Statement by
Professor John Bailey
Georgetown University
Center for Latin American
Studies
Before House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere
Hearing on “U.S. Security Assistance to Mexico”
October 25, 2007
A key requisite for economic growth
and democratic governability is a minimum acceptable level of public security.
For a variety of reasons Mexico
is currently facing a critical challenge of insecurity. The recent announcement
of a U.S.-Mexico bilateral strategy to combat organized crime is a welcome
step. I want to comment here on four points: 1. why the timing is important; 2.
the nature of the public security problem in Mexico; 3. the basic compatibility
in the security agendas of the two countries and thus the mutual benefit of the
initiative; and, 4. the differences between this initiative and Plan Colombia
and the lessons that might be learned from the latter. My conclusion emphasizes
the importance of transparency in the formulation and implementation of the
anti-organized crime initiative.
1. The bilateral initiative to combat organized crime comes
at a critical time. The initiative is actually overdue, because problems of
organized crime have been allowed to worsen from a difficult law enforcement
issue to become a threat to Mexico´s democratic governability as well as to U.S. security.
The timing of the initiative is critical for at least three reasons. First,
from a low point in the mid-1980s the degree of bilateral cooperation in law
enforcement has improved substantially. A remarkable frankness has evolved in
the bilateral dialog, and the cooperation at the policy-making levels has
continued to improve. The two countries
can work effectively together at the policy-making level, although much remains
to be done at the street level. Second, there is political will on both sides
to confront the challenge. President Felipe Calderon has put public security
and the fight against organized crime at the top of his policy agenda. For that
very reason, the perception of his relative success will figure importantly in
the effectiveness of the remaining five years of his presidency (2006-2012).
President Bush and the border state governors and Congressional delegations are
also focused on the issue. Third, like a tipping point, a substantial bilateral
initiative can have an important psychological effect in supporting the efforts
throughout the Mexican government and civil society to improve the
police-justice administration system and to send signals to the Mexican society
that both governments are strongly committed to working toward improving public
security.
2. What is the nature
of the public security problem? I would emphasize two dimensions: first, the
evolution in the power and behavior of organized criminal groups; and, second,
the widespread sense in Mexican society that the government is not adequately
protecting the citizenry. It is
important to recognize that the security problem in Mexico is not one of generalized
criminal violence. In fact, to take one indicator, the overall homicide rate in
Mexico
has dropped substantially over the past twelve years, from something just under
20 per 100,000 in 1993 to under 10 per 100,000 in 2005. The problem tends to be
concentrated in a few states, where there are well armed, organized, and
violent criminal groups that have become increasingly confrontational with
respect to local, state, and federal government. For example, the Mexico City
daily newspaper El Universal (online, October 11, 2007) reports 2,113 violent
murders attributed to organized crime groups from January 1 to October 11 of
2007, 306 more than over the same period in 2006. Nearly half of these crimes
were committed in just 5 of the 32 states.
There have
long been violent criminal groups operating in various regions of Mexico
and in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. What has impressed me is the recent
evolution of the behavior of some of these groups, especially in the border
region. The level of violence has increased dramatically, which is reflected in
the homicide statistics of states such as Baja California Norte, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Nuevo
Leon, and Durango. Additionally, the groups have
become more political in the sense of targeting high-level police officials,
and elected and appointed officials. Criminal groups openly defy the police and
army in public statements. Murders have been carried out in ways to magnify
their shock effect on the public. There is basis, I believe, to hypothesize
that some criminal groups may have been involved in terrorist acts, such as the
recent bombing of oil pipelines. All of this is to suggest that the situation
is critical and that there were substantial reasons for President Calderon´s
decision at the beginning of 2007 to send federal army troops and police to
various cities and states.
The threats
to the United States
appear in a variety of forms. A number of U.S. citizens have been murdered or
kidnapped. By way of anecdote, residents in Tijuana
told me in January of this year that kidnappers from Baja
California had begun crossing into San Diego County
to seize Mexican citizens who had moved their families to escape insecurity.
Even more serious, the abilities of organized crime groups to smuggle varieties
of goods into the U.S., to counterfeit documents and launder money, and to
corrupt U.S. law enforcement and military personnel underlines the
vulnerability of border security.
