Testimony
of Daniel Fried
Assistant
Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs
before
the
House
Foreign Affairs Committee
“The Caucasus: Frozen Conflicts and Closed Borders”
June 18,
2008
Chairman Berman, Ranking
Member Ros-Lehtinen, members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the situation in the South Caucasus region of Europe.
Let me begin with a
characterization of the overall historical context. In 1989, a wave of democracy began sweeping
eastward from its origins in Central Europe. Starting that year, the peoples of Central
and Eastern Europe threw off the failed
systems of the past and invested their hopes and energies in a future of
democratic, free market societies well-integrated with the transatlantic community. The results were so astonishing and
successful that it is hard today to recall the divided Europe
of less than a generation past. Europe in its narrower definition, with the partial
exception of the Balkans, is now united and integrated through either
membership or close association with the European Union or NATO, or both. The question remains, however, about the
reach of this wave of freedom and democracy.
Will it, and can it, extend to the easternmost reaches of Wider Europe?
The issue of whether the
region between the Black Sea and the Caspian, the south Caucasus, can in fact
join Europe and its institutions is being
contested as we speak.
The policy of the United States
in this region is unambiguous: we want to help the nations of this region
travel along the same path toward freedom, democracy and market-based economies
that so many of their neighbors to the West have traveled. We believe that the ultimate place of these
nations – which are, after all, a part of Wider Europe – ought to depend on
their own choice and their own success, or lack of success, in meeting the
standards of democracy, the rule of law, and responsible foreign and regional
policies that the transatlantic community has established. We do not believe that any outside power –
neither Russia nor any other – should have a sphere of influence over these
countries; no outside power should be able to threaten, pressure, or block the
sovereign choice of these nations to join with the institutions of Europe and
the transatlantic family if they so choose and we so choose.
Georgia has made a choice to join NATO. The United
States and the nations of NATO welcome this choice, and Georgia’s
neighbors should respect it. Azerbaijan
has chosen to develop its relations with NATO at a slower pace, and we respect
its choice. Armenia’s
situation is different, due to its history and currently complicated relations
with Azerbaijan and Turkey,
and we respect its choice as well.
To be sure, these nations and
Russia need to have good neighborly relations, based on a regard for one
another’s interests and just basic geographic proximity, but also based on
respect for the sovereignty of the nations of the South Caucasus, and, in
particular, their right to find their own way in the world. The United
States does not see itself in some 19th
century contest with Russia
for “influence,” much less a sphere of influence in this region or any
region. This is not zero-sum. All countries – the countries of the South
Caucasus, Russia, and the transatlantic community – would benefit from a set of
benign relations among all the players, great and small, in the South Caucasus. To
be blunt: the United States
does not seek to exclude Russia
from this region. That would be neither
wise nor possible.
In looking at the region as a whole, our strategic
interests are focused on several issues: the advance of freedom and democracy;
security, including counterterrorism and peaceful resolution of separatist
conflicts; and energy. Our first
strategic interest I have already described—the spread of freedom and democracy
beyond the Black Sea and toward the Caspian. Each of the Caucasus
countries has made important strides in this area, but each has further to go
before we can say it has irrevocably chosen this path.
On the second interest, we
are working with each of these governments to find peaceful ways of dealing
with the separatist conflicts of Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia
that stem from the breakup of the Soviet Union. We are also cooperating with each government
in the global fight against terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, including nuclear and biological.
On the third issue, we believe it is in the interests
of the Euro-Atlantic community that Caspian gas and oil resources reach
European and global markets expeditiously, free from monopolistic pressures and
geographic chokepoints.
Georgia, Azerbaijan
and Armenia
are ancient nations, but they are still new as nation states. They are navigating a double transition: they
must throw off the failed communist institutions of the past and build new ones
to replace them, including in many cases entirely new systems – such as modern
banking and financial systems to support their newly free economies – where
none existed before. The legacy of
Soviet communist institutions and poor governance is a burden; as are the
historical issues of ethnic strife that were exacerbated by the Soviet
experience. On top of this, these
countries are building new identities as modern, sovereign nation-states.
