Saudi Arabia and the Proposed Arms Sale

F. Gregory Gause, III

Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Middle East Studies Program

University of Vermont

Testimony before House Committee on Foreign Affairs

September 18, 2007

The desire of the government of Saudi Arabia to purchase billions of dollars in advanced weaponry from the United States is driven by two factors: 1) the Saudi perception of the threats facing it in its regional environment, specifically the growth of Iranian power in recent years; and 2) internal Saudi political and bureaucratic dynamics, with the Defense Ministry looking to get its share (if not more) of the oil windfall accruing to the Saudi government over the last few years.

Despite the huge dollar amount of the proposed sale, it is unlikely to have much effect on the security situation in the region. Saudi Arabia is most unlikely to use its forces outside its borders. It has never done so on its own in the history of the modern Saudi state. While a Saudi arms build-up might increase its deterrent strength against Iran, the likelihood of a direct Iranian military attack on Saudi Arabia is very low, with or without the new arms. It is also unlikely that this arms sale will spark a regional arms race. Egypt and Israel are receiving large arms deals from the United States already. Iran initiated its nuclear program years ago, driven by perceived threats that have nothing to do with the level of Saudi armament. While Iran might try to increase its own conventional capabilities in response to the Saudi arms deal, it will be constrained by its own budgetary limitations. The real effect of the arms deal will be to reassure the Saudi leadership about the American commitment to its security and stability. That reassurance might give Washington the leverage it needs to dissuade Riyadh from contemplating its own acquisition of nuclear weapons should Iran succeed in a nuclear breakout.

This background paper will treat four issues related to the proposed arms sale to Saudi Arabia: 1) the Saudi Arabian view of the regional security situation, 2) internal drivers of Saudi Arabian politics, 3) the current state of the Saudi-American relationship, and 4) possible regional effects of the arms sale itself.

Saudi Arabia and the Middle East Regional Security Situation

The Saudi government views the regional landscape essentially through a classic balance of power lens. It is preoccupied now with the growth of Iranian regional power, reflected in the expansion of Iranian influence in Iraq, Lebanon (through Hizballah) and among Palestinians (through Hamas). It is also concerned about the Iranian nuclear program. However, it has only been in the past 12 months or so that Riyadh has begun to take concerted action to block what it sees as Iranian influence in the Arab world. Before then, the Saudi leadership seemed somewhat paralyzed on the regional front, particularly on Iraq. It was caught in a difficult place. It was very reluctant to back the Maliki government (or the Jaafari government before that), because it saw them as extensions of Iran. However, it was leery about the Sunni insurgency for two reasons: 1) the al-Qaeda influence in it; and 2) it was killing Americans in Iraq, and backing it would create problems in the Saudi-American relationship. As long as the U.S. was in Iraq, the worst outcome for Riyadh – an Iraq completely dominated by Teheran – would be avoided without the Saudis doing very much.

It appears that the debate over the Iraq Study Group report in the U.S., in late 2006, galvanized a more active Saudi policy. The Saudis were clearly worried that the ISG report might lead to an American withdrawal from Iraq, leaving the field open for the Iranians. High level Saudi officials urged Washington to avoid doing anything precipitously, while hinting that the kingdom might have to intervene directly in Iraqi politics if the U.S. left. Even though the ISG report did not lead to withdrawal, it seems that the debate around it convinced Riyadh that, eventually, the U.S. would be leaving Iraq. It was then that Saudi diplomacy became more activist. On Iraq itself, one sign of that activism was King Abdallah’s declaration at the Arab summit in March 2007 that the foreign presence in Iraq is “illegitimate.” This can be seen as the entry price to dealing with Sunni groups in Iraq, which have consistently opposed the American presence in the country (even while some of those groups are now making tactical alliances with our forces there). While there is no evidence in public sources about Saudi government ties to Sunni tribes and groups, one can draw an interesting connection between the signs of Saudi activism in Iraq from late 2006 and the beginnings of the turn among many Sunni groups and tribes against al-Qaeda in Iraq’s influence. There is more circumstantial evidence of active Saudi support for efforts by opponents of Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, led by former Prime Minister Allawi, to form an alternative parliamentary coalition to oust Maliki from office.

