiations
on a 2008 bilateral agreement would discuss the issue of permanent bases,
although he did not give an indication of a likely outcome on that issue. If there is a decision to seek permanent
basing, the major facilities that might be considered are such well-developed facilities as Balad,
Tallil, and Al Asad air bases, as well as the arms depot at Taji; all have been
built up with U.S. military construction funds in various appropriations.
! Some comments by Iraqi officials suggest that
permanent bases might not be included in a long term agreement. On December 12, 2007, Iraqi National
Security Adviser Mowaffaq al-Rubai said in a press interview in UAE that
“permanent forces or bases for any foreign forces is a red line that cannot be
accepted by any nationalist Iraq.” In addition, some U.S. law might constrain
U.S. options on the permanent bases issue.
The Defense Appropriation for FY2007 (P.L. 109-289); the FY2007
supplemental appropriation, (P.L. 110-28); and the FY2008 Defense Appropriation
(P.L. 110-116), and the conference report on a FY2008 defense authorization
(H.R. 1585), contain provisions prohibiting the establishment or the use of
U.S. funds to establish permanent military installations or bases in Iraq. These provisions comport with Recommendation
22 of the December 2006 “Iraq Study Group” report, which recommends that the
President should state that the United States does not seek permanent military
bases in Iraq.
! Allies. The Declaration does not specifically provide
for how these issues would apply to U.S. coalition partners, if at all. However, several observers believe that the
United States is likely to seek help from willing foreign partners to fulfill
long-term security commitments to Iraq and that negotiations would likely have
to have provisions made for allied force contributions in Iraq.
Political,
Diplomatic, and Cultural Issues. Part one of the Declaration stipulates a
range of political and related issues that might be included in any U.S.-Iraq
pact. Of the seven points, most appear
to commit the United States to relatively normal diplomatic and political
activity that the United States might undertake even with countries with which
there is no strategic pact. For
example, point four of the political section of the Declaration commits the
United States to supporting Iraq’s effort to “enhance its position in regional
and international organizations...”
Point seven commits the United States to encourage cultural,
educational, and scientific exchanges with Iraq.
At least two points in the political
section of the Declaration raise broader questions about the degree of
potential long-term U.S. involvement in the internal political affairs and
structure of Iraq. Point one in that section
stipulates that a U.S.-Iraq pact might commit the United States to supporting
Iraq “in defending its democratic system against internal and external
threats.” That stipulation, if included
in an eventual pact, could have major implications if political upheaval leads
to the downfall of the elected Iraqi government. Some experts believe that there is a
significant possibility of such an outcome, even if it is not widely believed
the most likely scenario, based on current information. If the elected government were to be forced
out by violence, this stipulation could conceivably be interpreted to
require the United States to intervene
to restore the elected government or to oust a government, even a stable
government, that came to power through un-democratic means.
Point two of the political section
similarly raises questions about the potential to draw U.S. forces into
internal events in Iraq. It states that
the United States would assist Iraq in “standing against any attempt to impede,
suspend, or violate” Iraq’s constitution.
While the legalities could be complicated, some might argue that this
stipulation would allow the Iraqi government the right and responsibility to
define who is attempting to impede, suspend, or violate Iraq’s constitution,
and could therefore compel the United States to act against activists in Iraq
whose activities or political ideology might not necessarily conflict with U.S. interests.
Economic
Issues. The Economic section of the Declaration of
Principles has a number of provisions that some believe would imply or entail a
substantial U.S. financial and political commitment to Iraq. For example, point three of that section of
the Declaration commits the United States to “[Support] the building of Iraq’s
economic institutions and infrastructure with the provision of financial and
technical assistance to train and develop competencies and capacities of vital
Iraqi institutions.” Would this
mean a continued high level of State
Department, USAID, and contractor involvement in assisting Iraq’s
ministries?
This section’s point five commits the
United States to encourage foreign investment, particularly U.S. investment,
into Iraq. Iraq still has not enacted
national hydrocarbon laws that would spell out the terms for foreign investment
in the key energy sector. Some might
argue that this point represents a U.S. effort to “tilt the playing field”
toward U.S. firms in competitions for energy development and other deals, and
implies that the United States might increase its involvement in efforts to
shape these laws. On the other hand,
some might argue that it is appropriate for the United States to try to
facilitate investment by U.S. and U.S. allied firms and to impede investment by
potentially negative Iraqi partners such as Iran.