Despite sharing some common
challenges, each of these three countries has taken its own path in addressing
these challenges, and the picture on the ground in each country is mixed.
I would like to discuss these
three states in turn, both the challenges they face, and our efforts to support
them.
AZERBAIJAN
We have welcomed our progress
with Azerbaijan
in recent years on issues of security cooperation and diversification of energy
supplies and pipelines, and have good, productive relations with Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev.
We value Azerbaijan’s troop contributions – 150 soldiers in Iraq
and 45 in Afghanistan;
President Aliyev’s recent promise to double the troop level in Afghanistan would put Azerbaijan’s troop strength up
around 90. Azerbaijan also contributed to
NATO’s peacekeeping force in Kosovo, with a platoon embedded with a Turkish
unit, up until Kosovo declared its independence. We appreciate Azerbaijan’s
steady offer of unlimited, free overflight and landing rights for our supply
network for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi
Freedom. This cooperation has proceeded
in parallel with advances in Azerbaijan’s
relations with NATO. Azerbaijan has now adopted its second Individual
Partnership Action Plan, demonstrating to NATO and the United States its commitment to
reforming its armed services and cooperation with the transatlantic alliance. Azerbaijan
has also taken decisive steps to combat terrorism by rounding up terrorist
networks in Azerbaijan.
In the area of energy, Azerbaijan is emerging as one of Europe’s critical, near-term alternative sources of
natural gas. Azerbaijani gas can open
the way for a new network of pipelines that will help the market, rather than a
monopoly, determine the price and availability of a critical commodity. As Azerbaijan
has developed a strong role as an energy source, it is also maintaining
constructive relations with Russia
and its neighbors on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, and with Georgia.
Azerbaijan has had the world’s fastest growing economy for three
consecutive years. This growth is being
driven by energy resources, which present both a tremendous opportunity but
also a challenge for the government. The
government deserves credit for stabilizing the economy after the breakup of the
Soviet Union.
Its challenge now is to manage the enormous influx of energy wealth
without distorting or corrupting the economy and political system.
The government has stated its
intention to avoid what some call “the energy trap” and its State Oil Fund has
helped it tackle the macroeconomic challenge of managing windfall energy
revenues. The Azerbaijani government has
taken the first steps to improve the business environment by implementing a
“one-stop shop” for registration of new businesses. But the business and investment climate in Azerbaijan
continues to be difficult, and much still remains to be done to attract foreign
investment outside of the energy sector.
We have urged the government to do more to limit and reverse widespread
corruption.
Progress in both economic and
political reform will be necessary to advance our shared objectives. Democracy has been part of Azerbaijan’s tradition. In its brief period of independence after the
Russian Revolution, Azerbaijan
established a democratic constitution, and Azerbaijan has an opportunity to
build on that proud tradition as its next Presidential election approaches this
October.
Yet the United States has been concerned for some time
about a relative lag in democratic reforms in Azerbaijan, including respect for
fundamental freedoms. We remain
particularly concerned about the state of media freedoms there. Although five journalists were released by
presidential pardon in December 2007, which we welcomed, three still remain in
prison. The jailed include editors of
the leading independent and opposition newspapers. In addition, the government has failed to
seriously investigate numerous cases of violence against journalists. Perhaps as a result, much of the domestic
electronic media exercises self-censorship by failing, for example, to cover
the activities of opposition parties. We
are working with Azerbaijan
to improve journalists’ professional and ethical standards. During my last visit to Baku, I met with young journalism students
studying in an independent institution.
I was impressed by their patriotism and simultaneous commitment to
democracy. The government should nurture
and support independent journalists and, as it does, it will have our support.
We are also troubled by
continuing restrictions on freedom of assembly.
Civil society and opposition groups are often relegated to holding
public rallies and demonstrations in remote locations often inaccessible by public
transport. We note that Parliament
recently passed a new law on public assembly with some welcome features. Implementation of the law will be key.