The new Saudi activism on Iraq is paralleled by the Saudi initiative in February 2007 to try to bring Hamas and Fatah together in a coalition government in the Palestinian territories. While that initiative was a failure, it was inspired by Saudi fears that the split between the two Palestinian parties would drive Hamas further into the Iranian camp. Saudi support for the Lebanese government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, in the face of pressure from Hizballah and Syria, predates this spate of new diplomatic activism, but it is driven by the same factor. Hizballah is Iran’s closest ally in Lebanese politics; Syria is the Arab state with the closest relationship with Iran. Blocking an increase in their influence in Lebanon is part of the Saudi strategy to limit Iran’s reach in the region.

The Saudi effort to contain and, if possible, roll back Iranian influence in the Arab world is being pursued subtly. Riyadh does not seek a direct confrontation with Teheran. King Abdallah has received a number of high-ranking Iranian officials, including President Ahmadinejad, during 2007. The Saudis have publicly acknowledged that they are consulting with Iran about a solution to the Lebanese political stand-off. The King even received a delegation of Hizballah leaders in early 2007. The Saudis fear the consequences of an open confrontation with Iran. They lived through that during the 1980’s, with Ayatallah Khomeini castigating them as “un-Islamic” puppets of the United States and Iran supporting Shi’a opposition groups throughout the Gulf. They did not like it then and would prefer to avoid it now. They know that, in any direct American-Iranian confrontation, Iranian responses would most likely be directed at U.S. allies in the Gulf. They seek to block Iran’s efforts to expand its influence in the Arab world more indirectly, but that is their goal.

There has been much speculation that Saudi policy is driven more by sectarian than balance of power concerns – that the Saudis are looking to contain Shi’a influence, not Iranian influence. It is admittedly difficult to separate the issues. Iran tends to extend its influence in the Arab world through relations with Shi’a groups (though not exclusively – Hamas). With Iraqi politics now defined in sectarian terms, “blocking Iran” means “blocking Iran’s Shi’a Iraqi allies” by supporting Sunni Arab and more secular Iraqi groups. There have been a number of very high-profile Saudi clerics and salafi activists who have explicitly framed the Iraq issue as a sectarian fight, calling for Sunnis to rally to support their co-religionists and condemning the Shi’a as non-Muslims. However, the balance of the evidence indicates that the Saudi leadership is animated more by the fear of Iranian power than by sectarian animus against the Shi’a. I come to that conclusion based on two major factors.

First, the Saudi government itself has not played the sectarian card in the recent crises. On the contrary, Saudi writers who normally reflect elite opinion in the kingdom have gone out of their way to emphasize that it is Iranian power, not “Shi’a power,” that is of concern. The Saudis sponsored a meeting in Mecca in October 2006 in which Sunni and Shi’a clerics from Iraq issued a statement condemning sectarian violence. King Abdallah himself told an interviewer in January 2007 that he thought Sunni-Shi’a tensions were “a matter of concern, not a matter of danger,” and that if handled correctly those tensions would not become dangerous. When asked in the same interview about allegations of Shi’a efforts to convert Sunnis in Arab countries, the King said that such efforts would fail, but quickly changed the subject to the support the kingdom gives to conferences aimed at bridging Sunni-Shi’a differences.

