Testimony of Daniel Fried
Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Eurasian Affairs
March 12, 2008
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
“The Balkans after the Independence of Kosovo and on the Eve of NATO
Enlargement”
Acting Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen,
Members of the Committee, thank you for giving me this opportunity to discuss
the current status of the political situation in the Balkans. Before I
proceed, I would like once again to share our sense of loss at the passing of
Chairman Lantos. His was a moral voice
that will be deeply missed. We look
forward to working with the new Chairman.
Geography
places the Balkans at an edge of Europe;
history puts it front and center. The 20th
century began with the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and ended with the
dissolution of Yugoslavia. The two very bloody conflicts that sandwiched
the last century were fueled by the same scourge: violent ethnic nationalism. It should not surprise that the noun
associated with the region is “Balkanization”.
The term was coined in 1919 and Merriam-Webster defines it as “to break
up into smaller and often hostile units.”
Given
this history, our efforts in the Balkans are based on one overarching
objective: the integration of the region into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Over the decades, those institutions helped
historical enemies in Europe to overcome their
enmity and to shore up democracy where its foundations needed
strengthening. After 1989, we saw the
former communist states of Central Europe accelerate
political and economic transformation as they entered NATO and the EU. Bulgaria
and Romania
succeeded under this model. The rest of
the Balkans can follow.
For
the past 15 years, three U.S.
administrations have sought to stabilize the region and facilitate its
post-communist transition, investing significant diplomatic capital and
assistance funds. Three American
Presidents — Presidents George W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George H.W.
Bush—articulated and advanced the strategic objective of helping Europe become
whole, free, and at peace.
Today
as we take stock, we can see that several countries have turned a corner. Much work remains, but realism about
challenges ahead should not obscure the prospects for success. I will start this overview with:
·
Kosovo, Europe’s newest democracy.
·
Then, I will
address Serbia, whose path
to Europe must be nurtured, even more so in
the wake of Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
·
Following that, I
will discuss Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which is in need of reform.
·
Finally, I will
discuss the so-called Adriatic three—Albania,
Croatia and Macedonia and another newly independent state - Montenegro.
Kosovo’s
declaration of independence was the last chapter in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Whether Yugoslavia had its merits as one
way to deal with that region’s ethnic mix is a matter for historians. Slobodan Milosevic’s ravages ended this
multi-national effort.
The
break up of Yugoslavia
was nonconsensual and exceedingly violent.
In 1989, Milosevic stripped Kosovo of the autonomy it had enjoyed within
Yugoslavia. This act of nationalist chauvinism sowed the
seeds of the entire Balkans conflict. Wars
throughout the region followed. An
apartheid-like system of ethnic rule in Kosovo and Milosevic’s policy of ethnic
cleansing of Kosovar Albanians necessitated NATO intervention in Kosovo in
1999.
The
United Nations, whose Security Council had issued seven
resolutions on Kosovo, administered Kosovo since the end of the conflict acting
under Resolution 1244. That same resolution
authorized a NATO-led peacekeeping force to provide for a safe and secure
environment. These could only be temporary
arrangements.
International
negotiations on Kosovo’s status lasted two years. Both the efforts of UN Special Envoy Martti
Ahtisaari and the EU-US-Russia Troika did not bring Belgrade and Pristina closer together. But President Ahtisaari nevertheless provided
a blueprint for Kosovo’s future: a
comprehensive plan to ensure protection of minorities and to foster Kosovo’s
democratic development.
The
people of Kosovo understandably refused to endure perpetual uncertainty about
their status. On February 17, agreeing
with the Troika that there was no prospect of an agreement with Serbia, they brought closure to the issue by declaring Kosovo to
be an independent and sovereign state. In
its declaration, the Kosovo Assembly committed to implementing the Ahtisaari
Plan and invited the international community to supervise its
implementation. In response, the United States
and key European partners recognized Kosovo’s independence, in line with the
recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.
We
must deal with short-term challenges of security and longer-term challenges of
Kosovo’s development. These are
serious. Many things can go wrong and
some things probably will. But leaving Kosovo
in limbo under UN administration could not continue indefinitely. Instead, we have witnessed the birth of the
world’s newest democracy.