We hope that Azerbaijan
will use the presidential election in October – not only election day and the
vote count but also, importantly, the conduct of the campaign – to demonstrate
substantial democratic progress. One
important factor in measuring the conduct of ‘free and transparent’ elections
is domestic elections monitoring, and unfortunately, Azerbaijani courts
recently deregistered and annulled Azerbaijan’s largest independent
domestic election-monitoring NGO. The United States
would like to see this NGO’s registration restored. While it is important that Azerbaijan permit a
full and unfettered election observation by the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights, in fulfillment of its OSCE commitments, the determination by the OSCE
and other international observation missions on the conduct of the elections
could be hindered by the lack of a domestic election monitoring effort.
One of Azerbaijan’s greatest challenges is
to find a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The United States, in its role as
co-Chair of the Minsk Group alongside our French and Russian colleagues,
continues to actively pursue a diplomatic resolution of this problem. While we support Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity,
Nagorno-Karabakh’s final status must be determined through negotiations and a
spirit of compromise that respects international legal and political
principles. An important step forward
was taken by President Aliyev and Armenian President Sargsian when they met for
the first time in St. Petersburg
on June 6 to discuss the resolution of the conflict, after which they met with
the Minsk Group Co-Chairs. Both sides
reaffirmed their commitment to working within the Minsk process and expressed their readiness
to continue discussions on the “Basic Principles,” a document developed under
the auspices of the Minsk Group that lays out the basic framework for a
lasting, peaceful settlement.
As Azerbaijan’s income from its rich
oil and gas resources rises dramatically, we continue to urge its leadership to
use these revenues wisely for both current and future generations. We hope that the Azerbaijani government will
avoid the temptation of thinking that renewed fighting is a viable option. In our view, it is not. We have noted our concern with persistent
bellicose rhetoric by some Azerbaijani officials. We have urged the government of Azerbaijan to focus on the peaceful resolution
of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and its resultant benefits for regional
integration, which will lead to greater prosperity and stability for the entire
Caucasus region.
In sum, Azerbaijan has the opportunity to
accelerate its economic and political development, to build on its successes in
establishing good relations in its region, and to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh
dispute.
ARMENIA
Armenia can be a great success story, but its recent history
has been one of difficulties. The
Armenian people have demonstrated extraordinary resilience through their long
history of hardship and tragedy.
Achieving independence from the Soviet Union
in 1991, the new republic was also rising from the ruins of a catastrophic
earthquake in 1988. That event mobilized
aid from around the world, including the first U.S.
humanitarian mission in the Soviet Union, and
a wave of support from Armenian Diaspora groups.
This effort to rebuild was
strained by the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, which led to an energy embargo and
closed borders with both Azerbaijan
and Turkey,
exacerbating the post-independence political and economic stresses.
Despite those hardships,
however, the last decade has witnessed an economic turnaround in Armenia,
with double-digit GDP growth year upon year coupled with, until recently, low
inflation. The Diaspora community around
the world continues to extend its hand to Armenia, in both humanitarian and
philanthropic giving and direct investment.
Through their advocacy and indications of a will to reform, Armenia
in 2006 entered into a Millennium Challenge Corporation compact worth $236
million. I also can’t let this
opportunity pass without thanking Armenia
for a recent doubling of its troop level in Kosovo to 70 and the continuation
of the Armenian troop presence in Iraq, which numbers 44.
Yet Armenia faces serious challenges
today: geographic isolation, widespread corruption, and recent setbacks to its
democratic development. Supporting Armenia’s regional integration is a particular
priority for the United
States.
One major step toward
regional integration would be a peaceful, just, and lasting settlement of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. During the
past two years, the parties have moved closer than ever to a framework
agreement based on a set of Basic Principles developed through intensive
negotiations under the auspices of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs.
Achieving normal relations
between Armenia and Turkey
is another principle concern. As a key
part of that effort, the United
States supports the opening of the
Turkish-Armenian border. The status quo
is not helpful to anyone. Fortunately,
some progress has been achieved in recent years: there are regular charter
flights between Yerevan and Istanbul
and other flights to Antalya; bus connections
via Georgia are numerous;
and trade with Turkey
through Georgia
is common. Both countries would greatly
benefit from increased, direct trade with the other, connecting their
electrical grids, and implementing other measures natural to neighbors. The U.S.
also supports more cross-border dialogue and cooperation between the people of Armenia and Turkey through research
initiatives, conferences, and exchange programs. An example of this cross-border exchange, supported by U.S.
assistance funds, was the performance of the Armenian Komitas Quartet in Istanbul last week, and the scheduled performance of the Turkish
Bosphorus Quartet in Yerevan
today.
Reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey, however, will require
dealing with sensitive, painful issues. Turkey needs to come to terms with a dark
chapter in its history: the mass killings and forced exile of up to 1.5 million
Armenians at the end of the Ottoman Empire. That will not be easy, just as it has not
been easy for the United
States to come to terms with dark periods of
our own past. For its part, Armenia must be ready to acknowledge the
existing border and disavow any claim on the territory of modern Turkey, and respond constructively to any
efforts Turkey
may make.
In the short term, however, Armenia’s
greatest challenge is to strengthen its democratic institutions and processes,
including respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and regain
democratic momentum lost after the significantly flawed presidential election
in February and its violent aftermath.
There had been some positive signs before the election, such as the
invitation of a robust election observation mission from OSCE’s Office of Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), and certain electoral reforms. But our concerns grew during the lead-up to
the vote, when international observers noted a biased media environment, with
the state media vilifying former President Ter-Petrossian and other key
opposition candidates. Media outlets
such as Radio Liberty that provided balanced coverage to opposition candidates
faced intimidation and harassment, which continues to this day. The pro-opposition TV station, Gala TV,
continues to be investigated, ostensibly for tax reasons, in what is widely
seen as a government move to silence coverage viewed as unfavorable to the
ruling party.
The election itself was
marred by credible claims of ballot stuffing, vote buying, intimidation and
even beatings of poll workers and proxies, and other irregularities. Recounts were requested, but ODIHR observers
noted “shortcomings in the recount process, including discrepancies and
mistakes, some of which raise questions over the impartiality of the [electoral
commissions] concerned.” OSCE observers
were also harassed in the period following the election.
When peaceful mass protests
followed the disputed vote, the United States
and others pressed continuously for the government of Armenia to refrain from responding
with force. However, on March 1, within
hours of formal assurances by the Armenian government that they would avoid a
confrontation, police entered the square.
Ensuing clashes later in the day between demonstrators and security
personnel led to at least 10 deaths and hundreds of injuries. Mr. Ter-Petrossian was taken to his residence
by security forces, where he appeared to remain under de facto house arrest for
weeks. A State of Emergency (SOE) was
declared in Yerevan. Freedom of assembly and basic media freedoms
were revoked. Opposition newspapers were
forced to stop publishing and news websites were blocked, including Radio
Liberty. The government then filled the
information void with articles and broadcasts disseminating the government
version of events and attacking the opposition.
While it was alleged that some protesters were armed before the March 1
crackdown, there have been no convictions to date on such charges.
Mass arrests of opposition
activists, especially demonstration organizers, soon followed. Since then,
numerous activists have been imprisoned on questionable charges. Some have fled the country while others
remain in hiding. Of the cases that have
come to court, several defendants have been given harsh sentences for seemingly
small offenses.
I contacted now-President
Sargsian on March 1 and shortly afterwards asked my colleague, Deputy Assistant
Secretary Matthew Bryza, to go to Yerevan,
where he met with all sides, including then-President Kocharian,
President-elect Sargsian and Mr. Ter-Petrossian. Since then, we have sought to foster dialogue
between the parties with the aim of restoring full freedom of speech and
assembly and securing the opposition’s pledge that protests will be peaceful. We have criticized the government’s crackdown
and have called for the immediate release of all those who have been detained
for political reasons. The CEO of the
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), Ambassador Danilovich, sent a public
letter on March 11 to President Kocharian warning that the election and
post-election events threatened Armenia’s
eligibility for MCC funding absent a demonstrated commitment to democratic
practices.