The other
main dimension of the security problem is the sense that the Mexican
police-justice system is not protecting the citizenry effectively. There is a
widespread perception, reflected in public opinion polls (for example,
Transparencia Mexicana), that the police and justice system have worse problems
of corruption and inefficiency than other public agencies. Press accounts
frequently report the arrests of police officers for involvement varieties of
forms of organized crime. One important implication is a widespread sense of
fear and distrust which regularly shows up in public opinion polls. The fear
and distrust are reinforced by mass media portrayals of criminal violence, to
the point where citizens become alarmed but cannot get a clear sense of “real” trends
in criminal violence and government response.
3. How will a bilateral initiative to combat organized crime
fit into the public security strategies of the two countries? I believe the
public security agendas of the two countries are compatible in important
respects: organized crime tops Mexico´s agenda and terrorism is the top U.S. concern. A
number of tools and techniques are useful for both purposes, and close
cooperation between the two countries is mutually beneficial. The initiative
will need to address a number of issues.
First, both
countries are large, complicated federal systems that struggle to find adequate
mechanisms to facilitate intergovernmental and inter-agency coordination. My
sense is that some good progress has been made to improve coordination but that
much remains to be done.
Second,
Mexican police-justice systems have not performed effectively and much of the
burden of the fight against organized crime has fallen to the Mexican Army.
This presents several policy dilemmas. The police and army are trained in
different ways to carry out different missions, and the army is not well suited
for law enforcement missions that require transparency, close cooperation with
civil society, and protection of civil rights. But my view of reality is that
the army has much better organization and operational capacity than the police.
The army ranks near the top in Mexican public opinion, while the police and
justice agencies rank near the bottom. An effective reform of the police and
justice systems will require several years, possibly several decades. For
short-term, effective results against well organized and equipped criminal
groups, the army (and navy) will necessarily play key roles. At the same time,
my sense is that the army is over burdened. The challenge is to find ways to
reinforce the army´s anti-organized crime operations, while—at the same
time—reinforcing reforms of the police and justice systems so that they can
take on more of the burden in the medium term.
Another policy dilemma is that the
Mexican army is a particularly nationalistic institution in a nationalistic
society that is open to practical bilateral steps to improve security but is
also distrustful of U.S.
actions and intentions. The U.S. Congress and administration have appropriately
required effective oversight of police and military assistance programs to
guard against corruption and inefficiency and to protect human rights. Some
mutually acceptable formula is needed to achieve Congressional goals without
unduly intruding into Mexico´s law enforcement and intelligence operations.
4. Plan Colombia
is different from the proposed U.S.-Mexico bilateral initiative in important
respects, but there are some lessons to be noted. Plan Colombia emphasized crop eradication and
aggressive interdiction, which involved considerable U.S.
military presence in Colombia
as well as other countries. My understanding is that the U.S.-Mexico initiative
involves no U.S. military
presence in Mexico.
That noted, one lesson I take from
Plan Colombia is that U.S.
involvement did contribute to the professionalization of Colombian police and
justice systems. At the same time, Colombians have commented on problems of U.S. priorities
occasionally overriding Colombian interests. I suspect this will be a more
pressing issue in a U.S.-Mexico initiative.
Another lesson might be that, in
the best of all worlds the U.S.-Mexico strategy ought to fit into well-conceived
national and regional security strategies. I will be surprised if such
strategies are articulated in the initiative. But my sense is that Plan
Colombia was introduced in a context also lacking a broader strategy. It took
on more of a coherent democratic security strategy several years later, under
President Uribe, when the largely military and police elements were
complemented by more attention to political and welfare priorities.
This points to yet another lesson.
Police-military-justice coercive approaches to problems of organized crime are
essential short-term steps to stabilize a dangerous situation. But the police
and military are not the long-term answer. Over the longer term the entire
criminal justice policy arena requires substantial reform, from crime
prevention to investigation, sanction, justice administration, prison
management, and social rehabilitation. Positive steps in these various areas
can create conditions that promote sustainable economic growth, which is a potent
crime prevention measure.
Conclusions
The joint anti-organized crime
initiative is a timely and significant step to address serious problems of
public security that threaten both Mexico
and the U.S.
The important next step is that the initiative is carefully studied and fully
debated in the U.S.
and Mexican legislatures and in the public arena. A requisite for the success
of the initiative is broad political support, even if unanimity cannot be
reached. Closed negotiations may be necessary to negotiate a proposal. But transparency,
both in the coming public debates and in the implementation of the programs, will
be critical to create the public support necessary for success.