Since independence, the
Kosovars have moved swiftly to implement obligations under the Ahtisaari Plan
to respect and above all protect minorities, especially the Serbs. The Government of Kosovo not only includes
Serb ministers, but also has taken steps to reach out to local Serbs and assure
them they are welcome in a multi-ethnic Kosovo.
It is significant that Serbs have not left Kosovo to become refugees in Serbia. While these are still early days, that is a
good beginning.
The international community
now has a responsibility to assist Kosovo develop.
With its explicit consent,
Kosovo will be “supervised” for a period by an International Civilian Office
(ICO). This office will be European-led,
but with strong U.S.
participation. In late February, a newly
formed International Steering Group for Kosovo appointed former Dutch diplomat Pieter Feith
to be the International Civilian Representative for Kosovo to head the
ICO. In this capacity, Mr. Feith will
possess certain executive powers to ensure the Ahtisaari Plan is fully
implemented.
The ICO deputy is a senior U.S.
Foreign Service Officer, and the Administration also will second a number of
other State Department staff and contractors to the operation. The United States will cover 25 percent
of ICO operating costs, with the remainder coming from contributions from the European
Commission, and other states.
The EU will deploy a rule
of law mission, called “EULEX”, to Kosovo, with around 1,900 international
staff and around 1,100 local staff. Its
mission will include support and training for the Kosovo police and judicial
system. The United States has made a commitment
in principle to participate in this key European Security and Defense Policy
mission with approximately 80 police, 2 judges and 4-6 prosecutors. The EU will bear the brunt of the 190 million
euro annual operating cost of the mission.
NATO,
through KFOR, has continued to provide security on the ground. It remains authorized to operate in Kosovo under
UNSCR 1244. We expect that NATO will
also play a key role in the establishment of a new Kosovo Security Force and a
civilian agency to oversee it. Kosovo is
eager to contribute to NATO, the organization that intervened to save the
people of Kosovo during their darkest hour.
These
three institutions: the ICO, EULEX, and
KFOR will help put Kosovo on the right trajectory – toward Europe
and away from the Balkan cycle of dictatorship, nationalism, and war.
Kosovo
may not be a strong country now, but with our assistance, and the support of
the World Bank and IMF, Kosovo will be viable.
It has large lignite coal reserves; it has hydro-power potential. It has a young, motivated population,
yearning to join the European family. We
need, however, to focus international resources on realizing the economic
potential of Kosovo’s industrious people.
To
do this, the United States
will participate in a major donors’ conference this summer. Although Europe will contribute the majority
of assistance to Kosovo, the United
States and other international partners will
play a role to lift Kosovo out of the economic stagnation of the last
decades.
We
anticipate that the EU and its member states will provide roughly 50 percent of
the significant assistance that Kosovo will need in its first few years.
Kosovo
has been making good progress in the month since independence. A total of 32 countries have recognized or
declared their intent to recognize soon, including most of the EU member states. More will follow in due course.
Serbia
I
will now turn my attention to Serbia,
which has opposed Kosovo’s independence.
I need not tell you that emotions have run high over this issue in Serbia. We understand Serbia’s opposition to Kosovo’s
independence, and for that reason have reached out to Serbian leaders during
what has been a painful period for them.
This
makes the mob attack on our embassy and other embassies in Belgrade all the more disgraceful. I have spoken on other occasions about this
violation of the Vienna Convention and will not dwell on it here, except to stress
to the Committee that we hold Serbian authorities accountable for the safety of
our diplomats and facilities.
We
cannot overlook acts of violence, such as attacks on our Embassy in Belgrade, but barring such lapses in civilized behavior,
our diplomatic efforts must now be focused on bringing Serbia back to the trans-Atlantic
family of nations. Serbia is an important country in
that region and an ally in two world wars that has much to contribute.
The
choice must be for the people of Serbia to make, of course. Serbia
could have a great future as part of an undivided Europe, which has made clear
that it will welcome Serbia. But Serbia’s leaders must resist the
lure of nationalist demagoguery and forthrightly face their country’s war
legacy.
Serbia’s own people deserve
better, and many are demanding better. Much
has been heard of the strong Serb feelings about Kosovo. And it is true that you will probably find
very few people in Serbia
who wanted to see Kosovo declare independence.
