July 25, 2007
BACKSLIDING IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE
Testimony prepared for The Honorable Tom Lantos,
Chairman, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, by Charles Gati, Senior
Adjunct Professor, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns
Hopkins University, Washington, DC.
I.
Of the 29
ex-Communist countries in the former Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia, and Eastern Europe, ten have navigated well the difficult
passages of transition since the collapse of communism. These “leaders” are all
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE): Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania in the Baltics; Poland, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, and Slovenia in Central Europe; and Romania and Bulgaria
in southeastern Europe. They have done well compared
to such “laggards” as Croatia
or Russia and especially
well compared to such “losers” in the transition as Kazakhstan
or Turkmenistan. Today, the Central European Ten are all
members of both NATO and the European Union; they all hold free, periodic
elections (and those who lose invariably step aside); and, with a few
exceptions, their economies, sparked by private capital, both domestic and
foreign, have been growing far faster than those of their Western neighbors in
the European Union. Indeed, the changes
made are so substantial that the basic achievements of pluralism and the free
market are not going to be reversed. The Central European Ten will avoid the
abyss of Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian Russia
and muddle through, while such energetic countries as Slovenia and Estonia will continue to progress
and catch up with their western neighbors in the European Union in the next
decade or so.
II.
For the
first time since the early 1990s, even the Central European Ten face growing and
serious resistance to new and necessary political and economic reforms.
·
In Poland, the new Polish government
led by twin brothers Lech Kaczynski, the president, and Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the
prime minister, concentrates less on deepening democratic reforms than on discrediting
its opponents. Elected in late 2005, the government has shown immense hostility
toward all political forces that have guided Poland’s
politics since 1989 and suspicion toward important parts of the outside world,
notably Russia and Germany.
·
In the Czech Republic,
the atmosphere of hopeful optimism under President Vaclav Havel has given way
to a political standoff that has prevented the rise of a workable parliamentary
majority and more generally to skepticism toward politics, an attitude exemplified
by the policies and personality of President Vaclav Klaus.
·
In Slovakia,
in June 2006 a coalition of three parties, of which two display the mentality
of political authoritarianism, replaced Mikulas Dzurinda’s government which had
engineered Slovakia’s
economic miracle in the previous few years. What happened, as the Financial Times noted, was “a popular backlash against… Dzurinda’s
sweeping free-market reforms that [had] turned Slovakia from international pariah
into a country championed by foreign investors.”
·
In Hungary, the main right-wing opposition
party, FIDESZ, having lost two consecutive elections, tried to seize power in
the fall of 2006 via a series of demonstrations, some violent, some peaceful,
while the country’s socialist-led government resorted to the use of excessive
force to protect its authority. Meanwhile, undue spending before the 2006
elections (which also entailed lying about economic conditions) seriously
damaged the economy that was once the region’s top performer. Probably in order
to repair the damage, Hungary
has sought to improve commercial ties with Russia, a process that could open
the way not only to increased trade but to Russian investments even in strategic
areas such as energy, electric works, and telecommunications.
Central Europe is thus experiencing a winter of
discontent. Having joined NATO and the European Union,
too, Bulgaria and especially
Romania can ignore Brussels’ advice without
fearing a strong reaction. Elsewhere, populist or demagogic parties keep gaining
adherents while other parties often feel compelled to compete with their empty
rhetoric. Bluntly put, the region that
the United States has held up as a model for democracy – arguably the only
region where democracy has taken root since the collapse of communism -- is
drifting away from the ambitious goals it set in 1989 and in the years that
followed. Most disturbingly, Poland
– now as always the barometer of change in Central and Eastern
Europe – appears bent to undo such major aspects of its post-Communist
transformation as the compromises made by Solidarity-led anti-Communists in
1989 with the country’s Communist authorities. Freedom House -- in its 2007
study Nations in Transit, which,
issued every year, includes a so-called “Democracy Score” -- has downgraded Poland from its
No. 1 position in 1999 to being No. 8 in 2007.
III.
In
Poland
and elsewhere, four disturbing regional trends are in evidence:
·
First is a renewed, polarizing, at times
vitriolic, and ultimately destabilizing campaign, particularly intense in Poland, against
political opponents, notably ex-Communists and their liberal allies.