The Armenian government
allowed the State of Emergency
to expire after 20 days, which allowed re-establishment of most print and
on-line media freedoms, though coverage of the political opposition is still limited
on television, where almost all stations are loyal to the government. In addition, many of the SOE restrictions
were hastily written into law before the SOE expired, giving the government
vast latitude to prohibit and prevent demonstrations and rallies. Furthermore, Armenia’s tax authorities have
begun intimidating investigations of four opposition newspapers. While the military presence on the street has
ended, the police presence remains palpable, particularly in Freedom Square, where access is still
being denied to opposition activists who participated in post-election protests
there. Reports of intimidation and
arrests of opposition activists continue.
The United States has called for an
independent investigation into the events of March 1 and 2, and
prosecution of anyone who used violence on either side. We seek full restoration of all basic
freedoms in both law and practice. We
seek a national dialogue among the government, opposition, and civil society
leaders to chart new electoral reforms and perhaps conclude a “contract for
democracy” that will ensure freedom of assembly in exchange for a pledge to
protest lawfully and peacefully. We want
to see the release of all those who have been arrested for political
reasons. And we seek timely, substantive
and dramatic steps by the government of Armenia to restore the democratic
momentum.
Our efforts to assist Armenia during this crisis have been hampered by
the fact that we have not had an ambassador in Yerevan for nearly two years. The position was due to be filled in 2006,
but the nomination got caught up in the controversy here at home over what
words should be used to describe the atrocities that the Ottoman Empire
committed against Armenians in the early years of the 20th century.
Whatever language we choose
to describe this horrific period, the United
States can best help Armenia
– and Armenian-American relations – by having an experienced U.S. ambassador at the helm in Yerevan.
The setbacks in Armenia’s
democratic development deeply concern us as long-time friends and partners of
the Armenian people, and we need all of our resources to conduct a full
dialogue with Armenian officials at the highest levels of government. Armenia’s leaders are at a
crossroads in their path toward democracy and they have much work to do. We are committed to working with Armenia
as it takes these steps, as we hope it will.
GEORGIA
Before the 2003 Rose
Revolution, Georgia
was often described as a country near collapse – a “failed state.” Since the Rose Revolution, however, Georgia
has enjoyed rapid growth and a marked decline in corruption. The World Bank named Georgia “the world’s
leading economic reformer” in its 2007 “Doing Business” report, and Georgia
is now rated by the World Bank as the 18th easiest country in the world in
which to do business, placing it ahead of many EU member states. The Georgian government has initiated
judicial reform, established fair standards of entrance into universities, and
made exemplary progress in combating trafficking in persons.
Georgia’s challenge at home is to build strong democratic
institutions and processes to match its commitment to economic and commercial reform. Notwithstanding progress on democratization
since the Rose Revolution, Georgia
has work to do, and the
events this past fall marked a setback for democracy in Georgia. Large segments of the Georgian public
expressed serious dissatisfaction during protest rallies in September, October,
and November. This dissatisfaction
stemmed from a combination of continuing poverty and unemployment, a sense the
Georgian government had grown disconnected from certain segments of society,
and anger over a political system that seemed to be structured to prevent the
development of a vibrant opposition.
On November 7, Georgia’s
Ministry of Internal Affairs forcibly dispersed protestors camped out in the
vicinity of Parliament and later that day the government imposed a State of Emergency. In several confrontations that day police
clashed with protestors elsewhere in Tbilisi.
The U.S. government condemned the
imposition of a state of emergency, the closure of the independent Imedi
television station, and what appeared to be the use of excessive force by the
Georgian government against protestors.
President Saakashvili addressed the crisis by taking an unusual step,
calling for a snap presidential election on January 5 that shortened his term
by a year. The conduct of the presidential
election, in which incumbent President Saakashvili narrowly won a first-round
victory, was regarded by OSCE and other observers as an improvement over
previous elections, but flawed, and thus did not fully restore Georgia’s
democratic reputation. Georgian leaders
and citizens will long argue over whether irregularities skewed the outcome of
the election. Our assessment, after
careful consideration by our Embassy, was that – absent evidence to the
contrary – Mikheil Saakashvili had been legitimately re-elected, but that
election irregularities had to be remedied prior to spring parliamentary
elections if Georgia
were to restore the faith of its voters and the international community in the
country’s democratic trajectory.