It is also true, however, that polls show that more than 70 percent of
Serbians want integration with the EU and cite unemployment as a greater
concern than the fate of Kosovo. Keeping Kosovo’s
status an open question would have continued to distract Serbia’s
leaders from addressing the concerns of their citizens.
Serbia has a legitimate interest in the welfare of the Serbs
in Kosovo. The Ahtisaari negotiations
and other efforts have given Belgrade
every opportunity to shape arrangements for their protection and support. But to exercise its influence effectively, it
must put aside policies of disruption and destruction, and partner with the
international community and the Kosovo authorities as a good neighbor.
Serbia can, if it makes wise choices, hasten the day when Kosovo
and Serbia
find themselves together within the EU.
The EU has been the institution through which seemingly intractable
national conflicts in Europe have been resolved, and it can be so for Serbia.
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Serbia’s attitude will also have an impact on its western
neighbor, Bosnia-Herzegovina. There cannot
be long-term stability in the Balkans without progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The reform process there lost momentum
following the failure of constitutional reform in April 2006, and in place of
forward momentum, we have witnessed an increase in divisive nationalist
rhetoric. Politicians need again to exhibit
political courage to compromise on key reforms needed to modernize the
country’s governing structures and prepare it for further Euro-Atlantic
integration. They cannot afford to be lured
by nationalist demagoguery, but this temptation exists among all ethnic groups.
Without
a resumption of progress, Bosnia
and Herzegovina will regress along
nationalist lines.
Some
leaders of the Bosnian entity bordering Serbia, known as Republika Srpska (or
RS), have claimed parallels between Kosovo and their own future, playing with
the fire of secession. They need to stop
rhetoric that can take on a dangerous life of its own, and instead promote the
functioning of the Bosnian state government.
In short, they must not undermine the Dayton constitution that is in fact the
foundation of the existence of the RS.
By
the same token, Bosniak nationalist calls for the abolition of the RS are also
unacceptable and have contributed to political radicalization. Reforms may upgrade but cannot supplant Dayton, which stopped the fighting, established Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
internal structures, reconfirmed its territorial integrity, and garnered the
support of members from all three constituent peoples.
Given
our concern over the stalled reform agenda in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the United States supported the Peace
Implementation Council’s February 27 decision to continue the Office of the High
Representative and focus on completing key objectives to ensure BiH’s self-sustaining
stability. These objectives, once met,
will provide greater confidence that Bosnia is on an irreversible path
toward Euro-Atlantic institutions.
The
next few months will be critical for Bosnia and Herzegovina. If BiH’s leaders can enact legislation to
reform the country’s police structure, it will open the door to a closer
relationship with the EU. Brussels has indicated a willingness to sign a Stabilization
and Association Agreement soon should Bosnia
and Herzegovina
meet this requirement, a process we firmly support.
Adriatic Charter
Encouragingly,
the three members of the Adriatic Charter – Albania,
Croatia, and Macedonia
– are on a positive trajectory. They show
that political reform, inter-ethnic reconciliation, and economic development
are achievable in the Balkans. All are
now net contributors to international security.
All three have succeeded in creating workable democratic institutions
and free market economies. All three are
with us in Afghanistan. The United States
wants to see the A3 join NATO as soon as they demonstrate they meet NATO
performance-based standards, and the Alliance is
now considering that question for the Bucharest
summit. Experience shows that progress,
reforms, and constructive regional and international behavior will only grow
stronger once inside the Alliance.
Albania has made steady progress on corruption, with arrests
of even high-level government officials, substantial progress on judicial
reform, and progress on laws to increase transparency and efficiency within the
court system. Albania has strengthened its
multi-party parliamentary democratic system and has focused on building
consensus for further reforms. Albania’s
Constitution provides for pluralism and religious coexistence, and the Albanian
government upholds these rights in practice.
Increased tax revenue and central government staffing cuts from Albanian
reform efforts have enabled the Albanian government to double its education and
health budgets and boost infrastructure investment.
Albania has a full company of troops in Mosul, Iraq,
now on its 10th consecutive rotation – committed to staying until the end of
the mission. Albania
increased its Afghanistan
commitments last fall by a full company, up from a platoon.