For the past 20
months or so, the Kaczynski twins have unleashed a crusade against the “uklad”
or “the arrangement.” Better understood as a conspiracy, “uklad” refers to a
corrupt coalition of Communists and ex-Communists, businessmen, secular
liberals, survivors or remnants of the old secret police, and Russians who have
undermined Poland’s
moral authority and values. It is this coalition, real or imagined, that the
Polish government seeks to expose and destroy.
The
popular appeal of exposing “uklad” stems, in part, from the traditional place conspiracies have long had in the
region’s political cultures; for some, conspiracies still offer easy answers to
difficult dilemmas about why things are not better than they are. More
immediately, and perhaps more importantly, there is an almost universal and
fully understandable revulsion in Poland (and elsewhere) against
corruption, which has seriously damaged the reputation of both the economic and
the political elites. Riding on the wave of widespread public indignation, the
Kaczynski twins, who are not known to have engaged in shady practices, have
made the fight against corruption the centerpiece of their administration.
Yet, after almost
two years in power, no major arrests or convictions have taken place. The most
celebrated “success” so far has been the dissolution of the Polish military
intelligence service earlier this year, a process directed by a certain Antoni
Macierewicz, a close friend of the Kaczynskis and a particularly agitated
far-right radical. The problem with his case was not only weak evidence – some
of those he accused of collaborating with the Communists were children or
teenagers in 1989 -- but Macierewicz’s own curious past that in his youth
included admiration for Che Guevara and in the 1990s opposition to Poland’s
membership in the European Union. Moreover, he has been a leading light on
Radio Maryja, known for its promotion of right-wing conspiracy theories and
anti-Semitic innuendos. Someone with a more consistent past might have
credibly pursued such a purge; after all, the basic idea of exposing economic
and political corruption was fully justified and urgently needed.
There is an inner
circle around the Kaczynski brothers who believe not only that the 1989
roundtable that set Poland on a peaceful rather than a violent path of
transition was wrong and thus what Poland has experienced is an unfinished
revolution; they also appear to believe that a permanent revolution is now
needed to undo the damage.
This is why the composition of the Polish government keeps changing. Few are
trusted; almost everyone is suspect. During its less than 20 months in power, the
government initially ruled as a minority government; then it made a deal with a
demagogic left-wing party (Self-Defense) and a demagogic right-wing party
(League of Polish Families); then it excluded the leftists but soon returned
them to the coalition; and then, in mid-July of this year, as this statement is
drafted, the leftists left again but could still return to assure the Kaczynskis’
parliamentary majority. Some may argue,
of course, that this is “Italian politics on the Vistula”; others may conclude,
however, that, given Poland’s
relatively fragile democratic culture, the Kaczynski brothers’ stubborn
intolerance may damage the quality of Polish political life.
Meanwhile, the
government has had no fewer than five finance ministers, two foreign ministers,
two defense ministers, and even two prime ministers. The country’s diplomatic
service has been decimated. The personnel of the Office of National
Remembrance, where many of the old files are, have been purged. The constant
flux of leading personalities is as harmful as it is mystifying. Are the
Kaczynski brothers, who concentrate so much power in their own hands, crusading
radicals or are they only inexperienced or incompetent? The polls appear to
suggest radicalism rather than inexperience as the primary reason for their
political performance. The majority of the Polish people – some 70 percent –
believe that the random opening of old Communist files is meant to distract
attention from other issues facing their country.
True
or not, the ongoing, desperate search for culprits (or scapegoats) has produced
deep divisions in the region’s politics, turning even family members against
one another. In an atmosphere of “if you’re not with us you’re against us,”
these polarized polities feature sharp categories of good vs. evil, which harms
such critical elements of democratic political life as tolerance and civility
and thus the ability to compromise.
·
The second
trend that has become increasingly evident in recent months and years is the
region’s leadership deficit.
The comparison
with the 1990s is especially clear. In the Czech Republic,
there was Vaclav Havel then. In Poland,
there was Lech Walesa, Tadeusz Mazowieczki,
and Bronislaw Geremek. In Hungary, there
was Jozsef Antall and Arpad Goncz. In the Baltics, such dedicated men and women
as Lithuania’s Valdas Adamkus, Latvia’s
Vaira Vike-Freiberga, and Estonia’s
Lennart Meri paved the way to their countries’ integration into Euro-Atlantic
institutions. While they did not share the same political philosophy -- some
were conservative and some liberal, some religious and some secular, some
fervently nationalist and some strongly integrationist -- they all worked hard to ally their countries
with the United States and Western Europe, and they showed a good deal of
tolerance toward political opponents.