Second, the Saudi government has been on a minor, but in the Saudi context significant, charm offensive toward its own Shi’a minority for a number of years. The Saudi Shi’a leader Hassan al-Safar was very publicly invited to participate in the King’s “National Dialogue” initiative which began in 2003, and was photographed with Abdallah at the first meeting of the Dialogue. Municipal council elections in 2005 allowed Saudi Shi’a to elect representatives for the first time in decades to help manage their cities (though the elected members comprise only half of the members of these councils, and the councils themselves do not have much power). Perhaps most importantly from a symbolic standpoint, Saudi Shi’a for the past three years have been able to commemorate the Shi’a feast of Ashura publicly. Such public commemorations had been banned for decades, and are particularly offensive to hard-line salafis from the Wahhabi tradition. While Saudi Shi’a certainly feel the effects of rising sectarian tensions, I did not hear in my conversations with a number of Shi’a leaders during a visit to the Shi’a city of Qatif in early January 2007 that they felt that the Saudi government was reversing its tentative policies of outreach to their community. If Riyadh were viewing the rise of Iranian regional power primarily through a sectarian lens, the first place that it would react would be against its own Shi’a population, as it has done in the past.

That being said, the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the other Sunni Arab states worried about Iranian power are willing to play to the baser instincts of their own constituencies in allowing anti-Shia rhetoric to develop. The Saudi government could have cracked down on the salafi activists who issued anti-Shi’a statements in late 2006 and early 2007, but did not, at least in any public way. From our own experience in the U.S., we know that mobilizing public support for a foreign policy based on cold, realist, balance of power considerations is a tough sell. It would be an even harder sell for these Arab leaders, whose populations basically like the idea of Iran developing a nuclear program and cheered Hizballah in its confrontation with Israel in the summer of 2006. The Saudi leaders cannot sell the policy on the basis of balancing Iran, so they sell it (or allow it to be sold) on a sectarian basis. The danger in this kind of cynical manipulation is that sectarian tensions might escape the control of these governments. In the Saudi case, the escalation of sectarian tensions could both complicate, if not reverse, King Abdallah’s efforts to reach out to the Saudi Shi’a minority and make it more difficult for Riyadh to pursue a nuanced policy toward Iran and the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi government. Playing with the sectarian issue is playing with fire. The Saudi government clearly believes that it can keep the fire under control. Whether it can remains to be seen.

There has also been speculation that the Saudi focus on containing Iranian influence might lead to a new willingness to deal with Israel. It is true that nothing brings countries together like a common enemy. It seems that a high-ranking Saudi official (speculation centers on Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the former ambassador to the U.S. and current national security adviser) met with a senior Israeli official (speculated to be Prime Minister Olmert) to discuss common interests in 2006. We should not, however, expect too much movement on this issue from the Saudi side. The Saudis feel constrained by their own public opinion, which remains decidedly anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian. The Saudi government is not a democracy and frequently acts against its public opinion, but only when it sees some immediate benefit. In the case of the Arab-Israeli peace process, the Saudis would demand up-front guarantees that their engagement with Israel would lead almost immediately to a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza before they would take the significant step of publicly engaging the Israeli government in any serious way. Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faysal’s recent statements about Saudi conditions to attend the U.S.-proposed peace meeting confirm this view. The Saudis will not stand in the way of others in the Arab world dealing with Israel. They got the Arab League summit in March 2007 to reiterate its support for King Abdallah’s earlier offer to recognize Israel in exchange for Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders. For Riyadh, this diplomatic gambit, a number of steps behind where Israeli and Palestinian negotiators actually were in 2000, is going out on a limb. It is wishful thinking to believe that the Saudis will take the lead on this issue.

Saudi Domestic Politics

In past debates over proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia, one of the major concerns has been the stability of the Saudi government. Since the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, there has always been the fear that sophisticated American weaponry sold to a friendly regime could end up in the hands of people who wish us ill. Given current indicators, however, there is no reason to fear that the Saudi regime will fall any time soon. It is awash in oil money. For a regime built on a sophisticated and wide-spread system of patronage, both through formal channels of government and through more informal, personal relationships, high oil prices make life much easier. The Saudi security forces have wrested the initiative away from their most serious domestic opponents, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (QAP). In 2003 and 2004, QAP was able to launch a number of high-profile attacks throughout the kingdom. Since that time, the Saudi security forces have, for the most part, been the ones taking the initiative: killing or capturing QAP leaders, attacking QAP hide-outs and weapons stores, making pre-emptive arrests. QAP elements are still active in the country and can mount attacks. But they have not been able to mobilize large sectors of the Saudi public to their cause. They are a security threat, but they are not a threat to overthrow the regime.

