OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BILL DELAHUNT
The Subcommittee will come to
order. This is the third in a series of
hearings on the Declaration of Principles signed by President Bush and Iraqi
Prime Minister Maliki on November 26 of last year. This Declaration appears to be a pledge by
the two leaders to negotiate a number of substantial commitments.
Most significantly -- the
Declaration suggests an indefinite
-- Supporting the
-- Providing security assurances and commitments to
the
-- …supporting the Republic of Iraq in its efforts to
combat all terrorist groups, at the forefront of which is Al-Qaeda, Saddamists,
and all other outlaw groups regardless of affiliation, and destroy their
logistical networks and their sources of finance, and defeat and uproot them
from Iraq.
I would note that the Declaration
of Principles is not just about military commitments. But it also includes a political and economic
agenda that involves serious and possibly open-ended obligations.
For the third time in three
months, we have invited the Administration to explain the import of this
document to the Congress and to the American people. And for the third time, they have declined
the invitation.
I would note for the record:
On January 29, Chairman
Lantos sent an invitation to Secretary of State Rice, asking her or someone she
designated to testify at this hearing.
The State Department responded that no representative would appear, on
the grounds that the agreement to be negotiated was still in “preliminary form.” This contradicts a January 25
It is my position that the
American people have a right to be fully and directly informed as to the
intentions of this Administration regarding any agreement with the government
of
Almost 4,000 of their sons
and daughters have died in that conflict.
And tens of thousands have been seriously injured.
Possibly hundreds of
thousands of innocent Iraqi civilians have been killed. And millions have been forced to flee their
homes and are now refugees in neighboring countries.
Furthermore -- the financial
cost of this war is well on its way to a trillion dollars -- with no end in
sight.
The record of this
Administration in terms of consulting with Congress has been abysmal.
Senator Chuck Hagel, our
Republican colleague in the other body, has said that during the run-up to the
invasion of
I find it particularly
disturbing that the Bush Administration has even ignored State Department
regulations requiring that:
The appropriate congressional leaders and committees
are advised of the intention to negotiate significant new international
agreements, consulted concerning such agreements, and kept informed of
developments affecting them…
I have checked with the House
leadership. And I have checked with the
leadership of this Committee. As well as
that of the House Armed Services Committee.
And there has been no such consultation, unless you count the classified
briefing that occurred yesterday.
There has been one exception
to this lack of transparency. And that
also occurred this week. Secretary Gates
appeared before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees on Wednesday and
seemed to minimize the Declaration of Principles as nothing more than a press
release. He testified that the
Administration is not seeking to make -- and in fact he pledged that it would
not make -- any security commitments to defend
On its face, this would
appear to be a major reversal of the Administration’s position. It is all the more important now to remove
any confusion and explore the apparent contradictions between the Declaration
of Principles signed by President Bush and the testimony of Secretary Gates. We will reissue our invitations to the
Administration once more in an effort to achieve definite clarity for the
American people.
Our witnesses today will
address at least four main questions:
Question 1. What is a Status
of Forces agreement, and can it provide the authority for
Question 2. If, as the
Declaration of Principles implies, the agreement were to include a commitment to
defend the Maliki Government against internal and external enemies, could it be
carried out by the Administration alone, or would Congress have to approve it
as a treaty or a congressional-executive agreement? Constitutional scholars Oona Hathaway, a professor
at the
Question 3. What consultation
is required with the Congress, by law and by State Department regulations, on
both the form of the agreement and the issues to be negotiated, and has such
consultation occurred? Professor Glennon
and former State Department Legal Adviser Michael Matheson, who is now a
professor at the
And finally, Question 4. What
procedures must be followed within the Executive branch as it makes decisions
on what form the agreement should take and on how the negotiations are to be
organized, and have they been properly taken to date? Professor Matheson will walk us through those
procedures. I note that he can also
guide us through the implications of terminating the UN Mandate and perhaps
other UN resolutions regarding
We are also pleased to have
the benefit today of testimony on any and all of these questions from our
witness who has been suggested by the Republican side, Professor Ruth Wedgewood
of Johns Hopkins University, who has also served in a number of administration
legal positions.
Before we hear from our
witnesses, let me turn to my friend and Ranking Member Mr. Rohrabacher of