By contrast, such principled
and visionary leaders articulating national needs, interests, and aspirations
are now in short supply. Many, perhaps most, of those in prominent positions
today are pragmatic politicians seemingly interested in gaining and holding
power only. They are not necessarily worse than their counterparts in Western Europe or elsewhere in the world; it is only
that, given their predecessors’ reputation and commitment to cause, their
negative qualities are now more evident.
As for the reasons
for the region’s leadership deficit, they are hard to identify. It may be that,
having achieved membership in NATO and the European Union, it is more difficult
now to pursue high-minded and ambitious goals. More likely, demagogic leaders find
it politically advantageous to seek and obtain support from large minorities –
in some cases, majorities – that have not benefited sufficiently from the
post-1989 changes: these are the “losers” who see themselves as victims of
still another political and economic order that has failed to meet their needs.
Of course, such people and groups tend to favor politicians who offer easy
solutions. This is why Robert Fico rather than Mikulas Dzurinda is Slovakia’s
prime minister. This is why even Vaclav Havel has lost his appeal to most of
his countrymen.
In today’s Central
and Eastern Europe, the era of leaders asking
for blood, sweat, and tears is over -- and aspiring politicians know it.
·
The third
trend is popular resistance to the next round of economic reforms.
In retrospect, the
extraordinary economic transformation achieved in the 1990s, which included
privatization and currency stabilization, among others, was easy going compared
to what several of the region’s governments are now attempting to do or should
be doing: i.e., privatize parts of health care and higher education so as to
rationalize these services and limit government subsidization. The problem is
that people who are used to “free” health care and “free” education oppose the introduction
of such reforms. They are nostalgic for the meager benefits of the welfare
state, preferring to listen to the siren song of populist politicians who
promise a better life without additional taxes or fees and without pain. This
is true even if populist politicians, such as Slovakia’s Robert Fico, may not –
once in power – reverse their predecessors’ policies. The political axiom often
prevails: where you sit is where you stand.
Bluntly put: After more than 15 years of
reforms and experimentation, capitalism itself is not doing so well in Central
and Eastern Europe. True, there is no alternative to the free
market; it is, indeed, the worst economic system except for all the others that
are worse.. But, to repeat, too many people have yet to benefit
economically from the new order. Shortages are gone -- but who can afford all
the expensive items displayed in elegant stores? Walking the beautiful downtown areas of Prague or Budapest, it is
easy to believe that all is well, but
there is a huge, and growing, gap throughout the region between city and
countryside. This gap is one of the sources of social tension and polarization,
for the region’s dominant political parties have yet to find the proper balance
between offering incentives to the entrepreneurial middle class and at the same
time offering a meaningful social contract to wage-earners and the unemployed,
too. To win elections, the region’s political parties must appeal to the
energetic, city-based middle class eager to favor public policies that create
new opportunities. Yet the same political parties must also appeal to the
entirely different mindset of the rural population interested in greater social
spending and a vague return to traditional values. Alas, more often than not these
interests and visions are incompatible.
Finally, there is
a growing gap in some of the countries the Central European Ten between rich
and poor that is an important source of pervasive skepticism about the merits
of capitalism. According to a European Union survey of all of Europe, the gap
between incomes of the top 20 percent of the population and the bottom 20
percent is greatest in Portugal
-- but Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania are not far behind. (Such
wealthy but more egalitarian countries as Germany
and France
are far behind.) The Polish income ratio between the rich and
the poor is more than 40 percent higher than in the average European Union
member state. For a striking
comparison, Poland can be said to be 100 percent more
unequal than Sweden and 60
percent more unequal than Germany. The paradox that has come to prevail today is therefore this: Large
segments of the region’s populations know that pre-1989 “socialism” did not
work, and they know it could not be resurrected anyway, but in their dislike
for income differentiation under capitalism they favor populist politicians mouthing
egalitarian rhetoric.
IV.