While we have not
yet seen the OSCE’s final report on the May 21 parliamentary elections, our
assessment at this point is that they were a marked improvement over the
January balloting. According to the preliminary assessment of
international observers, including the OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Parliamentary Assemblies of the OSCE and NATO
and the European Parliament, the election in Georgia offered the people an
opportunity to choose their representatives from a wide array of choices. Georgian officials made efforts to conduct
elections according to OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and standards for
democratic elections.
Despite the improvements,
international and domestic monitors identified a number of problems during the
campaign and balloting. For example,
before the elections there were allegations of voter intimidation and a lack of
balance in the media, and questions about fair adjudication of complaints. We have urged the Georgian authorities to
investigate all allegations of irregularities and to work with all sides to
address the challenges and shortcomings identified by international and
domestic observers. There are charges of
violence against opposition members which we have encouraged the government to
investigate expeditiously and to make the results of that investigation public.
The United
Opposition has claimed that the elections were outright stolen. While we find this argument unconvincing, the
Georgian body politic remains deeply polarized.
As a result, Georgian democracy continues to lack a necessary element –
a credible and viable opposition – and the United National Movement and the
United Opposition share the blame for this shortcoming. Without
a viable opposition, an empowered, independent parliament and strong, credible
judiciary, and a reform process that respects dissenting voices, democracy will
not be consolidated.
To sum up: Georgia’s young
democracy has made progress, but Georgia needs to make more progress if it is to live up to the
high standards that it has set for itself.
The United States
will help as it can to support democratic reform, urging the Georgian
authorities to take seriously their ambition to reach European standards of
democracy.
While Georgia’s domestic political development has
proceeded, Georgia’s
ability to find regional and international security is at risk. Georgia has expressed its desire to
join NATO, part of its overall effort to join the European and transatlantic
family. As it has done so, Georgia has been subjected to unremitting and
dangerous pressure from Russia,
including over the separatist regions of Abkhazia and, to a lesser degree, South Ossetia. Georgian
political mistakes in the early 1990s led to conflicts in these regions, and
the separatists, with Russian military support, won. The Abkhaz, who comprised only 17 percent of
that region’s inhabitants before the war, drove out virtually all the ethnic
Georgians, about 250,000 people, or nearly half of the pre-war population. The legacy of these wars has been a displaced persons problem
that has placed heavy economic, social and political burdens on Georgia, and the unresolved nature of these
conflicts is a major inhibitor of stability and security in Georgia.
Moscow has in recent years put economic and political
pressure on Georgia:
closing their common border; suspending air and ground transport links; and
imposing embargoes against exports of Georgian wine, mineral water, and
agricultural goods. This year, despite
recently lifting some of the economic and transport embargoes, Moscow has
intensified political pressure by taking a number of concrete steps toward a de
facto official relationship with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where Russian
peacekeeping forces have been deployed since the early 1990s – up to 3,000 in
Abkhazia, and 500 Russians plus 500 North Ossetians in South Ossetia. In March, Russia
announced its unilateral withdrawal from Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) sanctions on Abkhazia, which would allow Russia potentially to provide
direct military assistance (though the Russian government has offered
assurances that it will continue to adhere to military sanctions). On April 16, then-President Putin issued
instructions calling for closer ties between Russian ministries and their Abkhaz
and South Ossetian counterparts. Russian
investors are known to be buying property in Abkhazia in disregard of Georgian
law. Some of these properties may have
belonged to displaced persons, making their eventual return even more
difficult. Russian banks maintain
correspondent relationships with unlicensed and virtually unregulated Abkhaz
banks, an open invitation to money launderers.
Besides political pressure, Russia
has also increased military pressure. Russian
officials and military personnel have been seconded to serve in the separatist
governments and armed forces. Two
Russian officers were killed last September leading a unit of Abkhaz troops in
a firefight with a Georgian unit.
Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia are specifically mandated to facilitate
the return of refugees, but there has been no net return of Georgians to
Abkhazia in over a decade.