Most of the other points in the
Economics section appear to involve mostly U.S. diplomatic support, for example
to help Iraq obtain debt forgiveness and forgiveness of the compensation
payments mandated by U.N. resolutions following the 1991 war to liberate
Kuwait, and to support Iraq’s efforts to obtain trade preferences and accession
to the World Trade Organization. Point
six also commits the United States to assist Iraq in recovering cultural
artifacts, properties, and funds spirited out of Iraq just prior to or after
the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Iraqi Views of the Proposed Strategic
Framework Agreement
The complexities of any U.S.-Iraq
pact forged along the lines of the Declaration of Principles would likely
expose and possibly widen all the splits that now exist in the Iraqi political
structure. Iraqi politics are certain
to color the amount of flexibility the Iraqi side has during the negotiations. The Iraqi side of the debate over the pact
may well pit those favoring a strong
central government against those who support “federalism” – or strong powers
for sectarian or ethnically-based regions.
The “battle lines” of the debate are, in many ways, the same as those
that characterize ongoing debates over new national hydrocarbons laws and over
a major bloc of amendments to the
constitution. In addition, the
negotiations on a strategic framework agreement
– and provisions addressing some key issues such as permanent basing –
could harden the positions of those, inside and outside Iraq, who believe the
United States always intended a long-term occupation of Iraq as part of its
effort to control Iraq’s natural resources.
Generally, Sunni Arabs in the COR,
like most Sunnis in Iraq, support a strong central government. Sunni regions have few known major oil or
gas deposits and will be dependent indefinitely on the distribution of Iraq’s
oil revenues by a central government. The
Sunnis in the COR consist mainly of the Consensus Front bloc (44 seats) and the
National Dialogue Front (11 seats).
They sought parliamentary review of the U.N. mandate renewal; they are
likely to insist on strict conditions governing the U.S. presence in any
strategic framework agreement. Some
Sunnis outside the COR, including the hardline Muslim Scholars Association
(MSA), whose members have been widely accused of ties to the Sunni insurgency,
denounced the extension of the current U.N. mandate and will likely oppose any
U.S.-Iraqi bilateral agreement as providing license for the United States to
continue anti-Sunni insurgent operations virtually indefinitely. Many Sunnis, both within and outside the
COR, have viewed U.S. forces as an instrument wielded by the Shiite-dominated
government and will want to limit U.S. freedom of action, such as the ability
to take prisoners.
On the other hand, there is a growing
body of Sunni leaders outside the COR that
might look more favorably on an
agreement that gives wide latitude to U.S. forces. These Sunnis are associated with the various
“Awakening Movements,” led mostly by tribal leaders, that began in Al Anbar
Province in 2006 and have now spread to other Sunni provinces. These Sunnis are united by opposition to
AQ-I and other extreme insurgent movements that have committed abuses against
other Sunni Iraqi citizens. These
movements have produced about 70,000 Sunni recruits, some of whom are former
insurgents, that are now working as with U.S. forces as “Concerned Local
Citizens” (CLC) to expel AQ-I from their neighborhoods. These Sunnis view U.S. forces as limiting the
excesses of the Shiite-dominated government and the ISF, which many Sunnis
distrust. However, because these Sunnis
are not widely represented in the COR, their role in any review of a strategic
framework agreement will likely be limited.
Two important Shiite blocs have sided
with the nationalist Sunnis on issues concerning the mandate for U.S.
forces –
the faction of Moqtad al-Sadr (30 seats in the COR), and another party
called the Fadilah (Virtue) Party (15 seats).
Both broke with the UIA bloc in 2007, and both generally represent
poorer Shiites, although they themselves are in competition in Basra and other
cities in southern Iraq. The Sadr
faction led the efforts in 2007 to insist that the Maliki government submit the
U.N. mandate extension request for COR approval. Many experts
attribute the Sadr faction’s views to its advocacy of Iraqi nationalism. Many Sadr supporters see U.S. troops in Iraq
as occupiers rather than liberators. In
the view of many Sadr supporters, any SOFA that allowed U.S. forces to remain
essentially under U.S. law, and permitted extensive facilities housing U.S.