·
The fourth
trend is the ongoing radical transformation of Central and Eastern
Europe’s international environment.
The historical
comparison is striking: In 1989 and throughout the 1990s all of the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe turned to Washington
for guidance. They understood and appreciated the significance and benefits of
the Atlantic Alliance. They all sought to join NATO, in part because it was a
Western alliance and membership signified their return to “the West.” They also
wanted to join NATO in order to protect themselves against a possible revival
of Russian ambitions. For these reasons and more, the United States (as NATO’s
leading power) was, for all of Central and Eastern Europe, the country of hope,
the assurance that the single most important goal of their 1989 peaceful
revolutions -- independence – would be
achieved and defended. Put another way, the United
States, having won the cold war against the much-despised
Soviet Union, could do no wrong at that time.
It is only a slight exaggeration to suggest that when American diplomats made a
request to a Central or Eastern European government in the 1990s, they did not
have to ask twice.
The European Union
also generated a good deal of interest in the 1990s. The hope that these former
Communist countries could soon “return
to Europe” after decades of enforced subservience to the Soviet
Union was both widely and deeply held. If the US role was to protect the region’s
independence, the European Union’s role was to help move Central and Eastern Europe from the continent’s economic periphery to
its center -- and prosperity would
follow. The slow pace of the admission process disappointed some, but by the
end of the decade there was hope once again of membership in this exclusive
European club.
Russia, for all practical purposes, was not a
player in Central and Eastern Europe in the
1990s. It mourned the loss of its “external empire” as it focused,
unsuccessfully, on protecting its real or imagined interests in the “internal
empire” in the former Soviet Union itself.
Beyond a few gestures under President Boris Yeltsin, Russia had little or nothing to
offer to its former Warsaw Pact satellites. It was even too poor to buy
Bulgarian tomatoes or Hungarian salami… An occasional news item about mischief by Russian
secret services, notably in the Baltic states with large Russian ethnic
populations or in Poland, reminded the world of Moscow’s old ways, but Russia
had neither economic nor political means by which to influence in any
significant fashion the course of events in Central and Eastern Europe.
In 2007, the
region’s international environment is different.
Despite dramatically
declining public support for US
policies in the Middle East and elsewhere, the Central European Ten still favor
close relations with the United
States. Of the ten, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, and to a lesser extent Romania and the Czech
Republic have governments that
continue to seek and value American protection against a revived Russia under
President Vladimir Putin. To some extent the other four – Slovakia, Hungary,
Slovenia, and Bulgaria -- also cooperate with Washington on such issues as fighting
terrorism (and, earlier, even on Iraq), drug interdiction, etc., but in these countries there is far less
interest in maintaining strong ties with the US. A new generation there, and
indeed throughout the region, does not seem to appreciate what the United States did to save Europe from the Nazis
and from the Soviet Union. What they know is
what Washington is doing in Iraq; what they know is Washington’s unwillingness
to pave the way to visa-free travel; and what they know is the gap between Washington’s
verbal promotion of democracy and the absence of deeds to back it up – that is,
a genuine relationship between ends and means that used to enhance America’s presence,
credibility, and reputation in the region in the 1990s.
The polls attached
to this statement speak for themselves. Particularly striking is the drop in
Polish public approval of US policies – from 62 to 38 percent in one year –
because Poland
used to be the most pro-American country in the world. The predominant attitude now is one of opposition to US leadership
in the world. Contrary to the
received wisdom about “New Europe” being fundamentally different from “Old
Europe,” a more accurate formulation is that the United
States has lost the high moral ground in every European
country – from Great Britain
to Turkey.
All the same, those who fear Vladimir Putin’s Russia most – the three Baltic
states, Poland, and to a lesser extent Romania and the Czech Republic -- continue
to court and count on the United States.
Meanwhile, the
European Union is riding high in Central and Eastern
Europe. For a variety of projects, it is expected to provide Poland some $75
billion in the next seven years. Others may be benefiting less from membership,
but they all have visa-free travel in the EU area, increasingly good access to
institutions of higher learning, and significant employment opportunities. (Presently,
1.5 million Poles work in Ireland,
England,
and elsewhere.) Throughout the region, all can see a national flag and the EU
flag flying high – together! The best news from Central and Eastern Europe now is that integration has begun to work.