While King Abdallah and his brothers are old, succession in the near term will not destabilize the system. Prince Sultan, the crown prince, will definitely follow Abdallah to the throne, if he outlives the king. There are other brothers available to follow Sultan, most prominently Prince Salman, the governor of Riyadh, who just turned 70 and seems to be in good health. Succession could be an important and difficult issue for the Al Saud when it comes time to transfer rule from the sons who have governed since the death of the founding king, Abd al-Aziz (Ibn Saud) in 1953, to the next generation, the grandsons of the founder. But that generational transfer will not happen for some time.

While the Saudi regime is stable and the oil money continues to flow in, it faces important domestic challenges which are of great concern to the United States. The foremost of these is the continuing appeal of radical jihadist ideas among the Saudi population. Since September 11, 2001, and more urgently since the QAP campaign against the regime began at home in May 2003, the Saudi government and the official clergy have preached (literally and figuratively) against extremism. They have condemned Usama bin Laden and his ideology. Saudi-funded international Muslim organizations have propounded interpretations of jihad that are almost parallel to Christian just war theories. The Saudi state has undertaken an extensive campaign to re-educate those among its citizens who have been arrested for involvement in radical activities. The official clergy has publicly discouraged Saudis from going to Iraq to fight. The Saudi media has condemned and ridiculed the radicals and given large amounts of airtime and print space to those who have recanted such views.

And yet, Saudis make up one of the largest, if not the largest, contingent of foreign fighters in Iraq. QAP continues to be able to recruit sympathizers in the country. Just this year, in April and then in August, Saudi police made two series of arrests against suspected QAP cells. In each case over 100 people were arrested. No less a figure than the Saudi Interior Minister, Prince Nayif, the chief policeman in the country, upbraided Saudi religious scholars in May 2007 over their laxity in combating extremist ideas. The same forces that produced Usama bin Laden and 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers continue to be at work in Saudi Arabia, despite government efforts to extirpate them in recent years.

It is difficult in a few years to delegitimate intellectual trends that date back decades. The celebration of jihad in the Saudi Islamic context dates back to the Saudi (and American) supported jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union in the 1980’s. This celebration of jihad was encouraged by the government in the 1980’s. During the 1990’s, rather than confront it at home, the Saudi rulers turned a blind eye to it. They confronted those among their citizens who challenged their own rule (including bin Laden), but did not take on the larger issue of radicalism itself. This violent and activist jihadi ideological current, combined with the bedrock intolerance and narrowness of Wahhabi Islam, are important sources (though not the only sources) of what became al-Qaeda and the radical salafi jihadist movement. While the government and the official clergy have now taken on the task that they chose to avoid in the 1990’s, it is clear that the salafi jihadist strain is embedded in elements of Saudi society.

While the Saudi government now campaigns against this interpretation of Islam and brutally suppresses those of its citizens who challenge the regime on the basis of this interpretation, it treads much more lightly around those Saudi religious scholars who, while not openly opposing the government, encourage intolerant and radical interpretations of Islam. A number of prominent Saudi religious activists in December 2006 called on Sunnis to go to Iraq to support their co-religionists and condemned Shi’a Muslims in the most derogatory terms. Two prominent Saudi religious scholars issued similar judgments in the following weeks. The government took no public steps against any of these figures. The religious establishment, in both its official and more independent elements, remains an extremely important supporter of and constituency for the Saudi leadership. That leadership will not act against them unless the men of religion directly challenge the Al Saud’s political prerogatives.