forces would constitute an unacceptable infringement on Iraqi sovereignty. Part of the premise of the Sadr faction’s
insistence on a timetable for a U.S. withdrawal – and likely opposition to a
long term U.S. presence – is its ongoing battle with U.S. forces in Baghdad and
elsewhere, as noted above. Sadr’s
“Mahdi Army” militia (Jaysh al-Mahdi, JAM) is perhaps the largest Shiite
militia, with as many as 60,000 fighters throughout Iraq. Sadr might calculate that a U.S. withdrawal
from Iraq – or at least a limited mandate to conduct operations against the JAM
– would benefit Sadr politically in his competition against other Shiite
factions. Fadilah is politically strong
in oil-rich Basra Province because many of the security forces (Facilities
Protection Service) that protect the oil infrastructure are purportedly loyal
to Fadilah. The governor of Basra Province,
Mohammad Waili, is a Fadilah member and successfully has resisted efforts by
Maliki and Maliki allies to replace him.
The purported fears of many Fadilah supporters are that an extensive,
long term U.S. presence would help Maliki and its other Shiite allies - mainly
the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) - to gain full and undisputed
control of Iraq’s oil infrastructure and revenues.
The bloc of former Prime Minister
Iyad al-Allawi opposed the unilateral
governmental mandate renewal but, by contrast to some of the other blocs, is
not anti-U.S. or anti-U.S. presence. The
bloc has 25 seats in the COR. Allawi is considered a staunch opponent of Maliki
and he has, by many accounts, been campaigning to organize a vote of no
confidence against Maliki. Allawi has
tended to support the United States; the opposition of his bloc to the mandate
renewal might reflect Allawi’s efforts to obstruct Maliki on virtually any
issue where Allawi can do so. The bloc
pulled out of the cabinet in August
2007, joining the Consensus Front which pulled its ministers out in June 2007
and the Sadr bloc, which pulled out of the cabinet in April 2007. On similar grounds, Allawi’s bloc is likely
to oppose the U.S.-Iraq pact as an expression of a U.S. commitment to keep
Maliki’s government in power.
On the other side of the political
equation in the COR are the blocs that support the Maliki government. These blocs – including Maliki’s Da’wa
Party, ISCI, Shiite independents within the UIA bloc (the bloc now has about 83
seats, down from 128 before the Sadr and Fadilah defections) and the two main
Kurdish factions – the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) – supported the governmental request to extend the U.N.
mandate and are likely to support extensive concessions to the United States in
any long-term bilateral agreement. Most
of these blocs tend to support the concept of federalism, primarily because
they consider themselves politically and financially stronger in their regions
than as part of a central government. At
the same time, together, these blocs are dominant in the central government,
and any agreement that keeps U.S. troops in Iraq helps preserve their grip on
power. These blocs are not as
concerned with the perception that a bilateral agreement, with the limitations
likely to be insisted on by the Iraqi government, would erode Iraq’s sense of
sovereignty and national pride.
On the other hand, there are some
divisions among these blocs that could emerge in the strategic framework
agreement negotiations and on other issues.
ISCI supports a large Shiite region in southern Iraq, whereas the Da’wa
Party opposes that concept. In addition,
ISCI has a militia, the Badr Brigades, that has burrowed into the ISF,
particularly the National Police and other police forces. A bilateral agreement with the United
States could therefore benefit ISCI more so than Da’wa, since the U.S. forces
would, under such agreement, remain in Iraq to train the ISF and thereby
strengthen ISCI. The Da’wa Party does
not have a militia force. It should be
noted that it is not the stated intent of U.S. policy to benefit any one
political faction in the effort to build up the national security forces.
The Kurds already exercise control
of their own legal region consisting of
Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah Provinces.
They are the most supportive of the United States of all the sects and
ethnicities in Iraq. The Kurds, like
many Shiites, see U.S. forces as having liberated them from Saddam Hussein’s
tyranny. All available data indicate
that the Kurds do not see U.S. troops in
Iraq as occupiers, whereas many Shiites, who tend to identify with oppressed
Palestinians and with mostly Shiite Iran, which is at odds with the United
States, have come to see the United States as occupiers. However, the Kurds view Turkey as an
external threat because of Turkish military action against the PKK inside Iraq,
and they could potentially accuse the United States of violating a U.S.-Iraq
pact if the United States continues, as has been acknowledged by U.S.
officials, to provide intelligence to Turkey on PKK activities within
Iraq. The United States is providing
that assistance to Turkey in an effort to forestall more dramatic Turkish
action such as a large scale ground incursion into northern Iraq.