Nationalist resistance is much weaker than it was even a year or two ago.
Some of the most vocal Euro skeptics have changed their spots and present
themselves as supporters of their countries’ association with the European
Union. While, after decades of foreign oppression, it is hard to give up even a
modicum of independence to an international body – even when it is done
voluntarily! – the successful integration of the Central European Ten is
underway. Today, the European Union has certainly taken the upper hand in the
competition between the EU and the US.
Compared to the
1990s, Russia
has a presence in the region now and it is not a benevolent one – but its significance
should not be overestimated. Russia
offers energy – oil and especially gas – to the Europeans, and it has made as
many as ten bilateral deals with individual countries rather than just one with
the EU. The reasons for that approach are obvious. Moscow can make more money this way. And it
can try to drive a wedge among European Union members by playing off one
against the other. Gazprom and President Putin work hand in hand to spoil a
common European energy ”plan” -- not common energy “policies” because such do
not yet exist. This is why the Hungarian and Austrian dithering about the EU’s Nabucco
Project – a competitor to Gazprom – was unfortunate but certainly not decisive.
The issue of diversification is on the table, and all European governments would
prefer not to have to rely on Russian energy alone.
Energy
aside, Russia
can offer its vast market for goods from the Central European Ten. How long,
and how much, are important questions. Of all the stock markets in the world, only
one – Russia’s
– came down during the first half of 2007.
This is bad omen for an economy
that has grown but has not been modernized. Could it be that Russia, after impressive growth for
several years that has been based only on the exploitation of vast energy
resources, is facing its own diversification problem? Will it continue to grow even if it proves
unable to develop new industries and new technologies, or if the price of
energy finally comes down? Ultimately an economic dwarf rather than an economic
giant, Russia, in the long
run, has little to offer to Europe, including
the Central and Eastern Europeans.
V.
Thinking of policies that would strengthen America’s position in the region, it should be
emphasized that for many years the United States will not recover the
ground it has lost since the end of the 1990s. The time when American diplomats
could always and easily get what they want is over.
True, the Czech Republic
and Poland,
despite significant and perhaps decisive parliamentary opposition, are apparently
ready to offer hospitality to new American missile sites, which signals at
least residual support for American strategic objectives. Yet as governments
come and go, it is important to look ahead and pay attention to the region’s
publics that have become increasingly critical of US
policies abroad and violations of democratic norms at home, and therefore they
no longer side automatically with the United States. In the longer run, they are unlikely to support governments that
favor protection of the United States
(and, in Washington’s view, of Europe) by an untested American shield against a
potential threat ten years or more from now over Russia’s direct and more
immediate threat to their own security. Indeed, Washington’s
reportedly rather heavy-handed demands for Polish and Czech cooperation may
eventually weaken rather than strengthen America’s position there. Thus, as
these prospective missile sites actually make Poland
and the Czech Republic
more insecure, it would make good sense to delay their deployment, certainly
not in order to appease Moscow
but in order to dampen the fires of political polarization in these allied
countries.
In the
non-military realm, there are a few modest steps Washington could take:
·
With help from Congress, the Department of State
should reinstate some of the relatively inexpensive educational and cultural
programs that until a few years ago used to advance America’s good name in the region.
Relatedly, the State Department should encourage US businesses to offer
seasonal summer jobs to young Central and Eastern Europeans. At various
resorts, such as those at North Carolina’s Outer Banks, many young Poles,
Slovaks, Russians, and others now work for supermarkets, improving their
knowledge of English and gaining
insights into the American way of life – why not extend such programs so that
more such young folks from the region could see the US as it really is? This is
an area where the United
States can compete with members of the
European Union.
·
Congress should urgently extend visa-free travel
to citizens of the Central Eastern European Ten (as it presently does to older
members of the European Union). If this had been done three or four years ago, America’s
image in the region would have been significantly advanced. As it is, with
visa-free travel to the EU countries as well as increasing work and study
opportunities there, the issue of entry to the US has lost some of its initial
import. Still, this would be a desirable and long overdue measure for Congress
to enact.