On April 20, a Russian
fighter shot down a Georgian unmanned aerial vehicle over Georgian airspace in
Abkhazia; a UN investigation confirmed that a Russian fighter was
responsible. Russia also has increased its
military posture in Abkhazia without consultation with the Government of
Georgia. In April, without consulting Georgia, Russia
sent highly-trained airborne combat troops with howitzers to Abkhazia as part
of its peacekeeping force, and in May Russia
dispatched construction troops to Abkhazia to repair a railroad link to Russia.
We are very concerned about
these actions, which challenge Georgia’s
territorial integrity and have increased tensions in the separatist regions. They risk igniting a wider conflict and call
into question Russia’s role
as a peacekeeper and facilitator of negotiations between Georgia and Abkhazia and South
Ossetia respectively.
The United States has called on Moscow to reverse its unconstructive actions
and actively facilitate with us and others a diplomatic process to resolve
these conflicts. We could start from the
peace plan proposed by President Saakashvili and that Prime Minister Putin has
publicly supported. Georgia, for its part, must
continue to resist the temptation of a military reaction or unwise political
demands, even in the face of repeated provocations. President Saakashvili has wisely offered to
negotiate with the Abkhaz leadership wide autonomy for Abkhazia, an offer that
has support in many European capitals and from the United States. Europe and the United States are working together
to support a peaceful approach to the Abkhaz problem. We continue to steadfastly support Georgia’s
territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. We want to work with Russia in this effort, and Russia, if it chooses, could play a
constructive role in a settlement that took account of both the parties’ interests.
The increase of Russian
pressure against Georgia
comes in the context of Georgia’s
transatlantic aspirations, particularly its attempt to secure a Membership
Action Plan (MAP) from NATO. The United States and most NATO members strongly
supported a MAP for both Georgia
and Ukraine at the April
NATO Summit in Bucharest
– and I wish to note appreciation for bipartisan support for this effort from
many Members of Congress. Although there
was no consensus at Bucharest for a MAP
invitation, NATO’s leaders stated flatly in the final communiqué from the
summit that Georgia and Ukraine
will become members. NATO foreign
ministers will review Georgia’s
and Ukraine’s
MAP applications at their December meeting, and they are empowered to take this
decision at that time.
Having accepted the principle
of membership for Georgia
and Ukraine, the United States
believes that NATO should proceed at its next Ministerial meeting next December
to offer them MAP. MAP is not NATO
membership. But it is a way to help aspiring
countries meet NATO’s requirements. Georgia
has work to do before it is ready for NATO membership. But Georgia has distinguished itself
both by the thoroughness of its military reforms and the deployability of its
troops as well as by the progress that I noted earlier. Today, Georgia
is the third-largest troop contributor in Iraq,
with over 2,000 soldiers on the ground in Baghdad
and Wasit Province. Georgia
has agreed to extend its deployment and will continue to stand with Coalition
Forces in Iraq. The Alliance
should base its MAP decision on these objective factors – holding Georgia to high standards, and not allowing Russia to exercise a veto over an Alliance decision.
CONCLUSION
The countries that I have
described are diverse both in their histories and in the challenges that they
face today. America’s policy toward them has
been steady, steadfast and supportive. The
United States has
consistently sought to advance the frontiers of freedom in Europe. This has been a bipartisan policy of the last
three presidents. We will continue this
policy by working together with Russia
and the nations of Europe toward the goal of
peaceful resolution of regional conflicts and creating an environment that will
allow the countries I have described to join the Euro-Atlantic community if
they wish to do so, and if they meet NATO and European Union requirements.
We support an open world,
without monopolies, spheres of influence, or great power domination, in all
aspects of development, from the energy and economic sectors to political life.
With a set of consistent polices
designed to support that end, we will pass on to the next administration a
solid platform on which to build in this region in the future.
At the beginning, I described
how a wave of freedom and democracy swept eastward after the fall of the Berlin
Wall. We believe that wave is still on
the move, and it will continue to advance as long as we promote the cause of
freedom, democracy, and prosperity.
Thank you. I look forward to responding to your
questions.