This balancing act, which allows extremist ideas and groups to fester, is clear on the issue of terrorist financing. The Saudi government has, since 9/11, adopted a number of policies urged upon it by the U.S. government to better control the activities of Muslim charities in the kingdom. Fundraising activities which were permitted, if not encouraged, in the 1980’s and 1990’s (such as soliciting donations in mosques and setting up cash boxes for donations outside of mosques) are now forbidden. American officials have regularly praised the steps Riyadh has taken on the terrorist financing front. Yet Saudi citizens remain, according to American officials, a major source of funding for Sunni extremist groups, whether in Iraq or elsewhere. While the Saudi government has enacted much new legislation to monitor and stem such financial transactions, it has not publicly prosecuted any of its citizens for terrorist financing.

Finally, on the domestic political scene, it has to be noted that the very modest political reform steps taken in the 2002-2005 period have come to a halt. A number of important petitions were circulated among Saudi reform activists, one even received by Abdallah himself, then. Saudis were permitted to test the limits of political speech in newspapers and other media. That more open political atmosphere has been curtailed. The municipal councils, half of whose members were elected directly by the Saudi (male) electorate in 2005, have not assumed an important role in the country’s politics. While the political atmosphere is not as circumscribed as it was in past decades, the promise of continued political liberalization which seemed to be in the air in the first half of this decade has not been borne out.

Saudi-American Relations

The very fact that this large American arms sale to Saudi Arabia has been proposed is evidence that the bilateral relationship has weathered the crisis of 9/11. The Saudi leadership still sees the United States as its most important ally and its ultimate security guarantor in a dangerous region. Washington still values the relationship with the Saudis, for oil and security reasons. The founding basis of the relationship six decades ago – shared interests on oil and security issues – remains in place. With Iraq in shambles and Iran actively hostile to the U.S., Saudi Arabia is the only major Gulf state which is a stable American partner. On the big strategic questions of the Middle East today, the United States and Saudi Arabia are on the same page to a greater extent than at almost any time in their relationship. They both worry about increasing Iranian regional influence and the Iranian nuclear program. They both see the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a suppurating wound that needs to be healed. They both worry about the spill-over effect of Iraqi violence. They share an opposition to al-Qaeda and its regional affiliates.

Despite this general agreement, however, there are tensions between the two states on how to achieve these goals. Those tensions are such that King Abdallah chose to forego an opportunity to visit the U.S. earlier this year. Washington and Riyadh have very different tactical approaches on a number of issues:

-Iran: As mentioned above, Riyadh would not support a policy of direct

confrontation with Iran. It seeks to contain and roll-back Iranian influence in the Arab world through a subtle combination of opposition and engagement. It does not want to be on the front lines of an American-Iranian military exchange. As long as the United States continues its current path of using diplomatic pressure, multilateral and U.N. sanctions and indirect military threats to push Iran away from the nuclear path, it will have Saudi support. However, if the Bush Administration decides that diplomacy has run its course and more direct action is needed against Iran, the Saudis will get off the train.

-Iraq: While Saudi Arabia attended the Sharm al-Shaykh summit on Iraq in May 2007, agreed to forgive the bulk of Iraqi debts incurred under the Saddam Hussein regime to it and recently said it would re-open its embassy in Baghdad, it has made clear that it opposes the Maliki government, which it sees as an extension of Iranian influence in Iraq. King Abdallah very publicly refused to receive Maliki on the latter’s regional trip preceding the Sharm al-Shaykh summit. It has supported efforts by opponents of Maliki (including Iyad Allawi, various Sunni political factions and Maliki’s Shi’a opponents) to form a political front to challenge the government’s parliamentary majority. Saudi support for Sunni Arab groups, if such support in fact is developing, dovetails nicely with the current American strategy of partnering with Sunni tribes and groups opposed to al-Qaeda. However, that convergence might not last if those Sunni groups end up turning their guns against the Maliki government.

-Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Washington and Riyadh have very different visions of how to approach the issue. The Bush Administration seeks to isolate Hamas diplomatically and choke off the economy in Gaza over which Hamas now presides. Meanwhile, it hopes to encourage both economic growth and political progress in the Fatah-controlled West Bank, showing Palestinians in both locales that their best choice is to abandon Hamas and support Mahmoud Abbas. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is pushing for a renewal of Fatah-Hamas dialogue and a return to the Mecca Agreement on power sharing which the Saudis brokered earlier in the year. The Saudi thinking revolves around their desire to limit Iranian influence among Palestinians. They see an isolated Hamas turning more toward Teheran, and want to use their influence to bring Hamas back into an Arab-supported, unified Palestinian front. These tactical differences will become more prominent as the Bush Administration seeks to put together a successful peace conference this fall, particularly as Washington sees the Saudis playing a major role at the conference.

-Oil: With oil prices edging toward $80 per barrel and the 2008 American presidential primary season fast approaching, the issue of Saudi Arabia’s role in the world oil market will once again become prominent in American politics. While the Saudis took the lead at the most recent OPEC meeting in urging an increase in production, they were also the leaders of the effort in 2006 to cut production by 1 million barrels per day. It seems clear that, while Saudi Arabia does not want prices to go over $80 per barrel, it is very comfortable with prices around $70 per barrel. Whether Washington shares that comfort level for the long term remains to be seen.

It must also be noted that public opinion in both countries is not particularly supportive of the close bilateral relationship. In the United States, the strong public opinion reaction against Saudi Arabia immediately after 9/11 has dissipated somewhat, but that does not mean that there is strong public support for the relationship. Rather, the vast majority of Americans have gone back to not particularly caring about Saudi Arabia. However, the public sense of mistrust about Saudi Arabia that 9/11 created can be easily revived if another major crisis in the relationship occurs. On the Saudi side, public opinion polling shows disturbingly large majorities holding negative views of the United States and its policies in the region. The Saudi-American relationship has always operated most smoothly at the elite level. The Saudi government is not a democracy. While its foreign policy is affected by its public opinion, it is not dictated by it. Nevertheless, the lack of public support on both sides for the relationship remains a troubling background issue.

The Arms Deal Itself

There are two primary drivers on the Saudi side of this arms deal. The first is simple security. We should not be surprised that leaders of states in conflict-ridden areas want to have modern and well-equipped militaries, even if those militaries have very poor track records of actually doing anything. The Saudi leadership undoubtedly thinks that the arms deal will contribute to deterrence of possible attacks and signal possible opponents (Iran now, but perhaps others down the road) that the country has friends internationally which will support it. The Saudis are not acting all that unusually in the context of international politics in high-conflict areas.

The second driver is Saudi bureaucratic politics. Without questioning the sincerity of the leaders of the Saudi defense establishment in their desire to defend their country, they are also players in a domestic political game in which money brings power and influence. During the low-oil-price years of the 1990’s, the Defense Ministry had to live without any major new arms deals. Given the huge oil windfall of the past years, it was inevitable that the Defense Ministry would want a big chunk of it. The only way to justify such large budget allocations is major military purchases. The Defense Ministry is not relying on Washington alone to provide it with the goods. It has already announced a major arms deal with Great Britain for fighter aircraft, a follow-up on the huge al-Yamamah-BAE deal signed in the mid-1980’s. There is no doubt that other countries stand ready to sell Riyadh whatever it will pay for. Again, we should not be shocked that bureaucratic politics and even personal gain play a role in weapons procurement decisions in Saudi Arabia. It is the rare country where those factors are absent in such decisions.

So the Saudi desire for big-ticket arms deals is understandable. However, it is hard to imagine that this arms deal will significantly change the security situation in the Persian Gulf or Middle Eastern regions much at all. The Saudis have never used their army outside of their borders in the modern era, except in much larger coalitions (the Gulf War of 1991, a very small number of Saudi forces participating in some of the Arab-Israeli wars). The hints that Saudi forces may enter Iraq to try to affect events there, dropped in late 2006, are most likely bluff. It is hard to imagine what Saudi units would do once they got into Iraq. Riyadh will more likely try to influence Iraqi politics using the tools that it has been successful with in the past: money and diplomacy. While the arms deal, it could be argued, will increase Saudi deterrence against an Iranian attack, the likelihood of a full-out Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia is very low. It might increase the Saudi ability to meet an Iranian air attack on Saudi facilities (perhaps in retaliation for an American strike on Iran), but only after quite a bit of time for the Saudis to integrate the new weapons into their forces. The Iranians are more likely to try to pressure the Saudis through the instruments they have used in the past: support for Shi’a opposition in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states and propaganda.