·
At a time when Washington
has few effective instruments of policy at its disposal to make a difference in
Central and Eastern Europe, it would serve US interests well to send a larger
number of professional diplomats to the region. True, politically
well-connected ambassadors assigned to the capitals of the Central European Ten
can and have made substantial contributions. Being familiar with key players in
Washington is
useful. On the other hand, only minimal understanding of the local political
and economic scene and especially of the region’s turbulent past is a serious
handicap. Meanwhile, rotating well-trained experts of Central and Eastern Europe to faraway lands about which they know
little or nothing, further complicates the increasingly difficult task of competent
representation.
It may be that
Washington’s main problem is not only a shortage of means -- that American
libraries in the region are closed, that the Department of State cannot bring
future leaders to the US, that there are
no funds for making America known and respected. Nor can declining American
influence be blamed only on this Administration’s misplaced priorities and
imprudent foreign policy. The additional problem is the tendency to take this
region for granted – and to look for new “opportunities” on the assumption that
“democracy promotion” will produce results around the globe. This is a mistaken
assumption. Democracy does not fall on fertile soil everywhere. Even in Central and Eastern
Europe it requires careful and generous cultivation.
SELECTED DATA AND POLLS FROM CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE
I. CIA World Factbook, 2007
GDP/Capita (2006
estimates)
|
Slovenia
|
$23,400
|
|
Czech
Republic
|
$21,900
|
|
Estonia
|
$20,300
|
|
Slovakia
|
$18,200
|
|
Hungary
|
$17,600
|
|
Latvia
|
$16,000
|
|
Lithuania
|
$15,300
|
|
Poland
|
$14,300
|
Average (countries, not population): $18,375
|
Bulgaria
|
$10,700
|
|
Romania
|
$9,100
|
European Union (27): $29,900
II. Freedom House, Nations in Transit, 2007
(2006 in parenthesis)
A) “Democracy Score”
(represents an average of seven subcategory ratings for electoral process;
civil society; independent media; national democratic governance; local
democratic governance; judicial framework and independence; and corruption. On
a scale of 1 to 7, 1 represents the highest level of democratic development and
7 the lowest)
|
|
2007
|
2006
|
|
Slovenia
|
1.82
|
(1.75)
|
|
Estonia
|
1.96
|
(1.96)
|
|
Latvia
|
2.07
|
(2.07)
|
|
Slovakia
|
2.14
|
(1.96)
|
|
Hungary
|
2.14
|
(2.00)
|
|
Czech
Republic
|
2.25
|
(2.25)
|
|
Lithuania
|
2.29
|
(2.21)
|
|
Poland
|
2.36
|
(2.14)
|
B) Corruption
|
|
2007
|
2006
|
2005
|
|
Slovenia
|
2.25
|
2.25
|
2.00
|
|
Estonia
|
2.50
|
2.50
|
2.50
|
|
Hungary
|
3.00
|
3.00
|
2.75
|
|
Poland
|
3.00
|
3.25
|
3.00
|
|
Latvia
|
3.00
|
3.25
|
3.50
|
|
Slovakia
|
3.25
|
3.00
|
3.00
|
|
Czech
Republic
|
3.50
|
3.50
|
3.50
|
|
Bulgaria
|
3.75
|
3.75
|
4.00
|
|
Lithuania
|
4.00
|
4.00
|
3.75
|
|
Romania
|
4.00
|
4.25
|
4.25
|
III. Transparency International, 2006 (TI Corruption
Perception Index)
Least corrupt: Finland,
Iceland, New Zealand – CPI Score: 9.6
Most corrupt: Haiti, 1.8
163 countries surveyed
|
20. Belgium,
Chile, USA
|
7.3
|
|
24. Barbados,
Estonia
|
6.7
|
|
28. Malta,
Slovenia, Uruguay
|
6.4
|
|
41. Hungary
|
5.2
|
|
46. Czech Republic,
Kuwait, Lithuania
|
4.8
|
|
49. Latvia,
Slovakia
|
4.7
|
|
57. Bulgaria,
El Salvador
|
4.0
|
|
61. Jamaica,
Poland
|
3.7
|
|
84. Romania,
Algeria, Madagascar, Mauritania,
Sri Lanka
|
3.1
|
IV. Eurobarometer, 2007
A) How would you judge
your country’s economy?