Croatians have built a
functioning democracy through a stable, multi-party democratic political
system. For example, ethnic Serbs and
Croats now work together in the new government, demonstrating that such
inter-ethnic cooperation is indeed possible elsewhere in the Balkans, including
in Kosovo. The Croatian Serb party is
supporting the center-right Croatian Democratic Party (HDZ) party, and one of
its members is a deputy Prime Minister, something unthinkable five years
ago.
Croatia is a valuable partner of U.S.
and NATO Allies in the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Croatia bears all of its costs for
participation in operation and has no caveats attached to its forces. Croatia plans to increase its
participation in ISAF in 2008.
Croatia is working to close remaining war-legacy issues,
primarily concerning returning refugees.
It has reported meeting its 2007 benchmarks on providing housing units
to returning refugees. Satisfactory
resolution of this and related issues are explicitly included among the EU’s
criteria for Croatia’s
eventual accession to the Union. Judicial reform and attacking corruption remain another challenge, but the
Croatian government is making progress. On
property restitution issues, the government has promised to, but not yet
amended, legislation to put non-citizens on an even footing with
Croatians. The government must consider
and plan for how many claims there may be against Croatia, how it would pay for these
claims without threatening public finances, and how it will adopt procedures
for implementing the amended law.
The commitment of
successive Macedonian governments to uphold enhanced minority rights under the
2001 Ohrid Accord has brought the country forward. These efforts have broadened domestic
political consensus and strengthened ethnic minority participation in
decision-making. Macedonia’s progress on economic
reform and fighting corruption were praised by the World Bank and Transparency International.
Macedonia has expanded steadily its contributions to
international coalition operations and has able troops fighting alongside ours
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Public and government support for NATO and
these deployments has been very high and steady. Eleven Macedonian soldiers died recently in a
helicopter crash returning from peace keeping operation duty in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Although Macedonia’s practical, business, and
people-to-people ties with Greece
are good, differences over Macedonia’s
name pose a serious problem. The
Administration has repeatedly emphasized its support for the ongoing
UN-facilitated talks on the name issue.
It has pressed both parties to work with UN negotiator Matt Nimetz to
use the time remaining before Bucharest to come to a solution – and not
to allow this issue to prevent Macedonia from being invited to join NATO if
allies so decide.
Montenegro is now approaching the second anniversary of its
independence, its divorce from Serbia
having been negotiated under international auspices and based on a free and
fair referendum. Its new constitution
was adopted in Parliament last October with widespread support. While Montenegro too has internal ethnic
differences, its leaders and people have addressed them through legal and
peaceful means, allowing reform and economic growth to accelerate. Significantly, the Montenegrins are not
dwelling on the past but making up for lost time, including making the most of
their membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace and the Stabilization and
Association Agreement signed with the EU last summer.
Institutions
Increasingly, the countries
of Southeast Europe are working together to overcome common problems and
finding they need less assistance from the United States and the EU. The Central European Free Trade Agreement
created a small common market and aided economic growth in the 1990s for
countries that have since joined the EU.
The effort to expand this arrangement to the Western Balkans culminated
when Serbia
ratified it in September 2007. The
Stability Pact for Southeast Europe was
another initiative of the 1990s that sought to help integrate and stabilize the
region through practical cooperation in fields like customs, investment, and
law enforcement. While that organization
was largely a U.S.
and West European initiative, it has just passed the baton to a new Regional
Cooperation Council. This new body is
based in Sarajevo, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, while the predecessor was in Brussels. The new Secretary General is a Croat, while his
predecessor was an Austrian. These
developments are real evidence of the deepening stability and maturity of
societies in Southeast Europe. They show that the glass is way more than
half full and filling.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman and members of
the Committee, I’ve given you today an overview of the policies of this
Administration toward the Balkans. It is
a key region for us and for our European allies. We have made progress helping this region
move from war to peace, from disintegration to sustainable development, and from
a European to a Euro-Atlantic future. We
have much work to do, though we have already achieved much.
Thank
you for giving me the opportunity to come and share our thoughts with you. I will be happy to answer your questions.