The argument that this arms deal will lead to an arms race in the region does not hold much water. The United States is already going to supply Israel and Egypt with massive new arms packages. Maybe that is an arms race, but it is one that we are managing. Syria can hardly keep up technologically in such a race. It has no superpower patron and cannot afford to buy sophisticated armaments on its own. Iran was already developing the potential for a nuclear weapons program long before this arms deal was announced. It is driven in that pursuit by threats and past experiences which have nothing to do with Saudi Arabia. Teheran’s decisions on nuclear questions will be determined by factors other than the amount of conventional arms the United States sells to Riyadh. The Iranian leadership has already pointed to the arms sale as a justification for its own military programs, but this is more propaganda than causality.

Some critics of the arms deal raise the legitimate point that, by linking Saudi Arabia ever closer to the United States, this transaction actually increases the risk of domestic opposition to the Saudi monarchy. People who make this argument point to both the example of the Shah of Iran, whose ties to the United States contributed to his unpopularity, and to Usama bin Laden’s indictment of the Saudi regime for hosting American forces. These are important points, but exaggerate the impact of this particular arms sale. The analogy to the Shah is apt, in that the Saudi regime is closely tied to the United States and this is not a popular thing among many in Saudi Arabia. However, the Saudi regime’s link to the U.S. is decades old (like the Shah’s was), and not dependent on any particular arms deal. It is hard to imagine that, if this arms sale was not concluded, the regime’s opponents would think any better of it or that they would believe that the Saudi regime’s reliance on the United States was diminished. Will bin Laden’s criticism of the regime end if this arms sale does not go through? I doubt it. If the U.S. wants to distance itself from Riyadh, it will have to do much more than take back one arms deal. If we think we can maintain a close relationship with the Saudi government but shield it from the public opinion consequences of that relationship just by holding back one arms sale, we are fooling ourselves. It is hard to see how this one arms sale, as large as it is, would be the tipping point for popular discontent against a regime that has bought lots of American arms in the past and weathered a number of regional and domestic crises.

If this arms sale involved the stationing of American combat units in Saudi Arabia, as was the case between 1990 and 2003, then it could become the kind of lightening rod around which popular opposition could coalesce. We saw that occur in the 1990’s. However, my understanding of the deal is that it will involve American trainers and technicians being in Saudi Arabia, not whole units of combat forces. This has been the case in Saudi Arabia for decades, since the first American military deals with Saudi Arabia in the late 1940’s. Those training missions did not excite the kind of domestic opposition that the presence of the American air wing in the country during the 1990’s did. While any high-profile American military presence in Saudi Arabia could excite domestic opposition, it does not seem that the training missions that would accompany these arms would be that obtrusive.

So this arms deal would have neither many positive aspects from a regional security perspective nor many negative repercussions for American interests in Saudi Arabia or the region more generally. Aside from simple economic interest, to secure sales for American companies that would otherwise go elsewhere, is there any reason to support the deal? There might be one, but it is speculative and long-term. The arms sale would reassure the Saudi elite of continued American support, in the face of growing Iranian power and with the prospect of an American withdrawal, sometime down the line, from Iraq. Such reassurance could be an important lever of influence with the Saudi regime if, someday, Iran does acquire a nuclear capability. In the face of an Iranian nuclear breakout, the Saudi regime would be faced with two choices: a) rely on American promises of support in exchange for not trying to match the Iranians by getting their own nuclear forces, or b) try to acquire an off-the-shelf nuclear capability from an existing nuclear power. If the Saudis are confident in the American commitment, they would be more receptive to American pressure not to proliferate themselves. If they are not confident in the American commitment to their security, they would be more likely to try to go nuclear themselves.