“Very good &
rather good”
|
Denmark
|
99%
|
|
European Union (27)
|
52%
|
|
Estonia
|
81%
|
|
Slovenia
|
72%
|
|
Slovakia
|
55%
|
|
Czech
Republic
|
45%
|
|
Poland
|
45%
|
|
Lithuania
|
33%
|
|
Latvia
|
22%
|
|
Romania
|
18%
|
|
Bulgaria
|
10%
|
|
Hungary
|
9%
|
B) Is membership in
the EU a good thing?
|
The Netherlands
|
77%
|
|
European Union (27)
|
57%
|
|
Poland
|
67%
|
|
Romania
|
67%
|
|
Estonia
|
66%
|
|
Slovakia
|
64%
|
|
Lithuania
|
63%
|
|
Slovenia
|
58%
|
|
Bulgaria
|
56%
|
|
Czech
Republic
|
46%
|
|
Hungary
|
37%
|
|
Latvia
|
37%
|
C) Are you very
optimistic/fairly optimistic about the EU?
|
European Union (27)
|
69%
|
|
Poland
|
82%
|
|
Slovenia
|
80%
|
|
Estonia
|
77%
|
|
Slovakia
|
75%
|
|
Romania
|
75%
|
|
Lithuania
|
74%
|
|
Czech
Republic
|
66%
|
|
Bulgaria
|
66%
|
|
Latvia
|
60%
|
|
Hungary
|
58%
|
D) Comparison of polls
taken within the Central European Ten comparing the opinion on the US
with that on the EU regarding world peace
Adapted from
Eurobarometer September 2005, with polling taking place between May and June
2005
|
|
In your opinion, would you say that the US tends to play a positive role
regarding peace in the world?
|
In your opinion, would you say that the EU tends to play a
positive role regarding peace in the world?
|
|
Bulgaria
|
24%
|
74%
|
|
Czech
Republic
|
43%
|
80%
|
|
Estonia
|
30%
|
76%
|
|
Hungary
|
30%
|
72%
|
|
Latvia
|
30%
|
70%
|
|
Lithuania
|
49%
|
78%
|
|
Poland
|
33%
|
63%
|
|
Romania
|
57%
|
81%
|
|
Slovakia
|
34%
|
79%
|
|
Slovenia
|
18%
|
73%
|
|
Central European Ten (average)
|
35%
|
75%
|
V. German Marshall Fund, Transatlantic Trends,
2006
A) How desirable is it
that the US
exerts strong leadership in world affairs?
“Very desirable &
somewhat desirable”
|
Europe 12
|
35%
|
|
USA
|
84%
|
|
Poland
|
39%
|
|
Slovakia
|
19%
|
|
Bulgaria
|
21%
|
|
Romania
|
46%
|
B) How desirable is it
that the EU exerts strong leadership in world affairs?
“Very desirable &
somewhat desirable”
|
EU 12
|
70%
|
|
USA
|
76%
|
|
Poland
|
70%
|
|
Slovakia
|
50%
|
|
Bulgaria
|
55%
|
|
Romania
|
65%
|
C) Do you approve or
disapprove of the way the President of the US is handling international
politics?
“Approve very much
& approve somewhat”
|
Europe 12
|
18%
|
|
USA
|
40%
|
|
Poland
|
41%*
|
|
Slovakia
|
23%
|
|
Bulgaria
|
20%
|
|
Romania
|
41%
|
*Poland:
Approve very much: 3%; somewhat: 38%
VI. BBC
Poll on US Role in the World, 2006-2007
(selected European countries)
A) “Views of US
influence mainly positive”:
|
France
|
24%
|
|
Germany
|
16%
|
|
Great
Britain
|
33%
|
|
Italy
|
35%
|
|
Portugal
|
38%
|
|
Russia
|
19%
|
|
Turkey
|
7%
|
|
Poland
|
38% (dropped from 62% in one year)
|
|
Hungary
|
29%
|
Average in 18 countries polled:
2005: 40%
2006: 36%
2007: 29%
B) Handling Iraq
by US: “Strongly” or “somewhat approve”:
|
France
|
5%
|
|
Germany
|
11%
|
|
Great
Britain
|
13%
|
|
Italy
|
15%
|
|
Portugal
|
16%
|
|
Russia
|
5%
|
|
Turkey
|
6%
|
|
Poland
|
22%
|
|
Hungary
|
12%
|